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Západ a ti druzí: Globalizace a teroristická hrozba
Zatímco islámská civilizace je drásána konflikty, západní civilizace má vnitřní tendenci k rovnováze. Svobody, které občané Západu pokládají za samozřejmost, jsou v islámských zemích veskrze neslýchané, a zatímco žádní západní občané ze Západu neutíkají, 70 procent světových utečenců jsou muslimové prchající z míst, kde je oficiální doktrínou jejich náboženství. Všichni tito utečenci navíc míří na Západ, protože neznají jiné místo, které by jim dalo příležitosti, svobody a osobní bezpečí, které beznadějně hledali doma. Zarážející však je, že jakmile přijdou na Západ, mnozí z těchto muslimských běženců začnou pociťovat ke společnosti, která je obklopuje, nenávist; chtějí se jí pomstít za nějakou chybu, která je tak odporná, že za přiměřený trest nepovažují nic menšího než její naprosté zničení. Ještě podivnější je skutečnost, že ti muslimové, kteří se usadili, integrovali a osvojili si určitý druh loajality k západním institucím a zvykům, často vychovávají děti, které se navzdory tomu, že se narodily na Západě, samy identifikují s jeho opozicí – s opozicí tak nelítostnou, že opět hraničí s touhou po zničení. Bylo by však chybou svalovat vinu pouze na islám. Kniha známého britského filosofa Rogera Scrutona, inspirovaná událostmi 11. září 2001, je nejen břitkou intelektuální obranou západní civilizace, ale i kritickým zkoumáním toho, zda mohou západní státy ve své nynější podobě nabídnout islámským přistěhovalcům tolik potřebný pocit sounáležitosti, aby mohli získat loajalitu k hostitelské zemi.
172 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2002
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About the author
Roger Scruton
140 books1,352 followersSir Roger Scruton was a writer and philosopher who has published more than forty books in philosophy, aesthetics and politics. He was a fellow of the British Academy and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature. He taught in both England and America and was a Visiting Professor at Department of Philosophy and Fellow of Blackfriars Hall, Oxford, he was also a Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington D.C.
In 2015 he published two books, The Disappeared and later in the autumn, Fools Frauds and Firebrands. Fools Frauds and Firebrands is an update of Thinkers of the New Left published, to widespread outrage, in 1986. It includes new chapters covering Lacan, Deleuze and Badiou and some timely thoughts about the historians and social thinkers who led British intellectuals up the garden path during the last decades, including Eric Hobsbawm and Ralph Miliband.
In 2016 he again published two books, Confessions of A Heretic (a collection of essays) and The Ring of Truth, about Wagner’s Ring cycle, which was widely and favourably reviewed. In 2017 he published On Human Nature (Princeton University Press), which was again widely reviewed, and contains a distillation of his philosophy. He also published a response to Brexit, Where We Are (Bloomsbury).
In 2015 he published two books, The Disappeared and later in the autumn, Fools Frauds and Firebrands. Fools Frauds and Firebrands is an update of Thinkers of the New Left published, to widespread outrage, in 1986. It includes new chapters covering Lacan, Deleuze and Badiou and some timely thoughts about the historians and social thinkers who led British intellectuals up the garden path during the last decades, including Eric Hobsbawm and Ralph Miliband.
In 2016 he again published two books, Confessions of A Heretic (a collection of essays) and The Ring of Truth, about Wagner’s Ring cycle, which was widely and favourably reviewed. In 2017 he published On Human Nature (Princeton University Press), which was again widely reviewed, and contains a distillation of his philosophy. He also published a response to Brexit, Where We Are (Bloomsbury).
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January 28, 2019
This book was written shortly after Nine-Eleven and it definitely bears the traces of it. The title "The West and the Rest" expresses the overall tenor of this work, but Scruton mainly focuses on Islam, and therefore the title in the Dutch translation that I read (The West and the Islam) covers the load of this book much better. This is the first book I read from Scruton. Of course, I already knew him indirectly through what I had read about him in newspapers and seen or heard in the audio-visual media. His straightforwardly conservative view of the world is resumed in a nutshell in this book, but he specifically focuses on the danger that lies in the Islamic point of view.
Scruton is a clever and erudite man, that is clear. His analysis of what the West stands for cannot simply be swept aside. In the first chapters he gauges the uniqueness of the Western institutions, in a very condensed style that is sometimes difficult to read. Essential to him are the concepts of 'territorial jurisdiction' (that is the sovereignty of the nation state, limited to a specific geographical area) on the one hand, and the 'loyalty of the citizen' of that nation state on the other, by Scruton also called 'membership', the feeling to belong to that particular nation state. Demarcated jurisdiction and loyalty are two interrelated aspects of the same phenomenon in the Western nation state, and they are the fruit of the Enlightenment.
This is an interesting view, because it rightly states that the specificity of the West is not limited to something as instrumental as elections, but rather that cultural-institutional aspects are decisive. The problem is that Scruton boldly states that these phenomena simply do not exist outside the West (roughly Europe and North America). On the contrary, regimes on other continents, even if they are sovereign and even though they have a certain democratic appearance, are usually the mere instrument of potentates and have no legal personality with which their inhabitants identify themselves. Even if that is true for a lot of states, with this polarizing thesis Scruton just sweeps Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and especially Asia in one heap, and that is at least questionable (besides, also the predicate 'the West' as a generalization does not live up to reality).
As said before, Scruton mainly focuses on Islam: not five pages pass or the attitude or view of Islam is contrasted with the Western 'values', and in an extensive third chapter he explicitly zooms in on the danger of Islam as a whole. Again, Scruton obviously touches ground, and he exposes issues that cannot simply be ignored; in traditional Islam there are certainly elements that differ from the Western way of feeling and doing and that is at least a more or less neutral conclusion. But here too the problem is that Scruton generalises everything into the absolute and ignores the enormous diversity in thinking and doing in the Muslim communities; it is typical that he limits the Islamic world to the Middle East and to the radical cores in the West, that he leaves Asia completely out of the picture and limits his analysis of Islam to what the basic texts and traditions say.
Scruton links that threat of Islam (in general) with the loss of the core values of Western society itself. Under the title "denial" he argues how Western society undermines itself and contributes to its own destruction. It’s the ultra-conservative in him that surfaces here. Scruton states that relativism in the West has taken over in the form of politically correct thinking, multiculturalism (of which he gives a very narrow and very coloured definition), radical feminism, deconstructive philosophy, modernist architecture and the "sex and drug lifestyle of the modern teenager" (sic). Scruton dissolves all his devils here and his most poisonous arrows he focuses on global institutions such as the UN and the EU that systematically undermine the principle of territorial jurisdiction of Western nation states.
Again: his criticism to a certain extant can be justified, but at the same time his extreme conservatism makes him an implicit ally of other radicalisms, such as extremist Islamism, that fight against Western civilization. For example, there’s his praise for the Islamic madrassas (the schools where Islamic education is given, now often seen as hotbeds of radicalization) because they provide much better moral education than Western schools; and members of Al Quaeda, through their Western technical and scientific education, have also seen how empty that civilization has become, which is what Scruton himself endorses!
In general, I tend to react to people who are fanatical or extremely polemicizing at first by looking carefully at what they say and weighing whether there is some ground in their views or not. But at the same time, I also have the reflex to ask myself the question of what is going on in the personal lives of these people, in their deepest psychology that makes them so extremist. While reading this book, especially the second half of it, I also had this reaction. Of course, I don’t know Scruton as a person and I absolutely want to respect him, but the question is really relevant. This thinker offers interesting opinions that are to be valued, but his thinking is clearly 'contaminated' by experiences that have clouded his reasonable insight and sent him on the extreme way. You can of course say: sometimes it is necessary that the hard contours of the truth are said, and I can get that, but in this case there is clearly more going on. And it’s a pity that in my view this undermines the great intellectual that Scruton certainly is.
Scruton is a clever and erudite man, that is clear. His analysis of what the West stands for cannot simply be swept aside. In the first chapters he gauges the uniqueness of the Western institutions, in a very condensed style that is sometimes difficult to read. Essential to him are the concepts of 'territorial jurisdiction' (that is the sovereignty of the nation state, limited to a specific geographical area) on the one hand, and the 'loyalty of the citizen' of that nation state on the other, by Scruton also called 'membership', the feeling to belong to that particular nation state. Demarcated jurisdiction and loyalty are two interrelated aspects of the same phenomenon in the Western nation state, and they are the fruit of the Enlightenment.
This is an interesting view, because it rightly states that the specificity of the West is not limited to something as instrumental as elections, but rather that cultural-institutional aspects are decisive. The problem is that Scruton boldly states that these phenomena simply do not exist outside the West (roughly Europe and North America). On the contrary, regimes on other continents, even if they are sovereign and even though they have a certain democratic appearance, are usually the mere instrument of potentates and have no legal personality with which their inhabitants identify themselves. Even if that is true for a lot of states, with this polarizing thesis Scruton just sweeps Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and especially Asia in one heap, and that is at least questionable (besides, also the predicate 'the West' as a generalization does not live up to reality).
As said before, Scruton mainly focuses on Islam: not five pages pass or the attitude or view of Islam is contrasted with the Western 'values', and in an extensive third chapter he explicitly zooms in on the danger of Islam as a whole. Again, Scruton obviously touches ground, and he exposes issues that cannot simply be ignored; in traditional Islam there are certainly elements that differ from the Western way of feeling and doing and that is at least a more or less neutral conclusion. But here too the problem is that Scruton generalises everything into the absolute and ignores the enormous diversity in thinking and doing in the Muslim communities; it is typical that he limits the Islamic world to the Middle East and to the radical cores in the West, that he leaves Asia completely out of the picture and limits his analysis of Islam to what the basic texts and traditions say.
Scruton links that threat of Islam (in general) with the loss of the core values of Western society itself. Under the title "denial" he argues how Western society undermines itself and contributes to its own destruction. It’s the ultra-conservative in him that surfaces here. Scruton states that relativism in the West has taken over in the form of politically correct thinking, multiculturalism (of which he gives a very narrow and very coloured definition), radical feminism, deconstructive philosophy, modernist architecture and the "sex and drug lifestyle of the modern teenager" (sic). Scruton dissolves all his devils here and his most poisonous arrows he focuses on global institutions such as the UN and the EU that systematically undermine the principle of territorial jurisdiction of Western nation states.
Again: his criticism to a certain extant can be justified, but at the same time his extreme conservatism makes him an implicit ally of other radicalisms, such as extremist Islamism, that fight against Western civilization. For example, there’s his praise for the Islamic madrassas (the schools where Islamic education is given, now often seen as hotbeds of radicalization) because they provide much better moral education than Western schools; and members of Al Quaeda, through their Western technical and scientific education, have also seen how empty that civilization has become, which is what Scruton himself endorses!
In general, I tend to react to people who are fanatical or extremely polemicizing at first by looking carefully at what they say and weighing whether there is some ground in their views or not. But at the same time, I also have the reflex to ask myself the question of what is going on in the personal lives of these people, in their deepest psychology that makes them so extremist. While reading this book, especially the second half of it, I also had this reaction. Of course, I don’t know Scruton as a person and I absolutely want to respect him, but the question is really relevant. This thinker offers interesting opinions that are to be valued, but his thinking is clearly 'contaminated' by experiences that have clouded his reasonable insight and sent him on the extreme way. You can of course say: sometimes it is necessary that the hard contours of the truth are said, and I can get that, but in this case there is clearly more going on. And it’s a pity that in my view this undermines the great intellectual that Scruton certainly is.
October 1, 2018
Attuale seppur edito in origine più di una decade fa, è un solido compendio che rapporta l'evoluzione della società occidentale a quella islamica, dalle loro origini sino ai giorni nostri. Sono evidenziate le differenze principali su temi quali diritto, cittadinanza e sistemi di valori, analizzando poi le immancabili e dolorose collisioni (l'undici settembre è di sicuro la più ricordata) e infine proponendo alcune soluzioni radicali e che, seppur non "politicamente corrette", sono tutt'altro che populiste o fondate su stereotipi, specie quelle che riguardano identità e globalizzazione.
April 9, 2020
Scruton, z toho, čo som počul, je veľkým priekopníkom odkazu Západnej civilizácie a zároveň ten, kto upozorňuje na jej úpadok. Táto kniha vyšla v čase po teroristických útokoch 9/11 a okrem toho, že porovnáva Západ s ostatkom sveta (čo je v tomto prípade hlavne moslimský svet), nevyhla sa poukázaniu na úpadok Západu. Sám si uvedomujem tento fenomén, no vždy keď na mňa odniekiaľ vyskočí, tak sa ironicky sám seba pýtam, že z akej výšky to musí ten Západ padať, lebo už padá veľmi dlho. Každopádne Scruton z úpadku Západu spravil jeden zo svojich argumentov, prečo západný svet v nasledujúcich rokoch bude čeliť väčšej hrozbe terorizmu, pričom ohrozená je hlavne Európa. V tomto smere sa ukázal jeho argument prorockým, i keď by bolo určite veľkým zjednodušením nechať to len v tejto rovine. Lebo úpadkom Západnej civilizácie sa dá argumentovať v podstate všetko, ale niečo na tom bude.
Každopádne, táto útla knižka je rozdelená na štyri časti. Prvá sa venuje Spoločenskej zmluve a hovorí o tom, že Západ na takejto zmluve stojí, pričom ide o hlavne o to, že svoju legitimitu stavia na slobode voľby a rozhodnutia sa - teda, že ľudia sa dohodnú na zákonodarstve. Toto moslimský svet podľa Scrutona nepozná a všetko stavia na podriadení sa Alahovi. Západ pozná kresťanské "dať cisárovi čo je cisárovo a Bohu, čo je Božie." Ostatok sveta túto zásadu nepozná. Spoločenská zmluva pritom vytvára lokálne zákonodarstvo, ktoré zväzuje národ či občanov a vytvára tak "membership". V moslimskom svete, nazvime to spolupatričnosť, viaže jedine k Alahovi.
Druhá časť, nazvaná Osvietenstvo, občianstvo a lojalita, bola pre mňa trošku ťažšia na pochopenie, ale v podstate len rozširovala podstatu spoločenskej zmluvy a hovorí o vzniku národnej identity a lojalite k národu v Západnom svete, ktorá vznikla odstránením náboženstva z verejného života. V tejto kapitole formuluje svoj argument, ktorý hovorí, že úpadok západnej civilizácie, odpor voči všetkému národnému či západnému spôsobil oslabenie a môže viesť k deštrukcii všetkého to, čo sa budovalo.
V kapitole Svätý zákon Scruton načrtol krátke a stručné dejiny islamského extrémizmu (dúfam, že ma nikto neukameňuje za toto slovné spojenie, myslím tým extrémizmus, ktorý čerpá z Islamu, nie je však súčasťou náboženstva ako takého). Popisuje Wahhábizmus, Moslimské bratstvo až ku Al-Káide, pričom hovorí o probléme, ktorý vzniká z toho, že teroristi neprináležia k žiadnemu štátu (z toho aj názov "základňa", sú všade aj nikde).
Na záver nakladá globalizácii, ktorá to všetko len urýchlila a vytvorila predstavu, že nadnárodné korporácie a inštitúcie chcú útočiť a suverenitu menších štátov a národov, čo je úrodná pôda pre terorizmus, ktorý zneužíva výhody, ktoré globalizácia ponúka.
Určite stojí za prečítanie. Mňa síce až tak nenadchla, ale je to hlavne tým, že celou knihou sa ťahá skepsa a pesimizmus. Chýba tam nádej, o ktorej hovoril napríklad Christopher Dawson, ktorý taktiež hovoril o úpadku Západnej civilizácie.
Každopádne, táto útla knižka je rozdelená na štyri časti. Prvá sa venuje Spoločenskej zmluve a hovorí o tom, že Západ na takejto zmluve stojí, pričom ide o hlavne o to, že svoju legitimitu stavia na slobode voľby a rozhodnutia sa - teda, že ľudia sa dohodnú na zákonodarstve. Toto moslimský svet podľa Scrutona nepozná a všetko stavia na podriadení sa Alahovi. Západ pozná kresťanské "dať cisárovi čo je cisárovo a Bohu, čo je Božie." Ostatok sveta túto zásadu nepozná. Spoločenská zmluva pritom vytvára lokálne zákonodarstvo, ktoré zväzuje národ či občanov a vytvára tak "membership". V moslimskom svete, nazvime to spolupatričnosť, viaže jedine k Alahovi.
Druhá časť, nazvaná Osvietenstvo, občianstvo a lojalita, bola pre mňa trošku ťažšia na pochopenie, ale v podstate len rozširovala podstatu spoločenskej zmluvy a hovorí o vzniku národnej identity a lojalite k národu v Západnom svete, ktorá vznikla odstránením náboženstva z verejného života. V tejto kapitole formuluje svoj argument, ktorý hovorí, že úpadok západnej civilizácie, odpor voči všetkému národnému či západnému spôsobil oslabenie a môže viesť k deštrukcii všetkého to, čo sa budovalo.
V kapitole Svätý zákon Scruton načrtol krátke a stručné dejiny islamského extrémizmu (dúfam, že ma nikto neukameňuje za toto slovné spojenie, myslím tým extrémizmus, ktorý čerpá z Islamu, nie je však súčasťou náboženstva ako takého). Popisuje Wahhábizmus, Moslimské bratstvo až ku Al-Káide, pričom hovorí o probléme, ktorý vzniká z toho, že teroristi neprináležia k žiadnemu štátu (z toho aj názov "základňa", sú všade aj nikde).
Na záver nakladá globalizácii, ktorá to všetko len urýchlila a vytvorila predstavu, že nadnárodné korporácie a inštitúcie chcú útočiť a suverenitu menších štátov a národov, čo je úrodná pôda pre terorizmus, ktorý zneužíva výhody, ktoré globalizácia ponúka.
Určite stojí za prečítanie. Mňa síce až tak nenadchla, ale je to hlavne tým, že celou knihou sa ťahá skepsa a pesimizmus. Chýba tam nádej, o ktorej hovoril napríklad Christopher Dawson, ktorý taktiež hovoril o úpadku Západnej civilizácie.
January 19, 2023
To really understand why the terrorists in the Middle East conflicts with the West is not an easy task. One has to reflect on what makes the Western civilization so hate-inducing to these people, and when we reflect that, then it comes to no suprise that the West has it better. But how can it come to this?
Roger Scruton believes that the West has two fundamental concepts pertinent for the foundation of their states, territorial jurisdiction and national loyalty. As Scruton argues, to really bind a society a state needs a territory, a law and a loyalty.
The Arab states on the other hand have no foundations of the same value as these (Arab nationalism failed, as an example Scruton offers). Because they are not attached to their territory and their nationalism had failed, there is one loyalty that they share, and that is the religion of Islam.
Just by bringing to light this difference, we can see how the West sees itself and the Arabs see themselves. That's why in the West their nation-states are successful and why the Middle East filled with failed states. Terrorism, as Scruton argues, is the uninteded by-product of this very envy of nation-states, so a certain group needs to rid off it.
That, I think, is the reason terrorism have existed: their unconscious desire to destroy what they even lack back in home.
Roger Scruton believes that the West has two fundamental concepts pertinent for the foundation of their states, territorial jurisdiction and national loyalty. As Scruton argues, to really bind a society a state needs a territory, a law and a loyalty.
The Arab states on the other hand have no foundations of the same value as these (Arab nationalism failed, as an example Scruton offers). Because they are not attached to their territory and their nationalism had failed, there is one loyalty that they share, and that is the religion of Islam.
Just by bringing to light this difference, we can see how the West sees itself and the Arabs see themselves. That's why in the West their nation-states are successful and why the Middle East filled with failed states. Terrorism, as Scruton argues, is the uninteded by-product of this very envy of nation-states, so a certain group needs to rid off it.
That, I think, is the reason terrorism have existed: their unconscious desire to destroy what they even lack back in home.
October 1, 2022
Two decades old in 2002 and written in the aftermath of 9/11, the conservative philosopher Roger Scruton's polemical 'The West and the Rest' appears more sensible now than ever, not on the detail (where he was a trifle too alarmist) but on the general trajectory of globalisation.
Terrorism proved not to be the downfall of Western civilisation. American power and the Islamists' own weak reach and existential exhaustion (probably based on generational factors) failed to do more than cause pain and misery to relatively small and localised populations.
The book's great value in this context, if we ignore the paranoia and neurosis of the 2000s, is to point up a far deeper issue - the essential incompatibilities in the way Islam and the West see social and political reality.
The book contains a superb and succinct account of Islamic cultural norms and how they differ from Western norms (incidentally permitting us to see exactly what Western habits consist of), emphasising difference rather than simplistic and excitable American good/evil judgments.
Where Scruton scores is in pointing out the intrinsic conflict that must emerge between the globalisation process that drives the extension of Western values into every corner of the world and the traditional cultures that this process has been disrupting.
Looked at two decades on, Islamism and its associated terrorism was just an early symptom of a much greater disease which has seen a growing resistance to the extension of Western values that now encompasses Chinese neo-confucianism, Russian orthodoxy, Hindu nationalism and so on.
What we see in Scruton's book is a preliminary sketch for a world, partially predicted by Huntington and unseen by Fukuyama, in which the Kremlin can, quite reasonably by its own lights, present itself as the centre of a global resistance to Western hubris and arrogance.
What Scruton did not see and we can now see is that the 'extension of Western values' not merely created its own forms of violent resistance elsewhere in the world but started to redefine Western values at home and so created its own internal populist resistance.
The world of 2002 was one of absolute Western hegemony fairly united around the assumed benefits of globalisation and dealing with what appeared to be a single primitive traditionalist revolt that was nihilistic and which 'justified' extreme security and cultural measures.
The world of 2022 is the fruit of the 'West' (actually interlocking political elites centred on Washington) failing to realise that the unjust behaviour of Islamist militants hid an underlying just resentment that the 'West' thought could be railroaded and bludgeoned into compliance.
The underlying just resentment was at being ordered around and told to believe what one part of the world which had inherited its vast wealth had decided was appropriate. With backs to the wall, the resentment turned violent and this required brutal methods to crush the consequent revolt.
Now the West faces a far more serious revolt from a nuclear power with the resources of a modern if flawed state machinery behind it. The doubling down on 'all means necessary' to put down this far more important revolt risks a world-destroying nuclear conflagration.
Even were this challenge to the West to be crushed, the resentment would not go away. China and India are aware of their own need to survive as civilisations. Russia's resistance has created a new awareness of the colonial legacy in Africa and much of the rest of the world.
Meanwhile, the West's elites attempt to create cover for its post-imperial hegemony by promoting ESG, social capitalism and global liberal values in ways that have not only alienated these external communities but significant elements within its own voting electorates.
Scruton was pushed aside in 2002 as just a dissident 'Tory' voice. He got it wrong on the level of threat from Islamism, effectively buying into hysteria that was manufactured often for enhanced internal security powers and militarist operations, but he got it right where it really mattered,
Radical Islamism had become vicious. There was rightly no compromise with it. The 'West' (aka US) acted reasonably if clumsily to contain it. However, this was just a sticking plaster on a far bigger and festering problem that required new thinking not the 'doubling down' we see today.
Capitalism itself was shaken in 2008 to such an extent that it becomes now a strategic possibility for Russia to exploit the massive debt burden in the West through its disruptions. 2016 saw warning shots to liberal elites that were ignored in yet another round of doubling down on 'values'.
Now, in 2022, all that has happened because of the failure of the West to moderate and manage its values imperialism is a raising of the stakes - the splitting of the world into camps driven not by ideology but by warring 'values', a lack of mutual respect and economic competition.
Core Western values as described by Scruton in the book are also at threat in the West's heartlands - since the West may be regarded as a distinct civilisation in its own right but with important variations - through federalisms, the manufacturing of consent and flawed democratic procedures.
A Prime Minister elected by 0.2% of her population almost triggered the meltdown of the financial system in her country through incompetence yet there is no way of either bringing her into line or removing her that is not in the hands of a very few men and women in Parliament.
It was supposed to be the Marxists who brought down capitalism yet it would seem that ideological liberals, in the ultimate internal contradiction, are in danger of doing so through a combination of moral absolutism, economic sanctions, disorganisation and defiance of popular sentiment.
The world system is no longer the United Nations created in 1945 on a victory by two ideologies over a third but has become a more fluid and competitive structure based on 'civilisations' that are modernising in different ways whilst trying to preserve their essential characters.
If one of those civilisations, based on its historic hegemony, attempts to impose its essential character beyond a certain point then it will face violent resistance because, while it may suborn elites, elites can be overuled by their own civilisational histories.
While there are now substantial 'liberal' minorities in all traditional civilisations, the majority remain passively traditional and remain passive only to the extent that they are both fed (economic) and not insulted as to their core values (cultural).
Similarly hungry and/or culturally neglected minorities within the West are likely to become resistors in turn - generally in the form of populism - especially as it is becoming clear that the middle classes are getting poorer and working classes treated with contempt.
Put all this together and we have a volatile and dangerous situation both internationally and domestically. Frightened elites, no longer able to control the situation they find themselves in, constantly 'double down' making the situation worse as they reach their points of no return.
We see this most obviously with the Ukraine situation but there are similar issues arising with China while India and the Gulf States are no longer to be taken for granted. We can expect a similar 'doubling down' on domestic populations resentful of the cost of living and migration
The book is thus worth reading for two reasons - as a remarkably cogent account of the state of affairs that should have predicted our current malaise and as a case study in the contrast between two civilisational systems (the 'West' and Islam)
If only more people in the West had read Scruton's book at the time and then gone on to think about the implications of what he was saying. In the meantime, read it for the excellent material on Islam and as a baseline for a rethink - that may now be too late.
May 16, 2019
Sir Roger Scruton, normally at home speaking about culture and architecture, doesn't put together a convincing enough case for the problem of jihad and Islam, or what people these days call "Islamism." Written in 2002, it has proven to be the mildest of responses to 9/11 and all that has come since. Because Scruton accepts the principles of the so-called Enlightenment, he is half defeated before he even picks up his pen on this issue.
As a quick survey of the development of law and government in Christian states as opposed to Islamic ones, it is useful.
"It is, in my view, impossible to understand the French Revolution if one does not see it as primarily a religious phenomenon. The inner compulsion was to dethrone the gods of the monarchical order, and to erect a new community in its place - but a community demanding sacrifice, devotion, and slaughter, establishing a right to obedience through the spilling of blood. The leading revolutionary St-Just could say, in 1794, that a republic 'is constituted by the total destruction of that which is opposed to it,' so abolishing at a stroke the century of political thinking that had finally come to fruition in revolutionary France. Membership, as St-Just's remark makes clear, means the establishment of a "we," and the easiest way to invent this "we" is through a fight to the death with "them." The French Revolution was prodigal of opponents - some of them real, as in the Vendee uprising, some of them imaginary, like the quasi-supernatural emigres, crystallizing now in this person or club or gathering, now in that, and everywhere the object of the most violent suspicion and enmity. There is no need to dwell on the parallels with subsequent revolutionary movements and their demons: the emigres were simply the first in a long line of victims - kulaks, Jews, the bourgeoisie - prepared as sacrificial offerings on behalf of a new form of social membership. It is from a deficit of membership that the urge to revolution arises, and when people are hungry for membership, collective violence issues as a matter of course.
The French Revolution sought to replace one religion with another: hence its fanaticism and exterminatory zeal. But the new religion of the nation was demonic, fraught with contradiction and self-hatred, with no power to survive. It quickly gave way to the Napoleonic project of empire, through which violence was externalized and a rule of law re-established at home." (p. 44-45)
As a quick survey of the development of law and government in Christian states as opposed to Islamic ones, it is useful.
"It is, in my view, impossible to understand the French Revolution if one does not see it as primarily a religious phenomenon. The inner compulsion was to dethrone the gods of the monarchical order, and to erect a new community in its place - but a community demanding sacrifice, devotion, and slaughter, establishing a right to obedience through the spilling of blood. The leading revolutionary St-Just could say, in 1794, that a republic 'is constituted by the total destruction of that which is opposed to it,' so abolishing at a stroke the century of political thinking that had finally come to fruition in revolutionary France. Membership, as St-Just's remark makes clear, means the establishment of a "we," and the easiest way to invent this "we" is through a fight to the death with "them." The French Revolution was prodigal of opponents - some of them real, as in the Vendee uprising, some of them imaginary, like the quasi-supernatural emigres, crystallizing now in this person or club or gathering, now in that, and everywhere the object of the most violent suspicion and enmity. There is no need to dwell on the parallels with subsequent revolutionary movements and their demons: the emigres were simply the first in a long line of victims - kulaks, Jews, the bourgeoisie - prepared as sacrificial offerings on behalf of a new form of social membership. It is from a deficit of membership that the urge to revolution arises, and when people are hungry for membership, collective violence issues as a matter of course.
The French Revolution sought to replace one religion with another: hence its fanaticism and exterminatory zeal. But the new religion of the nation was demonic, fraught with contradiction and self-hatred, with no power to survive. It quickly gave way to the Napoleonic project of empire, through which violence was externalized and a rule of law re-established at home." (p. 44-45)
August 12, 2015
Scruton's prose is felicitous, and his grasp of Islamic political philosophy seemingly comprehensive. He advances a number of conclusions in this book, written in response to the 9/11 attacks - some more compelling than others.
His first thesis is that Western political thought is inherently suited to develop disestablishmentarian ideas. Its influences, after the Greeks, are from Christianity - a religion which developed in the shadow of the Roman empire, a pre-existing law system, and contains the idea of an independent church (a non-human legal person, like a firm or a state) separate from a secular state. "Render unto Caesar..."
Islam, by contrast, is inherently both a theological and a political movement. Jesus was a victim, Agnus Dei, turning the other cheek to his executioners. Mohammed was a warrior, who combined military stratagems with his poetic suras. Globalisation has brought these two forces into contrast, but it is impossible to resolve them.
Scruton positions himself as a sort of radical centre, mixing in criticisms of postmodernism, the excesses of pluralism and political correctness, and the Western world's value crisis - his familiar bêtes noires - with a traditionally leftist disparagement of cultural and economic globalisation, and the excesses of the IMF and WTO. Your mileage may vary; I found the critique wanting, in its presumption of a prelapsarian status quo to which all developing countries would wish to return. While the debate on globalisation of a few years ago has mostly died down, issues such as migration in Europe and home-grown terror cells are still very much in the public eye. This slim book is a cogent and authoritative contribution to our public debate.
His first thesis is that Western political thought is inherently suited to develop disestablishmentarian ideas. Its influences, after the Greeks, are from Christianity - a religion which developed in the shadow of the Roman empire, a pre-existing law system, and contains the idea of an independent church (a non-human legal person, like a firm or a state) separate from a secular state. "Render unto Caesar..."
Islam, by contrast, is inherently both a theological and a political movement. Jesus was a victim, Agnus Dei, turning the other cheek to his executioners. Mohammed was a warrior, who combined military stratagems with his poetic suras. Globalisation has brought these two forces into contrast, but it is impossible to resolve them.
Scruton positions himself as a sort of radical centre, mixing in criticisms of postmodernism, the excesses of pluralism and political correctness, and the Western world's value crisis - his familiar bêtes noires - with a traditionally leftist disparagement of cultural and economic globalisation, and the excesses of the IMF and WTO. Your mileage may vary; I found the critique wanting, in its presumption of a prelapsarian status quo to which all developing countries would wish to return. While the debate on globalisation of a few years ago has mostly died down, issues such as migration in Europe and home-grown terror cells are still very much in the public eye. This slim book is a cogent and authoritative contribution to our public debate.
February 6, 2015
The West and The Rest by Roger Scrunton (a philosopher) is a short, but well-written and informative look at the ideas that led to attacks on 9/11. I thought that he was especially lucid about the fundamental differences that underlie the Christian and Muslim religions, mainly in that Christianity is concerned with conciliation to break the cycle of violence. Furthermore, he points out that Islamic societies are unable to break out of the paradigm of families and members of their religion, whereas the western countries are bound by citizenship that binds a society of strangers together for a common purpose. He also points out the three major effects of the Khomeini’s revolution in Iranian 1981: 1) He showed that a Islamic government is a viable option in the modern world 2) He made the exportation of the Islamic Revolution the cornerstone of his foreign policy by support Hezbollah in Lebanon 3) He endowed the Islamic revolution with a Shiite physiognomy, which made martyrdom a central part of the strategy.
November 18, 2017
Scruton’s book provides a forthcoming account the paths of development between the West as defined as the Judeo-Christian and the rest defined as the Islamic world, with an aim at understanding what led to 9/11 attacks. While the author makes some convincing arguments about the innate differences between the historical background of Islam and Christianity, yet the book lacks from a comprehensive methodological approach on the subject. In describing Christianity, the author places more emphasis on the historical development of the religion, while in describing Islam the emphasis is overwhelmingly placed on the canonical texts of the religion. While the author argues that the approach that he employed is justified based on the innate differences of the two religions, the methodological divergence allows for exogenous factors (such as the rise of nation-states) to influence the outcomes of cases. The author attempts to solve the endogeneity issue by arguing that the nation-states are a by-product of Christianity, or at least, Christianity provides space for nation-states that Islam does not afford to provide. Yet, the argument remains insufficient and unable to fit either within the localities of the analysis of established texts or historical backgrounds, including a total ignorance of both territorial and de facto power of the Catholic Church that sprang from the Christian theology itself. The hostility towards other groups arising from Christian doctrines, such as anti-semitism, hostility against gays and minority rights.
Another weakness of the book is that its assumptions of the unaltered relationship of the pious Muslims to the holy scriptures. While the author finds the authority to make claims about “true” Muslims following the orders of the God, he ignores the numerous heterodox orders that have existed across the Islamic world, and which, instead of focusing on the laws derived by God, focused on spiritual experiences. The number of these heterodox orders dwindled not because of the globalization, but as a result of the imperial dictates that attempted to put these groups under control through the official state doctrines of Sunni or Shi’a Islam. In addition,The approach of Muslims to the holy texts change with globalization and changing societal orders. For instance a majority of Muslims do not advocate for cutting the hands of the thieves, whereas Qur’an stipulates that the hand of thieves shall be cut down ( http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/th...). While it can be argued that Muslims on average are harder to acquire the changing norms and moral values due to the innate nature of the scripture, the embedded nature of the Islamic law over secular governance that the author argues for does not have a strong base.
Similarly, the author treats the case of secularization and modernization in the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey as a “deviation” form normal and “an imperial power”, he ignores that Ottoman Empire experienced a constitutional monarchy with more participatory democratic forms than many European countries in the late 19th century. As such, the retreat of Ulama was not as much a result of a “forced change” from above but rather as a natural product of modernization and scientific development. The composition of Mecelle, (مجلة (, the relatively egalitarian Civic Code written in the late 19th century in the Ottoman Empire, is a good example of this process. Thus, Islamic societies can change and adjust to a secular order, albeit potentially at a smaller pace than the west. Similarly, emphasizing the status of the scripture and God in Islam, the author argues that it is inherently hard in Islamic societies to be governed by the constitutional regimes. Yet, the regime change often occurs through the break-up among the elites in the process of power-sharing. Thus, democratization is a mass process as much as it is an elite process, with the utilities of elites being determined by their ability to reach power, as was the case in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the current experiences of Tunisia, a Muslim-majority and on average pious society, discredits the author’s claims regarding Islam and a constitutional and democratic order.
In order to strengthen his argument on the “deviated” nature of the modern Turkey, the author makes another claim that secularism in Turkey was accomplished due to rapid changes that occurred during the Ataturk’s time on Turkish customs and language. As such, the “traditional literature of the country (Turkey) became unreadable.” The Ottoman language was the language of the palace, spoken among the selected elite. Thus, the transformation to the Latin Alphabet did not exert a huge toll on the traditional literature, which had remained oral in its form due to the striking low rates of illiteracy. The ignorance of such critical points enables the author to explain the cases that do not fit his framework as deviations, whereas their examination naturally requires a lot more attention than the author affords.
The author makes selection biases by explaining the experiences of Western Muslims through the paradigms of terrorists or radicals such as المهاجرين (Al muhaciryn) in Britain, whereas the aggregate evidence in surveys such as PEW indicate that Muslims in the West, particularly in America, have developed a certain understanding of theology that is quite accommodating, and indeed more accommodating than some Judeo-Christian views.
Finally, the author treats Enlightenment as an idea that enabled humanity to establish a common concept of citizenship and togetherness irrespective of different religious of individuals that are part of the communities. Yet, this limited approach to Enlightenment, while enabling the author to criticize the changing gender and family dynamics, misses a crucial point, that is increasing irrelevance of religious dogmas and religious authority that the Enlightenment has afforded.
Another weakness of the book is that its assumptions of the unaltered relationship of the pious Muslims to the holy scriptures. While the author finds the authority to make claims about “true” Muslims following the orders of the God, he ignores the numerous heterodox orders that have existed across the Islamic world, and which, instead of focusing on the laws derived by God, focused on spiritual experiences. The number of these heterodox orders dwindled not because of the globalization, but as a result of the imperial dictates that attempted to put these groups under control through the official state doctrines of Sunni or Shi’a Islam. In addition,The approach of Muslims to the holy texts change with globalization and changing societal orders. For instance a majority of Muslims do not advocate for cutting the hands of the thieves, whereas Qur’an stipulates that the hand of thieves shall be cut down ( http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/th...). While it can be argued that Muslims on average are harder to acquire the changing norms and moral values due to the innate nature of the scripture, the embedded nature of the Islamic law over secular governance that the author argues for does not have a strong base.
Similarly, the author treats the case of secularization and modernization in the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey as a “deviation” form normal and “an imperial power”, he ignores that Ottoman Empire experienced a constitutional monarchy with more participatory democratic forms than many European countries in the late 19th century. As such, the retreat of Ulama was not as much a result of a “forced change” from above but rather as a natural product of modernization and scientific development. The composition of Mecelle, (مجلة (, the relatively egalitarian Civic Code written in the late 19th century in the Ottoman Empire, is a good example of this process. Thus, Islamic societies can change and adjust to a secular order, albeit potentially at a smaller pace than the west. Similarly, emphasizing the status of the scripture and God in Islam, the author argues that it is inherently hard in Islamic societies to be governed by the constitutional regimes. Yet, the regime change often occurs through the break-up among the elites in the process of power-sharing. Thus, democratization is a mass process as much as it is an elite process, with the utilities of elites being determined by their ability to reach power, as was the case in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the current experiences of Tunisia, a Muslim-majority and on average pious society, discredits the author’s claims regarding Islam and a constitutional and democratic order.
In order to strengthen his argument on the “deviated” nature of the modern Turkey, the author makes another claim that secularism in Turkey was accomplished due to rapid changes that occurred during the Ataturk’s time on Turkish customs and language. As such, the “traditional literature of the country (Turkey) became unreadable.” The Ottoman language was the language of the palace, spoken among the selected elite. Thus, the transformation to the Latin Alphabet did not exert a huge toll on the traditional literature, which had remained oral in its form due to the striking low rates of illiteracy. The ignorance of such critical points enables the author to explain the cases that do not fit his framework as deviations, whereas their examination naturally requires a lot more attention than the author affords.
The author makes selection biases by explaining the experiences of Western Muslims through the paradigms of terrorists or radicals such as المهاجرين (Al muhaciryn) in Britain, whereas the aggregate evidence in surveys such as PEW indicate that Muslims in the West, particularly in America, have developed a certain understanding of theology that is quite accommodating, and indeed more accommodating than some Judeo-Christian views.
Finally, the author treats Enlightenment as an idea that enabled humanity to establish a common concept of citizenship and togetherness irrespective of different religious of individuals that are part of the communities. Yet, this limited approach to Enlightenment, while enabling the author to criticize the changing gender and family dynamics, misses a crucial point, that is increasing irrelevance of religious dogmas and religious authority that the Enlightenment has afforded.
June 7, 2021
The book is a defence of Western civilisation and the liberal democratic system of government that has evolved within and become the de rigueur system of government in the West. It begins with an explanation of the social contract by which the populace accepts being governed in exchange for the benefits of membership of the governing polity and that this requires freedom of conscience which, in turn, requires secular government. He explains that the question of what makes secular government legitimate is itself a core question within Western philosophical debate.
He then explains that civilisations are composed of communities which can be held together by political processes, language, religion, ethnicities or territory, but only those defined by territory with the law of the land and only of the land (i.e. the nation-state) can a community comprising multiple languages, religions and/or ethnicities peacefully co-exist, the nation-state being the best defence of Enlightenment values. Western civilisation is based on nation-states. He stressed the importance of citizenship binding strangers together as citizens of the nation-state independent of religion, ethnicity and/or language in contrast to communities where persons are bound only by familial and creedal relationships. He contrasted the principles of citizenship and territorial respect of Western civilizations with Islamic communities which respect only the laws derived from the Koran and not secular law and, by implication, the authority of the nation-state, noting that shari’a law does not well define the status of non-Moslems living in Moslem communities, the absence or recognition of corporations, organisations and the government itself as legal persons and that shari’a law applies only to domestic matters and does not address the public sphere.
Scruton then takes a detour into architecture noting a resentment of how modernist architecture with its skyscrapers, wide streets and public spaces was a marked contrast to traditional architecture in Islamic communities and which it was progressively replacing. Beyond physical architecture, he noted that Islam today was characterised by nostalgia for an idyllic past and a sense of having been uprooted not just by modernity but each person from that person’s natural place. He observes that Islamic insurgents have used Western laws and agreements such as the UN Refugee Convention to gain access to Western territories and used the Internet and other technologies to facilitate the distribution of their messaging much faster and further than was possible in the pre-internet age. But he adds that globalisation also involves the succession of powers by nation states to such international bodies as the EU and the UN arguing that this loss of sovereignty reduces each nation state’s capacity to fight terrorism.
I see the strength of the book in its articulation of the attributes and merits of Western civilisation. The primary weakness is that, although the title promised a comparison with the rest, it only compared Western civilisation with Islam and primarily Islam as a civilisational force instead of the countries that are predominantly Islamic and it made no mention of other civilisation including South America, Eastern (Orthodox) Europe, China, Japan, India and sub-Saharan Africa. A minor weakness is that he hinted although didn’t state that a strengthened belief in Christianity in the West would help defend itself against the challenge posed by increasingly militant Islamic countries and Islamic minorities. Finally, he also claimed that the Swiss architect Le Corbusier, the leading early 20th century proponent of modernism was able to convince the colonial French government to flatten much of Algiers and replace it with buildings of design whereas it would appear that as much as he wanted to do so, he was prevented from doing any such thing.
He then explains that civilisations are composed of communities which can be held together by political processes, language, religion, ethnicities or territory, but only those defined by territory with the law of the land and only of the land (i.e. the nation-state) can a community comprising multiple languages, religions and/or ethnicities peacefully co-exist, the nation-state being the best defence of Enlightenment values. Western civilisation is based on nation-states. He stressed the importance of citizenship binding strangers together as citizens of the nation-state independent of religion, ethnicity and/or language in contrast to communities where persons are bound only by familial and creedal relationships. He contrasted the principles of citizenship and territorial respect of Western civilizations with Islamic communities which respect only the laws derived from the Koran and not secular law and, by implication, the authority of the nation-state, noting that shari’a law does not well define the status of non-Moslems living in Moslem communities, the absence or recognition of corporations, organisations and the government itself as legal persons and that shari’a law applies only to domestic matters and does not address the public sphere.
Scruton then takes a detour into architecture noting a resentment of how modernist architecture with its skyscrapers, wide streets and public spaces was a marked contrast to traditional architecture in Islamic communities and which it was progressively replacing. Beyond physical architecture, he noted that Islam today was characterised by nostalgia for an idyllic past and a sense of having been uprooted not just by modernity but each person from that person’s natural place. He observes that Islamic insurgents have used Western laws and agreements such as the UN Refugee Convention to gain access to Western territories and used the Internet and other technologies to facilitate the distribution of their messaging much faster and further than was possible in the pre-internet age. But he adds that globalisation also involves the succession of powers by nation states to such international bodies as the EU and the UN arguing that this loss of sovereignty reduces each nation state’s capacity to fight terrorism.
I see the strength of the book in its articulation of the attributes and merits of Western civilisation. The primary weakness is that, although the title promised a comparison with the rest, it only compared Western civilisation with Islam and primarily Islam as a civilisational force instead of the countries that are predominantly Islamic and it made no mention of other civilisation including South America, Eastern (Orthodox) Europe, China, Japan, India and sub-Saharan Africa. A minor weakness is that he hinted although didn’t state that a strengthened belief in Christianity in the West would help defend itself against the challenge posed by increasingly militant Islamic countries and Islamic minorities. Finally, he also claimed that the Swiss architect Le Corbusier, the leading early 20th century proponent of modernism was able to convince the colonial French government to flatten much of Algiers and replace it with buildings of design whereas it would appear that as much as he wanted to do so, he was prevented from doing any such thing.
January 8, 2018
This was a very insightful book on the whole issue of the "global terror threat," delving deep into the philosophical, religious, and political underpinnings of Western & Islamic civilizations. There are serious differences in how modern-day countries (and national political entities are a relatively new construct) have developed their governmental policies versus how traditional Islamic civilizations have evolved. Unfortunately, in recent years, as the author points out, there are many who have come from Muslim majority countries ("The Rest") to make their homes in Western countries--yet they have not become nationalized, but under their new political/religious freedoms have sought to take advantage of and to bring down countries/cultures which have Western political values ("The West").
September 22, 2020
A fascinating little book that explores the strengths and weaknesses of both the Western civilization and the other ways of organizing society, especially the different forms of society in the Middle East. Scruton argues that there is, to put it in the words of Samuel Huntington, a clash of civilizations between "the West and the rest". Some of it is due to a fundamentaly different way of percieving the state and society. On the other side some of it is due to what Scruton claims is a moral and cultural decadence in many Western countries that has created a greater gap between "the West and the rest".
September 4, 2020
A slightly outdated book (published in 2002), but still a very relevant one. Scruton writes powerfully about the effects of globalization as a by-product of the Western nation-state. He asserts that global bodies (like the EU and UN) have eroded national sovereignty, and he advocates for a more mindful, local approach to politics and economics as an antidote to this phenomenon. His knowledge of history and religion are unmatched, and even the most ardent supporter of globalization could benefit from reading Scruton's critique.
March 21, 2021
This book was written shortly after the 9/11 theorist attacks. In my opinion, it is clearly written and, if really taken into consideration many of the subsequent theorist attacks or other problems caused by islamists would have been eradicated or diminished. The root cause, political correctness, makes nowadays even more victims, those who do not change their speech and actions according to the ideology.
January 14, 2025
Ač velmi dobře sepsané a rešersované dílo, pojednávající o teoriích terorismu a celkového vztahu mezi muslimy a "lidmi západu", je poněkud příliš konzervativní.
Toto citové zabarvení hněvu je pochopitelné, nicméně by přeneslo svou hlavní myšlenku i bez toho.
Každopádně otvírá mysl novým perspektivám nejen na útok 11.9.2001, ale na celkové fungování arabských států a muslimů.
Toto citové zabarvení hněvu je pochopitelné, nicméně by přeneslo svou hlavní myšlenku i bez toho.
Každopádně otvírá mysl novým perspektivám nejen na útok 11.9.2001, ale na celkové fungování arabských států a muslimů.
December 12, 2019
Organizing and cleaning a bookshelf. I found this. In another life, it was on a bookshelf in my downstairs powder room in another house and it is short so one could sit and shit and read!
June 29, 2020
A fantastic explanation of the core reasons why there is continual conflict between western nations and Islam.
Read
May 12, 2023Shallow. There are much better things to read. I will avoid this author in future.
March 3, 2012
A very interesting read for those interested in the theology, philosophy, and politics that distinguishes, as the name says, West from the Rest. Scruton, who I have read as an essayist before, does an nice job in a compact book, laying out what distinguishes the Western / Christian based culture from Arab / Islamic culture and why the later will not blend into the former tradition. He explores the theological, philosophical, and political traditions of Islam, and how it focus on the the Muslim interpretation of all belonging to Allah. This is different from the Western tradition of a separate state, separate from the church, but not separate form a religious moral tradition, in which a territorial relation is established. From this territorial relationship with the individual rights spring and are protected.
Scruton lays out an interesting argument, exploring the whole evolution of the western idea of a social contract, the rise of the nation-state, and the recognition of rights as part of citizenship connected to a nation-state. He crosses beyond theology, philosophy, and politics, at times spending quite a bit of time exploring architectural connection to the sense of place and the person. He also warns against the threat to the western ideas of rights, coming not just from radical Islam, but also from inside the West; from westernized Muslims who enjoy its liberties and then rail against them, and also the "enlightened" western who wants to tear down the sovereign nation, to be replaced by a trans-national bureaucratic state, where decisions for the common good are reached by the elect few. He worries that globalization both weakens the West, while at the same time providing the Islamic radical the mean and methods for attacking the source of wealth and education which helps them organize their assault.
Very interesting stuff. Well worth reading.
Scruton lays out an interesting argument, exploring the whole evolution of the western idea of a social contract, the rise of the nation-state, and the recognition of rights as part of citizenship connected to a nation-state. He crosses beyond theology, philosophy, and politics, at times spending quite a bit of time exploring architectural connection to the sense of place and the person. He also warns against the threat to the western ideas of rights, coming not just from radical Islam, but also from inside the West; from westernized Muslims who enjoy its liberties and then rail against them, and also the "enlightened" western who wants to tear down the sovereign nation, to be replaced by a trans-national bureaucratic state, where decisions for the common good are reached by the elect few. He worries that globalization both weakens the West, while at the same time providing the Islamic radical the mean and methods for attacking the source of wealth and education which helps them organize their assault.
Very interesting stuff. Well worth reading.
July 29, 2016
Je to dílo filozofa. Své poznatky má málokdy podložené další odbornou literaturou, proto to spíše než odbornou publikaci beru jako polemiku na téma islamismus vs západní společnost. Na druhou stranu přináší několik nových perspektiv, jak se na toto téma dívat.
- Na rozdíl od záp. zemí nemají islámské státy skutečnou politickou organizaci - jejich právní a politický systém je založen na koránu a pouze pokud je v souladu s ním, je možné ho považovat za legitimní. To je možná nejdůležitější myšlenka v celé knize.
- Zajímavě tam popisuje ideové kořeny al-kajdy - wahábismus, jeho vznik a zákl. principy, od toho odtržený salafismus; a muslimske bratrstvo
- Nepřítelem ismlam. fundamentalistů není demokracie, globalizace, sekularizace a pod. ale amerika, která je konkrétní manifestací těchto abstraktních pojmů. Nejsou to ani americane. Je to amerika jako stát. (Scruton, p. 188)
- teroristicke praktiky sionistu, kteri chteli, aby britanie vyklidila protektorat palestiny.
- myšlenka státu-osobnosti
- nesnášenlivost vůči moderní architektuře - mrakodrapy vyšší než minaret
- autor nevěří v sílu osn, wto, eu...
- Nový evropský superstát (EU) proto představuje pro islámský terorismus úrodnou půdu. odmítá národ a národní hrdost, proto si za cíl braly USA. V evropě byli ale všichni útočníci na WTC vycvičeni.
- nakonec vyzívá k přehodnocení několika současných společenských, politických a ekonomických proudů a postojů.
Každopádně mě to přijde dosti subjektivní
- Na rozdíl od záp. zemí nemají islámské státy skutečnou politickou organizaci - jejich právní a politický systém je založen na koránu a pouze pokud je v souladu s ním, je možné ho považovat za legitimní. To je možná nejdůležitější myšlenka v celé knize.
- Zajímavě tam popisuje ideové kořeny al-kajdy - wahábismus, jeho vznik a zákl. principy, od toho odtržený salafismus; a muslimske bratrstvo
- Nepřítelem ismlam. fundamentalistů není demokracie, globalizace, sekularizace a pod. ale amerika, která je konkrétní manifestací těchto abstraktních pojmů. Nejsou to ani americane. Je to amerika jako stát. (Scruton, p. 188)
- teroristicke praktiky sionistu, kteri chteli, aby britanie vyklidila protektorat palestiny.
- myšlenka státu-osobnosti
- nesnášenlivost vůči moderní architektuře - mrakodrapy vyšší než minaret
- autor nevěří v sílu osn, wto, eu...
- Nový evropský superstát (EU) proto představuje pro islámský terorismus úrodnou půdu. odmítá národ a národní hrdost, proto si za cíl braly USA. V evropě byli ale všichni útočníci na WTC vycvičeni.
- nakonec vyzívá k přehodnocení několika současných společenských, politických a ekonomických proudů a postojů.
Každopádně mě to přijde dosti subjektivní
April 19, 2013
In this book, Roger Scruton did a great job defining globalization and recognizing its dangers. I especially enjoyed the 3rd chapter. In it, Scruton outlined the ideology of Islam and recognized its dangers. On page 104, he identifies Islam as "less [of] a theological doctrine than a system of piety."
In this piece, he also addresses the dangers of multiculturalism. Scruton goes as far as to compare the rise of multiculturalism in the United States to a sort of apartheid. One of the most brilliant passages with regards to multiculturalism can be found on page 63:
"Those who express doubts about the 'multicultural society' are not, as their opponents hasten to call them, racists. They are trying to remind people that we in the 'West' enjoy a single political culture, with the nation-state as the object of a common loyalty, and a secular conception of law, which makes religion a concern of family and society, but not the state."
I recommend this book to anyone interested in understanding the rise of the terrorist threat to the West.
In this piece, he also addresses the dangers of multiculturalism. Scruton goes as far as to compare the rise of multiculturalism in the United States to a sort of apartheid. One of the most brilliant passages with regards to multiculturalism can be found on page 63:
"Those who express doubts about the 'multicultural society' are not, as their opponents hasten to call them, racists. They are trying to remind people that we in the 'West' enjoy a single political culture, with the nation-state as the object of a common loyalty, and a secular conception of law, which makes religion a concern of family and society, but not the state."
I recommend this book to anyone interested in understanding the rise of the terrorist threat to the West.
May 20, 2013
"The easiest way to invent this "we" is a fight to the death with "them""
": a good citizen is one who knowns when voting is the wrong way to decide a question, as well as when it is the right way. For he knows that his obligations to strangers may be violated when majority opinion alone decides their fate."
": a good citizen is one who knowns when voting is the wrong way to decide a question, as well as when it is the right way. For he knows that his obligations to strangers may be violated when majority opinion alone decides their fate."
August 14, 2014
A short but clear-writen book that highlights the main differences between the West and Islam, pinpointing the sore spots between both. It shows the main internal problems facing each and why the current relations between Western states and the Islamic world are so troublesome.
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November 21, 2009None
August 6, 2016
A clear and concise - if depressing - account of how 'we' (you'll have to read the book) got into this mess.
December 31, 2018
A difficult book to rate. Well written and incisive I do however think the fundamental arguments regarding Islam and its inability to sit within a western pluralistic society are flawed.
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