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448 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2017
"Groups of critical importance to mass mobilization in 1917, such as soldiers and the non-Russian nationalities, did not fit easily into a class-based schema. The success of the discourse of class derived less from its accuracy in describing social relations than from the fact that it played upon a deep-seated division in Russian political culture between 'them' and 'us'...
The historian Mark Steinberg has called the language of class a 'flexible designation of otherness', a way of condemning the rich and powerful, or anyone else perceived to be acting against the interests of the common people. Class enemies were landowners, employers, officers, government officials, the police, and sometimes even priests, village elders, or foremen. It could be used against those who were believed to to have profited from the war, for example, but also against those believed to have undermined the war effort... The discourse of class could thus pick up and transmute the most diverse grievances, hopes, fears, and ideals of those Dostoevsky had called the 'injured and insulted'. But it was, above all, the term burzhui, a corrupted form of the foreign-sounding word 'bourgeois', that was most readily used by the less politically conscious to blacken those of whom they disapproved. Burzhui was as much a moral as a sociological designation of otherness."
"Millions still had only the vaguest idea about the ideological differences between the socialist parties but were captivated by an idealized vision of a socialist society. A typical pamphlet, entitled What is Socialism?, published in Minusinsk in eastern Siberia, explained: 'Need and hunger will disappear and pleasures will be available to all equally. Theft and robberies will cease. Instead of coercion and violence, the kingdom of freedom and brotherhood will commence.' This idea of socialism as the dawn of universal happiness resonated with the apocalyptic strain in Russian culture."
"Language in general became more formulaic -- evident in the use of slogans, fixed expressions, and stereotyped metaphors. The significance of this should not be minimized, since language, especially when it is articulated with social practices and political institutions, shapes the way we perceive the social world. There is evidence, for example, that peasants quickly learned to discuss village society in terms of the class categories approved by the regime, a good tactic if one wished to make claims on the state, justify oneself, or discredit one's fellows... The earnest efforts of worker correspondents and village correspondents - those tasked with reporting to the press on events in their milieux - to master the Soviet lexicon were touching, sometimes comical. 'We youth awakening from eternal hibernation and apathy, forming influence in our blood, brightly reflecting the good progresses and initiatives, step by step however slowly (are) moving away from old and rotten throw-backs and branches.' The strange words and locutions of official propaganda had an almost magical power for those said to be 'half-schooled.'"
"Within a loosely imperial framework, however, the 1920s saw a unique process of nation-building, as the state entrenched nationality as a major principle of socio-political organization... This was something of a paradox, since the Soviet Union at one level claimed to represent the transcendence of the nation state and, at a various times, deployed a rhetoric of ultimate 'fusion' of the constituent nations of the USSR into a single Soviet people. In practice, however, nationality, once seen as an impediment to socialism, was now viewed positively - as the modality through which the economic, political, and cultural development of the non-Russian peoples would take place.
A series of what historian Terry Martin has dubbed 'affirmative action programs' were devised to promote native political elites and intelligentsias and to further the use of national languages... This process, known as nativization (korenizatsiia), was designed, in Stalin's words, to produce republics and autonomous regions that were 'national in form, but socialist in content.' By institutionalizing the republics as political units and by creating national elites, Soviet rule helped to create quasi-nations, albeit at a sub-state level. Broadly, this policy of indigenizing the party-state was a success."
"The Sixth Congress [of the Comintern]... insisted that the phase of capitalist stabilization was over and that capitalism was now entering its 'third period' of development since the First World War. All cooperation with reformist socialists must end -- a tactic known as 'class against class' -- and the trade-union movement must be split by the formation of a 'red trade-union opposition'. The new policy had devastating consequences in Germany where the refusal of the German Communists to cooperate with the Social Democrats facilitated the rise of Adolf Hitler."
"In fact, purely in relation to the 1920s (Stalinism in the 1930s was a different matter), it is not obvious that Soviet society was more violent than its statist predecessor. Historians often fail to convey how ingrained violence was in late-imperial Russia, evinced in colonial conquest, police repression, counter-insurgency, terrorism by left and right, and anti-Jewish pogroms, extending, too, into more everyday forms of violence, such as practices of samosud ('self-judgement'), meted out by peasant communities on those who transgressed their norms, to the flogging of prisoners, to beatings in the workplace, child abuse, and wife-beating."
"The Bolsheviks are prepared in order to maintain their position, to make all sorts of possible concessions to bureaucracy, to militarism, and to capitalism, whereas any concession to democracy seems to them to be sheer suicide." - Karl Kautsky, in Terrorism and Communism (1919)