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The Rise And Fall of British Naval Mastery
Paul Kennedy's classic naval history, now updated with a new introduction by the authorThis acclaimed book traces Britain's rise and fall as a sea power from the Tudors to the present day. Challenging the traditional view that the British are natural 'sons of the waves', he suggests instead that the country's fortunes as a significant maritime force have always been bound up with its economic growth. In doing so, he contributes significantly to the centuries-long debate between 'continental' and 'maritime' schools of strategy over Britain's policy in times of war. Setting British naval history within a framework of national, international, economic, political and strategic considerations, he offers a fresh approach to one of the central questions in British history. A new introduction extends his analysis into the twenty-first century and reflects on current American and Chinese ambitions for naval mastery.'Excellent and stimulating' Correlli Barnett'The first scholar to have set the sweep of British Naval history against the background of economic history' Michael Howard, Sunday Times'By far the best study that has ever been done on the subject ... a sparkling and apt quotation on practically every page' Daniel A. Baugh, International History Review'The best single-volume study of Britain and her naval past now available to us' Jon Sumida, Journal of Modern History
401 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1976
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557 people want to read
About the author
Paul Kennedy
151 books275 followersPaul Michael Kennedy is a British historian specialising in the history of international relations, economic power and grand strategy. He has published prominent books on the history of British foreign policy and Great Power struggles.
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Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews
December 26, 2021
The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, first published in 1976, reads as a test run for Kennedy’s subsequent The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, sharing concepts such as relative strengths between nations, and military power being underpinned by economic resources.
The book is a summary of Britain’s maritime power from the Tudor ages to present (1976), primarily from a "Grand Strategy" perspective. As a simplistic definition, it's about how many ships should Britain build with the money it has and where should it put those ships. Kennedy relies on the work of others to draw his conclusions, which is mostly fine, though I have an issue or two below. It is not a bad read, even a good one, but it is a limited book.
Hitting an ant from 30,000 feet
Kennedy’s book is narrow. Kennedy’s book is broad. The focus is on the high level naval policies of Britain… …over 400 years.
The topic choice fits a narrative of Rise, Zenith, and Fall. It also provides a moving kaleidoscope of challenges for Britain as it moved from predator to defender to supplicant. Unfortunately running this narrative through the lens of Grand Strategy (even with economic input) does make it kind of a bit flat.
Grand Strategy can be interesting. What should a nation do in a particular situation within the constraints it faces? Britain is also interesting due to the number of different situations, such as the Armada; Napoleonic Warfare; the Anglo-German race; and Japanese aggression in the Pacific. But putting them all in 350 pages? You end up with a shallow read, with none of the colour of the men who fought and the vessels they fought in. It compares poorly with something like Marder's Old Friends, New Enemies, which reviewed a tight timeframe in detail, with more interesting revelations.
Further, while this book is fine as a descriptive history, it is less useful from a prescriptive perspective. Being big is good. Having a lot of money is good. Having people that are nice to you is good. That is an oversimplification, but otherwise creating any useful form of model seems to require a hundred different variables, in which case you are just describing reality. Where’s your country? How big are your heartlands? Do your people like to fish? Got any useful islands? Do you like the finest china from overseas? Who else is sniffing round? Do you have submarines? And so on and on and on. Britain is an interesting story, but it is hard to find useful replicators, other than truisms like a big country is harder to hurt than a smaller one. The version I have includes an introduction written in 2017, and basically comes down to big countries like China are gonna be big.
History Like I Tell it
Kennedy does not seem to ever have been big on the details. In 2017 he writes of:
the thunderous roar of F-15 and F-16 aircraft being catapulted off the decks of giant Nimitz-class carriers,
unaware that neither of those types of aircraft can do that. Most of the time I am “fine, whatever” with the minor stuff, but the section on the Zenith of British naval mastery (about two-thirds of the 19th Century) has not held up well. Kennedy is big into Britain’s informal empire; laissez faire economy; promotion of free trade; and anti slavery patrols. However these positions float on without being anchored in reality.
Kennedy writes that at the time of the Napoleonic Wars, four fifths of Britain’s overseas income came from the West Indies, without detailing that such income arose from sugar plantations (and subject to several slave rebellions following the Haitian revolution). Anti-slavery patrols get plenty of space, yet no mention is made of Britain’s reliance on indentured labour well into the 20th Century.
Kennedy also refers to statistics that hold that majority of emigration, exports and capital went to areas outside Britain’s formal empire, citing a paper that has come into dispute. Even if correct, it leaves out any details about the remissions Britain received from its empire, particularly India, income that cannot be categorised as earned by way of free trade. On on the topic of free trade, Kennedy goes onto state:
The two wars and many smaller clashes with the Chinese, whereby the latter were forced to give into British demands for commercial intercourse with full security for Western merchants.
I find it suspicious that the Kennedy neglects to mention the names of the Opium Wars, which would put a different slant on the rest of his sentence and just what Britain was up to outside its "formal" empire.
My view is that Kennedy intentionally creates an image of Britain as a reluctant overlord, even when swallowing down contradictory facts in the same sentence.
Formal empire was not popular - though there are remarkably few examples in the nineteenth century of the British government withdrawing from colonial territories - and instead the informal influence of the trader, the financier, the consul, the missionary and the naval officer was preferred.
I do not want to damn this book in its totality, but I would be very careful about how Kennedy interprets Britain’s colonial history. His credulous treatment of Jean Raspail’s trash fire of a book leaves me wary of Kennedy's historiography.
The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery is dry and problematic, but it is okay. His writing style easy to get through and it's a solid descriptive history, even with a questionable slant.
The book is a summary of Britain’s maritime power from the Tudor ages to present (1976), primarily from a "Grand Strategy" perspective. As a simplistic definition, it's about how many ships should Britain build with the money it has and where should it put those ships. Kennedy relies on the work of others to draw his conclusions, which is mostly fine, though I have an issue or two below. It is not a bad read, even a good one, but it is a limited book.
Hitting an ant from 30,000 feet
Kennedy’s book is narrow. Kennedy’s book is broad. The focus is on the high level naval policies of Britain… …over 400 years.
The topic choice fits a narrative of Rise, Zenith, and Fall. It also provides a moving kaleidoscope of challenges for Britain as it moved from predator to defender to supplicant. Unfortunately running this narrative through the lens of Grand Strategy (even with economic input) does make it kind of a bit flat.
Grand Strategy can be interesting. What should a nation do in a particular situation within the constraints it faces? Britain is also interesting due to the number of different situations, such as the Armada; Napoleonic Warfare; the Anglo-German race; and Japanese aggression in the Pacific. But putting them all in 350 pages? You end up with a shallow read, with none of the colour of the men who fought and the vessels they fought in. It compares poorly with something like Marder's Old Friends, New Enemies, which reviewed a tight timeframe in detail, with more interesting revelations.
Further, while this book is fine as a descriptive history, it is less useful from a prescriptive perspective. Being big is good. Having a lot of money is good. Having people that are nice to you is good. That is an oversimplification, but otherwise creating any useful form of model seems to require a hundred different variables, in which case you are just describing reality. Where’s your country? How big are your heartlands? Do your people like to fish? Got any useful islands? Do you like the finest china from overseas? Who else is sniffing round? Do you have submarines? And so on and on and on. Britain is an interesting story, but it is hard to find useful replicators, other than truisms like a big country is harder to hurt than a smaller one. The version I have includes an introduction written in 2017, and basically comes down to big countries like China are gonna be big.
History Like I Tell it
Kennedy does not seem to ever have been big on the details. In 2017 he writes of:
the thunderous roar of F-15 and F-16 aircraft being catapulted off the decks of giant Nimitz-class carriers,
unaware that neither of those types of aircraft can do that. Most of the time I am “fine, whatever” with the minor stuff, but the section on the Zenith of British naval mastery (about two-thirds of the 19th Century) has not held up well. Kennedy is big into Britain’s informal empire; laissez faire economy; promotion of free trade; and anti slavery patrols. However these positions float on without being anchored in reality.
Kennedy writes that at the time of the Napoleonic Wars, four fifths of Britain’s overseas income came from the West Indies, without detailing that such income arose from sugar plantations (and subject to several slave rebellions following the Haitian revolution). Anti-slavery patrols get plenty of space, yet no mention is made of Britain’s reliance on indentured labour well into the 20th Century.
Kennedy also refers to statistics that hold that majority of emigration, exports and capital went to areas outside Britain’s formal empire, citing a paper that has come into dispute. Even if correct, it leaves out any details about the remissions Britain received from its empire, particularly India, income that cannot be categorised as earned by way of free trade. On on the topic of free trade, Kennedy goes onto state:
The two wars and many smaller clashes with the Chinese, whereby the latter were forced to give into British demands for commercial intercourse with full security for Western merchants.
I find it suspicious that the Kennedy neglects to mention the names of the Opium Wars, which would put a different slant on the rest of his sentence and just what Britain was up to outside its "formal" empire.
My view is that Kennedy intentionally creates an image of Britain as a reluctant overlord, even when swallowing down contradictory facts in the same sentence.
Formal empire was not popular - though there are remarkably few examples in the nineteenth century of the British government withdrawing from colonial territories - and instead the informal influence of the trader, the financier, the consul, the missionary and the naval officer was preferred.
I do not want to damn this book in its totality, but I would be very careful about how Kennedy interprets Britain’s colonial history. His credulous treatment of Jean Raspail’s trash fire of a book leaves me wary of Kennedy's historiography.
The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery is dry and problematic, but it is okay. His writing style easy to get through and it's a solid descriptive history, even with a questionable slant.
May 6, 2014
A pleasant read, well written and containing by no shocking errors, but vague, unbalanced, superficial, and unfocussed. Not a first-class work of historical scholarship by any means, at least as I understand it.
Important terms, i.e., "Naval Mastery," receive very non-specific definitions, and no metrics. Consideration of the modes of interaction of the different sectors of the British economy, particularly Finance vs. everything else, is cursory, and disjointed. One might expect to find something of a detailed treatment of the evolution of shipbuilding, steam power, and munitions, especially as all changed radically during the period of the "Zenith" of British Naval mastery. But no--not even index entries for these topics. Suez? Three isolated mentions. Nor is there much about the chief rival to maritime technologies, the railroad. Kennedy notes that the railroads improved during the 19C, cites a few examples of the military utility that the railroads had achieved by ca. 1870, adds a few quotes to reenforce the notions that many soldiers, sailors and diplomats were aware of this development, but adduces little more. Four pages of text in all--no tables or graphs.
As far as the details of strictly Naval matters are concerned, the exposition is sketchy--even naive. Kennedy disposes of the post-Crimean War French crises/scares of 1859-1865 with a wave of the hand and a few references to un-objective, even bigoted, 19C. tracts by "patriotic" Britons. The discussion of the history of the RN after 1918 is commonplace--the relevant aspects of this topic are treated more completely and competently in many much more general works, and even a few popular books.
My volume (first ed., first printing) is marred by many editorial defects. The book lacks statistical analysis: important figures are simply displayed in tables, or more often, quoted in running text. There are no graphs. Such maps as are included lack detail and are crudely executed, with the exception of Map 9 in my edition. Most points that could be stated clearly only with the aid of a map merit none. Would a photo or two of a warship, a naval base, a naval gun, etc. been too much to add, especially give the 350 year span being considered?
Important terms, i.e., "Naval Mastery," receive very non-specific definitions, and no metrics. Consideration of the modes of interaction of the different sectors of the British economy, particularly Finance vs. everything else, is cursory, and disjointed. One might expect to find something of a detailed treatment of the evolution of shipbuilding, steam power, and munitions, especially as all changed radically during the period of the "Zenith" of British Naval mastery. But no--not even index entries for these topics. Suez? Three isolated mentions. Nor is there much about the chief rival to maritime technologies, the railroad. Kennedy notes that the railroads improved during the 19C, cites a few examples of the military utility that the railroads had achieved by ca. 1870, adds a few quotes to reenforce the notions that many soldiers, sailors and diplomats were aware of this development, but adduces little more. Four pages of text in all--no tables or graphs.
As far as the details of strictly Naval matters are concerned, the exposition is sketchy--even naive. Kennedy disposes of the post-Crimean War French crises/scares of 1859-1865 with a wave of the hand and a few references to un-objective, even bigoted, 19C. tracts by "patriotic" Britons. The discussion of the history of the RN after 1918 is commonplace--the relevant aspects of this topic are treated more completely and competently in many much more general works, and even a few popular books.
My volume (first ed., first printing) is marred by many editorial defects. The book lacks statistical analysis: important figures are simply displayed in tables, or more often, quoted in running text. There are no graphs. Such maps as are included lack detail and are crudely executed, with the exception of Map 9 in my edition. Most points that could be stated clearly only with the aid of a map merit none. Would a photo or two of a warship, a naval base, a naval gun, etc. been too much to add, especially give the 350 year span being considered?
June 6, 2012
This is well researched and argued book and useful as a corrective to the Mahanian tradition that over-emphasizes the ability of sea power to turn world events and is an excellent chronicle of the rise and fall of British naval mastery. The term naval mastery is important. It conveys the sense that the British navy was able to impose its will on the sea lanes, not that it was larger and more powerful than all over navies combined.
From its rise in the 1580s to its pinnacle in 1815 to its ultimate demise in the 20th century, the reasons for the arc are well argued. The book does lack the historical background and therefore the reader needs to be familiar with the history before tackling the book. The books arguments strike a good balance of the "great men" theory of history and impersonal social/economic forces theory of history.
From its rise in the 1580s to its pinnacle in 1815 to its ultimate demise in the 20th century, the reasons for the arc are well argued. The book does lack the historical background and therefore the reader needs to be familiar with the history before tackling the book. The books arguments strike a good balance of the "great men" theory of history and impersonal social/economic forces theory of history.
March 25, 2021
This book is ok. It's engagingly written, but not something you'd ever really return to.
I bought it almost by accident. Owing to it being an ambiguously described reprint, I believed this to be a fairly modern work, rather than actually being 45 years old with a new foreword. I certainly wouldn't have bothered with it, had I known.
This isn't really a history of the Royal Navy or even of Britain ruling the waves. Instead it is a history of how Britain's economy supported the navy (and vice-versa). Various key events, such as Trafalgar, Jutland, the sinking of the Bismarck only merit a single line. In contrast, there are paragraphs concerning the balance of trade. This is ok as far as it goes, but much of what he says in 350 pages can be summed up in one sentence:
When Britain was economically outstripping rival powers, she could afford a navy second to none, but when her commercial and industrial lead vanished, she could no longer afford to compete against larger nations and so her naval mastery declined.
The one thing that I did learn from this book was just how badly affected the country was by World War 2. Despite the victory, Britain's financial position was ruined and with no hope of ever regaining it.
I bought it almost by accident. Owing to it being an ambiguously described reprint, I believed this to be a fairly modern work, rather than actually being 45 years old with a new foreword. I certainly wouldn't have bothered with it, had I known.
This isn't really a history of the Royal Navy or even of Britain ruling the waves. Instead it is a history of how Britain's economy supported the navy (and vice-versa). Various key events, such as Trafalgar, Jutland, the sinking of the Bismarck only merit a single line. In contrast, there are paragraphs concerning the balance of trade. This is ok as far as it goes, but much of what he says in 350 pages can be summed up in one sentence:
When Britain was economically outstripping rival powers, she could afford a navy second to none, but when her commercial and industrial lead vanished, she could no longer afford to compete against larger nations and so her naval mastery declined.
The one thing that I did learn from this book was just how badly affected the country was by World War 2. Despite the victory, Britain's financial position was ruined and with no hope of ever regaining it.
April 22, 2020
pretty average but did serve its role of putting me to sleep within ten minutes each night.
July 26, 2019
I expected this book to focus on the minutia of naval tactics and naval warship building. Thankfully, this novel did not dive too deeply into those subjects. Instead, Kennedy walks through the grand strategy that Britain chose to employ throughout the 1600s-1900s. He makes this book more of an analysis of the factors that led the British to employ naval mastery as their strategy for global domination. The author explores the British economy, British national pride, British domestic politics, and British foreign policy as key factors that created the rise, the zenith, the decline, and the fall of British naval mastery. When considering that Britain is a small island nation, isolated from Continental Europe, it's rather extraordinary that they created an empire upon which the sun never set. Naval supremacy became the chief strategy to police and secure their empire, and it ensured that the Empire lasted far longer than it should have. In my opinion, this work has practical use in assessing the US and the Chinese strategies of pursuing naval mastery in the Pacific Ocean. Both nation-states are in the midst of a naval arms race that has drastic implications for their respective positions in the global order. They would do well to consider the importance of economic health and technological innovation in running this kind of race. Britain's rise coorelated with years of commercial wealth and scientific discovery, while her fall is undoubtedly linked to her post-World War I economic and innovative stagnation.
June 25, 2025
Un libro illuminante, attraverso l'analisi dello sviluppo e del successivo declino della Marina militare Britannica, lo storico Paul Kennedy ci mostra gli inestricabili legami tra questa e la potenza economica del Paese stesso.
Guidandoci attraverso i secoli l'autore ci mostra che la potenza navale di una nazione non nasce a caso o per predisposizione genetica ma è figlia di una serie di variabili che ne condizionano inesorabilmente il risultato finale: industria, commercio, politica, finanza, diplomazia; fino a che punto una Marina forte apporta benefici economici e sviluppo ad una nazione e a partire da quando diventa invece un fardello economico insostenibile?
Cercando di rispondere a questa domanda, il discorso si intreccia ad un'interessantissima analisi geopolitica dei secoli presi in esame, naturalmente con un occhio rivolto alla Gran Bretagna in primis, ma vista l'universalità di certi rapporti causa-effetto, Kennedy ci offre anche gli strumenti per esaminare la situazione della nostra Italia, passata e soprattutto presente.
Ed a beneficio del lettore, il tutto è esposto in maniera chiara e scorrevole.
C'è una nota negativa però per questa edizione italiana, visto anche il costo del libro (32 euro), l'editore si poteva risparmiare i vari refusi e soprattutto avrebbe potuto curare meglio la traduzione, a volte un po' confusionaria e approssimativa in alcuni passaggi.
Guidandoci attraverso i secoli l'autore ci mostra che la potenza navale di una nazione non nasce a caso o per predisposizione genetica ma è figlia di una serie di variabili che ne condizionano inesorabilmente il risultato finale: industria, commercio, politica, finanza, diplomazia; fino a che punto una Marina forte apporta benefici economici e sviluppo ad una nazione e a partire da quando diventa invece un fardello economico insostenibile?
Cercando di rispondere a questa domanda, il discorso si intreccia ad un'interessantissima analisi geopolitica dei secoli presi in esame, naturalmente con un occhio rivolto alla Gran Bretagna in primis, ma vista l'universalità di certi rapporti causa-effetto, Kennedy ci offre anche gli strumenti per esaminare la situazione della nostra Italia, passata e soprattutto presente.
Ed a beneficio del lettore, il tutto è esposto in maniera chiara e scorrevole.
C'è una nota negativa però per questa edizione italiana, visto anche il costo del libro (32 euro), l'editore si poteva risparmiare i vari refusi e soprattutto avrebbe potuto curare meglio la traduzione, a volte un po' confusionaria e approssimativa in alcuni passaggi.
June 20, 2019
Excellent book which makes two strong arguments:
1. A more nuanced interpretation of sea power than Mahan's battle-fleet heavy one is necessary.
2. Britain's naval mastery was not due to her single-minded focus on naval matters, but instead on her balance between a strategy of European equilibrium and naval/overseas expansion.
Kennedy argues well for both and presents his case not only with strategic clarity, but also in an immensely readable way. There is not a single chapter lacking these, but I enjoyed the parts on the navy between Elizabeth I and the elder Pitt, the Napoleonic Wars and Pax Britannica the most.
Sidenotes: I have read Rise and Fall of the Great Powers multiple times, so getting into Kennedy's early work was interesting, especially for two points he raises in the very end of the book:
1. He is getting more interested in the rise and fall of great powers, he says. We had it coming.
2. Historians reaching the future in their accounts means they leave their discipline or must stop writing. He prefers the latter. ...no such inhibitions in Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.
1. A more nuanced interpretation of sea power than Mahan's battle-fleet heavy one is necessary.
2. Britain's naval mastery was not due to her single-minded focus on naval matters, but instead on her balance between a strategy of European equilibrium and naval/overseas expansion.
Kennedy argues well for both and presents his case not only with strategic clarity, but also in an immensely readable way. There is not a single chapter lacking these, but I enjoyed the parts on the navy between Elizabeth I and the elder Pitt, the Napoleonic Wars and Pax Britannica the most.
Sidenotes: I have read Rise and Fall of the Great Powers multiple times, so getting into Kennedy's early work was interesting, especially for two points he raises in the very end of the book:
1. He is getting more interested in the rise and fall of great powers, he says. We had it coming.
2. Historians reaching the future in their accounts means they leave their discipline or must stop writing. He prefers the latter. ...no such inhibitions in Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.
February 4, 2024
The complaints I read here are, "why isn't this another book?" This has become a really big problem in the reviewing of history books. I see it in the journals all the time. Why didn't the author use the sources I like? Why didn't they include X, Y, and Z when they were talking about A,B, and C? Why does this book which was written 40 years ago use a source that is TODAY under dispute?
How much time and money do these people think the average historian has to work on a multi-hundred-page project like this? How much energy and concentration do they think goes into a book like Kennedy's? We've turned into a profession dominated by Monday-morning quarterbacks.
How much time and money do these people think the average historian has to work on a multi-hundred-page project like this? How much energy and concentration do they think goes into a book like Kennedy's? We've turned into a profession dominated by Monday-morning quarterbacks.
March 5, 2020
I really wanted to like this book a whole lot more. I was hoping for a grand sweep of what made the Royal Navy special, but instead I got a pedestrian look at the English establishment. With a few exceptions, there is little to recommend this book.
July 11, 2020
Revised rating 7/11/20 — 3 stars
After reading a good chunk of Chernow’s celebrated biography of Washington, I feel like I have to lower my rating. The readability of books is really important to me, and most of the time this was not particularly readable. History can be intensely analytical and include minute details without becoming dry. All it takes is good writing.
Started out well enough, but slowed down significantly in the middle as it got somewhat repetitive. The final few chapters, were incredibly insightful and illuminating in regards to the modern great power balance and naval situation, despite being written over forty years ago.
After reading a good chunk of Chernow’s celebrated biography of Washington, I feel like I have to lower my rating. The readability of books is really important to me, and most of the time this was not particularly readable. History can be intensely analytical and include minute details without becoming dry. All it takes is good writing.
Started out well enough, but slowed down significantly in the middle as it got somewhat repetitive. The final few chapters, were incredibly insightful and illuminating in regards to the modern great power balance and naval situation, despite being written over forty years ago.
April 19, 2020
Important look at the rise and fall of a major sea power and the underlying reasons for these changes in national fortune. Has significant relevance today.
August 9, 2021
Pedantic and full, this was a disappointment.
December 14, 2022
Kennedy is an expert in British sea power but explains for the lay man.
October 16, 2024
還行，好多東西我好像都學過。
溫故而知新。
溫故而知新。
May 22, 2011
Engagingly written strategic history of Britain’s naval power from the Tudors to the postwar period. The author makes a direct link between industrial economic power and technical capability, with the capacity to project strong naval forces and control the oceans.
Interesting parallels between the UK and US. Britain fought an epic naval conflict during the Napoleonic wars (arguably the actual first world war rather than 1914-18) and despite the massive strains of doing so came out of it even richer. Yet in the second world war when another colossal effort was made the UK was economically crippled by it and the US assumed the position that Britain had in 1815.There’s possibly a lesson here for the US related to the dangers of allowing its technological and industrial base to erode.
So what will be the strategic issues the UK has to face in future decades? Maybe it won’t be about fighting small wars in the Middle East and Central Asia as we currently assume, but coping with Chinese aircraft carriers in the Atlantic and North Sea.
Interesting parallels between the UK and US. Britain fought an epic naval conflict during the Napoleonic wars (arguably the actual first world war rather than 1914-18) and despite the massive strains of doing so came out of it even richer. Yet in the second world war when another colossal effort was made the UK was economically crippled by it and the US assumed the position that Britain had in 1815.There’s possibly a lesson here for the US related to the dangers of allowing its technological and industrial base to erode.
So what will be the strategic issues the UK has to face in future decades? Maybe it won’t be about fighting small wars in the Middle East and Central Asia as we currently assume, but coping with Chinese aircraft carriers in the Atlantic and North Sea.
January 28, 2017
Informative, a bit dense at the beginning but improves over the course of the book. Presents a fairly compelling counterargument to those who invoke Mahan to argue for the primacy of naval power in the present day.
January 23, 2013
Focused only on the portions of the book dealing with British sea power between 1815-1945. Kennedy provides a good overview, and does an excellent job linking the economy to sea power.
April 11, 2013
While Kennedy is a titan in his field, I find his prose style rather too dense for the casual reader.
April 29, 2023
Another very good but now somewhat dated book, covering British naval strategy over centuries.
Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews