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Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860
This study concentrates on the interplay between technology, navies and state building in a long-term perspective. For the first time a broad survey has been made of the size of the navies and the production of warships from the Renaissance to the mid-19th century. The aim of the study is to explain the role of the navies in the process of monopolization of violence to the states, their position as growing organizations within the states and the interplay between dynamics and inertia within established institutions with a long life-span. The method is mainly comparative and as far as possible all European and American navies have been taken into consideration, including oared flotillas. There are extensive appendices and tables on the size and structure of the navies.
- GenresHistory
752 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1993
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April 19, 2022
During the 16th and 17th centuries, the navies of Europe underwent a significant evolution. Whereas medieval states composed their maritime forces out of merchant vessels pressed into service on an as-needed basis, their early modern successors increasingly maintained permanent fleets of purpose-built warships for naval warfare. This was no small undertaking, as such efforts required expensive facilities to build and maintain such vessels, a professional officer corps to operate them, and a stable source of revenue sufficient enough to finance this new institution. Accomplishing all of this was only possible with a bureaucracy large enough to collect the necessary taxes and administer the new military organization, which consequently contributed to the growth of state power in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries.
Scholars have long written about these developments piecemeal by describing aspects of this transformation from a topical or national perspective. By contrast Jan Glete adopts a much broader focus in order to provide a macro-level account of this phenomenon. Employing both quantitative data and the full range of available scholarship, he offers a comparative study of the rise of state navies in the early modern era and how they became the critical tools for the state’s monopolization of the use of violence at sea. In the process, he shows how the dual technological and organizational transformations played out throughout Europe and North America, and the roles these changes played in determining the successes and failures for states involved.
Undertaking such a work is no small task. As Glete demonstrates, much of the available data defies easy comparison, as European states in that era often used different units of measurement and collected information in a haphazard fashion. Yet the very fact that data was being collected illustrates the increasing role played by state administration in managing maritime forces. Whereas medieval warfare was often outsourced to local actors or military contractors, early modern states assumed greater control in order to ensure that the demands of various interest groups for naval protection were met successfully. Contributing to this was the concurrent adoption of gunpowder artillery in naval warfare. These required expensive ships specially designed to mount and use these weapons, which changed the focus of naval warfare from boatloads of men fighting in direct contact with one another to gun platforms exchanging cannon fire.
These developments were neither sudden nor uniform. Glete emphasizes this by describing the regional differences in naval warfare. Combat in the Baltic took place under different circumstances and between different foes than combat in the Atlantic. In several navies, mercenary forces and rowed galleys continued to play important roles in naval warfare, such as in battles fought in shallow waters. The expanding geographic interests of the major European maritime powers, however, increasingly made sail-powered and cannon-armed ships the standard form of warship built by states during this period.
As states invested more in their navies, debates arose as to what roles these growing fleets should perform. Merchants concerned with overseas trade lobbied for a force of oceangoing cruisers that could control the sea lanes, while advocates for a navy capable of resisting seaborne invasions and breaking blockades wanted a battle fleet in which firepower took priority over endurance. These arguments played a decisive role in shaping naval doctrines for the various states, which were reflected in the standardized warships designs they adopted. Such was the importance of these debates that their results influenced how European states pursued policy goals and waged war, to the degree of determining the outcomes even before a shot was fired.
Such a summary of the basics of Glete’s argument cannot convey the richness of the detail he provides in his text. His book is chock full of information taken from the wealth of historical research on the era. The tables and graphs that pepper his text underscore the enormous effort he put into collecting and collating the data he uses to support his conclusions. His modest claims throughout the book for his achievements belie the importance of his study both as an analysis of state development in the early modern world and of Western naval warfare during this era. Simply put, nobody interested in either of these subjects can afford to ignore this indispensable work, which makes a convincing case for the role played by navies in the formation of states in early modern Europe.
Scholars have long written about these developments piecemeal by describing aspects of this transformation from a topical or national perspective. By contrast Jan Glete adopts a much broader focus in order to provide a macro-level account of this phenomenon. Employing both quantitative data and the full range of available scholarship, he offers a comparative study of the rise of state navies in the early modern era and how they became the critical tools for the state’s monopolization of the use of violence at sea. In the process, he shows how the dual technological and organizational transformations played out throughout Europe and North America, and the roles these changes played in determining the successes and failures for states involved.
Undertaking such a work is no small task. As Glete demonstrates, much of the available data defies easy comparison, as European states in that era often used different units of measurement and collected information in a haphazard fashion. Yet the very fact that data was being collected illustrates the increasing role played by state administration in managing maritime forces. Whereas medieval warfare was often outsourced to local actors or military contractors, early modern states assumed greater control in order to ensure that the demands of various interest groups for naval protection were met successfully. Contributing to this was the concurrent adoption of gunpowder artillery in naval warfare. These required expensive ships specially designed to mount and use these weapons, which changed the focus of naval warfare from boatloads of men fighting in direct contact with one another to gun platforms exchanging cannon fire.
These developments were neither sudden nor uniform. Glete emphasizes this by describing the regional differences in naval warfare. Combat in the Baltic took place under different circumstances and between different foes than combat in the Atlantic. In several navies, mercenary forces and rowed galleys continued to play important roles in naval warfare, such as in battles fought in shallow waters. The expanding geographic interests of the major European maritime powers, however, increasingly made sail-powered and cannon-armed ships the standard form of warship built by states during this period.
As states invested more in their navies, debates arose as to what roles these growing fleets should perform. Merchants concerned with overseas trade lobbied for a force of oceangoing cruisers that could control the sea lanes, while advocates for a navy capable of resisting seaborne invasions and breaking blockades wanted a battle fleet in which firepower took priority over endurance. These arguments played a decisive role in shaping naval doctrines for the various states, which were reflected in the standardized warships designs they adopted. Such was the importance of these debates that their results influenced how European states pursued policy goals and waged war, to the degree of determining the outcomes even before a shot was fired.
Such a summary of the basics of Glete’s argument cannot convey the richness of the detail he provides in his text. His book is chock full of information taken from the wealth of historical research on the era. The tables and graphs that pepper his text underscore the enormous effort he put into collecting and collating the data he uses to support his conclusions. His modest claims throughout the book for his achievements belie the importance of his study both as an analysis of state development in the early modern world and of Western naval warfare during this era. Simply put, nobody interested in either of these subjects can afford to ignore this indispensable work, which makes a convincing case for the role played by navies in the formation of states in early modern Europe.
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