Das antike Griechenland: Eine neue Geschichte

by Josiah Ober, Martin Bayer (Translator)

Die politisch-kulturelle Blüte des antiken Griechenlands ist eine der faszinierendsten Epochen der Menschheitsgeschichte. Unter Einbeziehung neuer politik- und wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Perspektiven hat Josiah Ober eine aufsehenerregende, neue Gesamtdarstellung und Deutung des klassischen Griechenland verfasst.

Josiah Ober erzählt die Geschichte vom Aufstieg und Niedergang des antiken Griechenland aufregend neu als »big history«. Er greift die höchst aktuelle Frage nach der Leistungs- und Erfolgsfähigkeit von Staaten im Sinne einer modernen Universalgeschichte für das 21. Jahrhundert auf. Eindrucksvoll und mit aktuellen Bezügen zeigt er am klassischen Griechenland, wie erst wirtschaftliches Wachstum, ein hohes Maß an Gleichheit sowie bürgerstaatliche Teilhabe die einzigartige Kultur der Hellenen ermöglichten. Es entsteht ein völlig neues Bild des antiken Hellas: nicht mehr eine wirtschaftlich rückständig-gleichgültige Sklavenhaltergesellschaft, sondern ein Netzwerk von Stadtstaaten, die ihr Wachstumspotential optimal ausnutzen. Schließlich gelingt es ihnen, die am Ende doch übermächtigen »Raubstaaten« Makedonien und Rom so zu prägen, dass das Erbe ihrer Kultur in einzigartiger Weise präsent blieb – bis heute!

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Ancient History, Greece, Economics, Ancient, Politics

561 pages, Kindle Edition

First published May 3, 2015

About the author

Josiah Ober is Tsakopoulos-Kounalakis Professor in honor of Constantine Mitsotakis, and Professor of Classics and Political Science, at Stanford University.

Reviews

[Σωτήρης Αδαμαρέτσος · Rating 5 out of 5]

«Το αίνιγμα με το οποίο καταπιάνομαι στις σελίδες που ακολουθούν είναι το εξής: "Γιατί ήταν πλούσια η αρχαία Ελλάδα;". Τούτο πάει να πει: Με ποιον τρόπο και για ποιον λόγο, από τον 8ο μέχρι τον 4ο αιώνα π.Χ., η οικονομία της κυρίως Ελλάδας (της ηπειρωτικής Ελλάδας και των νησιών της ανατολικής Μεσογείου) και του ευρύτερου ελληνικού κόσμου (στον οποίο περιλαμβάνονται η Σικελία, η νότια Ιταλία, οι ακτές του Εύξεινου Πόντου, η βόρεια Αφρική κ.ά.) πέτυχε τόσο υψηλές επιδόσεις; Ποια ήταν τα αίτια και τα αιτιατά αυτής της μακράς περιόδου κατά την οποία οι υλικές συνθήκες της ζωής τόσο πολλών Ελλήνων βελτιώθηκαν σε τόσο δραματικό βαθμό; Γιατί ο πληθυσμός του ελληνικού κόσμου αυξήθηκε από μερικές εκατοντάδες χιλιάδες ανθρώπους, την εποχή που περιγράφει ο Όμηρος, σε 8-9 εκατομμύρια ανθρώπους (μπορεί και παραπάνω) τον καιρό του Αριστοτέλη; Πώς μπόρεσε η κατά κεφαλήν κατανάλωση να αυξηθεί τόσο εντυπωσιακά στο ίδιο διάστημα; Πώς μπορούμε να εξηγήσουμε τα σχετικά μεγάλα και καλοχτισμένα σπίτια και την καλή και πλούσια σε πρωτεΐνες διατροφή των Ελλήνων που δεν ανήκαν στις τάξεις των ελίτ κατά την κλασική εποχή; Πώς εξηγείται το σχετικά χαμηλό επίπεδο οικονομικής ανισότητας στην κλασική Αθήνα;

Τα ερωτήματα αυτά άπτονται σχεδόν κάθε πτυχής του αρχαιοελληνικού πολιτισμού. Δεν μπορούμε να εξηγήσουμε τα εντυπωσιακά πνευματικά επιτεύγματα των αρχαίων Ελλήνων στα πεδία της τέχνης, της λογοτεχνίας, της φιλοσοφίας και της επιστήμης, δίχως να αναφερθούμε στις υλικές συνθήκες εντός των οποίων αυτά έλαβαν χώρα. Επιπλέον, δεδομένου ότι ο κατοπινός δυτικός πολιτισμός οικοδομήθηκε, τουλάχιστον εν μέρει, πάνω στα θεμέλια του αρχαιοελληνικού πνεύματος, τα ερωτήματα αναφορικά με το πώς και γιατί αναπτύχθηκε η αρχαιοελληνική οικονομία, αλλά και γιατί αυτή η ανάπτυξη δεν κράτησε για πάντα, μας αφορούν άμεσα εφόσον θέλουμε να κατανοήσουμε τον κόσμο στον οποίο ζούμε σήμερα.

Μονάχα καταλαβαίνοντας το πέρασμα του ελληνικού κόσμου από τη σχετική φτώχεια της εποχής του Ομήρου στη σχετική ευμάρεια της εποχής του Αριστοτέλη μπορούμε και να καταλάβουμε σε τι συνίσταται αυτό που μερικές φορές αποκαλείται "Ελληνικό Θαύμα". Εξίσου σημαντικό, όμως, είναι το γεγονός ότι, μελετώντας την υλική βάση του ελληνικού πολιτισμού, παύουμε να χρειαζόμαστε την έννοια του ιστορικού θαύματος. Μπορούμε έτσι να αφήσουμε στην άκρη τις διάφορες μυστικιστικές και νεφελώδεις εξηγήσεις σχετικά με την εντυπωσιακή πνευματική άνθηση της αρχαίας Ελλάδας. Ο θαυμασμός και το δέος μας απέναντι στα ελληνικά επιτεύγματα δεν μειώνονται καθόλου όταν επιχειρούμε να κατανοήσουμε τα υλικά θεμέλια πάνω στα οποία χτίστηκε το λαμπρό εποικοδόμημα του ελληνικού πνεύματος».

[Marc Lamot · Rating 3 out of 5]

There’s a fair amount of political theory, quantitative history, statistics, game theory, and even some specialized biology in this book. Josiah Ober (Stanford University) approaches the history of Ancient Greece from propositions relevant to our time: can we learn lessons from the success, and subsequent decline, of the Greek democratic poleis? I'm a more classically trained historian, and so that approach strikes me as rather tricky, and as a consequence I'm not entirely convinced of the book's methodology. After all, the available sources for antiquity, even for ancient Greece, are far from abundant, and there are numerous essential domains where our knowledge is completely uncertain. Ober is therefore taking a risk here, especially in the first five theoretical chapters.

What follows, about two-thirds of the book, is a more classical historical account, in which he tests theory against reality. I remain skeptical, but that doesn't detract from the fact that what Ober does is at least stimulating, challenging, and, to a certain extent, thorough and engaging. More in my History account on Goodreads: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show....

[Phil · Rating 5 out of 5]

This rather recent book has created a bit of a buzz among classicists. Rightly so because it comes at the familiar problem of explaining Greece's rise in the 6th and 5th centuries BC and its fall in the later 4th century in a rather different way than normal. While Ober demonstrates a thorough knowledge of the sources of this familiar period, he combines that knowledge with social science approaches such as game theory, demography and statistical analysis. Central to his project is his use of the Mogen Hansen's and Thomas Nielsen's Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis which supplies the statistics for Ober's efforts. I can't evaluate the reliability of those statistics, mind you, because I haven't looked at the Inventory, although I suspect that they are rather fuzzy around the edges like most 'stats' for the ancient world. That means that one does have to remember the general unreliability of the numbers when one looks at Ober's conclusion. I don't think this fuzziness is crucial, largely because Ober is aware of the issues and is careful how far he pushes his data.

Ober's main argument is that the cultural efflorescence (that is, flowering) of Classical Greece was fed by the rise of citizen-based city states, especially democracy. He argues that the de-centralized authority of the democracy and the rise of economic/social specialization created conditions which enriched much of Greece and allowed for a cultural flowering unlike anything seen before it. Further, he argues that this efflorescence merely slowed down in the Hellenistic era because the Macedonians were astute enough to borrow aspects of this state and to permit its subject cities to remain democratic in form. Ober argues his point well. His language is that of social science which may put off some habitual Classical readers, but, once, you get past that you can see that Ober's understanding of his sources is superb. I'm not sure that it changed my mind about much of what he wrote, but I suspect that is because I don't think that Ober swims very far upstream of Classical scholarship right now. His main point, I think, is generally accepted, even if his language and methodologies are different. He is firmly in a school of Classical scholarship which is optimistic about the achievements of the Greeks, especially the Athenians.

Yet, I did have moments of discomfort. There is more than a little assumption just below the surface that the efflorescence that Athens' democracy lead has direct relevance to our to own efflorescence that the West is experiencing. I think what I find troubling about that is that, just as Ober doesn't really do justice to the darker sides of Athenian democracy, I'm not sure that this kind of comparison can avoid justifying the darker sides of our own experience with democracy and cultural flowering. I wonder, if in a generation or so, this assumption will look as dated as Ronald Syme's equation of Augustan Rome to totalitarian states which still plagues Roman studies with its over-estimate of the coercive power of the ancient state. Of course, this kind of judgement of later scholar can't be avoided, but, it it seems clear now, what will it look like then. Of course, if one wants to avoid annoying the future academy, no one would write. So, perhaps it is better, as it were, to sin boldly in expressing one's opinions.

Despite that caveat, Ober's book is superb and well-worth reading. I know that I'll be using it to update my units on Classical Greece in my Classical Civilization course this year. It is well worth reading and, re-reading.

[Sense of History]

The somewhat clichéd title of this book ("The Rise and Fall") seems to herald a classical historical overview. Nothing could be further from the truth, or at least not entirely. About two-thirds of it does indeed follow the chronology of the 8th to the 3rd century BCE, from early Greece to the conquest by Macedonia. And that section is thorough, detailed, and balanced. But Ober's focus is clearly political and presentist. He wants to draw lessons from the rise and fall of Greece that are relevant to democracy today: “If we can explain the rise of classical Greece, we may gain a better sense of what it took to bootstrap the wealth and democracy package in the first place. If we can explain the fall of the Greek political order—that is, why major city-states did not maintain full independence for longer than they did—we may better understand democratic fragility.”

To this end, Ober first presents five chapters with a wealth of political and economic theory, statistics, a comparison between Ancient Greece, the Italian cities of the 14th century, the Dutch Golden Age of the 17th century, and even our modern era, and even a comparison of ancient Greek civilization with the behavior of ants (!). To be honest: this was a tough nut to crack for me, and some passages were clearly beyond my capabilities. And I also had some methodological questions: do we have enough source material to allow for a quantitative comparison between ages with some much time in between? Is that even epistemologically sound enough? And can you simply apply current political theories and propositions to the Ancient Greek period?

Josiah Ober answers all these questions with a resounding yes, although he also acknowledges how tricky they are. And let's be honest: he's certainly not just anyone. Ober is a trained historian, a specialist in the Ancient Greek period, affiliated with both the Classics and Political Science departments at Stanford University, CA, and the Hoover Institution. So, not someone to talk nonsense. I must concede that Ober certainly poses the right questions, and I find his starting points, which also constitute his conclusions, entirely plausible. Namely, that the extreme labor specialization within and between regions, and the specific citizen-oriented attitude of the Greek poleis, are the reason why Ancient Greek civilization was able to reach such high peaks, and still inspires. I'm somewhat less convinced by his thesis about the "fall" of the Greek cities, that he attributes principally to the cunning copying work of Philip of Macedon. Nevertheless, this is an interesting book that is stimulating because of its unusual approach.

[Brandon · Rating 2 out of 5]

I found this book to be pretty terrible. I'm still not sure if this is a book or a textbook, and either way it is poorly written. The book at times felt like an endless stream of vacuous academic pomp, with sentences such as, "Per the argument developed in chapter 3, the high-level phenomenon of Hellas’ wealth is causally related to the microlevel of more or less rational choices made by many social, interdependent, justice-seeking individuals." I suspect that Ober writes like this because he is worried that someone might actually understand what he's trying to say and realize that it's bullshit.

Speaking as an outsider of this discipline I run the risk of sounding very ignorant here, but I was completely unconvinced by the evidence and data that Ober presented. But if I am wrong or mistaken about the data, it's still Ober's fault because he presented it very poorly and unconvincingly. This is the first fact that I found to be completely unbelievable:

The overall population density of the ancient Greek world was, based on these calculations, about 44 persons per km2—very close to that of two of the most highly developed European states of the sixteenth and seventeenth century: Holland (in 1561) at 45.3/km2 and England and Wales (in 1688) at 44/km.

I just can't believe this. As he mentions shortly afterwards, Greece is 80% mountains, whereas Holland is almost entirely flat. How could the Greek world, in 400 BC, have possibly had the same population density as 16th century Holland?
But wait! There's more:

Rapid growth of urban populations has historically been associated with the spread of disease, and, e.g., in nineteenth century England and Holland, with squalid living conditions in crowded tenements. There is no evidence that these dismal conditions pertained in fourth century Greek towns.

I have an easy answer for this - because ancient Greece's population density was wayyyy less than his probably wildly optimistic estimates!
But there's even more - he says that wages for laborers in 4th century Athens were equivalent to wages in Holland from 1500-1800 - he follows up his lengthy analysis by mentioning that "The evidence for late fourth century Athenian wages is anecdotal." Wow.
Shortly after this, he presents a wildly optimistic estimate of Greek economic growth from 1000-300 BC (0.15%/year, which is actually a LOT given it's over a span of 700 years) and then says "Elite status in Athens can be defined by a liturgical fortune of 3–4 talents. Assuming a conventional annual return of 1:12, such a fortune would in fact yield a living standard of roughly 10 times bare survival." So... 0.15% growth rate per year... but he's "assuming" a "conventional" annual return on investments of 8.3%??? Wow. Even in the modern-day US you should be happy to "assume" that type of "conventional" annual return.

What annoys me the most about this book is that the author uses such annoying and pompous 'academic' language to make it sound like he's doing a 'scientific' analysis of the causes of classical Greece's efflorescence - "This method allows us to ask whether or not actual changes, over time and in different parts of the Greek world, are parsimoniously explained by the theoretical framework." BUT, his 'science' is founded on a great big pile of optimistic assumptions fine-tuned to support his hypotheses.
What's annoying about this is that the historical record alone, without any wind-baggy bullshit, supports his arguments. The latter two-thirds of the book, where he describes Greek history, were actually enjoyable and I learned a lot of interesting stuff and was convinced that his hypotheses are correct. But the first third of the book concerns me about the state of his discipline, because so much of his 'data' and 'analysis' are clearly just super vague estimates that he construes as hard facts.

That said, Greek history is super interesting. I like how he described the history of Athens, Sparta, and Sicily in detail, and I like his hypothesis that the Greek efflorescence was in large part due to a robust ecology of over 1,000 city-states competing and cooperating with each other. Their innovations in government institutions, finance, and warfare among other things seem to have really been unique and ahead of their time. Moreover, I was given a new appreciation for how complex Greek history is - there were so many things happening, some in succession, some all at once. The Greek poleis seemed to careen from crisis to crisis - the Persians try to invade; Athens builds an empire; Athens tries to conquer Sicily; Athens and Sparta fight the Peloponnesian War; Sparta wins and tries to build an empire; Persia is meddling in everything; Athens and Thebes are fighting; Thebes defeats Sparta; Philip II and Alexander the Great conquer everything and usher in the Hellenistic Age; etc etc. It's so interesting though how what is now kind of a tiny sleepy backwater was once so big and dynamic. It was a time when Sparta dominated Messenian helots; Athens patrolled the Aegean to protect its supply of grain from Black Sea poleis; island states such as Rhodes and Lesbos were important and wealthy; and Syracuse in Sicily had to fight off Carthaginians (with help from Corinth). Another thing I found interesting was that the state of Athenian government was in constant flux over time - sometimes a democracy, sometimes a Spartan-backed oligarchy or tyranny. Even when Athens was a democracy, it took centuries for the Athenians to fiddle with their laws to make their government stable. There were many important legislators such as Solon, Cleisthenes, and some other guys whose names I've already forgotten. If Ober had stuck to just describing actual Greek history, the book would have been a lot better.

[James Klagge · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great read for serious fans of ancient Greece. This is a historical survey of ancient Greece that uses an impressive amount of economic evidence and the tools of game theory to account for the rise and fall of the city-state ecology of ancient Greece. Instead of focusing on Athens, the book looks at the whole environment of literally hundreds of city-states. I didn't realize there was so much evidence about such a variety of city-states.
I am a philosopher, rather than an economist or a historian, but I was somewhat unimpressed by his account of Aristotle. Ober conjectures (282-3) that it was Aristotle's views on the state which led Philip to choose Aristotle as the tutor for Alexander. This seems to me unlikely. To the extent that we can understand the evolution of Aristotle's views over time, he seems to have been quite influenced by Plato during the years before he was a tutor. The views that Philip might have found sympathetic were likely not developed until after his time as a tutor. In fact some have conjectured that it was Aristotle's familiarity with Alexander that led him to develop some of his views as he did. In any case, this point was not well-argued by Ober. However, this book made me more interested in reading the later books in Aristotle's Politics about less-than-ideal states, since they are clearly written in light of the issues that Ober raises.
While I found the use of game-theory illuminating, I was surprised there was no mention of the work of Axelrod on The Evolution Of Cooperation. The secure environment in which economic growth could occur required long-term expectations that depend on reputations.
In sum, there is a lot of info and detail that might bore most people, but it is put to good and interesting use to address large and important issues.

[Betawolf · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting approach to the much-loved genre of narrative history. Rather than take the classic approach via great figures and a driving central story, however, Ober approaches his topic through the more quantitative lenses of economics. This includes both recounting the story the (limited) data can provide about the ancient shifts in wealth and trade, and also building explanatory models that focus on the mechanisms of incentives.

Essentially, Ober presents the history of the Hellas region as a natural experiment in providing a "market" for Greek governance. The geographical peculiarities of Greece favoured many small polities, each operating according to their own communal rules. The necessity of organising armed forces for local wars, and the lack of effective technology for subjugation, together urged Greek polities in the direction of participatory governments, either oligarchies of restrained elites or, most famously, democracies. The many simultaneous experiments in government, in a system promoting ideological interchange and competition, fostered (Ober contends) rapid development of cultural technologies, leading to the development of citizenship, federations, and due process rights for all individuals. It's interesting as a reflection on how to create systems that foster this development, and its historiographic application is given a convincing demonstration.

Some parts of the book are a little dry. Before the narrative takes off and Ober shows he also knows how to tell interesting stories, the first couple of chapters of scene-setting and outlining are a bit hard to get through. The end is also a little underdeveloped: Ober leaves off his tale around the end of Alexander's reign, but it's not exactly clear why -- he admits that the economic efflorescence that interests us about this period extends to the second century BCE, but seems unwilling to properly explore why the semi-stable situation under the Seleucids eventually decayed. There is a compelling narrative about the rise, but not the fall.

One of the oddest parts of the book to me was Ober's discussion of the mechanisms of the Delian League. As Ober described it, the League was almost neoliberal in operation -- expansive in a profit-focused manner, paying slightly too much attention to the rational economic interests of itself and its opponents, leaving it open to surprise when opponents acted in an irrational manner. I cannot decide if this is a true rendition of ancient behaviour, couched in modern language, or if Ober is projecting back some modern ideology to describe events motivated in a more alien manner.

[Bakunin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic. Amazing summery of previous work on Ancient Greece while providing new data on how median incomes of Greek citizens. Ober does a great job of explaining the rise of classical Greece by emphasizing its geopolitical position as well as the development of key institutions which low transaction costs of trade thereby enabling rational agents to specialize in certain trades. An average Athenian citizen during the heyday of democracy had the same median income as a citizen in 1600's Holland. Imagine that! The data provide details which allow one to better understand the period. I didn't know that there were so many Greek poleis (over 1000) and that there were even more democracies after the fall of Athens during the postclassical period (3rd to 1st Century BC).

Did Athens really exert tyranny over other poleis through the Delian league? According to Ober the tax paid to Athens for mainting their navy (and thereby peace) was roughly 2-3% of the GDP of the that poleis. This league was also started in a join venture with Sparta in order to ensure that Persia wouldn't attack individual city-states. Athens also standardized currency which also lowered the transaction cost of doing trade. Athens had however no way of monitoring each poleis which meant that trade was also done outside of the mediteranean, with Egypt and Persia. Compare that to the type of force with which Sparta controlled its subjects!

The only drawback is that the tone is somewhat academic and therefore the author tends - on occasion - get into a lot of data from the period. I was more interested in the outline of what this new data says about the Greeks and the inferences the author was able to draw from them. Other than that it's a great read.


Read this book!

[Justin Evans · Rating 1 out of 5]

Fairness warning: my rating is unfair. I'm just trying to correct for all the equally unfair five star reviews. This is a solid three star book. My review is more negative than it should be, only because others have been too positive.

The three stars are due to the impressive attempt to study the actual material conditions of an ancient society. Two cheers! My two negative stars were caused by i) the book's neo-liberal triumphalism, and ii) its extremely shoddy historical thinking, which claims causation where there is maybe, kind of, sort of, perhaps, some correlation, but also just ignores historical events that can't be reduced to numbers.

i) Little more needs to be said. The point of this book is that Classical Greece was Great because it was more or less a modern, neoliberal state; all such states, we can assume, are, in turn, great. This is transparently false (e.g., they had slavery and we have capitalism; also, we are not great). I hesitate to say that Ober's book caused Trump's election victory, but one might think its success was a sign that certain portions of the American population were at least a little bit out of touch with reality.

ii) If you have the book in front of you, you might like to have a look at figure 4.3, on page 99. This is Ober's summary of his data. It is supposed to show that 'core Greece' reached an exceptionally high level of wealth because of democracy. A quick check will suggest that core Greece's ascent started around 1000 B.C., reached a plateau during around the end of the Athenian and Spartan empires, and then rapidly descended back to historical norms. I would have thought this suggested that imperialism, rather than democracy, was the driving force behind Greece's wealth (and, if I were a good Stanford classicist, I would then immediately hint that something similar might be true of the modern West). But I would only say that because I have no Panglossian wish to pretend I live in a post-imperialist, democratic utopia, or that anyone else ever does or has, for that matter.

[Jerrod · Rating 3 out of 5]

You should also read this review: http://newramblerreview.com/book-revi...

I both liked and disliked this treatment of ancient Greece. Ober presents a vast array of quantitative history that should be taken seriously. If you take measurements of how much wheat a laborer can buy with a day's wages, then 4th century BC Athens was as rich as pre-industrial Holland, and Greece didn't regain its ancient living standard until the late 1800s. Ober also presents inequality measures based on the distribution of house sizes.

At the same time I just don't think his thesis that economic growth resulted from rule-based egalitarianism and that "competition between states within the decentralized city-state ecology created incentives for cooperation among many individuals with shared identities and interests" was well-supported by his evidence. He cruised right over the issue of slavery in his discussions of egalitarianism. He praises Athenian democracy's ability to choose capable military leaders without seeming to notice that his examples of Syracusean tyrannical military success at least make his claims about Athenian military success underdetermined. I'm concerned that much of his optimism about the welfare of ancient Greece relies too heavily on data from Athens. If people were migrating to Athens for work and if there was a significant non-citizen, non-slave population in Athens, that would be because workers could find higher wages in Athens. Making claims based on Athenian wages would then overstate the living standards of the broader Greek world. Towards the end, Ober seems to start taking all evidence as supporting his view. "In order to answer the question of why Philip succeeded where Darius failed [in conquering Greece], we need to look at how... Philip's Macedon was like an advanced fourth century Greek polis." Ober goes on to tell of how Philip employed many Greeks, especially for their financial expertise. So Philip conquered Greece by being Greekier than the Greeks? Or maybe we could just say that Macedon had a shorter supply chain than Persia when fighting the Greeks!

While I think there is a lot to Ober's thesis connecting culture and institutions with economic growth, I don't think he has supported his case well enough. I think the evidence he presents is more conducive to the argument that integrated markets and decreased transaction costs lead to economic growth, with Ober's emphasis on decentralization being a weak link in the argument. Athens was able to reduce piracy and create a dominant standard of money. And while Ober is a bit down on the economic successes of Rome, the evidence suggests that dominant money standards and integrated markets were why that empire also experienced some level of "efflorescence" (I really hate that term). So we have examples of decentralized and centralized systems that are relatively successful in generating economic growth. Even Greece's success came from a move towards marginally less decentralization.

The worst thing about the book was the interminable chapter comparing Greece to ant colonies... dear God why?

[Nick Klagge · Rating 3 out of 5]

I picked up this book because my dad, who also has an interest in Ancient Greece, gave it a very positive (5-star) review. I liked it, but ended up feeling that it didn't fulfill its initial promise.

I loved the initial chapters of the book. Ober starts out the book by trying to demonstrate empirically that the Greek world experienced significant economic growth over the period of several centuries that he's interested in analyzing. Of course, back then there was no NBER publishing GDP statistics! Instead, Ober draws on several very creative approaches to provide circumstantial quantification of growth over the period--for example, average sizes of houses from archaeological excavations over the period, or sizes of coin hoards identified in different periods. I always love this type of analysis (see also work by e.g. Branko Milanovic or Gregory Clark analyzing ancient economies). Really I wanted the whole book to be stuff like this. But in fact it is only the first couple of chapters.

The main part of the book is Ober's analysis of what caused this period of "efflorescence." His theory seems credible, if not particularly earth-shattering--Greek city-states flourished due to a combination of rule of law and citizen-oriented institutions that encouraged investment and specialization. (I don't think I am wrong to detect a tiny bit of rah-rah Americanism in his analysis--not that it is necessarily misguided.) But on the whole I am not sure I got a lot more out of reading Ober's analysis than out of reading Thucydides. (Talk about setting a high bar!) Although he does draw on some interesting scholarly evidence about the thousands of smaller Greek city-states, the focus ends up necessarily falling mostly on Sparta and, as you might expect from his thesis, Athens. I did learn a fair amount that I didn't know before about both the Hellenic colonies in Sicily (including Syracuse, which I didn't realize was on par with Athens and Sparta in size and influence) and those in Asia Minor. The structure of the later chapters of the book is a fairly straight-ahead narrative of events of the type you might find in any historical treatment. Ober does show some interest in using game theory to analyze political equilibria--I believe this may be a main focus of his academic work--but perhaps because he is trying to appeal to a broad audience, the treatment in the book is only sporadic and feels perfunctory. I did not really feel that it added much to the analysis already present in narrative form.

It was also interesting reading parts of this book shortly after reading James Scott's _Seeing Like a State_ and _Against the Grain_. Ober references Scott's work at one point, I think in connection to the way the mountainous terrain of Greece made it difficult for traditional grain-and-cavalry based land empires to rule. But he follows a pattern that Scott mentions in the latter book, which is to assume that "civilizational collapse" as indicated by lack of palaces and other monumental archaeological evidence means worse conditions for average people. (This is particularly in the context of the disappearance of the Minoan civilization.) Scott's view is that what evidence there is suggests that average people might have been better off in non-empire conditions, even if they don't produce cool stuff for us to study. I believe Ober does offer some circumstantial evidence for his contention (probably around house sizes in excavations). I suppose Scott wouldn't claim that average people are *always* better off in such conditions, but I'd be interested in seeing what he had to say.

Side note: boy, did reading this book bring me back to playing the original "Civilization" computer game, which I spent a ton of time doing as a kid. I played as "the Greeks" (led by Alexander) pretty often and clearly remember the dark green color of their cities. Only upon reflection while reading this book did I really think about how goofy it was to (a) have Alexander be the leader (since he was Macedonian), (b) have the first two cities in your empire be "Athens" and "Sparta," etc. (Although it is not any more silly than having "the Chinese" be led by Mao, or "the Americans" led by Lincoln.) But Ober's book contains quite a lot of tactical discussions around phalanxes, cavalry, triremes, catapults, city walls, and the like. I feel like Ober and Sid Meier (creator of the game) would enjoy geeking out together!

[Marks54 · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a learned and fun book about Classical Greece by a Stanford history professor. I have mixed feelings about the book, although if it is not a “4” it is certainly close. I am torn between recognizing the learning, skill, and insight in the book and at the same time suspecting that there might be a bit too much artifice on display. The book and its perspective are controversial - and perhaps a bit too clever.

The book moves away from a simple chronicle of the history to a more aggressive view of history as answering clear questions expressed in study hypotheses and supported by considerable data and innovative methods. What is not to like about that?

The problem motivating the book is to explain (1) why the periods of wonder for Ancient Greece —periods that are so well known due to the adoration of the British Imperial elites for the Greek tradition — took place at all, given the social and political reality surrounding Greece 2500+ years ago, (2) why the influence of Greek culture continued after the city-states had been conquered by Alexander the Great, and (3) why the memories of Greek accomplishment persisted up to the present as they have done, even though Greece as a political and economic reality has not so prospered.

Now I was not really aware that these were significant problems. There has been some prior history about classical Greece. The Greeks of the times, themselves, also proved to be savvy recorders and chroniclers of events. But ok - I get it. It is increasingly hard to get people to read serious scholarship (or any scholarship) on the classical era. So what is wrong with working up the story a bit more than is typically done, making use of the best and newest data sources, tying in some interesting research on ant colonies (yes, that’s true), and writing the entire package up well?

So what happens? It is not like there are spoilers here. The story that Professor Ober comes up with is that the Greeks did prosper both culturally and economically relative to other societies in close proximity. They did not because they were more decentralized, more entrepreneurial, and better networked. They stayed influential under the Macedonians because they were good at passing their ideas on and their ideas proved valuable within a larger empire. This is using the insights of historical political economy (a la North and colleagues) and applying it to the Classical Greek experience. This actually rings true and it is certainly different from conventional treatments.

I am still trying to wrap my hands around Classical Greece being transformed into a business case study, complete with data. (All that is missing is a set of discussion questions.). So was Herodotus really talking about the Greeks versus the Persians or was it in today’s terms Airbus versus Boeing?

This requires a bit more thought, but the book was well done and entertaining.

[Rob Marshall · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent tome written by one of the absolute world experts in the world of Classical Greek studies.

[Josh Fiore · Rating 1 out of 5]

"How an economist might think about ancient Greece." - Unfortunately for the reader, Ober's economists of choice are Acemoglu, Robinson, and (somehow) Schumpeter.

[Damian C. · Rating 2 out of 5]

A deep analysis of an ancient civilization's economy is no easy task. Presented in this comprehensive book, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece is a passionate and evidential offering. Filled with sources to other research to support statements made here, it feels very compelling and trustworthy. There are many visual aids that further support and help depict the factual evidence within its pages. To readers with both minor and major interests in Classical Greece, there is something new to learn in each topic covered. A real sense of understanding how this civilization actually functioned is achieved based on the statements made and supported by the evidence appropriately sourced.

Chances were taken by reading this book as I read it more like a novel than an encyclopedia. This was the first of its kind in my leisure reading experience, and it may have been more than I could handle. I truly enjoy the topic of ancient history and what readings on founding civilizations have to offer. Please do not be persuaded by my rating to steer clear of it. The author Josiah Ober cultivates an invaluable breath of knowledge that can be highly beneficial to anyone searching for an in-depth analysis of Classical Greece. With visual aids via charts, graphs, and maps, a better understanding of what the pages are presenting offering is met. The book is a fun read for those who are truly interested and be aware that it will push you beyond your limits of reading into new paths.

[Rajiv · Rating 4 out of 5]

An exciting exegesis of classical history rife with economic theory: what more could you ask from a book in the "rise and fall" vein?

Some of Ober's reasoning for an unparalleled efflorescence in Ancient Greece is a bit circular (e.g. democracy promotes efflorescence so that's why the Greeks were democratic), but overall the book is thoroughly researched and data driven.

Highly recommended to students of history and economics alike.

[Tomislav · Rating 4 out of 5]

Behind this general title lies a much more specific study, a political economy of ancient Greece. It combines behavioral and new institutional economics, public choice theory, international relations theory, and some of Aristotle’s ideas. Ober argues that between 800-300 BCE Greek city-states achieved an extraordinary level of wealth for the premodern era; Greece itself did not match it until 20th century. He attempts to explain this sustained economic growth as a result of exceptional political institutions and social norms. Greek city-states stood out among other premodern societies and were in many ways similar to successful early modern Western societies.

After reading several pages of this book I assumed that it was written by a young, pretentious economist attempting to apply standard scientific concepts to simplistically explain the ancient era. However, Ober is actually an experienced historian specialized in ancient Greece, and that clearly shows later in the book. Nonetheless, it is a highly ambitious book, with a youthful, fresh perspective, and based on some audacious assumptions and projections. Ober aggregates archeological evidence into quantitative data for analysis and modelling, attempting to determine size of cities, population density, income per capita, Gini coefficient and other economic statistics. A lot of this seems a bit too speculative, but political and economic arguments are interesting and convincing. First part of the book presents data, theoretical background, previous studies and general insights. This section is quite lengthy and somewhat haphazard in its exploration of various ideas, including parallels with the evolutionary biology of ants. The book becomes much clearer when it shifts to historical narrative, which fortunately constitutes the majority of its content. It starts with the earliest Greek states and culminates with Macedonian conquest, mostly focusing on Syracuse, Sparta and Athens.

Greeks developed decentralized, rule-based political systems with checks and balances, protections against arbitrary expropriation, reduction of extreme inequality, compromises between social classes, and a reasonable alignment between private and collective interests. Such systems not only fostered competition and cooperation but also encouraged capital investment, reduced transaction costs, and facilitated increased specialization. Cultural norms favored expertise, innovation, risk-taking, long-term thinking, financial prudence and scientific rationality among a significant portion of the citizenry. Even Greek oligarchies displayed a remarkable degree of egalitarianism and orderliness compared to other premodern societies. These norms also extended beyond domestic affairs to shape diplomacy, alliances, and federations. This explains how small city-states managed to endure, despite the challenges posed by wars and empire-building endeavors. Individual entrepreneurship, market exchange and competition encouraged quick dissemination of successful innovations, along with creative destruction of inefficient institutions and regimes. Macedonian conquest was initially not a radical break as Philip expanded numerous Greek traditions and adapted them for the new era, with cities retaining some of their autonomy. However, following the peak in the fourth century, a period of gradual decline set in, leading to oppressive, impoverished conditions typical of premodern societies.

Ober presents ancient Greece as the earliest historical example of the connection between democratic-leaning, free-market regimes and economic development. The framework and ideas which he employs are standard in this area of economics. While it begins a bit confusingly, the sections containing historical narrative are well written, and the book can be understood by readers without background in economics and political philosophy. However, a solid understanding of Greek history could be beneficial, allowing readers to take some of the more speculative ideas with a grain of salt. Although the book garnered controversy on various fronts, Ober’s ideas are far from preposterous. He employs a moderate theoretical approach and the limited available data to draw bold and intriguing conclusions that, while not definitive, remain satisfactory. Overall, it is a thought-provoking book, certainly worth reading.

[Ryan Patrick · Rating 3 out of 5]

Ober offers a provocative argument for the efflorescence of Classical Greece. The driving question of the book was why did Classical Greece achieve such political and cultural heights between 800 and 300 BC, when the rest of Western, and indeed World, History suggests that the path to efflorescence is rooted in the increasing centralization of government authority. Ancient Greece was highly decentralized and downright competitive. But, Ancient Greece developed a concept of citizen-centered government under fair rules and competitive emulation, which led to greater investment in human capital within a marketlike ecology that favored specialization and expertise, both economic and political. If you really want to understand that sentence, you'll have to read the book for yourself. :-)

What I liked about this survey-like treatment of Ancient Greek history was that it was thesis-driven. That did mean that lots of stuff normally included in a general survey got left out, but there are other books and resources to provide you with that. I assigned this to my students in the hopes that it would help them become better readers of real history.

[Jim Cook · Rating 5 out of 5]

(Jim Cook’s review) Ober trained as a political scientist but he has a historian’s insight as well. His book is based on a solid knowledge of classical literature and history as well as modern social science statistical analysis. It’s a relatively unique combination.

For those familiar with Nussbaum’s The Fragility of Goodness you would agree, having read Ober’s text, that a good subtitle for his work would have been “the fragility of democracy.”

I enjoyed reading the book and found his many footnotes to be unobtrusive but informative. In one of them I learned that during the fifth and fourth century Athens had a wide-range of “salaried public slaves.” For example, slaves were the city-states’ currency inspectors (protecting the value of its silver “Owls” from inferior copies); and, other such slaves served as its police force, with powers of arrest and detention over full citizens of Athens!

If you have an interest in this unique and still influential period of human history you will enjoy reading Ober’s thoughtful, well-researched and fascinating book.

[The American Conservative]

"This is a thought-provoking book with great depth. As the great political theorists of the modern era have always known, the ancient Greek experience provides immense empirical material to mine for insights into political science: how we design rules of politics to secure human freedom and well-being. We ignore the experience of classical civilization to our own disadvantage."

Jason Sorens's review: http://www.theamericanconservative.co...

[N Perrin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Well-researched, clearly presented, but reeks too much of social science.

Social science can never be more than pseudoscience, especially when it is applied to history. Ober's explanatory pontifications cloud an otherwise excellent book of history. Still a great overview of the history of classical Greece nonetheless.

[ALEKOS VENERIS · Rating 3 out of 5]

I enjoyed it because I read about the civilization that determined the contemporary western culture. I liked because I read about Athens, which is the city I live. I did not know so many things. Even I knew its fate I was bit sad when I read its lost battles against Spartans and Macedonians. Beyond that the the main and only convincing argument of the book was that Hellenic city states made progress and they were resilient, more than we thought, because they made a somewhat free economy that benefited all.
His attempt to contrast this situation with Hobbs situation, I think , is wrong. The writer gets confused while he tries to explain at the same time why the most city states had democracy and why there wasn't a dominant state most of the time. I think that the city-states were in a way Hobbs' states. The violence was not exercised by a king but by a majority of citizens. As for the reason that it was not created an empire, was that no state-city was strong enough to win the others. When Macedonians appeared this became reality. Everything he said about political theory of Aristoteles and ants was nice to read but irrelevant.
Finally I liked because it made me think that in this age, because they adopted a system of free market , the states-cities became more strong than it was usual then. The unfortunate event was this time of period the economic power was not accompanied with military power. Athenians were rich but this was not enough to keep them independent. Spartans won them, even if they were not as innovative as Athenians. In this way Athenians were ahead of their time. The following centuries in order a state to have a capable military force should first be an economic power. This need led to a capitalist system. The problem is now that the progress of technology has made possible a state to be military powerful without having strong economy. Our situation is like then. A dictator without the restrictions of the democracy can be more nimble than our democratic countries. Our freedom is more fragile than we think

[Will · Rating 3 out of 5]

"[I]n Greece, the distinctive political situation that arose beginning around 800 BCE and persisted for at least the next half-millennium was the differentiator that enabled the world of the city-states to perform economically and culturally at a level much higher than the premodern normal, defined by conditions in the Late Bronze, Early Iron, and early modern periods of Greek history - and indeed, at a level that in some respects matched the exceptionally high-performing early modern societies of Holland and Britain.

Those conclusions are important to us in modernity, not because Greece was the unique origin of the Western tradition or the spark that ignited a putative 'great divergence' between East and West but because classical Greece is the earliest documented case of 'democratic exceptionalism plus efflorescence' - a historically rare combination of economic, cultural, and political conditions pertaining among developed countries in the contemporary world.

Insofar as we value democracy and prefer wealth to poverty, then we have good reason to care about explaining the rise of the society in which the wealth and democracy package is first documented. We have equally good reasons for wanting to explain why the major states within that society failed to maintain their full independence in the face of entrepreneurial authoritarians willing and able to appropriate institutions and technology. In the long run, the loss of city-state independence was coincident with a long economic decline. By the seventh century CE, core Greece had reverted to the relatively impoverished condition of the 'premodern normal.' The world of Greek antiquity was obviously very different from our own, and some of the factors that led to both the rise and fall of classical Greece are unlikely to be repeated. Yet for those who do recognize certain features of our modernity in the history of classical Greece, that history may serve as a cautionary tale."

[Celoknob · Rating 2 out of 5]

Boldly entitled “The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece” this is not your ordinary survey of ancient history book. Heavy on interdisciplinary studies, Ober tries to explain the success of Greek poleis using archaeological, historical and especially political and economic arguments. Other reviews outline his conclusions so I will focus on the process he uses instead.

I will pause here a minute to admit I only finished half the book and that while I consider myself an educated layperson is multiple areas, I am almost wholly ignorant of economics and the jargon associated with it. Also, I can appreciate the importance of economics but it’s not what I like to read. This certainly explains some of my negative thoughts.

With that caveat out of the way let me explain other reasons I did not like the book. Ober makes bold assertions about his hypotheses, but it is almost always entangled in a jungle of multiple crude assumptions, poorly explained (or just poor) data sets, and vague technical jargon. It just isn’t a tight read.

I appreciate the attempt to incorporate a vast multidisciplinary approach but his analysis often seemed strained—forcing recent scholarship in different field to fit his theory. He refers to biological systems such as animal (especially ant) communities, game theory, philosophy, evolutionary theory, “emergence” and much more. Maybe there is brilliance in this cobbling of approaches but I found it too loose or vague to grasp. Too many assumptions, too many different “systems” and vague jargon left me frustrated.

[Joseph St Charles · Rating 5 out of 5]

An academic history of Classical Greece. Ober does an excellent job marshalling different data sources to show that Greece reached a particularly high level of development in the 4th-5th centuries BCE that was unmatched until the modern period (in terms of wealth, house size, trade, arts, philosophy, general cultural output, etc). Greece's income per capita might have been 4x the world average during this period. He then goes into an exploration of the economic, geographic, and sociological factors that made such a flourishing possible. In short: dispersed power & competition between city states allowed the development of democracies and relatively open societies (for the time) where the governments had an incentive to care about the welfare of a large swath of society. This, as opposed to the generally prevailing closed societies, where a very small elite (often centered around "god kings") was only concerned with extracting as much from the population as possible - not exactly a recipe for growth. Athens, in particular, made an effort to be as appealing of a place to do business as possible & explicitly advertised its business friendliness as a way to attract skilled immigration. This classical era efforance faded with the various conquerors that ended the era of city state competition, until by the 7th century CE Greece was back to Bronze Age bare subsistence.

[Nefeli Georgiou · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting economic history of Ancient Greece, attempting to answer the popular question of why and how Classical Greece flourished the way it did. The Key reason in my understanding was the 'Friendly' competition between self-governing city states in a decentralized market ecosystem of small states with a common language, traditions, culture and rituals. This competition incentivized each city-state to find its competitive advantage and specialize in it, thus a flourishing trade network developed. The common language and culture lowered currency costs for this trade to occur and made it profitable and less risky. The politics of city-states, heavily influenced their success. In democracies like Athens, citizens had the motive to invest in themselves, their training and education, witholding short term gains for long term ones, as they were not afraid that a despotic ruler would snatch it away from them. This made them develop expertise and ultimately benefitted society as people were developing and progressing, offering better goods and services. A flourishing middle class, highly atypical of a pre-modern society, thrived.

[Jeremy · Rating 3 out of 5]

An elaborate theoretical edifice is established at the outset of the book and complicated hypotheses described. "It this information-centered hypothesis is right, the key to effective decentralized human cooperation in the context of a state is enabling a wide variety of valuable (at a minimum: accurate and pertinent) information to be exchanged with great frequency by the residents of the state." Then the book shifts to a more traditional history of classical Greece that doesn't offer any serious evidence to support or disprove the hypothesis.

[Micala Ross · Rating 3 out of 5]

I received this book from a giveaway on good reads. I really did enjoy this book but I am only giving this book 3 stars because of my own experience with it. It took me awhile to get through it. There was so much data and I wanted to make sure I understood what I was supposed to. It is an interesting way to analyze Greece. Economic growth is not usually the first choice. Very good research and well put forth.

[Anna Mock · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic! Although the first few chapters were hard for me to get through. If you have a hard time with them, just keep going! Seriously one of the best books on the rise and fall of classical Greece I have read.

[David Zerangue · Rating 3 out of 5]

An informative read. However, the first four chapters were quite painful to trudge through as this book had the trappings of a thesis. The content was quite thorough and the maps were very detailed. Those who enjoy history and social science will like this work.