This is an impressive book, though David Cesarani sadly died before completing it [at 58], so it was finished by Richard Evans. Aside from synthesising the huge mass of research on the history of the Nazis’ assault on European jewry (which he does not call ‘The Holocaust’, as he thinks that implies a structured policy of genocide, which he says was not the true case), he also brings out much of the human stories that make history more real. The growth of the German policy up to the outbreak of the war was perhaps the most interesting part, to my mind - the litany of killing is hard to read and absorb, as it is beyond normal comprehension.
The book starts with the election of Hitler’s Nazi party on a clear anti-semitic platform in 1933, though many German Jews, who were highly integrated, thought that they were protected by the law. Hitler soon got rid of any such restraints, via the convenience of the Reichstag fire, and then laid the foundations for his totalitarian rule. This was also the start of Judenpolitik in Germany. Cesarani makes good use of personal accounts, in particular that of Victor Klemperer’s Diaries, to show the gradual erosion of Jewish rights to work and almost to exist in Nazi Germany over the ensuing years. The Kristallnacht in 1938, when Nazi thugs rampaged through the streets smashing up Jewish property (after a Nazi was killed in Vienna, following the Anschluss), led to great international concern but little action – funds were raised to help but the UK and US kept a firm lid on immigration. The annexed Austrian state in fact led the way in violence against their Jewish population, with much more severe actions than were then taking place in Germany. In 1938, he notes, there was no plan as yet to begin an extermination campaign against the Jews – the plan was to force the jews to emigrate (after stripping them of their assets), and the idea of using Madagascar was floated by Himmler as a solution.
Cesarani notes that the first use of mobile gas chambers was during euthanasia of mentally ill people and those with disabilities, which was a precursor to their use against the Jews, but it was the invasion of Poland in 1939 that set the Nazis on the road to what would be called the final solution – they practised indiscriminate killing of Jews (and Poles) in that campaign and began to set up medieval style ghettos to prevent racial mixing, with unhygienic conditions (which led to thousands of deaths). These were also, he notes, sources of economic value to the local governors, and to Jewish criminals, but the real change in policy was brought about by the invasion of Russia in late 1941, a strategic move that was forced on Hitler to some degree by the need for resources as well as his long-term plan for removing the Jewish population to the East.
Cesarani’s cental argument takes off here – that the Final Solution was the result of a Hitler’s insane view of the Soviet Union being ruled by/in league with ‘International Jewry’, as indeed were the Western powers in his view, and his military need to secure resources in the East to fight on two fronts. The genocide was always secondary to those aims, in this view. The war in the East was initially highly successful, aided and abetted by local fascist and nationalist groups (notably in the Baltics and Ukraine), who were keen to overturn Soviet rule and happy to implement anti-Jewish pogroms. However, once the Soviets started to have some success in holding back the German advance and their huge supply lines were being cut off by partisans, the Nazi leadership saw the further elimination of Jews (whom they considered behind all the partisan attacks and the Soviet leadership) to be a key strategy – both for ideological reasons (ensuring racial purity and the survival of the Volk) and for practical reasons (to save food, which was in short supply). Again, Cesarani reiterates that the Nazis were reacting to events rather than carrying out a plan. The liquidation program in the East was initially carried out by indoctrinated Einstatzgruppen with local partisan assistance and was an orgy of barbaric violence and looting, with mass rape and shootings, but with no structure.
The Soviet pushback against the invasion, which meant that the war was inevitably going to last into 1942, also had an effect on the program. The details of the mass shootings, often into open pits and conducted by drunk soldiers, is horrifying and mind-numbing – 2000 here, then 300 per day there, and so on, in remorseless fashion. It is necessary to make the point that it was haphazard (and horrific) but was not the result of ruthless German efficiency, as is often seen to be the case. People were given licence to act abominably, with no restrictions, and they did so, it seems, and also enriched themselves by stealing the possessions and property of their victims. As the author notes, the locals of Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine and Byelorussia were, if anything, even more savage and cruel than the Germans were in this pogrom.
The various death camps are described in some detail but there is more space given to the bureaucracy of the running the occupied territories and the many new ghettoes, which were managed as profitable ‘businesses’ in many instances, and the way that the war effort always created a tension in the Nazis between the need for (slave) labour and their absurd belief that the Jews were a critical ‘security threat’ and must be eliminated from Europe – Hitler’s constant refrain. As the war turned against the Germans after 1942, this became stronger and led to even more use of the extermination camps, despite the worldwide condemnation of these actions and the allies’ threats to put the Nazis on trial for their crimes after the war. Cesarani is clear that the Allies knew what was taking place from at least 1942 and did little about it, with the US/UK having a strict policy on refugees and also there being a general Allied view that these actions were only undermining the Nazis’ military efforts. There was also very little practical that could be done for people in the camps, in their view, but Cesarani states that more could have been done to get people out of countries under occupation, in western Europe at least.
In 1943, Himmler closed the Sobibor and Treblinka death camps (where they had been heroic revolts and escapes by prisoners) and made efforts to erase their very existence, building ‘farms’ on the land, but at the same time billeting soldiers there to prevent locals from scouring the land for leftover valuables (pillaging valuables was always a big part of the death camps' activity). This left Auschwitz-Birkenau as the remaining extermination camp and its work is described in chilling detail. Then, in 1944, with the war turning against Germany, with D-Day and the massive losses in the East, the previous policy of removing all Jews from German soil was revoked and prisoners from camps were sent back to Germany as slave labour. Then in late 1944, Himmler ordered the SS to stop to killing Jews and to preserve inmates as a pretext for opening channels of communication with the Allies – prisoners were ordered to dismantle the crematoria (in anticipation of losing the war, and in order to use the prisoners as bargaining chips with the Allies).
The Nazis' Jewish policy was, as ever, incoherent and made up on the hoof, and there was no structured plan for evacuating the camps and the prisoners of often just marched out, in the snow, often to die en route to the next holding camp, or be killed in random massacres by guards, panicking. Himmler proceeded to attempt unilateral peace negotiations with the allies in April 1945 (just before Hitler’s death), claiming he had never sought the destruction of the Jews – Hitler found out and stripped him of his offices.
As Cesarani notes, the persecution of the Jews only ended with the Allied occupation, as opposed to the ‘liberation from the camps’. The reality was many Jews lived as displaced persons in Allied camps after the war that were not hugely different environments, and there was little done to help people find their families or possessions. The Nuremberg trials were also notable for the lack of focus on the genocide of the Jews, with emphasis on the crimes against the allies. Cesarani concludes the huge book with a short chapter on these issues, and notes that the final solution was a haphazard affair, largely driven by Hitler’s insane anti-semitism, but also facilitated by the chaos of war and the willingness of many occupied peoples in Europe to help (most of the personnel in the death camps were not Germans, he notes). Later, after the war was ended, the Jews then became a pawn in the Cold War between the Western Allies and the Soviets.
Despite the horrendous subject matter, this is a readable book and should be read by anyone who wants to understand the enormity of the crimes committed in the war, but the early chapters are the most important for understanding how it was possible for such a policy to come to pass in a highly developed state.