A former top CIA executive captures the incredible pressure, bravery, and uncertainty of an agency pushed to the brink.
When the towers fell on September 11, 2001, nowhere were the reverberations more powerfully felt than at Langley. Almost overnight, an intelligence organization converted itself into a weaponized warfighting machine, one that raised questions about how far America would go to pursue al-Qa’ida. Now, more than fifteen years later, ex-CIA executive Philip Mudd comes forward with a never-before-told account of the 9/11 story, one that illuminates the profound impact that enhanced interrogation techniques and other initiatives known internally as “The Program” took on those who administered them. With unprecedented access to officials at the highest levels―including Director George Tenet―Mudd goes beyond the 2014 Senate report to show us what life was really like at the CIA prisons and why interrogators were forced to make decisions that they still ponder today. As hair-raising as it is revelatory, Black Site shows us the tragedy and triumph of the CIA during its most difficult hour.
Philip Mudd has decades of experience as an analyst and executive at the CIA, FBI, and the White House National Security Council, and has taught courses around the world on methodologies for understanding difficult analytic problems. He has also commented about terrorism in open and closed congressional testimony, and is regularly featured on CNN, NBC, Fox News, and NPR. His writing has appeared in Newsweek, the Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic, Foreign Policy, and the Washington Post, and he is the author of Takedown, a detailed account of intelligence gathering in the hunt for al-Qa’ida.
Still to this day, one of the most difficult moments in my working life came in April 2009. The Associated Press ran a story about a man named Gul Rahman who had been killed by the CIA at Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan in 2003. 3 months prior to this story, I had been in Peshawar investigating disappearances at the hands of the US, and had met with Rahman’s family. They believed him to be alive at that time, and assumed that he was still being detained in Bagram. During those months I reached out to all my colleagues who worked on cases at the detention camp, and none of them had heard of this name or case.
When the Associated Press article ran, I called the Rahman family in order to send my condolences. Except, they knew nothing about what I was saying. Not the Associated Press, the US, Pakistan or Afghanistan government had deemed it necessary to inform the family, and I found myself in the horrible position of having to inform them of their loss.
This moment is one of many in why I treat former deputy director of CIA Counterterrorism, Philip Mudd’s calls for empathy for the CIA in the post-9/11 environment with complete disdain. I have no time for his argument, and this was only exacerbated by his claim that Gul Rahman’s death was due to ‘oversights’ and ‘mistakes’. This wasn’t just a mistake and as my own colleague @withcage Moazzam Begg witnessed himself, they were willing to kick other detainees to death just for repeating the word Allah.
Mudd believes that if it wasn’t for the waterboarding, then the public outcry of torture (what is euphemistically referred to as enhanced interrogation techniques) would never have been the same. I think as human beings, we need to constantly remind ourselves that the legal gymnastics that governments play in order to rid themselves of accountability should never define who we are and what we find acceptable. Torture is torture, even the sleep deprivation that he has no problem with. His admissions of sleep deprivation and isolation should be enough to have him convicted of torture in any foreign jurisdiction, due to the international norm against this violent tool.
Gul Rahman was a person with a family, as were the hundreds of thousands of individuals detained in US detention camps around the world. Eric Holder, the same man who ensured that no one would be presecuted for Michael Brown’s killing, stated that no one could be prosecuted for Rahman’s killing - impunity being the order of Obama’s administration. I am still here though and I will never allow the CIA to forget or revise that history as long as I am alive inshallah.
I received this book through a Good Reads “First Reads” giveaway. Black Site, authored by the former Deputy Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, Philip Mudd, is an examination of the development and implementation of “the Program,” the CIA’s system of secret detention facilities and the “enhanced interrogation techniques” applied there to extract information from detainees following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. I believe the book’s primary purpose beyond explaining how “the Program” developed is to remind the reader of the intense pressure the intelligence community in general and the CIA in particular were under to prevent another large-scale attack in the immediate aftermath of 9/11; that there was a definite sense of unity in the country that the United States needed to take extraordinary measures to accomplish that objective; and that much of the later criticism of the CIA’s actions is to a large degree after-the-fact Monday morning quarterbacking. While fully acknowledging the awesome weight of responsibility placed on the CIA at that time, it is still difficult not to squirm when reading the list of approved “enhanced interrogation techniques” such as waterboarding and the rather dubious (in my opinion) legal rationale employed to find that none of those techniques constituted torture. (What I find fascinating is that while DOJ and CIA lawyers struggled to craft legal definitions of what “torture” actually means, Mr. Mudd doesn’t report anyone asking what seems in hindsight to be a fairly obvious question – if another sovereign country’s government applied these “techniques” to captured American military personnel, US government agents, or private American citizens, would the United States Government consider it torture? Yes or no?) Given the controversial subject matter and Mr. Mudd’s service as the Deputy Director during part of the time that the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center oversaw “The Program,” the narrative is remarkably clinical and dispassionate, reading much like an agency “after-action/lessons learned” report based on collective recollections and general assessments of anonymous former CIA officials and case officers interviewed by the author. In fairness, Mr. Mudd is upfront in his author’s note that he isn’t going to interject first-person references to his own experiences or his direct personal feelings or views into the narrative. Still, I really would have preferred a more personal account from Mr. Mudd on “the Program” and what conclusions we can draw from his own experiences and reflections in terms of the difficult and troubling trade-offs between national security and national morality.
I had hoped this book would be mea culpa of sorts, a reckoning of the deep crimes committed by the CIA over the last two decades amidst the gross human rights violation the U.S. calls the "War on Terror". Instead, what we get is a grand apologia, a relentless page-by-page futile attempt to justify the CIA constructing foreign detention centers to torture and detain people indefinitely. The author opens several chapters with an honest reflection of the dark violent history of the CIA, the governments they've illegally overthrown, the politicians they've assassinated, and then proceeds to explain how this time it's different you guys. Terrible book. The only reason I haven't given this 1 star is because of the sections that honestly say what the CIA has done in the past. Otherwise, a complete waste of my time. Not worthwhile at all.
The book is not a memoir of Mudd’s time at CTC or at the FBI’s National Security Branch; it’s written more as a history of the CIA’s rendition, detention and interrogation program (“The Program,” as Mudd calls it) Mudd writes in third person, and he states that he was only a partial witness to some of the events he covers. A lot of the book deals with CTC and its expanded responsibilities following the 9/11 attacks, particularly those involving in The Program.
Mudd begins with The Program’s origins, its history, to the revelations of the destruction of interrogation tapes and internal investigations that resulted, to the program’s eventual termination. He does a good job following the trail from policymakers and lawyers to the CIA officers, analysts and interrogators, and how everybody reacted to evolving attitudes to the mission. There’s a lot of information available about the program, due to investigations by journalists, the Agency IG, and Congress, but Mudd still manages to provide new details about it, especially on how it was managed, the details of how it worked, and on the impact it had on al-Qaeda. Mudd still has new details to provide. For example, he reveals that at one point the CIA considered rendering terrorists to “an Asian country as an option for prisoners, with the rationale that local officials would have broad and and deep experience on detention.” No doubt Mudd refers to China; the idea was scrapped since it would give China too much leverage and blackmail potential over the US.
Mudd provides some interesting insights into the Agency’s war on al-Qaeda. Mudd points out that successful renditions still posed problems, since al-Qaeda would, of course, find out that their people were being captured, and postpone their plans, take security precautions, and reshuffle their networks. He also covers the dilemmas posed by renditions; a rendition might take a terrorist off the playing field, but any intelligence he would give up might be perishable, and the interrogation methods used by the “third country” would probably be controversial at best. The Agency, of course, would eventually conduct its own interrogations, a field that the CIA, at that point in its history, had very little institutional experience with.
The narrative is a little slow. Also, Mudd sometimes uses some legalese in his writing that some readers might find obfuscate the things he wants to talk about. Also, the book includes lots of quotes from interviews Mudd made with CIA officers involved with The Program; many of these officers are anonymous.
Still, a compelling work, written in a more balanced fashion than you might expect.
By the looks of it, sounded like it would be a very sexy book about CIA ops after 9/11 and how 9/11 changed interrogation forever. It was more of a backwards looking justification (a very defensive one) of the CIA's actions during the period right after 9/11. It was almost whiny in the sense of blaming everyone else except the CIA for the detainment and interrogation of Al Qaida suspects. A lot of it was "but Congress approved..." "but the White house said..." "but our lawyers said..." "but the American public wanted.." Wah wah wah so very whiny and insecure about the actions they took and how it ultimately reflected negatively on the Agency (or at least they thought it did). It would be like if your friend was grievously injured, and you put them in your car and drove 150mph to the closet hospital, and then got a good talking to from a cop after you had safely arrived, and you wrote an entire book whining about your citation and explaining why it was justified for you to be speeding in the first place.
I expected some insight about a couple of things; what attacks were directly stopped due to EIT’s and why the CIA worked so hard to stop the Senate investigation. It was very disappointing to read a book that left out names we already know, sites we already know, and many other pieces of information we know - as if they are secrets. It completely overlooked the CIA’s own internal report that questioned the legitimacy of the EIT’s, and intel gathered. The book downplayed what many professionals feel was legal framework that simply wasn’t, and reads as a defense of the CIA; but with no supporting facts or data. Just a lot of “people I talked to think it was needed”. Ok.
I found the book to be thorough, but more biased in favor of the CIA that I had hoped. It did a good job of giving a complete summary of events, as well as insight into the chains of decisions and circumstances that lead to those decisions. However, I found the analysis of the ethics involved lacking. The felt more like a defense of the CIA's actions and provided a very one-sided view of those actions. I understand that the book is telling the story of the CIA, from their perspective, but an analysis should always entertain multiple viewpoints and the one in this book did not.
Mudd was a CIA agent so he instinctively justifies torture of captured terrorists and lionizes spy agency administrators. He does not address the widely circulated countervailing perspective that torture did not yield much good information, which significantly weakens the book. He mentions only one "rendition" of an innocent person, though it is almost certain there were more than that.
explicitly pro-EIT apologism, which was confusing until I remembered to read the front cover to discover Philip Mudd was deputy director of the Counterterrorism Centre 2003-2005. loser
Goodreads Giveaway - This book largely acts as an apologia for the CIA's rendition, retention, and enhanced interrogation program. Starting with a brief overview of the CIA's terrorism division pre-9/11 then moving into the rapidly changing worldview which drove a range of activities the CIA started to engage in, initially with very little oversight or legal guidance. Black Site does not have a whole CIA focus as the title implies, it is almost exclusively focused on the global terrorism division with some brief accounts coming from the CIA's director and AG. Descriptions of techniques and processes used on detained members of Al Q'aida are provided as well as rationalization of why these techniques were used and others were not. Time coverage of the book goes from 2000 to 2007, but is primarily focused on 2001-2004, the height of the Black Site rendition program. The author clearly has a favorable perspective of the program and it isn't until the final chapter where the personal recollections and justifications of CIA agents who engaged in the program are provided is there any sense of moral conflict, questioning, or doubt about what was done by the CIA. These hesitations are only from a handful of agents, the majority of the agents who participated said they'd do the exact same thing again if asked. While it was not the focus of the book, there is no grappling with the questions which have been raised around a sacrifice of the moral high-ground to ensure safety. If you're in to government or military history, this book is worth a read.
Excellent overview of system that shows government is never prepared for something new so they just muddle through... Although author's conclusion is that the program prevented another 9/11, I did not see the proof. Never got to or mentioned the actual acts that were prevented. Validation of pieces of information does not validate a program. I think some stories about what was prevented would have made the validation more believable. However, this could be like community policing - "The absence of crime [terrorism] is proof that it works" -- You cannot measure deterrence...
Still a good read just for the facts showing where they got the ideas from for Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs)...
I don't really feel like I learned anything from reading this book. It wasn't bad or anything, it just did not seem to have a purpose. You can only say it was a perilous time in history with morally ambiguous issues to be dealt with that lawyers needed to review so many times before you start to tune it out.
One grating point, although I recognize the author due to his prior employment may have restrictions was the failing to provide details that are fully public knowledge and 10 seconds of internet searching will reveal. Writing about unnamed nations or people when what they are is no secret made it a stilted read.
History of the reason for and the setting up of the "black sites" after 9/11. The reasons for the adopted torture techniques is explained. The book gives a good picture of the working of the CIA and the differences between its goals and that of the FBI. Several of my preconceived notions about these sites based on movies and other readers were altered and/or "fleshed out".
# Black Site --- ## The Book in 1 Sentence A CIA history of the requirements to house, interrogate, and move prisoners from Al-Qaeda in an effort to gather intelligence to prevent the next 9/11. ## Brief Review This was an interesting book that presents what could be the truth about how the CIA saw their role when dealing with "Guests." Its ability to talk about the judicial search for what was legal and required of the CIA when conducting interrogations.
## Why I Read this book As a contractor, I worked with CIA folks and know they can be a bunch of Harvard Bros and arrogant. I also have heard about black sites for my entire adult life. I was curious about what they "actually" were.
## In-Depth Review (Favorite Quotes) So this book is very interesting, but as it is the CIA, and we all know that lying is really the game they play. Also with 90+% of the sources in this book being "a senior agent active during the time," it is hard to give an honest assessment of honesty when reading this book.
So let us pretend that is all truthful and continue with the review. Overall, it was very informative about the predictive thought process of the CIA officers that were involved in the planning of this system. They knew that the political protection they had during the inception of the program could not last. Hearing all the work they did with foreign nations, Department of Justice, and the bureau of prisons is very intriguing and surprising for such a secretive agency.
Where this book frustrates me is that it becomes very repetitive in its information providing which in turn brings the pacing down. I can't tell you how many times I heard the same information about them being concerned about the housing detainees, also the psychologist wanting to ensure they were not going to get blamed for the EIT.
## How my life / behavior / thoughts / ideas have changed as a result of reading the book. My wife asked me what my opinions were on torture while I was reading the book and there is something that is sitting with me that was said at the end of the book. There were 11 different techniques that were approved by the Justice Department about what they could do for Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EIT).
A lot of their EIT were based on SERE training in the US Military. During the end of the program, there was a requirement for the Detainees to have 8 hours of sleep each night. When I was in the boot camp, I didn't get 8 hours of sleep. In fact the first couple days they push you to not sleep, so everyone gets on the same sleep cycle, and you are broken down. Are we torturing EVERY single member of the military? No. In fact, when this requirement was pushed down, the officers made the comment, "I don't have 8 hours each night to sleep, why should they?" While I think that sleep deprivation is a great technique to make individuals more pliant either from a mental break-down or just an unwillingness to care, I do not think it is torture. I guess it can be added to the list of EIT (It was on the list originally, but typically they are talking days at a time), but most of my military career I wasn't afforded 8 hours of sleep when I was working 12-hour days 6–7 days a week.
So, to answer my wife's question for you all to know, I am not sure that I agree with some items on the list of 11 being "torture." Most, sure. I think some of them were unnecessary like waterboarding, and so do most of the officers who stopped using it (according to the book). What we see in movies where they are pulling fingernails off or using drills, that is what I would consider torture, and it was not something that the US ever allowed or did.
## [Rating](https://epicscreentime.com/rating-rules) This book was very interesting. However, the lack of named sources, while understandable and expected, forces you to take this book with a grain of sand. The other issue is just the repetition of the conversation and bullet points that I felt I had already heard. It was well written, just the longer you read, the more you are ready for the pace to push on. It is a 6.
Phillip Mudd is an MSNBC and CNN contributor on all topics related to terrorism and security. He has the bona fides to speak knowledgeably on the subject as he was the deputy Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center. Black Site addresses the events that lead to the creation of black sites where the CIA was tasked with interrogating captured al-Qaeda prisoners after 9/11. Mr. Mudd doesn’t shy away from the moral, ethical and political issues inherent in and bottled up with the need to gain intelligence from these operatives. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks there was a level of desperation in the intelligence agencies and the White House. We were caught flat footed and unawares by the magnitude and audacity of the attacks. The CIA may have missed indicators and was now adamant about not being the victims of a Second Wave of attacks. There was a certainty that if al-Qaeda was not stopped, there would be more attacks with increased deaths and destruction. Early on it was discovered that attacks on major airports in the United States were in the planning stages. What happened was that housing prisoners was not in the purview of the CIA and despite DOJ and approval from POTUS, many in the upper reaches of the organization, had the sense that over time the country and politician would change their stances. The agency was squeezed between the proverbial rock and hard place. How to prevent another al-Qaeda attack, gather intelligence about the organization and its objectives and yet stay within the limits of the law. Mr. Mudd does an exemplary job of presenting all the conundrums faced by and thoughtfulness of the CIA officials, in particular, George Tenet. Waterboarding became a catch word in the news. It was polarizing and the agency’s choice to adopt the technique in the early days and on only a select few prisoners is still a bone of controversy. Mr. Mudd spends several sections of the book explaining the details of the enhanced interrogation techniques (EIT) and how they were developed. We have used similar procedures, including waterboarding on our own military in training in a program called SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) to prepare them for the possibility of capture and how to resist. (Personal note: many years ago, in prep for Vietnam duty, I went through SERE training). The logic or rationale was, if we developed these procedures to train our own military, with the caveat of not allowing lasting psychological or physical damage, then it should be allowable to extract intelligence from al-Qaeda operatives. Mr. Mudd does not gloss over or attempt to sugar coat the agency’s role. This is a well presented and balanced look at a time in recent history. His prose is clear and sharp and is worth the effort to sit down with this book.
Here is an eye-opening, compelling inside narrative of our premiere intelligence agency during one of the most upsetting periods in the life of our nation. Remember that the Central Intelligence Agency was not very old when Al-Qaeda flew planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and literally shocked the American public to its core. In intelligence and political circles especially, the question arose: is there a plan to protect us against a second attack? None of the law enforcement and counter-intelligence operations in our government could answer that question with any assurance and the political organizations of the nation were peopled with a lot of very nervous individuals. Written in the third person, by a former executive in the CIA and at the White House, and also at one time an executive at the FBI, the author has a deep experience with the changing mores and culture of the intelligence world pre- and post-9/11 world. He draws on his knowledge of the important players at all levels from the Oval Office to some of the regular workers at Langley, striving to make sense of ever-increasing flows of information. The Central Intelligence Agency was never planned as a keeper of prisoners. It had no jails and it had no protocols to deal with high or low value prisoners who had been members of the CIA’s principal target, Al-Qaeda. Author Philip Mudd follows the torturous path of interrogation techniques through the Department of Justice, the politicians and the operators, agents and analysts of the agency, the creation of black site jails and much of the rising and falling tension and shifting attitudes throughout the nation. From it’s very first incident to the final conclusion this is a riveting exploration of the secret and the prosaic world of intelligence gathering.
This was a very interesting read particularly given the context of the current history at the time in the U.S.A. In terms of the 9/11 tragedy in N.Y. and Washington D.C. and the impact it created to all Americans. I distinctly remember the impact it had on me at the time in terms of wanting to encourage everything we could to uncover and understand the foreign forces we were up against! The book for me was a good reminder that the operation Blacksite did allow the C.I.A. to identify 6 senior Al-Qaida Leaders as well as a number of other individuals with insights into this deadly organization and their further plans for terror acts. For me personally the only other event I can think of that impacted me not certainly as much as 9/11,was the domestic Sniper events in the Mid Atlantic Region of the U.S.
This said at the time I greatly appreciated and understood the importance of the U. S. Further uncovering and getting up to speed on this world wide threat that the Al-Quid-a organization posed. The book does an insightful dive into the legal policies and techniques of interrogation that were utilized during the course of investigating these individual suspects and while I may not agree with all the these techniques the situation at the time was dire and required an aggressive approach to get the U.S. and the rest of the world up to speed on what’s happening with this terrorist organization. This book provided a great view on some of the controversy about this clandestine approach to rooting out and understanding this threat to the safety to the United States & the World .
I may not finish it at this rate. The book isn't very long but it almost feels like it was ghostwritten by somebody trying to summarize what happened without really understanding what they were writing about. The sections don't feel like they flow together well. At one point I think there was a paragraph that re-introduced a concept that had already been covered, as though the proofreaders forgot they'd already mentioned it.
The author tries to convey the culture of the CIA while using very few anecdotes or stories to prove his points. The few times that people are quoted (almost never more than a sentence or two in length), they're anonymous (the author doesn't even give his sources nicknames/aliases to differentiate them from one another; all of the "anonymous" sources start to blur together after a couple of chapters). It somehow feels like the author never actually interviewed anybody in the book at all; by attempting to remain impartial by removing himself from the narrative completely, he instead gives the impression that he's just relaying a bunch of secondhand rumors he overheard in a hallway.
Super disappointed, I was really interested in the premise but after 45 pages I felt like the book still hadn't said anything worthwhile. For reference I blew though "Game Change" in about a week, and that was almost 500 pages.
3.5 stars. Because this book was written by Philip Mudd, a career CIA and government national security specialist, I wasn't sure what to expect-would he spend the book defending and justifying activities or did he possibly have an ax to grind? Surprisingly, I thought he was reasonably even-handed in his discussion of the CIA. The thrust of the book was to place the reader in mindset of counterterrorist agents and analysts in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. They completely missed the 9/11 plot, they didn't know what to expect next, and they were being charged with stopping any further terror attacks. Lots of things started happening very quickly. In that environment, mistakes and over-reactions were inevitable. This included "enhanced interrogation" (low-level torture) of captured terrorists. Most if not all of these mistakes have since come to light and received deserved heavy criticism. Philip Rudd does not shy away from these problems, but he does not blame the field agents and points out that they were able to prevent further al-Qa’ida attacks on the U.S. Many will disagree with his analysis, but I think his inside point of view is important for a complete historical perspective.
I knew this book wasn't going to be sexy, and I wanted to learn more about 9/11 (where the intelligence field failed us) and the effects. However, this book is very defensive over the actions the CIA had taken especially with interrogation. At no point does Mudd say we went too far, but defends all actions because we got good information out of it. However, as a regular person I have a follow up question and until that is answered his defense is not successful in my mind. They were able to go carte blanche under the Bush administration, but were limited under Obama's. It wasn't until late into Obama's first term that Osama bin Laden was killed.
How did this book find me? Browsing though the Audible catalog and thought it looked interesting.
This is an excellent review of the role of the CIA before 9/11, during 9/11 and after in the war on terrorism. In particular, the author discusses the pressure this agency felt in preventing another attack on America soil coupled with how little everyone knew about the enemy, as well as how these factors helped create "The Program," the secret detention sites where questionable tactics were used to obtain information from captives. He also discusses how political and public sentiment went from all out support for whatever it takes to questioning these tactics based on American standards, as well as the effect it had on the CIA. I found this book incredibly informative and insightful.
Unfortunately, I found this one shockingly flat considering the subject matter. It was very clinical, not people or story based at all. Like many modern books about the aftermath of 9/11, the author did indulge in some opinions that would have been hot takes at the time but that are easy to agree with now.
I would planned to give this 3 stars, but I really appreciated the way he wrapped it up - with acknowledgment that the post 9/11 early 2000’s were a complicated time with much uncertainty.
Th3 worst combination of being both kinda boring for its subject manner, as well as a gross defense of torture by a senior leader of the CIA. Maybe Mudd's arguments would be a little compelling if the Senate Investigation into CIA torture didn't exhaustively prove that both torture was happening, and that it was useless to gain reliable and unique information. Lame read
A good review of the very specific topic of the CIA post 9-11. The trip down memory lane to the way we were thinking back then, and Obama’s turn against the actors who did exactly what a lot of people wanted them to do was interesting to read, if tough.
Kind of a slog. I started Black Site but didn’t stick with it... A pity because I like listening to Philip Mudd on CNN a lot. He’s got strong, snappy opinions & expresses them well. But not here. The CIA might’ve gone through its most difficult hour but the reader shouldn’t have to...
Decent narrative about the CIA prisons. The idea behind their existence is a double edged sword, and regardless of where any of us stand on this bit of history it was a fascinating look into how high value individuals were detained and treated.
Good read, but didn't really feel that the book revealed any new insights to how the country, our government, the CIA and the men and women manning the operations...that we haven't heard of before or we could assume was along these lines.
This was... not my favorite book, but I'm not a history buff. I expected to like this more than I did but I really couldn't finish it. I'm not entirely surprised given that it was an impulse grab at the library but still a bit disappointing