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Campaigns and Commanders #19
With Zeal and With Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783
The image is indelible: densely packed lines of slow-moving Redcoats picked off by American sharpshooters. Now Matthew H. Spring reveals how British infantry in the American Revolutionary War really fought.
This groundbreaking book offers a new analysis of the British Army during the American rebellion at both operational and tactical levels. Presenting fresh insights into the speed of British tactical movements, Spring discloses how the system for training the army prior to 1775 was overhauled and adapted to the peculiar conditions confronting it in North America.
First scrutinizing such operational problems as logistics, manpower shortages, and poor intelligence, Spring then focuses on battlefield tactics to examine how troops marched to the battlefield, deployed, advanced, and fought. In particular, he documents the use of turning movements, the loosening of formations, and a reliance on bayonet-oriented shock tactics, and he also highlights the army's ability to tailor its tactical methods to local conditions.
Written with flair and a wealth of details that will engage scholars and history enthusiasts alike, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only offers a thorough reinterpretation of how the British Army's North American campaign progressed and invites serious reassessment of most of its battles.
This groundbreaking book offers a new analysis of the British Army during the American rebellion at both operational and tactical levels. Presenting fresh insights into the speed of British tactical movements, Spring discloses how the system for training the army prior to 1775 was overhauled and adapted to the peculiar conditions confronting it in North America.
First scrutinizing such operational problems as logistics, manpower shortages, and poor intelligence, Spring then focuses on battlefield tactics to examine how troops marched to the battlefield, deployed, advanced, and fought. In particular, he documents the use of turning movements, the loosening of formations, and a reliance on bayonet-oriented shock tactics, and he also highlights the army's ability to tailor its tactical methods to local conditions.
Written with flair and a wealth of details that will engage scholars and history enthusiasts alike, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only offers a thorough reinterpretation of how the British Army's North American campaign progressed and invites serious reassessment of most of its battles.
381 pages, Hardcover
First published December 1, 2008
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March 20, 2025
One does not have to look far to find histories of the Patriot forces that fought in the American Revolution. Many a shelf is crammed with accounts of Continental Army operations, the role played by local militias, and memoirs of the men who fought for independence. Their opposite numbers on the British side suffer from no such embarrassment of riches, however. By comparison, accounts from their perspective are few, and too many of them do little more than reinforce the traditional image of an effort bound to unimaginative strategies and inflexible tactics. If nothing else, the contrast is a fine demonstration of the truth of the adage about the orphaning of failure.
This is all the more reason to appreciate the contribution Matthew Spring makes with his book. In it he provides a long-overdue examination of the tactics and operations of British forces in the war, one that challenges many of the longstanding assumptions about their capabilities and achievements. Pushing back against the idea of a hidebound British war effort incapable of functioning outside of the parameters of European-style warfare, Spring demonstrates that the men on campaign did indeed adapt to the conditions they faced, adaptations which contributed to their battlefield success. Such flexibility contributed to their success throughout the conflict against the rebels’ conventional forces. Where the British Army fell short, he concludes, was in translating that success into compelling the populace to cut off their support for the rebels’ war effort, which trapped the British in a series of grinding campaigns with little likelihood of victory.
This failure was a product of the circumstances in which the British found themselves. From the start British soldiers demonstrated their superiority by routing repeatedly the poorly-trained Continental Army on the battlefield. While George Washington and the other rebel commanders were cognizant of this from their start, they hoped that a “forward defense” strategy involving occupation of defensive positions too strong to overcome without incurring unsustainable casualties would be an effective way to deter this. The British success in turning or bypassing these positions, however, forced the Americans to adopt a Fabian strategy of avoiding major battles unless victory was all but certain. This frustrated the British goal of neutralizing what was the primary obstacle towards restoring royal authority, and greatly hindered their efforts to force an end to the war.
The reluctance of the rebels to meet the British on the battlefield was just one of the challenges faced by the redcoats. Another was one of supply: operating as they did in hostile territory, British units were slowed by their dependence on supply trains to sustain their forces. These supply and baggage trains were necessary to maintain the morale of the men, who were volunteers on long service. With replacements difficult to come by, the British spent considerable effort to minimize the hardships they experienced. Lacking the depth of personnel the Continental Army enjoyed by being able to call on local militias, British generals were also mindful of the need to conserve their forces, which constrained tactical procedures almost as effectively as did the rugged colonial topography. All of these factors often left the British operating at a considerable disadvantage to their opponents.
Given these difficulties, the British performance in the field is even more impressive. Spring pushes back against the stereotype of narrow-minded commanders applying outmoded approaches in several chapters that detail their marches, deployments, and advances. While officers continued to prioritize the bayonet charge – a tactic that Spring explains was surprisingly effective – and used it whenever possible, they adapted to their circumstances as best they could. Lines of battle were reduced, men were deployed in battles as skirmishers or fought in open order, and other alternative approaches were pursued to win the day against the rebels. While such adaptability often helped the British win their battles, these battlefield successes did not produce the results they sought, as most colonists maintained their support for the rebellion despite the setbacks their forces suffered.
Spring identifies the resiliency of the Continental Army as the decisive factor in their eventual victory in the war. By its end, he notes that their best units were able to meet their British opponents on roughly equal terms, reflecting how the possibility of victory receded for the British the longer the war went on. With the growing frustration of the redcoats over the situation came the resort to “fire and sword” methods and other brutalities that the author only mentions in passing. An additional chapter examining this aspect as part of a broader focus on the soldiers’ relationships with the colonists would have better illustrated this point, though the absence of one does not diminish the overall value of Spring’s book. Drawing as he does on an enormous range of contemporary records, as well as the literature on his subject, he has produced a study that ably addresses a long-neglected subject. In doing so, he demolishes many misconceptions that have distorted our understanding of the nature of the war, making his book necessary reading for anyone interested in the military history of the American Revolution.
This is all the more reason to appreciate the contribution Matthew Spring makes with his book. In it he provides a long-overdue examination of the tactics and operations of British forces in the war, one that challenges many of the longstanding assumptions about their capabilities and achievements. Pushing back against the idea of a hidebound British war effort incapable of functioning outside of the parameters of European-style warfare, Spring demonstrates that the men on campaign did indeed adapt to the conditions they faced, adaptations which contributed to their battlefield success. Such flexibility contributed to their success throughout the conflict against the rebels’ conventional forces. Where the British Army fell short, he concludes, was in translating that success into compelling the populace to cut off their support for the rebels’ war effort, which trapped the British in a series of grinding campaigns with little likelihood of victory.
This failure was a product of the circumstances in which the British found themselves. From the start British soldiers demonstrated their superiority by routing repeatedly the poorly-trained Continental Army on the battlefield. While George Washington and the other rebel commanders were cognizant of this from their start, they hoped that a “forward defense” strategy involving occupation of defensive positions too strong to overcome without incurring unsustainable casualties would be an effective way to deter this. The British success in turning or bypassing these positions, however, forced the Americans to adopt a Fabian strategy of avoiding major battles unless victory was all but certain. This frustrated the British goal of neutralizing what was the primary obstacle towards restoring royal authority, and greatly hindered their efforts to force an end to the war.
The reluctance of the rebels to meet the British on the battlefield was just one of the challenges faced by the redcoats. Another was one of supply: operating as they did in hostile territory, British units were slowed by their dependence on supply trains to sustain their forces. These supply and baggage trains were necessary to maintain the morale of the men, who were volunteers on long service. With replacements difficult to come by, the British spent considerable effort to minimize the hardships they experienced. Lacking the depth of personnel the Continental Army enjoyed by being able to call on local militias, British generals were also mindful of the need to conserve their forces, which constrained tactical procedures almost as effectively as did the rugged colonial topography. All of these factors often left the British operating at a considerable disadvantage to their opponents.
Given these difficulties, the British performance in the field is even more impressive. Spring pushes back against the stereotype of narrow-minded commanders applying outmoded approaches in several chapters that detail their marches, deployments, and advances. While officers continued to prioritize the bayonet charge – a tactic that Spring explains was surprisingly effective – and used it whenever possible, they adapted to their circumstances as best they could. Lines of battle were reduced, men were deployed in battles as skirmishers or fought in open order, and other alternative approaches were pursued to win the day against the rebels. While such adaptability often helped the British win their battles, these battlefield successes did not produce the results they sought, as most colonists maintained their support for the rebellion despite the setbacks their forces suffered.
Spring identifies the resiliency of the Continental Army as the decisive factor in their eventual victory in the war. By its end, he notes that their best units were able to meet their British opponents on roughly equal terms, reflecting how the possibility of victory receded for the British the longer the war went on. With the growing frustration of the redcoats over the situation came the resort to “fire and sword” methods and other brutalities that the author only mentions in passing. An additional chapter examining this aspect as part of a broader focus on the soldiers’ relationships with the colonists would have better illustrated this point, though the absence of one does not diminish the overall value of Spring’s book. Drawing as he does on an enormous range of contemporary records, as well as the literature on his subject, he has produced a study that ably addresses a long-neglected subject. In doing so, he demolishes many misconceptions that have distorted our understanding of the nature of the war, making his book necessary reading for anyone interested in the military history of the American Revolution.
July 23, 2015
As any fan of American history can tell you, there are a lot of books out there on the American Revolution. From general overviews to treatises on specific battles, you can find a book on just about any aspect of the Revolution. In his 2008 volume With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America,1775-1783, Matthew H. Spring manages to focus in on a very specific topic - how the British infantry fought - in a way that will illuminate every other book on the Revolutionary War I will ever read.
Springs efforts in With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783 (hereafter to be referred to as With Zeal and with Bayonets Only ) are, to say the least, thorough. Every angle of the British infantry campaign is examined. There are chapters on strategy, supply, marching, firepower, principles of command, training - even an entire chapter, befittingly for the title of the book, on the use of the bayonet. Each chapter is filled with firsthand accounts from players on all sides - British, American, Hessian, officer, enlisted, no perspective is left out. Even that old friend of any Revolutionary War reader, American private and author of Memoir of a Revolutionary Soldier Joseph Plumb Martin makes two appearances, commenting on the effects of British artillery and on how to evade pursuit from British infantry.
Spring is British, and approaches the war from that perspective. Since most historians writing about the American Revolution are American, it's refreshing to see the British perspective, and fitting since With Zeal and with Bayonets Only is looking at the British side of the war. In this book, you have rebels and loyalists, instead of the usual patriots and Tories. It's a small detail, but it helps keep you in the British frame of mind.
With Zeal and with Bayonets Only illustrates very clearly how the British army fought, what changes they made in the American theater to adapt to the enemy and the terrain, why they fought the way they did, why it worked when it often did, and why in the end it just wasn't enough. Despite Spring's British perspective, he doesn't hesitate to point out flaws with the British army or strengths of the rebels.
The only aspect of the book that isn't quite to my taste is that I generally prefer my history to be more narrative. To be fair, Spring isn't trying to do narrative history, and that wouldn't really fit the subject well anyway. Spring's approach of thoroughly examining each aspect of the British campaign in its own chapter works very well for what he's doing, and you will certainly finish each chapter with a much better understanding of its topic. I mention this mostly to make other fans of narrative history aware of the way Spring structures the book.
With Zeal and with Bayonets Only is an excellent book. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the American Revolution. Yes, it's a very narrow topic, but it handles that topic excellently, and will do a great deal to inform the rest of your Revolutionary reading. It's added much to my understanding of the Revolution, and given me a greater appreciation for what the adversaries of the British army accomplished, whether you call them rebels or patriots.
Springs efforts in With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783 (hereafter to be referred to as With Zeal and with Bayonets Only ) are, to say the least, thorough. Every angle of the British infantry campaign is examined. There are chapters on strategy, supply, marching, firepower, principles of command, training - even an entire chapter, befittingly for the title of the book, on the use of the bayonet. Each chapter is filled with firsthand accounts from players on all sides - British, American, Hessian, officer, enlisted, no perspective is left out. Even that old friend of any Revolutionary War reader, American private and author of Memoir of a Revolutionary Soldier Joseph Plumb Martin makes two appearances, commenting on the effects of British artillery and on how to evade pursuit from British infantry.
Spring is British, and approaches the war from that perspective. Since most historians writing about the American Revolution are American, it's refreshing to see the British perspective, and fitting since With Zeal and with Bayonets Only is looking at the British side of the war. In this book, you have rebels and loyalists, instead of the usual patriots and Tories. It's a small detail, but it helps keep you in the British frame of mind.
With Zeal and with Bayonets Only illustrates very clearly how the British army fought, what changes they made in the American theater to adapt to the enemy and the terrain, why they fought the way they did, why it worked when it often did, and why in the end it just wasn't enough. Despite Spring's British perspective, he doesn't hesitate to point out flaws with the British army or strengths of the rebels.
The only aspect of the book that isn't quite to my taste is that I generally prefer my history to be more narrative. To be fair, Spring isn't trying to do narrative history, and that wouldn't really fit the subject well anyway. Spring's approach of thoroughly examining each aspect of the British campaign in its own chapter works very well for what he's doing, and you will certainly finish each chapter with a much better understanding of its topic. I mention this mostly to make other fans of narrative history aware of the way Spring structures the book.
With Zeal and with Bayonets Only is an excellent book. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the American Revolution. Yes, it's a very narrow topic, but it handles that topic excellently, and will do a great deal to inform the rest of your Revolutionary reading. It's added much to my understanding of the Revolution, and given me a greater appreciation for what the adversaries of the British army accomplished, whether you call them rebels or patriots.
April 8, 2020
A well-researched and interesting work.
According to our popular imagination, the eighteenth-century British army was a hidebound, rigid institution that blindly followed European tactics in the wilderness of North America, marching blindly and robotically to defeat. As Spring shows, the British army of the time period was a “thinking army” whose commanders were well aware of the need to adapt. The cohesive, tight-ranked formations of myth occurred only at Bunker Hill and were usually avoided afterwards. Because they lacked and under-valued effective cavalry (like the Americans), the British were trained to move quickly on the battlefield; they would typically close at 75 yards, fire, then charge with the bayonet. These tactics worked more often than not. When they didn’t, the British adapted.
As Spring shows, the British more or less won the battles and lost the war due to political and geopolitical factors that they either ignored or were all but impossible to resolve. The British also made extensive use of rangers and light infantry. The British army of the era was also quite risk averse since their forces were so difficult to replace. And since the entry of France and Spain complicated Britain’s position, the number of troops committed to North America was always depleted, especially since Britain viewed the West Indies as far more valuable than the mainland colonies.
Spring touches on the strategic and logistical constraints that hampered prospects of a British victory. Still, the book is mostly focused on tactical issues. However, Spring does use a good number of French terms and eighteenth-century British slang that make little sense to the modern reader. Tthe book’s focus means that it jumps around quite a bit. The tone is, of course, academic and dry, and full of technical detail. Nor does Spring bother with any sort of chronological approach.
Still, a well-written work.
According to our popular imagination, the eighteenth-century British army was a hidebound, rigid institution that blindly followed European tactics in the wilderness of North America, marching blindly and robotically to defeat. As Spring shows, the British army of the time period was a “thinking army” whose commanders were well aware of the need to adapt. The cohesive, tight-ranked formations of myth occurred only at Bunker Hill and were usually avoided afterwards. Because they lacked and under-valued effective cavalry (like the Americans), the British were trained to move quickly on the battlefield; they would typically close at 75 yards, fire, then charge with the bayonet. These tactics worked more often than not. When they didn’t, the British adapted.
As Spring shows, the British more or less won the battles and lost the war due to political and geopolitical factors that they either ignored or were all but impossible to resolve. The British also made extensive use of rangers and light infantry. The British army of the era was also quite risk averse since their forces were so difficult to replace. And since the entry of France and Spain complicated Britain’s position, the number of troops committed to North America was always depleted, especially since Britain viewed the West Indies as far more valuable than the mainland colonies.
Spring touches on the strategic and logistical constraints that hampered prospects of a British victory. Still, the book is mostly focused on tactical issues. However, Spring does use a good number of French terms and eighteenth-century British slang that make little sense to the modern reader. Tthe book’s focus means that it jumps around quite a bit. The tone is, of course, academic and dry, and full of technical detail. Nor does Spring bother with any sort of chronological approach.
Still, a well-written work.
March 11, 2015
"Without baggage, necessaries or provisions of any sort for officer or soldier, in the most barren, inhospitable unhealthy part of North America, opposed to the most savage inveterate, perfidious, cruel enemy, with zeal and bayonets only..."
- Charles Cornwallis, 1st Marquess Cornwallis.
In the latter half of the 18th century British army was considered, with good cause, to be the best in the world. It had performed with great distinction in the Seven Years War (1756 - 1763), defeating the French and their allies in Europe, North America, and India. It was disciplined, professional, and well-led, and a cornerstone - together with the Royal Navy - of worldwide British hegemonic power. The American War of Independence (1775 – 1783), however, saw it fought to a standstill and eventual defeat by the Continental Army under George Washington. This is often put down to a failure to adapt to North American conditions by the British commanders, and a dogged insistence on fighting the war as if it was against a conventional European enemy.
Matthew H. Spring disputes this simplistic narrative, with perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the British infantry campaign in the American War of Independence ever written. Looking at every aspect of the conflict from supply and training to woodcraft, intelligence, shock and light infantry tactics, in chapter after chapter. The picture he paints is much more complicated than that of the traditional narrative. Drawing on extensive sources from the period including journals, letters, and technical manuals, and the work of modern historians, Spring finds that the British army was surprisingly innovative in its pursuit of the rebels, but was consistently held back by poor supply lines and insufficient manpower. Consequently, the British were able to consistently win victories but could not capitalise on them by pursuing and annihilating the highly mobile rebel forces, thereby decisively crushing the rebellion once and for all. Meanwhile the American rebels, as students of modern counterinsurgency would recognize, had time on their hands and knew that their best chance of victory was simply to deny the British open battle for as long as possible. While his primary focus is on British infantry, particularly light infantry, attention is given to their German mercenaries and Loyalist allies as well as to the Continental Army and the Patriot-dominated state militias which, though not an effective fighting force except in rare circumstances, played an important role policing pro-British sentiment in American communities.
Spring's analysis won't be for everyone. He is clearly writing for an audience who is already familiar with the history of the war and the basics of 18th century infantry tactics, eschewing the more popular narrative style of history, and can be very technical in his use of military jargon. However, it's an excellent bit of analysis and an essential resource for those interested in "the other side" of this frequently misunderstood war.
- Charles Cornwallis, 1st Marquess Cornwallis.
In the latter half of the 18th century British army was considered, with good cause, to be the best in the world. It had performed with great distinction in the Seven Years War (1756 - 1763), defeating the French and their allies in Europe, North America, and India. It was disciplined, professional, and well-led, and a cornerstone - together with the Royal Navy - of worldwide British hegemonic power. The American War of Independence (1775 – 1783), however, saw it fought to a standstill and eventual defeat by the Continental Army under George Washington. This is often put down to a failure to adapt to North American conditions by the British commanders, and a dogged insistence on fighting the war as if it was against a conventional European enemy.
Matthew H. Spring disputes this simplistic narrative, with perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the British infantry campaign in the American War of Independence ever written. Looking at every aspect of the conflict from supply and training to woodcraft, intelligence, shock and light infantry tactics, in chapter after chapter. The picture he paints is much more complicated than that of the traditional narrative. Drawing on extensive sources from the period including journals, letters, and technical manuals, and the work of modern historians, Spring finds that the British army was surprisingly innovative in its pursuit of the rebels, but was consistently held back by poor supply lines and insufficient manpower. Consequently, the British were able to consistently win victories but could not capitalise on them by pursuing and annihilating the highly mobile rebel forces, thereby decisively crushing the rebellion once and for all. Meanwhile the American rebels, as students of modern counterinsurgency would recognize, had time on their hands and knew that their best chance of victory was simply to deny the British open battle for as long as possible. While his primary focus is on British infantry, particularly light infantry, attention is given to their German mercenaries and Loyalist allies as well as to the Continental Army and the Patriot-dominated state militias which, though not an effective fighting force except in rare circumstances, played an important role policing pro-British sentiment in American communities.
Spring's analysis won't be for everyone. He is clearly writing for an audience who is already familiar with the history of the war and the basics of 18th century infantry tactics, eschewing the more popular narrative style of history, and can be very technical in his use of military jargon. However, it's an excellent bit of analysis and an essential resource for those interested in "the other side" of this frequently misunderstood war.
August 2, 2012
Despite American myth making, the English Army during the Revolutionary War did not march around like mindless automatons. In fact, as one of the best professional armies in the world, they were tactically innovative and quite successful on the battlefield.
"With Zeal and Bayonets Only" was recommended to me by the Historian of Saratoga National Historical Park. The book is an adaptation of the author's PhD thesis and is well researched and rigorously presented.
The book goes through the organization, training, and tactics of the major infantry components of the English Army during the Revolutionary War period. He describes the Light, the Line/Battalion/Hatmen and the Grenadier Infantry, as well as a bit on the cavalry and the artillery. Spring particularly pays attention to how the Infantry was used in combat, and why. He most notably doesn't cover the German allies aka "Hessians" who tended to use different organization and tactics.
After covering how the infantry fought, Spring went into what I found the most innovative and interesting insights of the book. Spring addressed why he feels the English Army, though it excelled in fighting, was never able to decisively exploit it's tactical advantages. He analyzes the shortcomings of the operational and strategic underpinnings of the English military attempt to squelch the American Revolution. And also why, as the war went on, the English Army became more and more constrained by events and less able to defeat the American Revolutionaries.
I would highly recommend this book to all readers interested in the military aspects of the American Revolutionary War. I did not find it a difficult read. And I greatly appreciated the author's insights, expertise, and research.
"With Zeal and Bayonets Only" was recommended to me by the Historian of Saratoga National Historical Park. The book is an adaptation of the author's PhD thesis and is well researched and rigorously presented.
The book goes through the organization, training, and tactics of the major infantry components of the English Army during the Revolutionary War period. He describes the Light, the Line/Battalion/Hatmen and the Grenadier Infantry, as well as a bit on the cavalry and the artillery. Spring particularly pays attention to how the Infantry was used in combat, and why. He most notably doesn't cover the German allies aka "Hessians" who tended to use different organization and tactics.
After covering how the infantry fought, Spring went into what I found the most innovative and interesting insights of the book. Spring addressed why he feels the English Army, though it excelled in fighting, was never able to decisively exploit it's tactical advantages. He analyzes the shortcomings of the operational and strategic underpinnings of the English military attempt to squelch the American Revolution. And also why, as the war went on, the English Army became more and more constrained by events and less able to defeat the American Revolutionaries.
I would highly recommend this book to all readers interested in the military aspects of the American Revolutionary War. I did not find it a difficult read. And I greatly appreciated the author's insights, expertise, and research.
March 15, 2024
Spring, Matthew H. With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Campaign in North America, 1775-1783. University of Oklahoma Press, 2010.
In this academic work, Matthew Spring debunks several myths about the American Revolution. Although the book leans pro-British, and it does so to clarify certain points, it by no means paints the British in a universally positive light. While the British infantry was much better militarily than the rebels, Britain had no real chance of winning the war, at least not in the long run. True, it was an empire but for precisely that reason it could not bring all its weight to bear on the colonies. While fighting the rebels, it was simultaneously engaged in Ireland, India, Gibraltar, and elsewhere, all the while keeping an eye on a hostile France.
Before we go much further in the review, the reader is urged to watch the youtube videos by historian-tuber “Brandon F, particularly his analysis of Mel Gibson’s The Patriot. I learned more American history in that series than I did in college.
Britain had three aims: 1) defeat the rebels militarily, 2) control the local sentiment and shift it to the crown, and 3) force the rebels to a political settlement. The first option was the easiest, but it was also the riskiest. Throughout the war, save for a few setbacks, Britain dominated the battlefield. Unfortunately for them, the setbacks sent a message to the “undecided element” of the colonies that backing Britain was not the wisest move. Lacking a fifth column, Britain had no real chance to win the war.
Non-Military Factors
Point (2) was never feasible. Loyalists would have had to control a sizable part of economic and political life in a township in order to render a town, if not supportive of, at least neutral towards the Crown. Even worse, many loyalists found themselves tarred and feathered for simply obeying Romans 13. Others had their homes torched. It was not safe to be a law-abiding Tory.
Tactics
The situation in America, owing to a different geography from that of the European plains, forced Britain to utilize a new strategy. To be sure, Britain had used auxiliary tactics in the French and Indian War. Accordingly, she would formalize such units, now known as Light Infantry, against the Colonists. The Light Infantry, occupying the right flank of a division, would amplify the flanking attack. The logic was simple: twenty muskets firing into the center of a line would not inflict that much damage. Twenty muskets firing on an exposed flank, on the other hand, would cause panic.
There were a few drawbacks, though. Such a maneuver took considerable time to deploy, leaving the middle of the formation to take fire. Moreover, if done later in the day, it might not be finished until night time, rendering much of the battle effectively over.
The major factor in tactics for both sides was the terrain. Contrary to a myth Americans tell about themselves, the war was not fought between ignorant Redcoats who marched in ranks and Mel-Gibson look-alikes who hid behind trees. Both sides regularly adapted to changing situations, and the British were using light infantry ten years before Mel Gibson and his two sons wiped out a battalion by themselves.
Regiments
There is some debate whether the British regiments were crack battalions or drunkards and criminals. The British Army, like every other army in history, had both. British regiments did have longer enlistment periods, leading to more disciplined soldiers. This gave them a clear advantage in the beginning, as the rebels enlisted only for the short term.
Fire and Volley
Was it the case that the average colonial was a backwoods sniper whose superior firepower wiped out British regiments? To a degree, maybe, but only to a limited effect. Regiments from the frontiers did use longer-range rifles and were good shots. Most Americans, though, did not use such weapons. They relied on roughly the same doctrine as did the British. The Americans did use marksman as flanking units before the main infantry came into play.
Conclusion
I came across this volume from watching Brandon F’s military history videos. It did not disappoint. In conclusion, Britain had the superior army, but it had no way of overcoming disadvantages due to its limited numbers, hostile territory, and forbidding distance from the mother country.
In this academic work, Matthew Spring debunks several myths about the American Revolution. Although the book leans pro-British, and it does so to clarify certain points, it by no means paints the British in a universally positive light. While the British infantry was much better militarily than the rebels, Britain had no real chance of winning the war, at least not in the long run. True, it was an empire but for precisely that reason it could not bring all its weight to bear on the colonies. While fighting the rebels, it was simultaneously engaged in Ireland, India, Gibraltar, and elsewhere, all the while keeping an eye on a hostile France.
Before we go much further in the review, the reader is urged to watch the youtube videos by historian-tuber “Brandon F, particularly his analysis of Mel Gibson’s The Patriot. I learned more American history in that series than I did in college.
Britain had three aims: 1) defeat the rebels militarily, 2) control the local sentiment and shift it to the crown, and 3) force the rebels to a political settlement. The first option was the easiest, but it was also the riskiest. Throughout the war, save for a few setbacks, Britain dominated the battlefield. Unfortunately for them, the setbacks sent a message to the “undecided element” of the colonies that backing Britain was not the wisest move. Lacking a fifth column, Britain had no real chance to win the war.
Non-Military Factors
Point (2) was never feasible. Loyalists would have had to control a sizable part of economic and political life in a township in order to render a town, if not supportive of, at least neutral towards the Crown. Even worse, many loyalists found themselves tarred and feathered for simply obeying Romans 13. Others had their homes torched. It was not safe to be a law-abiding Tory.
Tactics
The situation in America, owing to a different geography from that of the European plains, forced Britain to utilize a new strategy. To be sure, Britain had used auxiliary tactics in the French and Indian War. Accordingly, she would formalize such units, now known as Light Infantry, against the Colonists. The Light Infantry, occupying the right flank of a division, would amplify the flanking attack. The logic was simple: twenty muskets firing into the center of a line would not inflict that much damage. Twenty muskets firing on an exposed flank, on the other hand, would cause panic.
There were a few drawbacks, though. Such a maneuver took considerable time to deploy, leaving the middle of the formation to take fire. Moreover, if done later in the day, it might not be finished until night time, rendering much of the battle effectively over.
The major factor in tactics for both sides was the terrain. Contrary to a myth Americans tell about themselves, the war was not fought between ignorant Redcoats who marched in ranks and Mel-Gibson look-alikes who hid behind trees. Both sides regularly adapted to changing situations, and the British were using light infantry ten years before Mel Gibson and his two sons wiped out a battalion by themselves.
Regiments
There is some debate whether the British regiments were crack battalions or drunkards and criminals. The British Army, like every other army in history, had both. British regiments did have longer enlistment periods, leading to more disciplined soldiers. This gave them a clear advantage in the beginning, as the rebels enlisted only for the short term.
Fire and Volley
Was it the case that the average colonial was a backwoods sniper whose superior firepower wiped out British regiments? To a degree, maybe, but only to a limited effect. Regiments from the frontiers did use longer-range rifles and were good shots. Most Americans, though, did not use such weapons. They relied on roughly the same doctrine as did the British. The Americans did use marksman as flanking units before the main infantry came into play.
Conclusion
I came across this volume from watching Brandon F’s military history videos. It did not disappoint. In conclusion, Britain had the superior army, but it had no way of overcoming disadvantages due to its limited numbers, hostile territory, and forbidding distance from the mother country.
September 20, 2021
With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783, though an unexciting, technical read is an absolute MUST for students of the American Revolution. Author Matthew Spring provides the reader with a vast swath of technical points that governed the course of the war as well as the unmatched specifics regarding the who, what, where, and when. The information contained in this work would take a dedicated scholar at the least a year of dedicated research to amass the specifics contained in Spring's book.
January 1, 2024
Really enjoyed this overview of the British campaign. Can be a little dry but a must read, thank you Brandon f on YouTube.
April 5, 2012
The Rev War reenacting community awaited the publication of this book with breathless anticipation, which was well deserved! "With Zeal and Bayonets Only" is virtually required reading for not just reenactors, but anyone with an interest in the British army during the Revolution or the conflict in general. The information on tactics, weapons, and organization are far beyond what is available in the usual books on the subject, such as the Osprey series, but still remains accessible for the general reader.
October 23, 2013
This was a really excellent book as it helps to debunk the myths of the stupid old fashioned European army being thrashed by dashing frontiersmen. Rather it lays out clearly the ways in which the british army was organised and how it was able to inflict defeats on the revolutionaries. Spring's analysis is at its best however when dealing with why Britain was not able to capitalise battle field success into strategic gains. This was especially helpful as it is some times hard to grasp that an army that while suffering some set backs was generally victorious but ended up losing the war.
February 28, 2012
This was a very good book. I enjoyed getting a different perspective of the Rev. War, and not just from the rebel side of things. I did feel, however, that the author in some ways favored the rebels. As the book went on, it continued to talk about how the Crown forces failed to keep control of the colonies.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 22, 2012
I read a lot of narrative history, but I especially enjoy well-written historical analysis. This book does a great job of examining the tactics the British used during the Revolutionary War and tying that in with how it was impacted by Britain's strategy and strategic position. Very well done and very readable.
February 3, 2021
Great book providing a different look at the war.
xiv: "Rebels" vs. "Loyalists"
xiv: Rise and Fight again: The War of Independence in the South
p. 8: "Fabian strategy": a military strategy where pitched battles and frontal assaults are avoided in favor of wearing down an opponent through a war of attrition and indirection.
p. 9: "Perhaps the principal cause of this phenomenon was the eighteenth-century states' limited ability to replace its expensively recruited, trained, and maintained long-service professional soldiers. In the field this limitation manifested itself in a concern not to lose troops unnecessarily to sickness and desertion by exposing them to hardships like short rations and inclement weather. In turn, this curbed a field army's mobility by shackling it to magazines, bread ovens, and baggage trains."
p. 17: John Shy [has] proposed an alternative and altogether more convincing model of colonial attitudes. A People Numerous & Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence
p. 32: "Yet the absolute impossibility of conducting major operations without transport and artillery ensured that serious campaigning was limited to the growing season."
p. 55: "The miniature engagements of the American War had an influence on the conflict that was profoundly out of proportion to their size."
p. 60: atra cura: "black care"
p. 60: Average height of grenadier: 5'11"
p. 60: Average height of hatman: 5'8"
p. 60: Average height of light infantryman: 5'7"
p. 76: British infantry regiments have a single battalion of ten companies: two flank companies (one grenadier and one light infantryman) and eight companies of hatman.
p. 126-7: Probably typical was the reaction of one who, when told by some local Quaker lads before the battle of Brandywine that Washington "was considered to be a good man," retorted "that he might be a good man, but he was damnably misled to take up arms against his sovereign."
p. 132: "If my countrymen are beaten by these ragamuffins I shall be much surprised."
p. 134-5: "During the siege of Boston, Lieutenant William Carter expressed typical disgust at the rebel practice of sniping: 'Never had the British army so ungenerous an enemy to oppose. They send their riflemen (five or six at time) who conceal themselves behind trees, etc., till an opportunity presents itself of taking a shot at our advanced sentries, which done they immediately retreat. What an infamous method of carrying on a war!'"
p. 136: "The animosity that so many British soldiers felt for the rebels did not bode well for the latter if they found themselves within reach of British bayonets in combat. Indeed, in America the redcoats earned a grim reputation for ruthlessness."
p. 144-5: Ordinary Time = 75 paces/minute, Quick Time = 120-150 paces/minute, Bayonet Charge = Run
p. 169: "Historians commonly assert that eighteenth-century common soldiers braved enemy fire partly because they were more afraid of their officers than of the enemy."
p. 182: "incommoded": to give inconvenience or distress to
p. 198: "When British officers in America strove 'to inculcate the use of the bayonet, and a total reliance on that weapon,' they were turning their backs on a long-standing British tradition of dependence on fire tactics as the primary element of infantry warfare.'"
p. 216: "One needs to ask why the British infantry's minor tactics in America were consistently turned on their head in favor of 'the use of the bayonet, and a total reliance on that weapon.'"
p. 217: "When Howe planned an assault on the rebel works on Dorchester Heights for the night of 5-6 December 1775, he envisaged that the troops would carry out the attack with unloaded arms."
p. 230-1: "The principal advantage of General How's army over General Washington's ... must be ascribed to their being more trained to the use of the bayonet. The American army know their superior dexterity in firing well, and rely entirely upon it. The British army know it likewise, and dread it. Hence in all engagements the British soldiers rush on with the bayonet after one fire, and seldom fail of throwing the Americans into confusion."
p. 254-5: "After a mishandled skirmish in New Jersey on 23 February 1777, Captain Sir James Murray claimed that, though his company received heavy fire, it sustained small loss by 'favor of some pretty large trees, which by a good deal of practice we have learnt to make proper use of.'"
p. 260: "It may be said of it that every private man will in action be his own general, who will turn every tree and bush into a kind of temporary fortress; from whence, when he hath fired his shot with all [the] deliberation, coolness, and certainty which hidden safety inspires, he will skip [as it were] to the next, and so on, for a long time."
p. 261: Tactical advantages of hiding behind trees
p. 270: Otho Williams: "A pursuing army is always impeded by the effort that is necessary to maintain its own order; while, whether from terror, for safety, or for rallying, the speed of the fugitive is unrestrained. Hence, cavalry are the military means for rendering disorder irretrievable."
p. 271: "In eighteen-century warfare cavalry was generally only effective against unbroken, formed infantry if they were able to pounce upon an exposed flank."
p. 277: "On the mornings of the battles of Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse, the respective British forces moved off at 3:00 a.m. and at daybreak. Henry Lee later judged that, in contrast with the relative freshness of the rested and fed rebels, the hunger and fatigue of the King's troops was a key factor at both actions."
p. 279: "The resilience of the Continental Army was central to Britain's eventual failure in America."
xiv: "Rebels" vs. "Loyalists"
xiv: Rise and Fight again: The War of Independence in the South
p. 8: "Fabian strategy": a military strategy where pitched battles and frontal assaults are avoided in favor of wearing down an opponent through a war of attrition and indirection.
p. 9: "Perhaps the principal cause of this phenomenon was the eighteenth-century states' limited ability to replace its expensively recruited, trained, and maintained long-service professional soldiers. In the field this limitation manifested itself in a concern not to lose troops unnecessarily to sickness and desertion by exposing them to hardships like short rations and inclement weather. In turn, this curbed a field army's mobility by shackling it to magazines, bread ovens, and baggage trains."
p. 17: John Shy [has] proposed an alternative and altogether more convincing model of colonial attitudes. A People Numerous & Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence
p. 32: "Yet the absolute impossibility of conducting major operations without transport and artillery ensured that serious campaigning was limited to the growing season."
p. 55: "The miniature engagements of the American War had an influence on the conflict that was profoundly out of proportion to their size."
p. 60: atra cura: "black care"
p. 60: Average height of grenadier: 5'11"
p. 60: Average height of hatman: 5'8"
p. 60: Average height of light infantryman: 5'7"
p. 76: British infantry regiments have a single battalion of ten companies: two flank companies (one grenadier and one light infantryman) and eight companies of hatman.
p. 126-7: Probably typical was the reaction of one who, when told by some local Quaker lads before the battle of Brandywine that Washington "was considered to be a good man," retorted "that he might be a good man, but he was damnably misled to take up arms against his sovereign."
p. 132: "If my countrymen are beaten by these ragamuffins I shall be much surprised."
p. 134-5: "During the siege of Boston, Lieutenant William Carter expressed typical disgust at the rebel practice of sniping: 'Never had the British army so ungenerous an enemy to oppose. They send their riflemen (five or six at time) who conceal themselves behind trees, etc., till an opportunity presents itself of taking a shot at our advanced sentries, which done they immediately retreat. What an infamous method of carrying on a war!'"
p. 136: "The animosity that so many British soldiers felt for the rebels did not bode well for the latter if they found themselves within reach of British bayonets in combat. Indeed, in America the redcoats earned a grim reputation for ruthlessness."
p. 144-5: Ordinary Time = 75 paces/minute, Quick Time = 120-150 paces/minute, Bayonet Charge = Run
p. 169: "Historians commonly assert that eighteenth-century common soldiers braved enemy fire partly because they were more afraid of their officers than of the enemy."
p. 182: "incommoded": to give inconvenience or distress to
p. 198: "When British officers in America strove 'to inculcate the use of the bayonet, and a total reliance on that weapon,' they were turning their backs on a long-standing British tradition of dependence on fire tactics as the primary element of infantry warfare.'"
p. 216: "One needs to ask why the British infantry's minor tactics in America were consistently turned on their head in favor of 'the use of the bayonet, and a total reliance on that weapon.'"
p. 217: "When Howe planned an assault on the rebel works on Dorchester Heights for the night of 5-6 December 1775, he envisaged that the troops would carry out the attack with unloaded arms."
p. 230-1: "The principal advantage of General How's army over General Washington's ... must be ascribed to their being more trained to the use of the bayonet. The American army know their superior dexterity in firing well, and rely entirely upon it. The British army know it likewise, and dread it. Hence in all engagements the British soldiers rush on with the bayonet after one fire, and seldom fail of throwing the Americans into confusion."
p. 254-5: "After a mishandled skirmish in New Jersey on 23 February 1777, Captain Sir James Murray claimed that, though his company received heavy fire, it sustained small loss by 'favor of some pretty large trees, which by a good deal of practice we have learnt to make proper use of.'"
p. 260: "It may be said of it that every private man will in action be his own general, who will turn every tree and bush into a kind of temporary fortress; from whence, when he hath fired his shot with all [the] deliberation, coolness, and certainty which hidden safety inspires, he will skip [as it were] to the next, and so on, for a long time."
p. 261: Tactical advantages of hiding behind trees
p. 270: Otho Williams: "A pursuing army is always impeded by the effort that is necessary to maintain its own order; while, whether from terror, for safety, or for rallying, the speed of the fugitive is unrestrained. Hence, cavalry are the military means for rendering disorder irretrievable."
p. 271: "In eighteen-century warfare cavalry was generally only effective against unbroken, formed infantry if they were able to pounce upon an exposed flank."
p. 277: "On the mornings of the battles of Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse, the respective British forces moved off at 3:00 a.m. and at daybreak. Henry Lee later judged that, in contrast with the relative freshness of the rested and fed rebels, the hunger and fatigue of the King's troops was a key factor at both actions."
p. 279: "The resilience of the Continental Army was central to Britain's eventual failure in America."
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 20, 2016
Offers revealing insights into the "redcoat" of the American War of Independence. This book uses the historical record to reveal what the Average British soldier was really like. Some of the tales are very compelling!
September 25, 2015
A classic in every way: fair, well written, and original. Only gripe is that Spring cannot decide if Britain had a real chance to win the war. To be fair it remains a great enigma. Even I am not sure.
Read
January 21, 2011This book was awesome. Very good descriptions on the methods used by the Redcoats during the 18th century. A definite must read.
February 12, 2024
Phenomenal book if you're interested in 18th century warfare. Extremely detailed, filled with technical descriptions, and chock full of anecdotes from low and high level officers. Thoroughly researched, it is an excellent descriptive work detailing the reality of combat in this period, the problems with the logistics of fighting in the Americas for the British army, and breaks down many common stereotypes and myths about the type of fighting in the American Revolutionary War. The descriptions of actual line combat from anecdotes and close reading of primary accounts and training manuals, much different from the typical idea of it as stupid or bewildering, reveals many important details that can add to understanding of battles (less so the wars overall) in the same time period (Really any war between the War of Spanish Succession and the Napoleonic Wars)
If dozens of pages describing different perspectives on firing techniques when in line combat, and then another several dozen describing different perspectives on bayonet charges sounds appealing to you, it's a great book. If you don't find 18th century combat or warfare interesting, this book will probably bore you to tears. Extremely technical, very detailed, and focused on creating a comprehensive view of warfare in this period. Does not deal with Hessian troops at all, though, and skips over them frequently.
Listened on audiobook. The only suggestions/critiques I have: more normative analysis/suggestions of what the British SHOULD have done to be more successful in the war (ie. cavalry, naval integration with land based forces, following up on successes in the early and mid war). Second, more explicit comparisons and contrasts with the European style of warfare, often the author just observes how different the American situation was when more detail would be very appreciated and relevant. Third, a greater emphasis on the differences between 'Shock' (Bayonet and taking advantages of critical moments to break opponents) and 'Firepower' (Accuracy, reloading skill, ability to maximize effective fire output from a line in combat) approaches during combat itself and it's change over the century preceding would have been appreciated, though it's gone over in just enough detail to satisfy.
Overall, great book, will probably re-read at some point because of how hard it is to get this kind of detail.
If dozens of pages describing different perspectives on firing techniques when in line combat, and then another several dozen describing different perspectives on bayonet charges sounds appealing to you, it's a great book. If you don't find 18th century combat or warfare interesting, this book will probably bore you to tears. Extremely technical, very detailed, and focused on creating a comprehensive view of warfare in this period. Does not deal with Hessian troops at all, though, and skips over them frequently.
Listened on audiobook. The only suggestions/critiques I have: more normative analysis/suggestions of what the British SHOULD have done to be more successful in the war (ie. cavalry, naval integration with land based forces, following up on successes in the early and mid war). Second, more explicit comparisons and contrasts with the European style of warfare, often the author just observes how different the American situation was when more detail would be very appreciated and relevant. Third, a greater emphasis on the differences between 'Shock' (Bayonet and taking advantages of critical moments to break opponents) and 'Firepower' (Accuracy, reloading skill, ability to maximize effective fire output from a line in combat) approaches during combat itself and it's change over the century preceding would have been appreciated, though it's gone over in just enough detail to satisfy.
Overall, great book, will probably re-read at some point because of how hard it is to get this kind of detail.
August 15, 2023
The book goes over the experiences of British troops in the Americas, and how they fought. I found quite a few surprises compared to my preconceptions.
In Europe, the British model was very much tight formations and musketry. In America, that was replaced with much more open formations (allowing manoeuvre) and the use of bayonets (since the American troops may not have been better at the fire fight, but could at least compete in it using superior numbers). Later in the war, American troops were able to stand up to this, while earlier they tended to crumble – though could fight well in skirmishing and ambushes away from the battle or in very rough country. Incidentally, this less structured lines also tended to come more to Europe as time went on because the enclosure movement meant more fences and walls to negotiate.
The British strategy was very much to disorganise and discourage the American forces, which meant winning battles against them while always ensuring that the British maintained moral ascendancy by never losing. This partially worked because of the core of British professional troops, even though often a large fraction of the British troops were not particularly experienced or trained. However, in the end it failed this did not work as the Americans could just slip away in rough ground unsuitable for cavalry, disband and reform.
Overall, a little long in places and too full of examples, but a very well written and interesting account.
In Europe, the British model was very much tight formations and musketry. In America, that was replaced with much more open formations (allowing manoeuvre) and the use of bayonets (since the American troops may not have been better at the fire fight, but could at least compete in it using superior numbers). Later in the war, American troops were able to stand up to this, while earlier they tended to crumble – though could fight well in skirmishing and ambushes away from the battle or in very rough country. Incidentally, this less structured lines also tended to come more to Europe as time went on because the enclosure movement meant more fences and walls to negotiate.
The British strategy was very much to disorganise and discourage the American forces, which meant winning battles against them while always ensuring that the British maintained moral ascendancy by never losing. This partially worked because of the core of British professional troops, even though often a large fraction of the British troops were not particularly experienced or trained. However, in the end it failed this did not work as the Americans could just slip away in rough ground unsuitable for cavalry, disband and reform.
Overall, a little long in places and too full of examples, but a very well written and interesting account.
January 11, 2025
This book is a look through British eyes at how the British army fought in North America during the American Revolution. The author is a British historian, and this book is drawn from his dissertation. Dissertation tend to be more readable than American ones but some of the weaknesses of that origin do show through.
There is a larger problem though with the book, which is that it aims to be a revisionist history vindicating the British army from scurrilous insults by the Americans, but it’s not actually clear that anybody has believed those claims in a very long time. At one time, Americans told the story that they won the war by virtue of individual riflemen, not tied to European discipline, who could snipe effectively from beyond the range of the British muskets. But it’s not clear that anyone has taken that seriously in a century and so it’s not obvious why anybody needed to write a book to rebut this.
The main conclusion is already given in the title, which is that British army had far more discipline and cohesion than the Americans, and utilized that effectively. They had a tactical culture of aggressive attacks, typically with bayonets, which the colonials very rarely were prepared to stand and receive. Furthermore, British artillery was intensely destructive and demoralizing for the rebels, and a favorite tool of British field armies.
This should not surprise us. At the end of the 18th century, British had an extremely effective army, versatile enough to win in theaters stretching from Quebec to Spain to India. They were some of the best in the world, man for man. Somehow, though they were quite unable to put down the American rebellion. The author does address this question to beginning and end of the book but it seems strange to have this vindication of British battlefield performance at great detail when the more important question is why those battlefield victories didn’t go anywhere.
I thought the author’s analysis here was much more interesting. The basic problem the British had was that they did not have enough troops to simultaneously defeat or deflect the rebel field armies, and also to disperse enough to subdue the territory. It’s not obvious they had enough troops for either. They certainly did not have enough troops for both. If they kept their armies together, rebel militias would reimpose control and if they dispersed, they were vulnerable to defeat in detail.
This is a very familiar problem for empires, and it is a pity that the author did not push the analysis one step further to explain why this was true in North America, but not in other places and times. Somehow, the British did hold the rest of their empire.
There is a larger problem though with the book, which is that it aims to be a revisionist history vindicating the British army from scurrilous insults by the Americans, but it’s not actually clear that anybody has believed those claims in a very long time. At one time, Americans told the story that they won the war by virtue of individual riflemen, not tied to European discipline, who could snipe effectively from beyond the range of the British muskets. But it’s not clear that anyone has taken that seriously in a century and so it’s not obvious why anybody needed to write a book to rebut this.
The main conclusion is already given in the title, which is that British army had far more discipline and cohesion than the Americans, and utilized that effectively. They had a tactical culture of aggressive attacks, typically with bayonets, which the colonials very rarely were prepared to stand and receive. Furthermore, British artillery was intensely destructive and demoralizing for the rebels, and a favorite tool of British field armies.
This should not surprise us. At the end of the 18th century, British had an extremely effective army, versatile enough to win in theaters stretching from Quebec to Spain to India. They were some of the best in the world, man for man. Somehow, though they were quite unable to put down the American rebellion. The author does address this question to beginning and end of the book but it seems strange to have this vindication of British battlefield performance at great detail when the more important question is why those battlefield victories didn’t go anywhere.
I thought the author’s analysis here was much more interesting. The basic problem the British had was that they did not have enough troops to simultaneously defeat or deflect the rebel field armies, and also to disperse enough to subdue the territory. It’s not obvious they had enough troops for either. They certainly did not have enough troops for both. If they kept their armies together, rebel militias would reimpose control and if they dispersed, they were vulnerable to defeat in detail.
This is a very familiar problem for empires, and it is a pity that the author did not push the analysis one step further to explain why this was true in North America, but not in other places and times. Somehow, the British did hold the rest of their empire.
March 10, 2021
A fascinating book and great read, which really takes you beyond the stereotype of close order redcoats marching slowly into the rifle fire of the plucky rebels. Although a very detailed book, the author expresses himself clearly and provides plenty of battlefield examples and quotes from contemporary writers and eye-witnesses, so his arguments are easy to follow. The army was certainly not made up of veteran soldiers at the start and had much to learn, but learn it did and adopted flexible tactics appropriate to the terrain and the enemy's capabilities; however, given logistical difficulties, poor intelligence, manpower shortages and the nature of the enemy, the British probably couldn't win no matter how well they did on the battlefield.
March 1, 2023
Very good!
Author Matthew H. Spring wrote a masterpiece of a book that described the British army and German mercenaries against the Continentals, specifically myths, logistics, fighting, and other facets of the war. In 280 pages, a reader can learn so much about the war accurately and clearly, as the author cited dozens and dozens of primary and secondary sources, published by Oklahoma University Press.
If you like British or American military history, early American history, history of the American Revolutionary War, or military history in general, I highly recommend this book. As a War of 1812 reenactor and history graduate, this book is treasure.
Author Matthew H. Spring wrote a masterpiece of a book that described the British army and German mercenaries against the Continentals, specifically myths, logistics, fighting, and other facets of the war. In 280 pages, a reader can learn so much about the war accurately and clearly, as the author cited dozens and dozens of primary and secondary sources, published by Oklahoma University Press.
If you like British or American military history, early American history, history of the American Revolutionary War, or military history in general, I highly recommend this book. As a War of 1812 reenactor and history graduate, this book is treasure.
November 20, 2022
An analysis of the American Revolution from a British point of view. Their purpose was to defeat the rebel forces and thus convince the majority of Americans that the minority who had led them into rebellion were unable to win.
Obviously, they didn't. Their constraints on manpower, lack of supplies of any kind from tents to forages for horses, or horses themselves, the terrain and having to reimplement fighting as they did, the troops' motivations, how the officers worked, the deployments and how they had to change; guns and bayonets, among other topics. Gets technical.
Obviously, they didn't. Their constraints on manpower, lack of supplies of any kind from tents to forages for horses, or horses themselves, the terrain and having to reimplement fighting as they did, the troops' motivations, how the officers worked, the deployments and how they had to change; guns and bayonets, among other topics. Gets technical.
June 4, 2018
Very well written summary of the British during the Revolutionary War - I was very sad when it ended. It would have been great to have a second half of battlefield walk-throughs showing the discussed tactics in action to bring it all together. Very fascinating - it would be very interesting to know how history would have played out if the British had maintained their continental discipline.
March 17, 2018
By far the best study in 18th c warfare in the Americas. Spring’s book should be the first stop for anyone studying the evolution of tactics and warfighting functions in the American theater of war during the late 1700’s.
July 23, 2018
A very interesting book, well written and very readable. It gives a great insight on how the British fought in the American War of Independence, their strategy and tactics, the difficulties they faced and how the tried and ultimately failed to overcome them.
November 23, 2022
All said it was a hard read,not the campaign type history I am used to. The chapters were based on a different tactic or aspect of the British army in army.
There were only parts of battles or campaigning history throughout. Some may like this book but it was not for me.
There were only parts of battles or campaigning history throughout. Some may like this book but it was not for me.
June 9, 2025
good riddance!
January 11, 2015
I bought this book about two years ago and just finished it. Not knowing a lot about the Revolutionary War, I looked forward to diving in to this book and learning about the how the British Army fought during the war. The book started off strong, but the further I made it in the book, I felt like I was reading the same chapter again and again. I know there is a scarcity of primary sources for the Rev. War, but reading the same source saying the same thing over and over again got old and I put the book down. Returning to the book, I struggled through to the end.
The book is well written and Mr. Spring does a wonderful job explaining the role of the British Army and it's tactics during the war. He did a fine job transitioning the book from a thesis to a full length book. Mr. Spring also did a wonderful job of explaining the odds that the British Army was up against in America and how after 1777 the British would not have been able to win the war. I would recommend this book to anyone, especially for the source list that Mr. Spring includes, but I would also caution the reader to remember as they read to remember there are only so many sources an author can use.
The book is well written and Mr. Spring does a wonderful job explaining the role of the British Army and it's tactics during the war. He did a fine job transitioning the book from a thesis to a full length book. Mr. Spring also did a wonderful job of explaining the odds that the British Army was up against in America and how after 1777 the British would not have been able to win the war. I would recommend this book to anyone, especially for the source list that Mr. Spring includes, but I would also caution the reader to remember as they read to remember there are only so many sources an author can use.
January 11, 2014
Excellent study of the British Army in the American Revolution. It is written from the general officers point of view. As others have noted it contradicts the notion the British were unimaginative robots who were picked off by sharp eyed rifle armed frontiersmen. If the rating system used half stars I would have given it 3 1/2 stars.
September 26, 2018
Excellent, detailed study of the British side of the war. As a minor criticism, the author sometimes uses unfamiliar terms without defining them; for example, chapter refers to the "colonel's company" or "major's company"; also, it took me awhile before I figured out that the author was using the term "corps" as a synonym for "regiment".
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