What do you think?
Rate this book
The Strategy of Victory: How General George Washington Won the American Revolution
Led by the Continental Congress, the Americans almost lost their war for independence because their military thinking was badly muddled. The embryo nation narrowly escaped from the disastrous results of these misconceptions thanks to the levelheaded intelligence of one man: General George Washington.
Following the flush of small victories in 1775, patriot leaders were convinced that the key to victory was the homegrown militia--local men defending their families and homes. Washington knew that having and maintaining an army of regular professional soldiers was the only way to win independence. He fought bitterly with the leaders in Congress over the creation of a regular army. In the end, he and his army prevailed.
In Strategy of Victory, prolific historian Thomas Fleming examines the battles that created American independence, revealing how the strategy of a professional army, backed by a corps of citizen soldiers determined to fight for their freedom, worked on the battlefield, securing victory, independence and a lasting peace for the young nation.
Following the flush of small victories in 1775, patriot leaders were convinced that the key to victory was the homegrown militia--local men defending their families and homes. Washington knew that having and maintaining an army of regular professional soldiers was the only way to win independence. He fought bitterly with the leaders in Congress over the creation of a regular army. In the end, he and his army prevailed.
In Strategy of Victory, prolific historian Thomas Fleming examines the battles that created American independence, revealing how the strategy of a professional army, backed by a corps of citizen soldiers determined to fight for their freedom, worked on the battlefield, securing victory, independence and a lasting peace for the young nation.
310 pages, Hardcover
First published October 10, 2017
27 people are currently reading
211 people want to read
About the author
Thomas Fleming
127 books149 followersLibrarian note:
There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name
Thomas James Fleming was an historian and historical novelist, with a special interest in the American Revolution. He was born in 1927 in Jersey City, New Jersey, the son of a World War I hero who was a leader in Jersey City politics for three decades. Before her marriage, his mother, Katherine Dolan Fleming, was a teacher in the Jersey City Public School System.
After graduating from St. Peter's Preparatory School in Jersey City, Fleming spent a year in the United States Navy. He received a Bachelor's degree, with honors, from Fordham University in 1950. After brief stints as a newspaperman and magazine editor, he became a full-time writer in 1960. His first history book, Now We Are Enemies, an account of the Battle of Bunker Hill, was published that same year. It was a best-seller, reviewed in more than 75 newspapers and featured as a main selection of the Literary Guild.
Fleming published books about various events and figures of the Revolutionary era. He also wrote about other periods of American history and wrote over a dozen well-received novels set against various historical backgrounds. He said, "I never wanted to be an Irish American writer, my whole idea was to get across that bridge and be an American writer".
Fleming died at his home in New York City on July 23, 2017, at the age of 90.
There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name
Thomas James Fleming was an historian and historical novelist, with a special interest in the American Revolution. He was born in 1927 in Jersey City, New Jersey, the son of a World War I hero who was a leader in Jersey City politics for three decades. Before her marriage, his mother, Katherine Dolan Fleming, was a teacher in the Jersey City Public School System.
After graduating from St. Peter's Preparatory School in Jersey City, Fleming spent a year in the United States Navy. He received a Bachelor's degree, with honors, from Fordham University in 1950. After brief stints as a newspaperman and magazine editor, he became a full-time writer in 1960. His first history book, Now We Are Enemies, an account of the Battle of Bunker Hill, was published that same year. It was a best-seller, reviewed in more than 75 newspapers and featured as a main selection of the Literary Guild.
Fleming published books about various events and figures of the Revolutionary era. He also wrote about other periods of American history and wrote over a dozen well-received novels set against various historical backgrounds. He said, "I never wanted to be an Irish American writer, my whole idea was to get across that bridge and be an American writer".
Fleming died at his home in New York City on July 23, 2017, at the age of 90.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
February 22, 2022
There are many tales and myth surrounding the American Revolution and George Washington. The war and the man have become an engrained idea into the consciousness of the American people. And while this book does not set out to dispel these myths, it does provide context for them in the form of a military setting. "The Strategy of Victory" is a military history of the American Revolution with a focus on the grand strategic philosophies employed by Washington and other major generals. From the initial belief of continuously replicating Bunker Hill, to the adaption of Flavian prolongment tactics, to the development and integration of the Continental Army and state militias, the book explores the different approaches Washington and company took to securing the nation. Despite the subtitle, it must be noted that this is not a biography of Washington at all, as I mistakenly believed when I began this book. While old George is certainly the most important figure of the book and Revolution, he is absent from large stretches of the narrative, sometime arriving at the end of a chapter and sometimes not at all. In fact, at times it might be believed the book is centered around other military figures like Nathaniel Greene or Daniel Morgan. Regardless, the book has its positives and negatives. The prose is easy to read and there were very few times I was confused about the narrative, though a map or two might have been appreciated. Thomas Fleming clearly had a strong passion for the subject, and his enthusiasm beams in sections of the book; the depictions on the battles of Springfield and Cowpens are especially stirring. There are some major faults, however. Fleming very rarely departs from standard military history, which makes it difficult to understand why exactly the strategies were important. Additionally, anything outside of the American perspective was noticeably weaker, as the sections concerning French, British, Canadian, or Native American history seeming incomplete or even omitted. A smaller criticism, but Fleming also name dropped the title in virtually every chapter, which by chapter three was already surpassing cliche into downright annoying. The book accomplishes what it set out to do in explaining how the military strategies employed by the American Army were a major factor in reaching victory. However, the book left me with more questions that I feel should have been answered.
September 17, 2020
This is a very interesting book, the last one written from a historian I admire. The book jacket cover says it’s “A sweeping and insightful grand strategic overview of the American Revolution, highlighting Washington’s role in orchestrating victory and creating the US Army.” What the author means by this is that, in order to win the Revolutionary War, Washington’s grand strategy was building a professional army. Unfortunately, the book, as good as it is, suffers from a number of problems. I believe that this may have happened because the author died in July 2017, with the book being printed in October 2017. So what are the book's problems?
1. The identification of Washington’s strategy keeps changing:
a. p 3: “But he changed the strategy of the war. In the middle of the war.”
b. p 49 “He [Quintus Fabius Maximus] kept his legendary composure and patched together another army strong enough to resume his tactics [stragegy?] of delay and attrition.”
c. p 223: “In a series of letters, he [Greene] urged al the guerrilla leaders to join his force and give battle to Cornwallis in North Carolina. ‘The salvation of this country don’t [sic] depend on little strokes nor should the great business of establishing a permanent army be neglected to pursue them,’ Green told Sumter. ‘Partisan strokes in a war are like the garnish of the table, they give splendor to the army and reputation to the officers but they afford no national security….It is not a war of posts but a contest for states.' This may well be the best summary of George Washington’s strategy of victory that anyone has written, including the commander in chief.” [As some might ask, “Huh?”]
d. p 234: “Clinton curtly replied that Arnold’s proposal was out of the question. He noted how ‘the bold persevering militia’ of New Jersey had shot up the British army when it invaded the state in 1780. Here was a final tribute to the years Washington had spent cultivating a spirit of resistance in the militia. In no other state had the amateurs’ readiness to fight beside the Continentals offered better proof of the value of the American Fabius’ [Washington’s] strategy of victory.” [tactics or strategy?]
e. p 252: “Once more, he [Washington] was emphasizing the essential idea of his strategy of victory: a trained regular army, capable of looking an enemy in the face.” [matches book jacket cover]
f. p 273: “In the person of Major General Anthony Wayne, the principles of a strategy for victory in revolutionary warfare conceived by General George Washington were applied one last time – with victorious results.” [What exactly?]
2. The chapters names are hard to interpret at a glance.
(1) The First Stroke (my interpretation in parentheses: 1775 Battles of Lexington and Concord)
(2) Propaganda Meets Reality in 1776 (beaten soundly in NY & NJ; but Trenton)
(3) The Year of the Hangman (1777: 7s look like gibbets; Brandywine & Germantown, Saratoga)
(4) The Perils of Fabius (1777-8 Conway Cabal)
(5) General Double Trouble (General Lee, but author never explains moniker, 1780 Battle of Monmouth)
(6) A Surplus of Disappointment (1778 Battle of Newport, RI)
(7) Lexington Repeated – with an Army to look the enemy in the face (1780 Battle of Connecticut Farms, NJ)
(8) Enter the outraged conqueror of Charleston (1780 Battle of Springfield, RI)
(9) How much longer can Fabius Last? (1780 Battle of Camden)
(10) A plan so daring even Daniel Morgan feared the worst (1781 Battle of Cowpens)
(11) Downright fighting (more 1781 Cowpens)
(12) Fight, get beat, rise and fight again (1781 Battle of Guilford Court House)
(13) From mutiny and despair to improbable victory (1781 Mutinies to Yorktown)
(14) Victory’s unexpected challenge (1783 Newburgh Conspiracy)
(15) George Washington’s tears (1783 Washington’s regret to get Army paid)
(16) Major General Anthony Wayne (1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers)
As far as I can tell, errors of fact are very few. However, on page 275, the author mentions that in 1965 he met with the superintendent of West Point, Lieutenant General Donald V. Bennett. Actually, Bennett was a Major General at that time, later rising in the ranks to full General.
For those interested, per my book “Strategy Pure and Simple,” strategy is a nothing more than a plan to win (with tactics basically being subplans). Besides building a professional army, the Americans used a number of strategies in the Revolutionary War:
1. “Militia swarm”: This was basically the initial (19 April 1775), mostly uncoordinated rush of New England militia to Lexington and Concord to confront and surround the Boston-based British.
2. Siege: This was the 10-month period following Lexington and Concord in which the Americans surrounded the British in Boston, ending after the Battle of Dorchester Heights (4–5 March 1775; the artillery Knox brought in from Ft. Ticonderoga loomed over and threatened to devastate the city) and the British leaving Boston by ship on 17 March 1775.
3. War of Posts (Positions): This was a strategy Washington possibly learned from the Battle of Bunker Hill (at which he was not present). Essentially it was a plan to occupy well-fortified positions and lure the British into disastrous attacks. Unfortunately, General Howe learned his lesson at Bunker Hill and began outflanking Washington in a number of battles (27–30 Aug 1776 Long Island and later 11 Sep 1777 Brandywine). A later adaptation of the “War of Posts” was to wage a defensive war of positions (from which they could escape if need be), fighting only when they could win or at least not lose, with an overall strategy of outlasting the British.
4. Surprise Attack: On 26 Dec 1776, Washington surprised and captured a British outpost at Trenton, following this up with 3 Jan 1777 Battle of Princeton.
5. Attack: Washington’s 4 Oct 1777 Battle of Germantown and Gates’ 16 Aug 1780 were both attacks, and both did not go well for the Americans. The 28 June 1778 Battle of Monmouth was a tactical draw but perhaps a something of a strategic victory for the Americans, who had just come from Baron von Steuben’s training at Valley Forge.
6. Guerilla Warfare: This was the type of warfare that the American “Swamp Fox” Marion conducted against the British in South Carolina.
7. Total War: This was the 1779 war Washington had waged against the marauding Indians the British had stirred up. In return, “Town Destroyer” Washington ordered his forces to devastate their land. Many of those in 40 Indian villages not killed-outright starved.
8. Spying and Disinformation: This was the proactive plan that Washington set in motion to gain intelligence about and foil British plans.
9. Combined Arms: This was the American Plan to gain allies, primarily the French but also the Spanish and Dutch, to join them in war against the British.
10. Attrit and Attack: This was basically Washington’s plan to win by just not losing. He would exhaust the British, especially with through the cat-and-mouse activities of Greene and Lafayette in the South, with the British finally winding up to await a siege attack at Yorktown (28 Sep -19 Oct 1781).
11. Watchful Waiting: He would keep his forces ready to fight until the Treaty of Paris was signed on 3 Sep 1783 and the Revolutionary War formally ended.
12. Adherence to the Rules of War: Rules of Engagement. Washington strove always to engage and win the hearts and minds of the people. He did not allow his troops to rampage, loot, and pillage (except for his war on the Iroquois mentioned earlier). This was not always the case with the British. They had hopes of establishing a base in the middle colonies, especially New Jersey, which had a relatively large percentage of loyalists or at least neutrals. These hopes were dashed by British officers who looked the other way when their men (to include the hated foreign Hessians) resorted to “extra-legal” actions or who themselves, like their king, treated the population as less than British citizens. This was certainly the case later in the South, where “Bloody Ban” Tarleton committed his atrocities and where British Major Ferguson stirred up a hornets’ nest among the Overmountain Men by threatening to hang them all if they didn’t pledge allegiance to the King, whereupon they gave him their devastating answer by surrounding and killing him in the decisive (as Thomas Jefferson put it: “The turn of the tide of success”) 7 Oct 1780 Battle of Kings Mountain.
Nevertheless, Fleming’s book is filled with very interesting information, quite a bit of it which I haven’t seen elsewhere. It seems, though, that the author didn’t successfully weave the book’s information into a coherent, smooth-flowing whole, all the while not clearly explaining how the Grand Strategy of military professionalization fit into each of the examples/chapters. Again, this may have had a lot to do with the state of the author’s declining health. All this said, I found the book very interesting and, as a fellow author, recommend it highly.
1. The identification of Washington’s strategy keeps changing:
a. p 3: “But he changed the strategy of the war. In the middle of the war.”
b. p 49 “He [Quintus Fabius Maximus] kept his legendary composure and patched together another army strong enough to resume his tactics [stragegy?] of delay and attrition.”
c. p 223: “In a series of letters, he [Greene] urged al the guerrilla leaders to join his force and give battle to Cornwallis in North Carolina. ‘The salvation of this country don’t [sic] depend on little strokes nor should the great business of establishing a permanent army be neglected to pursue them,’ Green told Sumter. ‘Partisan strokes in a war are like the garnish of the table, they give splendor to the army and reputation to the officers but they afford no national security….It is not a war of posts but a contest for states.' This may well be the best summary of George Washington’s strategy of victory that anyone has written, including the commander in chief.” [As some might ask, “Huh?”]
d. p 234: “Clinton curtly replied that Arnold’s proposal was out of the question. He noted how ‘the bold persevering militia’ of New Jersey had shot up the British army when it invaded the state in 1780. Here was a final tribute to the years Washington had spent cultivating a spirit of resistance in the militia. In no other state had the amateurs’ readiness to fight beside the Continentals offered better proof of the value of the American Fabius’ [Washington’s] strategy of victory.” [tactics or strategy?]
e. p 252: “Once more, he [Washington] was emphasizing the essential idea of his strategy of victory: a trained regular army, capable of looking an enemy in the face.” [matches book jacket cover]
f. p 273: “In the person of Major General Anthony Wayne, the principles of a strategy for victory in revolutionary warfare conceived by General George Washington were applied one last time – with victorious results.” [What exactly?]
2. The chapters names are hard to interpret at a glance.
(1) The First Stroke (my interpretation in parentheses: 1775 Battles of Lexington and Concord)
(2) Propaganda Meets Reality in 1776 (beaten soundly in NY & NJ; but Trenton)
(3) The Year of the Hangman (1777: 7s look like gibbets; Brandywine & Germantown, Saratoga)
(4) The Perils of Fabius (1777-8 Conway Cabal)
(5) General Double Trouble (General Lee, but author never explains moniker, 1780 Battle of Monmouth)
(6) A Surplus of Disappointment (1778 Battle of Newport, RI)
(7) Lexington Repeated – with an Army to look the enemy in the face (1780 Battle of Connecticut Farms, NJ)
(8) Enter the outraged conqueror of Charleston (1780 Battle of Springfield, RI)
(9) How much longer can Fabius Last? (1780 Battle of Camden)
(10) A plan so daring even Daniel Morgan feared the worst (1781 Battle of Cowpens)
(11) Downright fighting (more 1781 Cowpens)
(12) Fight, get beat, rise and fight again (1781 Battle of Guilford Court House)
(13) From mutiny and despair to improbable victory (1781 Mutinies to Yorktown)
(14) Victory’s unexpected challenge (1783 Newburgh Conspiracy)
(15) George Washington’s tears (1783 Washington’s regret to get Army paid)
(16) Major General Anthony Wayne (1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers)
As far as I can tell, errors of fact are very few. However, on page 275, the author mentions that in 1965 he met with the superintendent of West Point, Lieutenant General Donald V. Bennett. Actually, Bennett was a Major General at that time, later rising in the ranks to full General.
For those interested, per my book “Strategy Pure and Simple,” strategy is a nothing more than a plan to win (with tactics basically being subplans). Besides building a professional army, the Americans used a number of strategies in the Revolutionary War:
1. “Militia swarm”: This was basically the initial (19 April 1775), mostly uncoordinated rush of New England militia to Lexington and Concord to confront and surround the Boston-based British.
2. Siege: This was the 10-month period following Lexington and Concord in which the Americans surrounded the British in Boston, ending after the Battle of Dorchester Heights (4–5 March 1775; the artillery Knox brought in from Ft. Ticonderoga loomed over and threatened to devastate the city) and the British leaving Boston by ship on 17 March 1775.
3. War of Posts (Positions): This was a strategy Washington possibly learned from the Battle of Bunker Hill (at which he was not present). Essentially it was a plan to occupy well-fortified positions and lure the British into disastrous attacks. Unfortunately, General Howe learned his lesson at Bunker Hill and began outflanking Washington in a number of battles (27–30 Aug 1776 Long Island and later 11 Sep 1777 Brandywine). A later adaptation of the “War of Posts” was to wage a defensive war of positions (from which they could escape if need be), fighting only when they could win or at least not lose, with an overall strategy of outlasting the British.
4. Surprise Attack: On 26 Dec 1776, Washington surprised and captured a British outpost at Trenton, following this up with 3 Jan 1777 Battle of Princeton.
5. Attack: Washington’s 4 Oct 1777 Battle of Germantown and Gates’ 16 Aug 1780 were both attacks, and both did not go well for the Americans. The 28 June 1778 Battle of Monmouth was a tactical draw but perhaps a something of a strategic victory for the Americans, who had just come from Baron von Steuben’s training at Valley Forge.
6. Guerilla Warfare: This was the type of warfare that the American “Swamp Fox” Marion conducted against the British in South Carolina.
7. Total War: This was the 1779 war Washington had waged against the marauding Indians the British had stirred up. In return, “Town Destroyer” Washington ordered his forces to devastate their land. Many of those in 40 Indian villages not killed-outright starved.
8. Spying and Disinformation: This was the proactive plan that Washington set in motion to gain intelligence about and foil British plans.
9. Combined Arms: This was the American Plan to gain allies, primarily the French but also the Spanish and Dutch, to join them in war against the British.
10. Attrit and Attack: This was basically Washington’s plan to win by just not losing. He would exhaust the British, especially with through the cat-and-mouse activities of Greene and Lafayette in the South, with the British finally winding up to await a siege attack at Yorktown (28 Sep -19 Oct 1781).
11. Watchful Waiting: He would keep his forces ready to fight until the Treaty of Paris was signed on 3 Sep 1783 and the Revolutionary War formally ended.
12. Adherence to the Rules of War: Rules of Engagement. Washington strove always to engage and win the hearts and minds of the people. He did not allow his troops to rampage, loot, and pillage (except for his war on the Iroquois mentioned earlier). This was not always the case with the British. They had hopes of establishing a base in the middle colonies, especially New Jersey, which had a relatively large percentage of loyalists or at least neutrals. These hopes were dashed by British officers who looked the other way when their men (to include the hated foreign Hessians) resorted to “extra-legal” actions or who themselves, like their king, treated the population as less than British citizens. This was certainly the case later in the South, where “Bloody Ban” Tarleton committed his atrocities and where British Major Ferguson stirred up a hornets’ nest among the Overmountain Men by threatening to hang them all if they didn’t pledge allegiance to the King, whereupon they gave him their devastating answer by surrounding and killing him in the decisive (as Thomas Jefferson put it: “The turn of the tide of success”) 7 Oct 1780 Battle of Kings Mountain.
Nevertheless, Fleming’s book is filled with very interesting information, quite a bit of it which I haven’t seen elsewhere. It seems, though, that the author didn’t successfully weave the book’s information into a coherent, smooth-flowing whole, all the while not clearly explaining how the Grand Strategy of military professionalization fit into each of the examples/chapters. Again, this may have had a lot to do with the state of the author’s declining health. All this said, I found the book very interesting and, as a fellow author, recommend it highly.
January 19, 2024
A compelling and insightful account of the military genius and strategic brilliance of one of America's most revered figures, General George Washington. With meticulous research and a captivating narrative style, Fleming brings to light the often overlooked tactics and decisions that ultimately led to the triumph of the American Revolution. Fleming's book offers a refreshing perspective on Washington's leadership and sheds light on his innovative strategies. The author skillfully dismantles the popular notion that Washington's victories were solely a result of luck or divine intervention, instead emphasizing the meticulous planning and calculated risks taken by the general. By carefully analyzing key battles such as Trenton, Princeton, and Saratoga, Fleming reveals the brilliance behind Washington's military maneuvers, highlighting his ability to exploit weaknesses in the British army and turn the tide of the war. Fleming provides a clear and concise analysis of the key battles, explaining the significance of each move and its impact on the overall war effort. Additionally, Fleming masterfully weaves together historical context, personal anecdotes, and quotes from primary sources, creating a well-rounded and engaging narrative. "The Strategy of Victory" is a must-read for anyone interested in American history or military strategy. Fleming's impeccable research and skillful storytelling make for a thoroughly enjoyable and informative reading experience. By highlighting Washington's strategic brilliance, the book offers a fresh perspective on the American Revolution and solidifies General George Washington's rightful place as a military genius and the savior of the fledgling nation.
January 2, 2018
Interesting examination of the American Revolution with the focus on George Washington. The major weakness is Fleming's bias toward Washington, which demonizes all those who disagreed with Washington and generally fails to present a two-sided examination of the different opinions as to how to prosecute the war.
As much military history as I have read, this book still contained a number of interesting details:
- Fleming maintains that the Howe brothers, senior British commanders, were opponents of King George III, and therefore did not fully prosecute the war, because they did not want to destroy the colonial army and give King George III a victory and free reign to terrorize the colonies.
- Washington is credited with understanding that, as with most insurgents, time was on his side. If he could just keep his forces moving and with some combat capacity, the British would tire of the protracted war. Fleming compares this strategy to that of Quintus Fabius Maximus, who fought scattered battles against Hannibal, never winning but never being destroyed.
- Fleming explores the struggles of rebel leaders in the South - Daniel Morgan and William Davidson (who led the NC militia) - to raise significant militias. The British were attempting to peel off southern states and get them to sign independent peace treaties.
- Anthony Wayne also comes across as a hero, both for his efforts to hold the militias together as they frequently threatened mutiny due to the lack of pay or provisions, and later for his leadership in battling the Indians and British in the West.
- One reason the French agreed to help in Virginia was because they did not believe they could challenge the British in New York City.
- In NC and SC, Nathaniel Greene may have never won a battle, but he won the war.
- Washington sent a messenger to tell Congress of the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, but the messenger had no money for a room when he arrived, and Congress had no money for him, so individual congressmen pitched in out of their own funds to find him a room.
- The famous story of Washington confronting the disgruntled officers after the war, as he dons his new glasses, "you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country."
- Washington's tears in Fraunces Tavern may have been driven in part by a farewell to friends, but also sadness at the state of the dispute between officers and soldiers seeking pensions and a country moving along after the war and resenting the demands of the officers.
As much military history as I have read, this book still contained a number of interesting details:
- Fleming maintains that the Howe brothers, senior British commanders, were opponents of King George III, and therefore did not fully prosecute the war, because they did not want to destroy the colonial army and give King George III a victory and free reign to terrorize the colonies.
- Washington is credited with understanding that, as with most insurgents, time was on his side. If he could just keep his forces moving and with some combat capacity, the British would tire of the protracted war. Fleming compares this strategy to that of Quintus Fabius Maximus, who fought scattered battles against Hannibal, never winning but never being destroyed.
- Fleming explores the struggles of rebel leaders in the South - Daniel Morgan and William Davidson (who led the NC militia) - to raise significant militias. The British were attempting to peel off southern states and get them to sign independent peace treaties.
- Anthony Wayne also comes across as a hero, both for his efforts to hold the militias together as they frequently threatened mutiny due to the lack of pay or provisions, and later for his leadership in battling the Indians and British in the West.
- One reason the French agreed to help in Virginia was because they did not believe they could challenge the British in New York City.
- In NC and SC, Nathaniel Greene may have never won a battle, but he won the war.
- Washington sent a messenger to tell Congress of the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, but the messenger had no money for a room when he arrived, and Congress had no money for him, so individual congressmen pitched in out of their own funds to find him a room.
- The famous story of Washington confronting the disgruntled officers after the war, as he dons his new glasses, "you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country."
- Washington's tears in Fraunces Tavern may have been driven in part by a farewell to friends, but also sadness at the state of the dispute between officers and soldiers seeking pensions and a country moving along after the war and resenting the demands of the officers.
January 12, 2024
This book reviews the Revolution and the frontier wars of the 1790s from the point of view of Washington's strategy. The thesis is that he developed a way to use militia troops and well-trained Continental regiments in a mutually supporting way (the former were everywhere and could constantly harass the enemy, but could not stand up to a line of British bayonets). His was a semi-Fabian strategy, staying mainly on the defensive but looking out for favorable opportunities for limited offensives. There was a lot of second-guessing of Washington and complaints about him in Congress that are now little remembered and justly emphasized here. The book describes a handful of battles (e.g. Saratoga, Cowpens) in maybe excessive detail, perhaps to illustrate militia and regular troops working together. The book could really use some maps to help understand the narrative.
The Continental Congress was incomprehensibly lackadaisical about paying the troops who had saved them from hanging for treason. This led to some mutinies and near-mutinies late in the war, which could have ruined our chance at free government. There was a pervasive idea that professional armies were bad, militias were all you needed, and men should fight out of mere patriotism without expecting to be paid. Perhaps that idea was attractive because it made budgeting easier.
The Continental Congress was incomprehensibly lackadaisical about paying the troops who had saved them from hanging for treason. This led to some mutinies and near-mutinies late in the war, which could have ruined our chance at free government. There was a pervasive idea that professional armies were bad, militias were all you needed, and men should fight out of mere patriotism without expecting to be paid. Perhaps that idea was attractive because it made budgeting easier.
January 26, 2018
Thomas Fleming’s last book before his death in 2017, this is a marvelous magnum opus to an outstanding historian.
The strategic genius of George Washington is underrated. As Fleming shows, only Washington’s unique understanding of how to integrate his Continental Army and militia will avoiding disastrous defeats could have won the Revolutionary War.
Washington’s military and political savvy were important not only achieving victory, but securing the fragile peace, defusing what could have been an America’s military coup in 1783.
A splendid little read.
The strategic genius of George Washington is underrated. As Fleming shows, only Washington’s unique understanding of how to integrate his Continental Army and militia will avoiding disastrous defeats could have won the Revolutionary War.
Washington’s military and political savvy were important not only achieving victory, but securing the fragile peace, defusing what could have been an America’s military coup in 1783.
A splendid little read.
March 6, 2018
I found this book to be interesting, although I think it's mistitled. Based on the title and other reviews I'd read, I expected more analysis of Washington's military strategy. The part of the book I enjoyed the most was at the end, when Fleming describes events following the treaty with Great Britain that ultimately led to the establishment of the U.S. Army.
December 27, 2017
Great history of the Flavian strategy of the Continental Army.
March 26, 2018
Great book documenting various Revolutionary War battles and how Washington learned from his failures to help America gain it's freedom from England.
August 23, 2024
Excellent read.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews