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Modern War Studies
Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-1940
Since the earliest days of warfare, military operations have followed a predictable after a decisive battle, an army must pursue the enemy and destroy its organization in order to achieve a victorious campaign. But by the mid–nineteenth century, the emergence of massive armies and advanced weaponry--and the concomitant decline in the effectiveness of cavalry--had diminished the practicality of pursuit, producing campaigns that bogged down short of decisive victory. Great battles had become curiously indecisive, decisive campaigns virtually impossible. Robert Citino now tells how European military leaders analyzed and eventually overcame this problem by restoring pursuit to its rightful place in combat and resurrecting the possibility of decisive warfare on the operational level. A study of war at the operational level, Quest for Decisive Victory demonstrates the interplay and tension between technology and doctrine in warfare and reveals how problems surrounding mobility--including such factors as supply lines, command and control, and prewar campaign planning--forced armies to find new ways of fighting. Citino focuses on key campaigns of both major and minor conflicts. Minor wars before 1914 (Boer, Russo-Japanese, and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13) featured instructive examples of operational maneuver; the First World War witnessed the collapse of operations and the rise of attrition warfare; the Italo-Ethiopian and Spanish Civil Wars held some promise for breaking out of stalemate by incorporating such innovations as air and tank warfare. Ultimately, it was Germany's opening blitzkrieg of World War II that resurrected the decisive campaign as an operational possibility. By grafting new technologies--tanks, aircraft, and radio--onto a long tradition of maneuver warfare, the Wehrmacht won decisive victories in the first year of the war and in the process transformed modern military doctrine. Citino's study is important for shifting the focus from military theory and doctrine to detailed operational analyses of actual campaigns that formed the basis for the revival of military doctrine. Quest for Decisive Victory gives scholars of military history a better grasp of that elusive concept and a more complete understanding of modern warfare. This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.
368 pages, Hardcover
Published January 1, 2002
3 people are currently reading
171 people want to read
About the author
Robert M. Citino
21 books112 followersRobert M. Citino is an American history professor, scholar and writer currently teaching at the University of North Texas. He specializes in German military history and has earned acclaim by writing several historical books on the subject. He has appeared as a consultant on the History Channel several times on the subject of World War II and German military tactics.
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
December 14, 2019
Quest for Decisive Victory is a solid work of history, focusing on how European and Japanese military thinking and practice changed from the 1850s to WWII.
Citino sees military leaders striving to accomplish Napoleonic victories, but finding themselves unable to as technologies change and post-battle pursuit becomes hard to realize. Increased firepower, especially for artillery, played a role, although it never dissuaded generals from launching infantry assaults. Cavalry's role dwindles. Increasing size of armed forces madee command and control difficult.
What solved these problems? First, Quest for Decisive Victory insists that military establishments kept experimenting and innovating, even in WWI. Second, new technologies helped.
Portable radios improved communications, command, and control. Tanks offered a new take on cavalry's old role in shock and pursuit. Third, a new form of combined arms appeared, best articulated by the Nazis in early WWII, using tanks, infantry, and air power to break or outflank an enemy's line, then pursue them into serious defeat.
It's a persuasive argument. I was especially impressed at Citino's use of examples. He starts with the classic Franco-Prussian and Austro-Prussian Wars, but also includes the pre-WWI Balkan Wars, the Russo-Japanese War, Britain's war against the Boers, and Italy in Africa. This is an usually wide range of examples, which provides a good testing range for the book's argument.
Citino sees military leaders striving to accomplish Napoleonic victories, but finding themselves unable to as technologies change and post-battle pursuit becomes hard to realize. Increased firepower, especially for artillery, played a role, although it never dissuaded generals from launching infantry assaults. Cavalry's role dwindles. Increasing size of armed forces madee command and control difficult.
What solved these problems? First, Quest for Decisive Victory insists that military establishments kept experimenting and innovating, even in WWI. Second, new technologies helped.
Portable radios improved communications, command, and control. Tanks offered a new take on cavalry's old role in shock and pursuit. Third, a new form of combined arms appeared, best articulated by the Nazis in early WWII, using tanks, infantry, and air power to break or outflank an enemy's line, then pursue them into serious defeat.
It's a persuasive argument. I was especially impressed at Citino's use of examples. He starts with the classic Franco-Prussian and Austro-Prussian Wars, but also includes the pre-WWI Balkan Wars, the Russo-Japanese War, Britain's war against the Boers, and Italy in Africa. This is an usually wide range of examples, which provides a good testing range for the book's argument.
January 24, 2022
La principal conclusión del libro que nos ocupa es que, aunque los asaltos de infantería y rupturas seguían siendo posibles, con un coste de bajas cada vez más alto, no había ninguna fuerza lo suficientemente poderosa como para poder explotar el éxito táctico y convertirlo en uno estratégico.
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November 18, 2021
Ya era hora de que este libro estuviera en castellano. Gran análisis de un joven Robert M. Citino.
February 4, 2011
This book drives home one of the most interesting time periods in world history. Robert Citino gives a comprehensive narrative look, from 1899 to 1940, deep into the art of war through the eyes of a true military historian. Citino, according to the Military History Center, teaches military history at the University of North-Texas. He is considered to be one of the best military historians in the country and shows his expertise in this stunning work on decisive victory. He covers a wide variety of wars from the South African war to the beginning of World War II. He diligently examines Napoleon through Hitler in astounding detail while showing doctrine and what was achieved by each commander during their time. Citino gives an intensive survey-like examination that provides his readers with a richer understanding of the art of war and what exactly is a decisive victory.
In understanding this time period of war and destruction from 1899 to 1940, one must look into all of the conflicts and not just the notable slaughters. In the opening chapter Citino mentions Picket’s Charge at the battle of Gettysburg during the American Civil War as an example of this idea of slaughter. These slaughters are due to numerous blunders made by the commanders and because of the advancement of technology and tactics. Tactics had begun to shift to the idea that defense is king. The new guns allowed for better defense and an all out frontal assault could decimate your army and still not provide for victory. This is where Citino’s main theme comes into play. “Mobility will be one key theme. While war is usually said to consist of ‘fire and movement,’ the former came to dominate the battlefield in this period, and the latter seemed in danger of disappearing altogether (XV).” Throughout the book Citino discusses mobility and maneuvering at great length.
A section that was really captivating is Citino’s section on Napoleon. Citino delves into Napoleon’s strategy and doctrine and examines why he was a brilliant commander. He took the new technology and the new strategies that were afforded to him and used them to his advantage. With military doctrine under examination all over the world and the researching of new technologies coming to fruition it became increasingly difficult for commanders to come up with a doctrine that would actually work for their specific military force. Napoleon was able to do this in stunning fashion leading decisive victories all over the European battlefields. Citino brings all of this to light with the use of specific statistics and battlefield information, through use of great resources and research, that the everyday student would not know. Not only does Citino do this in a new and interesting way he also provides the influences that Napoleon had on others, the influences on him and the decisions that he made. This is a breakthrough that this reviewer was extremely interested in and found respectable and without flaw.
Citino’s examination of World War I and operational art is truly captivating. He describes the battle of Chancellorsville during the American Civil War and describes how brilliant Robert E. Lee was in splitting his army to attack the Union. Citino makes a great point when he discusses that a military commander is a lot like an artist in the way he deploys his forces and where he chooses to attack or defend. Military commanders lose the art of tactics as time goes on and as weaponry advances. Citino believes that this operational level is where we “instinctively” judge commanders. In the next Chapter Citino documents the Russian commander Mikhail Tukhachevsky. He began the war with a brilliant career and he had many interesting ideas that Citino is able to call him an “armor prophet (211).” This is a similar idea to Blitzkrieg in that it consisted of “Shock Armies” which is also reinforced by extra artillery and infantry tanks. His career is cut short when Stalin’s paranoid activity causes Tikhachevsky’s arrest, trial, and execution in 1938. Other than Tikhachevsky, the Russians did not have a strong usage of mobile forces and most historians, according to Citino, do not even know if this idea would have worked with what the Russians had to offer.
The German doctrine was one of sheer brilliance. One can only wonder what they could have achieved had the Treaty of Versailles of 1918 not prevented the Germans from beginning their war machine building sooner. The concepts that the Germans employed were new because they were able to utilize their entire military force and concentrate it on one quick attack. Using air forces, infantry, and panzer forces they were able to decimate their enemy and provide for a quick and ultimately decisive victory over the Polish and the French. This type of war worked perfectly because they Germans needed to knock the French out of the war quickly and then turn towards the British. The Germans, as history shows, could not fight a war of attrition, as its enemies held the advantage in this strategy. The Germans had found what was needed for that decisive victory to be achieved. They realized, just as historians have today, that what had been missing since the great Napoleon was the pursuit of a beaten enemy. In World War I, the commanders were not able to pursue the enemy that they had defeated, they had to hold their position. With the German Panzers they were able to chase the enemy and run them down. This would decimate the already defeated enemy and allow for the killing and capturing of many more men.
Citino examines Ethiopia and Spain in his next chapter. The Spanish Civil War is an interesting topic to discuss. It was a breeding ground for the German military and was a place where the Germans could test their tactics, strategies, and doctrines without the Treaty of Versailles getting in their way. Each section that Citino mentions plays an important role in the development of the decisive victory and he tops the wonderful book off with an examination and an interpretation of Operational Art Reborn. Citino’s last effort to explain what an impact Germany had on operational warfare is once again flawless. He completes his book by explaining that even though the Germans were defeated twice in the great wars of the 20th Century, “they are still responsible for the greatest battlefield revolution in the history or modern warfare: the restoration of true operational mobility in the firepower-intensive environment created by machine weapons, and the return of decision to military operations (283).”
This compact and comprehensive look at a time wrecked with conflict is jam-packed full of doctrine and ideas. This reviewer is well-versed in many doctrines from World War II and found this book to be stimulating and extremely useful. Citino’s use of primary and secondary sources is well cataloged. This interpretation of decisive victory is full of detailed conflicts that anyone interested in these would be delighted to read. Citino is brilliant in the way he integrates the idea of mobility and technology throughout the entire book. The integration proves his thesis and is generally easy to follow, as the format is well designed. Citino’s book is one of the most comprehensive looks at military history during this time period this reviewer has ever read. Citino does a brilliant job examining the time period and without a doubt has established himself and this book as a member of history through intricate breakdown of the military doctrine of the time.
In understanding this time period of war and destruction from 1899 to 1940, one must look into all of the conflicts and not just the notable slaughters. In the opening chapter Citino mentions Picket’s Charge at the battle of Gettysburg during the American Civil War as an example of this idea of slaughter. These slaughters are due to numerous blunders made by the commanders and because of the advancement of technology and tactics. Tactics had begun to shift to the idea that defense is king. The new guns allowed for better defense and an all out frontal assault could decimate your army and still not provide for victory. This is where Citino’s main theme comes into play. “Mobility will be one key theme. While war is usually said to consist of ‘fire and movement,’ the former came to dominate the battlefield in this period, and the latter seemed in danger of disappearing altogether (XV).” Throughout the book Citino discusses mobility and maneuvering at great length.
A section that was really captivating is Citino’s section on Napoleon. Citino delves into Napoleon’s strategy and doctrine and examines why he was a brilliant commander. He took the new technology and the new strategies that were afforded to him and used them to his advantage. With military doctrine under examination all over the world and the researching of new technologies coming to fruition it became increasingly difficult for commanders to come up with a doctrine that would actually work for their specific military force. Napoleon was able to do this in stunning fashion leading decisive victories all over the European battlefields. Citino brings all of this to light with the use of specific statistics and battlefield information, through use of great resources and research, that the everyday student would not know. Not only does Citino do this in a new and interesting way he also provides the influences that Napoleon had on others, the influences on him and the decisions that he made. This is a breakthrough that this reviewer was extremely interested in and found respectable and without flaw.
Citino’s examination of World War I and operational art is truly captivating. He describes the battle of Chancellorsville during the American Civil War and describes how brilliant Robert E. Lee was in splitting his army to attack the Union. Citino makes a great point when he discusses that a military commander is a lot like an artist in the way he deploys his forces and where he chooses to attack or defend. Military commanders lose the art of tactics as time goes on and as weaponry advances. Citino believes that this operational level is where we “instinctively” judge commanders. In the next Chapter Citino documents the Russian commander Mikhail Tukhachevsky. He began the war with a brilliant career and he had many interesting ideas that Citino is able to call him an “armor prophet (211).” This is a similar idea to Blitzkrieg in that it consisted of “Shock Armies” which is also reinforced by extra artillery and infantry tanks. His career is cut short when Stalin’s paranoid activity causes Tikhachevsky’s arrest, trial, and execution in 1938. Other than Tikhachevsky, the Russians did not have a strong usage of mobile forces and most historians, according to Citino, do not even know if this idea would have worked with what the Russians had to offer.
The German doctrine was one of sheer brilliance. One can only wonder what they could have achieved had the Treaty of Versailles of 1918 not prevented the Germans from beginning their war machine building sooner. The concepts that the Germans employed were new because they were able to utilize their entire military force and concentrate it on one quick attack. Using air forces, infantry, and panzer forces they were able to decimate their enemy and provide for a quick and ultimately decisive victory over the Polish and the French. This type of war worked perfectly because they Germans needed to knock the French out of the war quickly and then turn towards the British. The Germans, as history shows, could not fight a war of attrition, as its enemies held the advantage in this strategy. The Germans had found what was needed for that decisive victory to be achieved. They realized, just as historians have today, that what had been missing since the great Napoleon was the pursuit of a beaten enemy. In World War I, the commanders were not able to pursue the enemy that they had defeated, they had to hold their position. With the German Panzers they were able to chase the enemy and run them down. This would decimate the already defeated enemy and allow for the killing and capturing of many more men.
Citino examines Ethiopia and Spain in his next chapter. The Spanish Civil War is an interesting topic to discuss. It was a breeding ground for the German military and was a place where the Germans could test their tactics, strategies, and doctrines without the Treaty of Versailles getting in their way. Each section that Citino mentions plays an important role in the development of the decisive victory and he tops the wonderful book off with an examination and an interpretation of Operational Art Reborn. Citino’s last effort to explain what an impact Germany had on operational warfare is once again flawless. He completes his book by explaining that even though the Germans were defeated twice in the great wars of the 20th Century, “they are still responsible for the greatest battlefield revolution in the history or modern warfare: the restoration of true operational mobility in the firepower-intensive environment created by machine weapons, and the return of decision to military operations (283).”
This compact and comprehensive look at a time wrecked with conflict is jam-packed full of doctrine and ideas. This reviewer is well-versed in many doctrines from World War II and found this book to be stimulating and extremely useful. Citino’s use of primary and secondary sources is well cataloged. This interpretation of decisive victory is full of detailed conflicts that anyone interested in these would be delighted to read. Citino is brilliant in the way he integrates the idea of mobility and technology throughout the entire book. The integration proves his thesis and is generally easy to follow, as the format is well designed. Citino’s book is one of the most comprehensive looks at military history during this time period this reviewer has ever read. Citino does a brilliant job examining the time period and without a doubt has established himself and this book as a member of history through intricate breakdown of the military doctrine of the time.
September 6, 2019
Citino's book is a detailed study of military strategy, tactics, and armaments which, as the title indicates, covers the quest for a decisive victory on the field of battle. A book like this could have been as dry as dust, but Citino's writing style brings it alive. Most impressive is his myth-busting appriasal of World War I.
July 24, 2020
Masterpiece!
May 23, 2024
Magnífica obra que me resolvió muchas dudas, pero que también me creo muchas incógnitas y que te estimula para seguir leyendo más
March 30, 2012
Robert Citino has produced a very important book on operational art, the rise of technology and the lack of innovative tactics here. I believe this book fills a major gap in why decisive victory was so elusive for decades throughout the world...
And the major reason Citino provides, and I fully agree with his conclusions, is that there was no force that could successfully exploit and pursue offensive tactical successes. Citino provides numerous examples of why this occurred in many different conflicts - lack of logistical support, lack of mobility from infantry or horse-mounted cavalry troops, and simply because the troops were exhausted from the assualt and could not continue to exploit the tactical situation.
There were some minor successes towards the end of World War I with the development of the Jaegar tactics from the Germans, however, they were strategically exhausted and could no longer provide large scale reserves to move long distances quickly.
The Germans had cracked the tactical code to operational success however during late World War One. The British, Germans and Soviets all integrated new technology in the form of tracked vehicles - the WWI tanks moved as slow or even slower than foot infantry - that became more reliable over time.
Even so, when Guedarian was informed about Operation Barbarossa, he was extremely concerned about the lack of experience with tracked vehicles moving large distances so quickly in such a short period of time. He commented that "Even if we met with no opposition on the march towards Moscow, I was unsure of that our mechanized forces could meet the timelines due to maintenance."
Citino has done students and practitioners of operational art a great service in writing this book, which explains the frustration of many generals and politicians when it came to decisive ends to wars. The American Civil War - which was generally derided by the European observers on both sides - was a harbinger of things to come...but as Citino shows, this was but one example of many that showed the inability of armies to pursue and finally destroy their adversaries. I recommend the Ottaman-Bulgarian chapter as a prime example, mainly because it occurred so shortly before the start of World War One.
And the major reason Citino provides, and I fully agree with his conclusions, is that there was no force that could successfully exploit and pursue offensive tactical successes. Citino provides numerous examples of why this occurred in many different conflicts - lack of logistical support, lack of mobility from infantry or horse-mounted cavalry troops, and simply because the troops were exhausted from the assualt and could not continue to exploit the tactical situation.
There were some minor successes towards the end of World War I with the development of the Jaegar tactics from the Germans, however, they were strategically exhausted and could no longer provide large scale reserves to move long distances quickly.
The Germans had cracked the tactical code to operational success however during late World War One. The British, Germans and Soviets all integrated new technology in the form of tracked vehicles - the WWI tanks moved as slow or even slower than foot infantry - that became more reliable over time.
Even so, when Guedarian was informed about Operation Barbarossa, he was extremely concerned about the lack of experience with tracked vehicles moving large distances so quickly in such a short period of time. He commented that "Even if we met with no opposition on the march towards Moscow, I was unsure of that our mechanized forces could meet the timelines due to maintenance."
Citino has done students and practitioners of operational art a great service in writing this book, which explains the frustration of many generals and politicians when it came to decisive ends to wars. The American Civil War - which was generally derided by the European observers on both sides - was a harbinger of things to come...but as Citino shows, this was but one example of many that showed the inability of armies to pursue and finally destroy their adversaries. I recommend the Ottaman-Bulgarian chapter as a prime example, mainly because it occurred so shortly before the start of World War One.
March 28, 2013
Very easy to read and interesting as well.
Citino chooses interesting wars for his case study such as the Russo-Japanese War, The (2nd) Boer War, and Italy's campaigns during the interwar period. The selection of these European Wars was enlightening to me especially since I never had much exposure to their literature beforehand.
Citino's perspective is almost purely military. There are various diplomatic observations, however, the bulk of the book is Citino's interpretation of wars leading up to World War II.
In terms of military analysis, Citino points out the importance of mobility, tactics, and communication in warfare. I find this to be an interesting analysis because I usually find military analyses' to point to the importance of technological development.
Therefore, if you are interested in European warfare from 1899-1940, then this book is going to be fore you.
Also, if you are interested in learning more about the operational level of military thinking, this book is full of great examples that will help you learn the challenging concepts.
Citino chooses interesting wars for his case study such as the Russo-Japanese War, The (2nd) Boer War, and Italy's campaigns during the interwar period. The selection of these European Wars was enlightening to me especially since I never had much exposure to their literature beforehand.
Citino's perspective is almost purely military. There are various diplomatic observations, however, the bulk of the book is Citino's interpretation of wars leading up to World War II.
In terms of military analysis, Citino points out the importance of mobility, tactics, and communication in warfare. I find this to be an interesting analysis because I usually find military analyses' to point to the importance of technological development.
Therefore, if you are interested in European warfare from 1899-1940, then this book is going to be fore you.
Also, if you are interested in learning more about the operational level of military thinking, this book is full of great examples that will help you learn the challenging concepts.
July 23, 2013
One of the very best books I've read concerning military history. It is written beautifully, and Robert Citino is border-line genius in his analysis and insight of the episodes he writes about.
The book itself is broken down into different sections, each about a conflict that was important in the development of military affairs from the time period in question. As a general history of these conflicts it provides a fascinating and rich narrative of what happened, why it was important, and how it represented a shift in military technique or strategy.
I recommend this book for anyone with a general interest and even a slight background about the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
It is very accessible, easy reading and does not rely on technical military terms.
The book itself is broken down into different sections, each about a conflict that was important in the development of military affairs from the time period in question. As a general history of these conflicts it provides a fascinating and rich narrative of what happened, why it was important, and how it represented a shift in military technique or strategy.
I recommend this book for anyone with a general interest and even a slight background about the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
It is very accessible, easy reading and does not rely on technical military terms.
January 6, 2012
This is the first volume in Citino's examination of the evolution of operational art. His strengths are his command of military history and his ability to write in a clear and compelling manner. He makes the complex easy to understand. But the reader won't get any flashes of insight such as he might from more academically-bent authors and analysts. That's all for the good, since those treatments exist elsewhere. Were I to put together a reader's list for operational art, this and his follow on book BLITZKRIEG TO DESERT STORM would be among the first volumes to read.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews