Conventional Deterrence: The Memoir of a Nineteenth-Century Parish Priest

by John J. Mearsheimer

Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939–1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war.

Genres: Politics, International Relations, History, Military History

440 pages, Kindle Edition

First published August 21, 1985

About the author

John Joseph Mearsheimer (1947) is an American political scientist and international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago. He has been described as the most influential realist of his generation.
Mearsheimer is best known for developing the theory of offensive realism, which describes the interaction between great powers as being primarily driven by the rational desire to achieve regional hegemony in an anarchic international system. In accordance with his theory, Mearsheimer believes that China's growing power will likely bring it into conflict with the United States.
Mearsheimer's works are widely read and debated by 21st-century students of international relations. A 2017 survey of US international relations faculty ranks him third among "scholars whose work has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past 20 years.

Reviews

[Lloyd Thrall · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mearsheimer deserves great credit for breaking new ground on deterrence, in a text that remains relevant today. Certainly, this is a great read for anyone thinking about contemporary conventional deterrence of Russia in the Baltics, Ukraine, etc.

There are, however, limitations. The text is dated, thus it doesn't reflect modern technology, though many of his concepts endure. Further, Mearsheimer restricts himself to direct (vice extended) deterrence in landpower contexts, making his arguments of less direct relevance to modern questions concerning China, Iran, etc. Still, there is wonderful thinking here, moving upward from tactical realities to strategic and political consequences--a welcome exception to the norm. There is great coverage, accessible to the layperson, of landpower offense and defense at the campaign level, in addition to interesting history regarding political and military decisionmaking during the Second World War and Israel's Arab wars.

[Liu · Rating 5 out of 5]

I'm not much of a military historian, but I still found this book pretty insightful. Mearsheimer's main question is under what conditions will conventional (non-nuclear) deterrence hold in conflicts between peer military powers engaging in land warfare. Mearsheimer argues that the military strategy available to the potential attacker is the key variable in determining the success or failure of deterrence. There are three primary categories of strategy: attrition, blitzkrieg, and limited aims. When the potential attacker believes they can viably employ a blitzkrieg strategy and win a decisive victory with minimal losses, deterrence is unlikely to hold. When the only option for the attacker is an attrition strategy that would result in heavy losses, deterrence is likely to hold.

This book was written in 1985 and is pretty dated (there's an entire chapter on whether NATO can deter the Warsaw Pact). I'm not sure how much this still applies given how much military technology has changed in the last four decades. The book has a chapter about how precision-guided munitions has already greatly weakened the blitzkrieg strategy since WWII, and I imagine techonological advancements since then have only changed the calculus even more.

[David Alman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Classic academic work. Was likely 5 stars at the time given energy devoted to NATO in Europe. Would have liked to have seen case studies without the armor emphasis. For example, Mearsheimer's framework of three types of military strategies (attrition, limited aims, blitzkrieg) does not necessarily have clear air/naval parallels. A must read for any student of military history, strategic analysis, or strategy more broadly.

[coffeebug · Rating 3 out of 5]

deterrence theory, bucking passing; when and why deterrence fail

[Michael]

I came across this text as I was nearing the end of my thesis writing, and even though I decided not to use it in my work, I am definitely adding it to my summer reading list since deterrence is a topic near and dear to my heart. Mearsheimer is an often-maligned and definitely misunderstood realist whose statements and writings are sometimes taken out of context in an exaggerated fashion... so it'll be great to read what he says directly, rather than digesting it through the analysis of other foreign policy analysts.