Крестный отец Кремля Борис Березовский, или История разграбления России

by Paul Klebnikov, Павел Хлебников

Вниманию читателей предлагается перевод книги Павла (Пола) Хлебникова, ставшей бестселлером в Америке в августе прошлого года. Автор — старший редактор журнала «Форбс», много лет изучал политическую и экономическую обстановку в новой России. Проводя своерасследование, он встречался с людьми, стоявшими у власти, с журналистами, сотрудниками спецслужб. Герои повествования не только Борис Березовский, но и другие знакомые фигуры последнего десятилетия нашей страны. Прочитав эту книгу, вы узнаете тайны Семьи, подоплеку чеченской войны, загадки многих экономических скандалов. Журналистское расследование Павла Хлебникова — попытка дать ответ на вопрос, кто же виноват во всех бедах России. Книга рассчитана на массового читателя.

Genres: History, Russia, Politics, Nonfiction, Biography, Soviet Union, Political Science

381 pages, Hardcover

First published September 1, 2000

Reviews

[Antigone · Rating 3 out of 5]

"Communist propaganda had always maintained that making money in a free market was a purely predatory and criminal activity. Soviet schoolchildren had been taught that the United States, as the paragon of capitalism, was controlled by a ruthless, superrich elite; they were taught that all the great financial and industrial empires powering the American economy had immoral origins - behind every fortune was a legacy of theft, lies, even murder. The American captains of industry were little more than crooks and criminals. Russia's new business magnates had all absorbed this image of Western capitalism in school; when they went into business, they acted accordingly."

Paul Klebnikov, a senior editor at Forbes magazine, outlines the financial trajectory of Russia from Communist collapse to the election of Vladimir Putin. These are the Gorbachev/Yeltsin years of a nation struggling toward the establishment of a market economy and the sabotage of that effort by a group of greedy gangsters and the politicians they could buy. Using the rise to power of oligarch Boris Berezovsky as a centralizing nexus, Klebnikov charts the gangland scuffle for profit, the capital flight (billions transferred off-shore and overseas), the voucher program, the auction of resources, the murders, the mendacity, the purchase of elections - in short, everything Putin wound up inheriting; crises that undoubtedly informed his political philosophy and leadership style.

This is an uneven work, yet I found myself willing to trade a dedicated through-line for an author who had actually met the Russians he was discussing. Sadly, Mr. Klebnikov was gunned down on a Moscow street in 2004 - the price, many suspect, for reporting on such associations.

[M.J. Javani · Rating 4 out of 5]

Godfather of the Kremlin is a book I read years ago and recently revisited given the prominence of Russia in the news. Klebnikov's first hand knowledge of the failed state that was 1990's Russia shines through the entire book. What I found most ironic, and tragic at the same time, was the fact that poor Klebnikov survived the chaotic gangland lawlessness of Russia in the 1990's only to be gunned down in Moscow under the reign of the "law and order" President (Czar) Putin.

The book tells the story of the looting of post Soviet Russia by a new class of thugs (aka oligarchs) with ties to President Yeltsin. It was actually a return to an old theme in Russian history, with the top man in Kremlin acting as head of a large patronage network handing out favors to his vassals in return for their loyalty (feudalism at its best). Putin's reign has only solidified this arrangement given that no one dares to challenge the position of the Czar as the Godfather of the Kremlin and entire nation. The difference is, whereas Yeltsin's security organizations were too weak to enforce his authority over all oligarchs/mafia dons, Putin reestablished the power of the Siloviki over the entire society. Now that everyone knows who the main boss is (along with their own position in the pecking order) there is no longer need for senseless violence.

The main tragedy highlighted by Klebnikov is the plight of the Russian people. Through the personal story of Boris Berezovsky (the top oligarch in the 1990's), the author painstakingly highlights how billions of dollars of state enterprises, built on the blood and sweat of the Russian people, was privatized seemingly overnight into the hands of a very few corrupt, ruthless, and connected thugs. Ironically, while the wealth of the Soviet state was controlled by 10% of the population (members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CPSU) in post communist Russia an even smaller clique of individuals controlled vastly greater sums of personal wealth that put Stalin and Brezhnev to shame. The moral of the story: until the creation of a large middle class that will demand the end of corruption, it is difficult to see how the patronage system between the Czar and the oligarchs/mafia dons will give way to liberal democracy.

[Aarav Balsu · Rating 5 out of 5]

"For the Russian people the Yeltsin era was the biggest disaster (economically, socially, and demographically) since the Nazi invasion of 1941."

Not many people understand when I say that the fall of the Soviet Union is one of the greatest modern contemporary tragedies. The human misery that blighted the countries of the former USSR in the 90s after its dissolution is painful to read: skyrocketing alcoholism and drug use rates, hyperinflation wiping out people's savings overnight , an elderly population that was left to die without their pensions, a huge spike in prostitution (and abortions), and a subsequent population decline in the country. This is not a book about this toll. I'd recommend reading Blackshirts and Reds by Parenti for a more illuminating analysis of formerly socialist countries transitioning to market capitalism, and their citizens' experiences during those times. It's not a book about that subject matter either, but it showcases it well iirc.


This is a book that explores the lives of the kleptocrats that made it big during the deregulation of the erstwhile Soviet economy; while the bulk of Russians found themselves reduced to a sharply lowered standard of living, these men siphoned off billions of state-owned enterprises for peanuts. Through this, these oligarchs have become some of the wealthiest people in the world, and commanded the Russian state in the 1990s/2000s. They are still very influential today, especially with their stranglehold on these nationally vital industrial sectors. Klebnikov masterfully weaves a complex net of relationships, conversations, and companies into an intriguing narrative. While reading this book, I frequently had to pause and just appreciate how thousands of hours of investigative journalism were so succinctly distilled into a readable, coherent narrative. If you want to understand how brutal and predatory capitalism is at the hands of a newly christened gangster elite, the shadowy ever-present nexus between big capital and government, and the technical details of how this large-scale fraud occurred, read this book. Klebnikov painstakingly charts out the relationships between the different state-enterprises, shell companies, fraudulent banks, Yeltsin's presidential campaign funds, etc. to show you whose hands are in the cookie jar. The lessons you learn from this can be applied in the analysis of contemporary events, especially the naked collusion between finance capital and the Trump presidency + associated federal apparatuses.

I should also add that Klebnikov himself was assassinated in Moscow in 2004: likely a result of his superb investigative reporting. RIP.

Long book, not particularly easy to read, but a gripping book. Finished in two days.

[Dmitry · Rating 5 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Эту книгу, как и несколько последующих книг на эту тему, я решил прочитать после выхода фильма ФБК «Предатели». Меня поразил не фильм, а невероятно агрессивная и истеричная реакция на фильм так называемых «демократов» и «либералов» из 90-х. Поразительна именно их реакция, ибо все, что сказано в этом фильме, было известно задолго до выхода фильма. Более того, в обсуждаемой книге и в книге «Олигархи. Богатство и власть в новой России» говорится о том же самом что и в фильме, но более подробно. Другими словами, эти книги лишь подтвердили выводы ФБК. Но как тогда объяснить ту истерику в среде так называемых «демократов» и «либералов» 90-х? У меня только один ответ: они сами замешаны в деле разворовывания РФ в те времена, точнее, они обслуживали жуликов и воров 90-х.

Книга нас знакомит с теми событиями и той атмосферой, что существовала после прихода к власти Ельцина и его людей. Что первое приходит нам на ум? Бандитизм. Да, зародился бандитизм всё же не при Ельцине, а при Горбачёве, но Ельцин то ли не смог, то ли не захотел побороть бандитизм. Бандитизм при Ельцине расцвёл таким пышным цветом, что вся эпоха 90-х стала именоваться «шальными 90-ыми» как в плане возможности заработать быстрые и большие суммы денег, так и в плане быть убитым средь бела дня. Автор правильно указывает на то, что бездарно проведённые либеральные реформы существенно подстегнули бандитизм, т.е. стали подпиткой, наделили большей силой мафиозные кланы. Вместо справедливого распределения богатств бывшего РСФСР между всеми слоями населения или хотя бы существенной её частью, пришёл «человек с ружьём (бандит)», который обманом и насилием стал формировать новую бизнес среду в РФ, что дало начало формированию мафиозных кланов. По сути, был дан старт рождению нового класса – мафиозного класса, т.е. людей так или иначе связанных с миром криминала, который в дальнейшем сросся с властью и даже сам стал властью.

По идее, либерализация экономики должна была привести к тому, что всевозможные теневые операции перерастут в законный бизнес, но произошло обратное: черный рынок засосал новые предприятия. Новый российский бизнес был загнан в мир организованной преступности. Этому способствовали коррумпированные чиновники из государственного аппарата; получалось, что для коммерческого успеха нужны политические связи. Успешному бизнесу мешал обременительный и запутанный налоговый кодекс, и приходилось вести двойную бухгалтерию. Не было эффективной правовой системы, в итоге контракты не имели силы, а получить долги было невозможно без помощи бандитов.
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В 1996 году директор ЦРУ Джон Дейч сообщил Конгрессу США, что в России существуют тесные связи между организованной преступностью и многими членами Думы. По мнению председателя комитета Конгресса Бенджамена Гилмена, именно эти связи тормозили принятие эффективных законов, направленных на борьбу с преступностью. Но основное сопротивление оказывала даже не Дума, а сам Кремль – окружение Бориса Ельцина.
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Через два года после того, как установился режим Ельцина, преступность проникла на самый высокий уровень государственного аппарата. Глава отдела по борьбе с организованной преступностью в ФБР, Джеймс Муди, заметил: самый главный фактор, который позволяет процветать организованной преступности, – это коррумпированное правительство. «Организованная преступность всегда пытается пробраться на самый верх, – сказал Муди. – И если в правительстве коррупция, кто же остановит организованную преступность?»

Именно указание фильма ФБК на то, что коррумпированными были и Ельцин и его окружение, и спровоцировала ту волну агрессии в адрес ФБК, которую изумлённые жители РФ наблюдали после выхода фильма «Предатели». Да, уже в 90-х было известно, что окружение Ельцина насквозь коррумпировано. Были сомнения в том, был ли сам Ельцин вором, но «рыба гниёт с головы», поэтому наивно думать, что Ельцин якобы не был замешан в коррупции. Просто в тот момент Ельцину, как Путину сегодня, принадлежала вся Россия, следовательно, в тот момент не было нужды в миллионных или даже миллиардных счетах в зарубежных банках. В тот момент Ельцину нужны были лояльные чиновники, политики и журналисты, и именно с этой целью он позволял им грабить страну, закрывая глаза на их коррупционные действия и не давая прокурорам заводить уголовные дела.

По общему убеждению, премьер-министр Виктор Черномырдин неплохо нажился на приватизации «Газпрома» и на бесчисленных сделках по экспорту нефти и газа. По оценке ЦРУ, личное состояние Черномырдина в 1996 году составляло 5 миллиардов долларов.
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Хотя о продажности министров Ельцина было всем известно, попыток вывести их на чистую воду почти не предпринималось. Даже когда сведения об их взятках и казнокрадстве просачивались на страницы газет, до суда дело не доходило – «засветившихся» просто снимали с работы и позволяли тихо наслаждаться неправедно нажитым. При этом были уволены нескольких чрезмерно рьяных прокуроров и борцов с коррупцией.

Так что с приватизацией по Чубайсу в таком случаи? Как мы понимаем, целью приватизации была скорейшая передача государственной собственности в частные руки, независимо от того, по какой цене продавалась собственность и кому она продавалась. Правда в таком случаи возникает вопрос, почему иностранные инвесторы не были допущены? Так же не понятно, почему так поспешно и неряшливо была проведена приватизация (как будто они понимали, что народ их возненавидит уже через пару лет), ведь СССР развалился, КГБ было ликвидировано и люстрацию можно было провести, чтобы полностью отрезать коммунистам путь во власть? Я думаю, причиной является непрофессионализм Чубайса, наличие лояльных, но не умных людей в окружении Ельцина и наличие огромного количества коммунистов, включая самого Ельцина, во главе нового Российского государства. Другими словами, они делали, как умели (или хотели создать аналог Китая, с капиталистической экономикой, но несменяемым правительством). По сути, они получили страну, которую необходимо было реформировать, но они не знали, как это правильно сделать и в итоге у них получилась «прихватизация», а не приватизация. Как говорит Екатерина Шульман, «важны не личности, но институты». А я добавлю, что институты создают личности и если личности гнилые, то и институты они создают гнилые.

Чубайс поставил на кон все сразу: крупнейшие нефтяные компании, металлургические и горные комбинаты, гигантские комплексы по переработке леса, автозаводы, машиностроительные комбинаты, тракторные заводы, крупные промышленные компании, огромные флотилии, крупнейшие порты страны – все это выплеснулось на рынок одновременно. Любому инвестиционному банкиру известно: чтобы получить хорошую цену за акции, появившиеся на рынке впервые, необходимо ограничить предложение.
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Назначив за ваучеры такую смехотворно низкую цену, правительство дало инвесторам понять, что оно само эти ценные бумаги ни капли не ценит. В результате Российское государство понесло тяжелый урон. Оно за гроши распродало свои лучшие активы. 151 миллион российских граждан тоже оказались в проигрыше, потому что очень мало кто из них получил реальную долю в приватизированных предприятиях. С другой стороны, инвесторам с хорошими связями представилась возможность совершить фантастически выгодные сделки.

В итоге они попали в ловушку, ибо вместо того чтобы нанять на Западе профессиональных CEO/продать 49% акций/пригласить инвесторов со всего мира, они отдали за бесценок предприятия ограниченной группе лиц. В совокупности с остальными проблемами это привело к тому, что в дополнении к бандитизму, государство обнищало и не смогло выполнять свои функции, включая выплаты зарплат госслужащим. Более глупую политику трудно себе представить. А может это не глупая политика, а преступная? Думаю да. Это было преступная политика, за которую и Ельцин и всё его окружение должно было оказаться на скамье подсудимых. Они это поняли, именно поэтому и произошёл Великий Обман 1996 года «Хороший коммунист Ельцин против плохого коммуниста Зюганова».

А что же сам Борис Ельцин: гигант, разбивший коммунизм, положивший конец десятилетиям советского империализма? Все его правление – это почти полный и безоговорочный провал. Проводимые им выборы были свободными, но вовсе не справедливыми. Рынок был свободным, но только для маленькой кучки игроков. Принесенная Ельциным свобода оказалась таковой в основном для горстки политических лидеров и «приближенных» капиталистов. Это был не капитализм, не свободный рынок, не демократия. Это была мафия. Для России эра Ельцина обернулась крупнейшей катастрофой (экономической, социальной и демографической), какой страна не знала со времен нацистского вторжения в 1941 году.
Что касается свободы слова и демократических завоеваний, эти принципы в основном установились еще в конце эпохи Горбачева. Ожидалось, что Ельцин и дальше разовьет идеи гласности и перестройки, но ни свобода слова, ни демократические завоевания серьезного развития при Ельцине не получили. Слово «демократия» вообще стало бранным, по сути дела, синонимом слова «мошенник». Две концепции, призванные обеспечить России будущее на западный манер, – приватизация и демократия – были дискредитированы. На улицах российских городов стали говорить о «прихватизации» и «дерьмократии».

The book introduces us to the events and the atmosphere that existed after Yeltsin and his men came to power. What is the first thing that comes to mind? Gangsterism. Yes, banditry started not under Yeltsin but under Gorbachev, but Yeltsin either could not or did not want to fight banditry. Gangsterism under Yeltsin blossomed so lushly that the entire era of the 90s became known as the “wild 90's” both in terms of the opportunity to earn quick and large sums of money and in terms of being killed in broad daylight. The author correctly points out that the ineffectively carried-out liberal reforms significantly stimulated banditry, i.e., they became fuel and gave more power to mafia clans. Instead of a fair distribution of wealth of the former RSFSR among all segments of the population or at least a significant part of it, a “man with a gun (bandit)” came, who by deceit and violence began to form a new business environment in Russia, which gave rise to the formation of mafia clans. The birth of a new class - the mafia class, i.e., people somehow connected with the world of crime, which later merged with the power and even became the power itself.

Economic liberalization had led, not to black-market operations evolving into legitimate businesses, but to newly incorporated businesses being sucked into the black market. Russia's new businesses were pushed into the world of organized crime by the corruption of the government apparatus, which meant that commercial success was overwhelmingly dependent on political connections. Businessmen were hampered by a crushing tax code-which impelled enterprises to conduct business off the books-and the absence of an effective legal system, which meant that contracts were unenforceable and debts uncollectible without the use of mob enforcers.
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In 1996, CIA director John Deutch informed the U.S. Congress that Russian organized crime had strong links to the country's parliament. Congressional committee chairman Benjamin Gilman speculated that these links were the reason for the delay in the passage of effective crime legislation. The greatest resistance to passing effective anti-Mafiya provisions came not from the parliament but from the Kremlin itself-from the group of men (and women) advising Boris Yeltsin.
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Two years after the establishment of the Yeltsin regime, the racket was operating at the highest levels of the state apparatus. James Moody, head of the organized-crime division of the FBI, observed that a corrupt government was the single most important factor allowing organized crime to flourish. "Organized crime always tries to penetrate the government," Moody noted. "If the government is corrupt, who is going to stop organized crime?"

It was the indication in the FBK film that Yeltsin and his entourage were corrupt that provoked the wave of aggression against the FBK, which the astonished Russian citizens witnessed after the release of the movie “Traitors”. Yes, it was already known in the 90s that Yeltsin's entourage was corrupt. There were doubts about whether Yeltsin himself was a thief, but “the fish rots from the head,” so it is naive to think that Yeltsin was not involved in corruption. It's just that, at that moment, Yeltsin, like Putin today, owned all of Russia, so there was no need for millions or even billions of dollars in foreign bank accounts (at that moment). At that time, Yeltsin needed loyal officials, politicians, and journalists, and it was for that purpose that he allowed them to plunder the country, turning a blind eye to their corrupt practices and preventing prosecutors from bringing criminal cases.

Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was widely believed to have profited from the privatization of the natural-gas monopoly Gazprom and from innumerable oil and gas export deals. According to one CIA estimate, by 1996 Chernomyrdin had accumulated a personal fortune of $5 billion.
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Although the venality of Yeltsin's ministers was common knowledge, little action was taken against them. Even when the details of top officials' bribe-taking or embezzlement spilled onto the pages of the newspapers, the officials were almost never prosecuted-usually they were simply dismissed and left to enjoy their ill-gotten wealth in private. By contrast, several overzealous prosecutors and anticorruption crusaders were fired.

So what about privatization? As we understand, the goal of privatization was to transfer state property into private hands as soon as possible, regardless of the price at which the property was sold and to whom it was sold. However, in such a case, the question arises as to why foreign investors were not admitted. It is also not clear why privatization was carried out so hastily and sloppily (as if they understood that the people would hate them in a couple of years) because the USSR had collapsed, the KGB had been liquidated, and lustration could have been carried out to completely cut off the communists' path to power? I think the reason is the unprofessionalism of Chubais, the presence of loyal but not smart people in Yeltsin's entourage, and the presence of a huge number of communists, including Yeltsin himself, at the head of the new Russian state. In other words, they did what they knew how to do (or wanted to create an analog of China, with a capitalist economy but an irremovable government). In essence, they got a country that needed to be reformed, but they did not know how to do it properly and ended up with “grab-it-ization” rather than privatization. As Ekaterina Shulman says, “It's not the personalities that matter, but the institutions.” I would add that individuals create institutions, and if individuals are rotten, they create rotten institutions.

Chubais's second mistake was the speed with which he privatized Russian industry. If privatization had begun earlier, it could have proceeded much more gradually. Chubais put everything on the block at once-the biggest oil companies, metals and mining companies, huge timber companies, automakers, machine-tool makers, tractor factories, big engineering companies, huge shipping fleets, the country's main ports and ended up by flooding the market. As any investment banker knows, getting a good price for a company's initial public offering of shares depends on limiting the supply.
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By assigning such a ridiculously low face value to the vouchers, the government was telling investors that it considered the securities nearly worthless. The Russian state was the loser. It sold its best assets for an insignificant sum. Russia's 151 million citizens lost out as well, since very few of them received equity stakes in the privatized enterprises. Well-connected investors, on the other hand, got an incredible bargain.

In the end, they fell into a trap, for instead of hiring professional CEOs in the West/selling 49% of shares/inviting investors from all over the world, they gave the enterprises to a limited group of individuals for nothing. Combined with the rest of the problems, in addition to the banditry, this left the state impoverished and unable to perform its functions, including paying salaries to civil servants. A more stupid policy is hard to imagine. Or maybe it wasn't a stupid policy, but a criminal one? I think so. It was a criminal policy for which Yeltsin and his entire entourage should have been in court. They realized it, and that's why the Great Deception of 1996 “Good Communist Yeltsin vs. Bad Communist Zyuganov” took place.

And what of Boris Yeltsin-the giant who slew Communism and ended decades of Soviet imperialism? His legacy is one of almost unmitigated failure. The elections that he presided over were free but not fair. The market was free but not open to outsiders. The freedom Yeltsin brought was the freedom enjoyed primarily by a handful of political bosses and crony capitalists. For the Russian people the Yeltsin era was the biggest disaster (economically, socially, and demographically) since the Nazi invasion of 1941.
To the extent that Russia has free speech and democratic accountability, these principles were largely established in the late Gorbachev years. Yeltsin was supposed to further the aims of glasnost and perestroika, but neither freedom of speech nor democratic accountability was expanded in any significant way. Democracy became a curse word-to be called a democrat became synonymous with being labeled a crook. The two concepts that were supposed to lead Russia to a Western-style future privatization and democracy-were discredited. On the streets of Moscow, people began to speak of privatization as "grab-it-ization" (prikhvatizatsiya) and of democracy as "shitocracy" (dermokratizatsiya).

[Alexey Khoryushin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Книга не совсем о Березовском, он скорее яркая деталь общего пейзажа. Очень интересно, многое из 90х стало понятнее, атмосферно, наверное местами субъективно.
Некоторая недосказанность, к сожалению, всё равно не сберегла жизни автору.

[morgan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good book to read if you want to take your own survey course of 1990's post Soviet Russia, gives you a lot of the broad strokes of everything, first Chechnya war of 94-96, privatization, attempted impeachments of Yeltsin . I believe as a writer, most of Klebnikov's journalism was centered around economics and finance. It has that feel of an extended article from Forbes or The Economist. A lot of characters in here, some like gangster Vyacheslav 'the Jap' Ivankov tend to come and go in a few pages. The one who is fleshed out the most is Boris Bereznovsky. Anatoly Chubais gets maybe the most amount of pages after him, but time and again, the narrative comes back to Bereznovsky. You get a lot of info about his rise from mathematics academic to car dealer to all powerful oligarch with his tentacles reaching into TV, politics, aluminum, oil, commodities. Certain chapters are page turners. Others less so, sometimes they are just dense with raw information about how the mechanics for certain 'loans-for-shares' schemes worked, i.e. Aeroloft gets a whole chapter. There's some excerpts of transcripts of phone conversations, a transcript of the Berezovsky/ Lesnevskaya videotape from 1995 , two appendixes at the back, very thorough footnotes/ sources listed. Klebnikov was definitely opinionated, but looks like he tried to be quite transparent with his research. I learned quite a bit from this book.

[0xd34df00d · Rating 4 out of 5]

Тошнотворная гниль, эхом раздающаяся и через четверть века.

[Sam Kessler · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read this book many years ago when in undergrad and working on my senior thesis. It's been a couple of decades now and I still think this book is very influential in understanding post-communist Russia during the turbulent 1990s for them, and it points out a lot of things that can easily be used to trace what we're seeing today in terms of the US-Russia relationship as well as how Russian policy and US sanctions are impacted by the rise of China too. It's still an important read and everything regarding the rise of the Russian oligarchy, the privatization voucher schemes, and the culture of corruption that came out of this era are things that anyone interested in understanding how the international system has returned to a renewed era of great power competition should understand and learn from the lessons of that period. When I heard that Paul Klebnikov had been assassinated on the news, I felt very sad for journalism and the fact that he had done a lot of great and important work in understanding the issues and trends of the time. Imagine if he had survived and the important work he could have done in this era.

[Chris Bartholomew · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good book. The Yeltsin years in Russia, post the collapse of the USSR. Graft and corruption on a grand scale. If you want a better understanding of why the Russian people are relatively happy with the administration of Valdimir Putin this book will show you what came before! While significantly different than what is happening in the U.S. today it does give one pause when thinking what can happen when distraught voters decide it is a good idea to put millionaires into places of power in the government.

[Dominika Klekner · Rating 5 out of 5]

Interesting and inspiring. Can be read in a flash - the story is very catchy, believable and unforgettable as many facts and anecdotes reoccur in the course of reading.

[Alexander Bragman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another man writing an expose of dangerous facts being murdered. That's enough information to make anyone interested in this book.

[Eli Kentner · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is great book to understand what compelled Russians to a strong figure such as Putin. After the fall of the Soviet regime, US intellectuals promoted a rapid liberalization of the Russian economy which resulted in a massive consolidation of Russian industrial and corporate assets into a few well connected oligarchs. Major state firms were sold off for pennies on the dollar. Russians resorted to serious measures to keep themselves alive. It is no wonder that the rates of alcoholism, drug abuse, abortion and suicide all rose dramatically in 1990s Russia.
The tremendous corruption and social emmizeration resulted in millions of Russians turning to a strong centralizing leader that would cut down oligacrchic abuses.
I'd recommend this to anybody who wishes to see how not to have a country undergo an economic transition.

The author, Klebnikov, was assassinated not long after the publication of this book. However, he was not assassinated by forces that were aligned with Putin. Rather, he was assassinated by oligarchs that Putin would later 'cut down'. This should be testimony to the how realist the book is in its portrayal of 1990s gangster capitalist Russia.

[Ryan Apperson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Klebnikov's book is a representative slice of Russian bedlam in the 1990s, capturing well this scene by zeroing in on one of the central villains of that story, the oligarch Boris Berezovsky. To accomplish this, sometimes the book gets into the weeds on intricate financial matters but I was never under the impression any of it was unnecessary. Through its window, the book encapsulates the influence and changing nature of post-Soviet organized crime, ethnic conflicts, political chicanery, foreign influence, and the Chechen Wars. Few hands come out of this soup un-dirtied, including western finance and political administrations.

Klebnikov himself went above and beyond his duties as an investigative journalist, having interviewed gangsters, Chechen terrorists and political leaders, Swiss bankers, and oligarchs including Berezovsky himself to finish this book. Paul Klebnikov was murdered in a contract killing in 2004, most likely by Chechen gangsters connected to the (then exiled) Boris Berezovsky. Klebnikov's epitaph is this profound illustration of what went wrong in Russia (and perhaps the Soviet Union more generally) in the 1990s, and is an excellent entryway into that world.

[Thomas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brutal. The lettering is faintly grayish on the pages in a suitably haunting way. Like you're holding something more than a book in your hands. An autopsy for an entire nation, which the author was shot and killed for writing. The sheer scale of the theft, the misery people across all walks of life endured. Resorting to unspeakable things in order to survive. Plus the frivolity and senselessness with which this money was blown on boats, jets, parties, divorces, in casinos. By a tiny group of connected people. The wealth of an entire population skimmed off and wasted entirely. It's the best account written on what amounted to the robbery the century. Sickening to read.

[Aleksej · Rating 4 out of 5]

Despite the lack of objectivity, this book is definitely worth reading. It reflects the most popular opinion about Berezovsky distributed at that time through Russian TV and (also "thanks" to Klebnikov) far abroad. The way how the book is structured deserves a special praise. The author gives a brief overview for each period of time first, and what Berezovsky has done then. This allows you to feel the spirit of that era in its every detail and especially in actions of Russian people

[Francesca · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you want to understand Putin and why people still put up with him: please read this blood. Klebnikov chronicled an economic disaster and how it created a class of thieves and a system of perpetual misery. This book does a phenomenal job of describing what was happening during the time from the perspective of common people and not just people looking in. If anyone wants to understand post-Soviet Russia, this book is a necessity.

[Braden Domier · Rating 5 out of 5]

The reporting is incredible and makes up most of the book. It’s genuinely enlightening and teaches the reader a lot about how the world works. The statecraft analysis / opinion is shoddy but it’s mostly left to the epilogue. Amazing read.

[Monica Showalter · Rating 5 out of 5]

I was never the same after reading this book. The horror and unfairness of the 1990s in Russia is laid out with pinpoint accuracy. This book is a must-read.

[DBrass33 · Rating 3 out of 5]

There should be an IQ standard attached to books cause I was not smart enough for this

Russia still bad

Capitalism maybe bad?

[Turgut · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best books on Russia that I've read so far.

[Aatrey Saxena · Rating 5 out of 5]

Russia in the 1990's sounds like the stories you read of the Wild West. Always wondered why so many Russians are steadfast in their support of Putin. Klebnikov's (RIP) book is an eye-opening account of how corrupt, selfish and inept Russian democratic leadership was and the rise of the gangster oligarchs . No wonder the country reverted back to a form of autocracy.

[Anton · Rating 3 out of 5]

"Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity."

William Butler Yeats

The epigraph to "Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism" by Paul Khlebnikov is quiet a good summary.

[MissInfo]

shoutout to karthick for the speedy recommendation! I've never used this feature on goodreads before, but as soon as I put my request (and admittedly odd one) out there, I got a rec for this! Very cool. This is exactly what I'm looking for....although, it seems pretty heady. Is there a fiction adaptation? lol....perhaps with a salty repeat-divorced journalist protagonist, and a socio-political scandal, lol.

[Purple Wimple · Rating 4 out of 5]

Somehow, Klebnikov got the confidence of one of Russia's oligarchs-- a gangster who participated in the gang-rape of Russia in the post-Communist turmoil and now lives the high life in London, a billionaire on account of his dirty deeds.

[Alessandro · Rating 4 out of 5]

Russian history over the last 30 years is more entartaining than high quality fiction. A comunist country turning into wild capitalism in few years. The author is very well informed, that's why he's been killed few years ago. Detailed and beneficial in understanding today's reality

[Ryan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Journalism at its finest...I suppose. The author was eventually murdered by the goons he reported on.

[Ulia]

Nothing

[Peter Fpepimama · Rating 4 out of 5]

Félelmetes leírása az orosz kleptokráciának kb. 1989-2000-ig.

[Vlad K · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is normal for Jewish people to read this sort of books