Estratégia Moderna

by Colin S. Gray

The first comprehensive account of all aspects of modern strategy since the Cold War ended, Modern Strategy explains how strategic reasoning makes sense of the great complexity of war on land, at sea, in the air, in space, and even in cyberspace. Essential reading for anyone interested in modern strategy and security studies, this unique book shows how strategy works in all geographical environments and with all kinds of weapons.

Genres: Military Fiction, War, Nonfiction, History, Military History, Politics, Political Science

624 pages, Paperback

First published November 18, 1999

About the author

Colin S. Gray was a British-American strategic thinker and professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he was the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies. In addition, he was a Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy.

Gray was educated at the University of Manchester and the University of Oxford. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He also served as a defense adviser both to the British and U.S. governments. Gray served from 1982 until 1987 in the Reagan Administration's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Furthermore, he taught at the University of Hull, the University of Lancaster, York University, Toronto and University of British Columbia. Gray published 23 books on military history and strategic studies, as well as numerous articles.

Reviews

[James Murphy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Modern Strategy is a book important to my understanding of the history of the 20th century. Colin Gray's explanation of the century in terms of strategic activity, foreign policy, and war is fascinating and instructional. Among his many salient points, he hammers 2 repeatedly: strategy is a continuous process, a constant stream of strategic competition between nations, and the practice of strategy itself, which is unaffected by technological progress, has remained unchanged through all of history, from the time of Thucydides through all the great military captains and all the wars of a bloody 20th century. Those same practices are just as appropriate today and are being practiced as I write here and you read there. Indeed, despite the relatively recent advent of such technological advances as the internal combustion engine, airplane, tank, nuclear weapons, submarines, space technology and the uses of cyberspace, the ideas behind and needs for strategy remain the same. The book's an important overview of the strategic concerns of our day. More, it imposes order for the understanding of a grand concept by using examples of historical record to illuminate the principles and philosophies he explains. Gray is a Clausewitzian dnd leans heavily on the theories of the great Prussian strategist. Though some recognition of the concpt and practice has been used by states through all of history, Gray's idea seems to be that Clausewitz discovered strategy, placing him firmly in the stream of strategic history running from Thucydides to David Patraeus. I believe Gray writes with wisdom about his subject, and always with interesting perspectives. He treats the Cold War, 1947 to 1989, for instance, as an actual conflict and considers it especially important in demonstrating how the principles he writes about played their part in the outcome. His analysis of U. S. strategy in Vietnam is scattered throughout the book and both confirmed my own ideas and taught me new ways of seeing. Two chapters are devoted to the strategic use of nuclear weapons and the arms race dominating the 2d half of the century. Surprisingly but convincingly, he equates the strategic learning curve of the nuclear age with that of World War I. He writes that the strategists of present-day nuclear arsenals had to solve new tactical and operational problems brought about by new technologies just as the high commands of the armies of the Great War. It's a rich brew he cooks up, blending together and slowly simmering for 364 pages the ingredients of foreign policy, strategy, history, and war. In the end you can't take any of the ingredients out--they're essential to the ideas he cooks up. You can't take strategy out of foreign policy or foreign policy out of strategy. History is a constant stream of strategic competition between nations in which wars are arrythmic pulses in the stream. He concludes with an interesting discussion of what he calls "bad times." He means open conflict, of course, and considers the persistence of bad times in history a fact of the human condition. It's always been with us, and always will be, so there will always be a need for strategy. Modern times, he says, the century just past, was a truly bad time.

[Scottnshana · Rating 4 out of 5]

If someone has a copy of Clausewitz on the shelf you can just about guarantee he hasn't read it. It's large, it's known, and most people in the national security business can whip out a short quote on you to make a point; but it's rare to find someone--myself included--who can get through it. It's dry, the sentences go on for days, and it's best to just highlight those useful quotes before sticking it (prominently) on the shelf in your office. Professor Gray, however, has done the nug work for the rest of us and analyzed the current trends in pol-mil affairs through the lens of "On War". First of all, he combats the aforementioned dryness by lassoing the reader with concrete examples from the 20th Century, like Viet Nam ("To resort to Clausewitz, because the United States could not settle upon a plausible military objective to fit a sound and stable political objective, strategy failed.") or the Wehrmacht's retreat westward. He says of Russia--and this is still pertinent 15 years after publication--that "It is possible to argue that Russia's historical survival, notwithstanding periodic catastrophic or near-catastrophic shocks, demonstrates that its dominant strategic culture has been strong enough to meet the traffic of historical challenges. But one could also argue that the constituents of Russia have been sufficiently robust to survive the behavioural consequences of a somewhat self-destructive culture." His treatment of small wars in Chapter 10 is comprehensive, though I think the absence of David Galula to support his argument is a massive oversight (especially when he puts Ralph Peters in the same league with T.E. Lawrence and Mao). He asks the pertinent question, for instance--"What is the difference between a brigand, a terrorist, and a freedom fighter?" and his definition of terrorists "(i.e., "...people who seek political ends through behaviour that deliberately induces fear") answers the mail pretty well, especially in light of the fact that it was published two years before 9/11. He tackles space, cyberspace, and, most eloquently--nuclear warfare in his analysis of what Clausewitz would say about modern strategy. He devotes two chapters to nuclear strategy in the post-Cold War world, and offers a pertinent admonition before wrapping up the book: "I challenge readers briefly to try and set aside their current wisdom on nuclear issues... Although (the Cold War) was concluded in 1989, the nuclear era most definitely rolls on. Nuclear weapons are no longer fashionable, but they have not gone away. In fact the nuclear history of the twenty-first century begins with the systemic problem that the much-heralded information revolution in military affairs is not able to retire, operationally and therefore strategically, the problems posed by the still-breathing nuclear revolution." His citation of pertinent gruesome terms like "Wargasm" and "Midnight Express" to describe the retaliatory strike that would likely end humanity adequately convinces the reader of this. Professor Gray's conclusion binds it all together nicely and he restates clearly both that technology is not a panacaea and that, while air, space, and sea are critical enablers, war is still land-centric (Where does most of the world live? Politics by definition demands people; and "Strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose." So guess what--if you're rebelling against the joint fight, you might be on the wrong side of Clausewitz.) I long ago admitted I'm never going to read "On War" from cover-to-cover; I do, however, think I've found the next best thing.

[Al · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good overview and introduction to strategy. I read it as a supplemental reading while at ICCC. Helped me to decide to become a FA 59. Some folks think he's kind of snarky, but it was a very good read. He's a great lecturer in person, as well.

[P. A. · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read this book immediately after finishing the Oxford World Classics abridgment of Clausewitz’s “On War.” Overall the book was a great overview of military strategy in the modern era, and definitely brought Clausewitz’s thoughts up to date with the additions of three new domains of war since his day (that is, air, space and cyberspace).

That said, there is not much on the actual ‘grammar’ of strategy throughout the twentieth century. This is certainly understandable as it is really outside the book’s scope. I put this here for merely because I had some hopes that there would be a bit more than there actually was in this book. Of course, there are other texts that concentrate on these topics. Army Publications such as FM 3-0, or Mao’s “On Guerilla Warfare” comes to mind.

The main issue that I find in this book, the one that precludes me from giving it five stars, lies in the fact that Gray sometimes meanders a hair too much on things that are not of prime importance to the book. Chapter 4, “The Poverty of Modern Strategic Thought,” dwells for 16 pages on an intellectual pursuit trying to ascertain why Clausewitz has no successor equal to his genius. Though this could be an interesting topic to some, such things I can’t imagine affect the strategist nor the tactician in the actual conduct of war. He also sometimes rebuts the claims of other authors in a manner that can be redundant. Thus, it is my belief that there is some superfluous material in this book that could have been spent on other topics.

To be sure, it is a very good book and it did what it set out to do. I wasn’t in need of being convinced, but his argument is convincing that there is a common thread connecting the wars from Alexander to WWII and beyond. That the essence of strategy doesn’t change, even with the addition of new domains to armed conflict.

To sum up, I must recommend this book to those who wish to understand the nature of strategy, though I doubt that many outside the professional context would be very interested in doing so.