This book shows through argument and numerous policy-related examples how understanding moral philosophy can improve economic analysis, how moral philosophy can benefit from economists' analytical tools, and how economic analysis and moral philosophy together can inform public policy. Part I explores the idea of rationality and its connections to ethics, arguing that when they defend their formal model of rationality, most economists implicitly espouse contestable moral principles. Part II addresses the nature and measurement of welfare, utilitarianism and cost-benefit analysis. Part III discusses freedom, rights, equality, and justice - moral notions that are relevant to evaluating policies, but which have played little if any role in conventional welfare economics. Finally, Part IV explores work in social choice theory and game theory that is relevant to moral decision making. Each chapter includes recommended reading and discussion questions.
We have regulations, this explains the motivating factor behind most regulations -spoiler alert I do not want to satisfy the average American’s preferences
A good book examining and explaining the importance of ethical and moral issues in economic theory, especially in welfare economics. It also tries, mostly successfully, analyzing other possible decision frameworks, often ignored or not considered by most economists, like that of liberty, freedom, equality, justice and distribution, and various intricate issues involved in crystallizing these ideas within the dominant 'scientific' economics vis a vis, the dominance framework of rational preference maximization. A good overview of up to date ideas, literature and research, though, for me, it looks that there is scope for improvement in analysis, focus and synthesis.
...proponents of economic measures tend to favor preference satisfaction accounts. In the words of Hausman and McPherson (1997): ‘‘Welfare economics identifies welfare with the satisfaction of preferences. This identification is so automatic and ubiquitous that economists seldom realize how controversial it is’’ (Hausman and McPherson 1997, 17).