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Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning : Final Report of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study
From the Preface, "Operation Deliberate Force was the North Atlatnic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign conducted between 30 August and 20 September 1995 to advance the cause of peace in the Balkans region. Lt. Gen. Jay W. Kelley, commander of Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and Gen. James L. Jamerson, deputy commander in chief of United States European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, jointly chartered the Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS) in October 1995. They directed the BACS team to 'capture' the planning and operational experience of Deliberate Force on behalf of Air University students preparing for future responsibilities as air-warfare planners and leaders, and on behalf of the broader community of air-warfare thinkers. Their specific direction entailed (1) writing a 'mile-wide-and-foot-deep' report laying out the salient events, causal relationships, and implications of this important air campaign and (2) assembling a comprehensive archive of relevant oral and documentary evidence to support future research into the planning, execution, and diplomatic exploitation of Deliberate Force."
- GenresMilitary Fiction
541 pages, Paperback
First published May 1, 2000
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
July 9, 2022
This book is pretty specialized, so it may only be worth it if you’re interested in the intricacies of planning and executing a complex air campaign.
In August of 1995, NATO launched an air campaign to force the Bosnian Serb Army to remove its forces from UN designed “safe areas” and bring the Serbs to the negotiating table in order to end the Bosnian war.
NATO Forces were originally saddled with a barely workable command structure known as “Dual Key” (Both the UN and NATO had to “turn their keys” to approve an airstrike), and a lack of suitable resources. UN and NATO planners used the lessons learned from Operation Deny Flight to straighten out their organizational, resource, and planning issues.
By the time “Deliberate Force” was put into effect, the missions, the plans, the necessary restrictions, and relationships were already in place. While the operation had plenty “hitches”, it did ultimately force the Bosnian Serb Army pull out of the “safe areas” and begin negotiations.
Military Officers often prefer to have little or no political interference in their operations. However in most conflicts, this is unrealistic. Conversely, politicians can often have naive expectations of what a military operation can or cannot do. At one point in the process, UN officials told NATO planners that they did not want anyone to get killed when NATO strikes took out Serb anti-aircraft defenses.
This book is a detailed and dry examination of how these issues were dealt with. It is a fine work but not for everyone.
In August of 1995, NATO launched an air campaign to force the Bosnian Serb Army to remove its forces from UN designed “safe areas” and bring the Serbs to the negotiating table in order to end the Bosnian war.
NATO Forces were originally saddled with a barely workable command structure known as “Dual Key” (Both the UN and NATO had to “turn their keys” to approve an airstrike), and a lack of suitable resources. UN and NATO planners used the lessons learned from Operation Deny Flight to straighten out their organizational, resource, and planning issues.
By the time “Deliberate Force” was put into effect, the missions, the plans, the necessary restrictions, and relationships were already in place. While the operation had plenty “hitches”, it did ultimately force the Bosnian Serb Army pull out of the “safe areas” and begin negotiations.
Military Officers often prefer to have little or no political interference in their operations. However in most conflicts, this is unrealistic. Conversely, politicians can often have naive expectations of what a military operation can or cannot do. At one point in the process, UN officials told NATO planners that they did not want anyone to get killed when NATO strikes took out Serb anti-aircraft defenses.
This book is a detailed and dry examination of how these issues were dealt with. It is a fine work but not for everyone.
Displaying 1 of 1 review