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Withdrawal: Reassessing America's Final Years in Vietnam
A "better war." Over the last two decades, this term has become synonymous with US strategy during the Vietnam War's final years. The narrative is enticingly simple, appealing to many audiences. After the disastrous results of the 1968 Tet offensive, in which Hanoi's forces demonstrated the failures of American strategy, popular history tells of a new American military commander who emerged in South Vietnam and with inspired leadership and a new approach turned around a long stalemated conflict. In fact, so successful was General Creighton Abrams in commanding US forces that, according to the "better war" myth, the United States had actually achieved victory by mid-1970. A new general with a new strategy had delivered, only to see his victory abandoned by weak-kneed politicians in Washington, DC who turned their backs on the US armed forces and their South Vietnamese allies.
In a bold new interpretation of America's final years in Vietnam, acclaimed historian Gregory A. Daddis disproves these longstanding myths. Withdrawal is a groundbreaking reassessment that tells a far different story of the Vietnam War. Daddis convincingly argues that the entire US effort in South Vietnam was incapable of reversing the downward trends of a complicated Vietnamese conflict that by 1968 had turned into a political-military stalemate. Despite a new articulation of strategy, Abrams's approach could not materially alter a war no longer vital to US national security or global dominance. Once the Nixon White House made the political decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia, Abrams's military strategy was unable to change either the course or outcome of a decades' long Vietnamese civil war.
In a riveting sequel to his celebrated Westmoreland's War, Daddis demonstrates he is one of the nation's leading scholars on the Vietnam War. Withdrawal will be a standard work for years to come.
In a bold new interpretation of America's final years in Vietnam, acclaimed historian Gregory A. Daddis disproves these longstanding myths. Withdrawal is a groundbreaking reassessment that tells a far different story of the Vietnam War. Daddis convincingly argues that the entire US effort in South Vietnam was incapable of reversing the downward trends of a complicated Vietnamese conflict that by 1968 had turned into a political-military stalemate. Despite a new articulation of strategy, Abrams's approach could not materially alter a war no longer vital to US national security or global dominance. Once the Nixon White House made the political decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia, Abrams's military strategy was unable to change either the course or outcome of a decades' long Vietnamese civil war.
In a riveting sequel to his celebrated Westmoreland's War, Daddis demonstrates he is one of the nation's leading scholars on the Vietnam War. Withdrawal will be a standard work for years to come.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published October 2, 2017
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
January 31, 2023
In his book, Gregory A. Daddis continues his analysis of the American strategy in Vietnam, this time focusing on the post-Tet period, when General Westmoreland was succeeded by Creighton Abrams as MACV commander. As is known, the American war effort did not improve after 1968 despite the change in command, and Daddis attempts to explain why.
The problem with Abrams, the author observes, is that instead of recognizing Westmoreland's mistakes, he decided that the existing American strategy was good enough – as different as the two commanders were, there was continuity instead of change. Although he was experienced – he had served as a corps chief of staff in Korea – he, just like his West Point classmate Westmoreland, did not have any experience in counterinsurgency. He tried to develop a strategy called "one war" by devoting more attention to pacification and ARVN training than his predecessor had done, but such programs became important not because of his new strategy, but because the American government decided that they should stop the Americanization of the war. President Lyndon Johnson still wanted Vietnam to be independent and non-Communist, but the main military objective now was peace, not military victory, which seemed increasingly unachievable.
Furthermore, by the time Abrams became MACV commander, there were almost no options to change the character of the war, and the enemy continued to influence the options that were available. Despite suffering huge losses during Tet and mini-Tet, an offensive launched on May 5, 1968 that fizzled out in two weeks but managed to turn 125,000 people into refugees, the Communists maintained their pressure on the cities of South Vietnam, forcing Abrams to join the battle. Committed to protecting Saigon against new attacks, he filled the countryside with small patrols to harass the enemy. His action was praised as proof that he was changing the American strategy. However, Abrams was actually reacting to the Communists' change in tactics. After Tet, they had to send more soldiers from the North to South Vietnam to replace those that the Viet Cong had lost, but the MACV was still struggling to find and engage with the enemy, who continued to elude the Americans.
Worse, under Abrams the MACV continued to measure progress in weapons captured, roads opened, and population secured. Although he did not care about body counts that much, he determined the performance of ARVN units based on their good kill ratios and did not address the high desertion rates among them, which weakened their improving effectiveness. Abrams struggled even more with measuring the success of pacification. How much of the population supported Saigon, whether the enemy was still successfully recruiting people and collecting taxes, and how secure could the secure areas to which the people were moved actually be if the enemy engaged in terrorism – he, just like Westmoreland, did not know the answers to these questions.
Abrams also continued to pursue the flawed strategy of searching major enemy forces and trying to destroy them. Although he did understand the importance of pacification and the political aspect of the Vietnam conflict better than Westmoreland, they were still not his priority. His "one war" strategy tried but did not succeed to change the nature of the Vietnam conflict, and his subordinates, who were not particularly open-minded, continued to dismiss pacification and rely on airstrikes and heavy artillery.
WITHDRAWAL is a well-written analysis of the American strategy in Vietnam. This book will be of interest to anyone who wants to know more about Abrams and the late years of the Vietnam conflict.
The problem with Abrams, the author observes, is that instead of recognizing Westmoreland's mistakes, he decided that the existing American strategy was good enough – as different as the two commanders were, there was continuity instead of change. Although he was experienced – he had served as a corps chief of staff in Korea – he, just like his West Point classmate Westmoreland, did not have any experience in counterinsurgency. He tried to develop a strategy called "one war" by devoting more attention to pacification and ARVN training than his predecessor had done, but such programs became important not because of his new strategy, but because the American government decided that they should stop the Americanization of the war. President Lyndon Johnson still wanted Vietnam to be independent and non-Communist, but the main military objective now was peace, not military victory, which seemed increasingly unachievable.
Furthermore, by the time Abrams became MACV commander, there were almost no options to change the character of the war, and the enemy continued to influence the options that were available. Despite suffering huge losses during Tet and mini-Tet, an offensive launched on May 5, 1968 that fizzled out in two weeks but managed to turn 125,000 people into refugees, the Communists maintained their pressure on the cities of South Vietnam, forcing Abrams to join the battle. Committed to protecting Saigon against new attacks, he filled the countryside with small patrols to harass the enemy. His action was praised as proof that he was changing the American strategy. However, Abrams was actually reacting to the Communists' change in tactics. After Tet, they had to send more soldiers from the North to South Vietnam to replace those that the Viet Cong had lost, but the MACV was still struggling to find and engage with the enemy, who continued to elude the Americans.
Worse, under Abrams the MACV continued to measure progress in weapons captured, roads opened, and population secured. Although he did not care about body counts that much, he determined the performance of ARVN units based on their good kill ratios and did not address the high desertion rates among them, which weakened their improving effectiveness. Abrams struggled even more with measuring the success of pacification. How much of the population supported Saigon, whether the enemy was still successfully recruiting people and collecting taxes, and how secure could the secure areas to which the people were moved actually be if the enemy engaged in terrorism – he, just like Westmoreland, did not know the answers to these questions.
Abrams also continued to pursue the flawed strategy of searching major enemy forces and trying to destroy them. Although he did understand the importance of pacification and the political aspect of the Vietnam conflict better than Westmoreland, they were still not his priority. His "one war" strategy tried but did not succeed to change the nature of the Vietnam conflict, and his subordinates, who were not particularly open-minded, continued to dismiss pacification and rely on airstrikes and heavy artillery.
WITHDRAWAL is a well-written analysis of the American strategy in Vietnam. This book will be of interest to anyone who wants to know more about Abrams and the late years of the Vietnam conflict.
December 4, 2019
A balanced, well-researched work.
Daddis disputes the idea that the US more or less “won” the war by 1971 under Abrams and with a strategy of pacification, and points out how the “better war” idea has influenced US foreign policy (especially in Iraq). He points out the isolation and corruption of the government in Saigon, the failures of pacification, the capabilities that the enemy was able to retain, and the destructive effects of US firepower on South Vietnam’s population. He also argues that the changes to US strategy often didn’t affect the situation much, and points out that Vietnam revisionists often seem to act like the Vietnamese sides of the war didn’t exist.
The narrative is crisp and in-depth, and his coverage of the anti-war movement is balanced, pointing out that they wanted out of the war as much as Nixon did but that its impact on Nixon’s decisions was mostly negligible. Daddis’ portrait of the decisionmakers is nuanced and human. The book seems a bit unfocused, though, almost if Daddis couldn’t figure out whether to focus on Abrams, or on this aspect of his war or that aspect. He also could have covered the concerns in the military establishment on Vietnam affecting America’s general readiness for a war with the Soviets or world crises in general.
An interesting and well-argued book. It probably could have been a bit longer, though
Daddis disputes the idea that the US more or less “won” the war by 1971 under Abrams and with a strategy of pacification, and points out how the “better war” idea has influenced US foreign policy (especially in Iraq). He points out the isolation and corruption of the government in Saigon, the failures of pacification, the capabilities that the enemy was able to retain, and the destructive effects of US firepower on South Vietnam’s population. He also argues that the changes to US strategy often didn’t affect the situation much, and points out that Vietnam revisionists often seem to act like the Vietnamese sides of the war didn’t exist.
The narrative is crisp and in-depth, and his coverage of the anti-war movement is balanced, pointing out that they wanted out of the war as much as Nixon did but that its impact on Nixon’s decisions was mostly negligible. Daddis’ portrait of the decisionmakers is nuanced and human. The book seems a bit unfocused, though, almost if Daddis couldn’t figure out whether to focus on Abrams, or on this aspect of his war or that aspect. He also could have covered the concerns in the military establishment on Vietnam affecting America’s general readiness for a war with the Soviets or world crises in general.
An interesting and well-argued book. It probably could have been a bit longer, though
February 13, 2018
This is a book, in Ta-Nehisi Coates-speak, that is a significant immunity to stupidity on historical interpretations of the Vietnam War. Daddis writes in the wake of authors and commentators, Lewis Sorley's "A Better War" chief among them, that have posited that United States forces succeeded militarily in Vietnam after the 1968 Tet Offensive, only to be stabbed in the back by fickle policymakers in Washington, DC and peaceniks marching through the streets of America.
Daddis's most significant contribution is a level-headed analysis of how the Nixon administration's grand strategy hemmed in Creighton Abrams's military strategy on the ground in South Vietnam, leaving the general without the means to prosecute a victorious end to the war.
Though the writing style is more dry than other books on the Vietnam War by such authors as David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan, Daddis illustrates an immensely important point in is book: Vietnam was not won under Creighton Abrams, and most likely could not have been won given the constraints imposed upon the war by grand strategists in the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations.
Daddis's most significant contribution is a level-headed analysis of how the Nixon administration's grand strategy hemmed in Creighton Abrams's military strategy on the ground in South Vietnam, leaving the general without the means to prosecute a victorious end to the war.
Though the writing style is more dry than other books on the Vietnam War by such authors as David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan, Daddis illustrates an immensely important point in is book: Vietnam was not won under Creighton Abrams, and most likely could not have been won given the constraints imposed upon the war by grand strategists in the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations.
February 25, 2025
’The time is ripe to reconsider the Vietnam War as many Vietnamese see it - the American War’
Withdrawal is a very well-written and in-depth look at General Abrams, the disparities between Nixon’s White House and the MACV headquarters, and competing lines of the military and US politics in the Vietnam War.
Daddis mainly focuses on criticising and offering alternative reactions to the ‘better war’, approach that has plagued much of modern American Vietnam histories and offers, in my opinion, a much less biased and critical look at the failures of the US within Vietnam.
It is a palatable and well-paced book, one that I think would be a good read for newbies to Vietnam history and those that have studied it (like me!). Being forced to read this for a class at university certainly doesn’t help in my feelings towards it, but that is no fault of the books.
Overall, Withdrawal gets 3.5/5 stars rounded down to a 3.
Withdrawal is a very well-written and in-depth look at General Abrams, the disparities between Nixon’s White House and the MACV headquarters, and competing lines of the military and US politics in the Vietnam War.
Daddis mainly focuses on criticising and offering alternative reactions to the ‘better war’, approach that has plagued much of modern American Vietnam histories and offers, in my opinion, a much less biased and critical look at the failures of the US within Vietnam.
It is a palatable and well-paced book, one that I think would be a good read for newbies to Vietnam history and those that have studied it (like me!). Being forced to read this for a class at university certainly doesn’t help in my feelings towards it, but that is no fault of the books.
Overall, Withdrawal gets 3.5/5 stars rounded down to a 3.
March 27, 2024
On one hand, speaking as a person who watched the collapse of Saigon in real time at sixteen-years of age, this study is simply a reminder of the lesson that intervening in another nation's civil war at the last second is probably an exercise in futility. On the other hand, the author also seems to be subjecting his own beliefs to ruthless analysis, as he would have been in West Point at the peak of Creighton Abram's reputation as the great military leader who had bought time for the South Vietnamese to make something of themselves; if only Congress had not betrayed Saigon out of pique with Dick Nixon. Daddis does an understanding, but tough-minded job of demonstrating why this narrative is a self-serving myth; one that it's past time to set aside. Those who admire Lewis Sorley's studies of Abrams will not be happy with this work. That said, this monograph is probably not the new analysis that Abrams' military career deserves.
Originally written: March 14, 2018.
Originally written: March 14, 2018.
August 9, 2020
Concise and readable destruction of the argument the Vietnam war could have been won, if only the politicians had given the Army a free hand - as well as a number of supporting narratives. Solid tie-in to a similar narrative peddled about the Iraq war. Good read, solid argument - recommend.
November 23, 2020
A masterful take on the complications of this war, distilled to the essence of the United States exit from Vietnam.
The author Gregory Daddis also takes the reader through a timeline that shows the ultimately hostile relationship of President Richard Nixon and General Creighton Abrams.
America withdrew from a stalemate because General Abrams could not build a South Vietnamese nation based on voluntary cooperation of the masses, and capable of standing on its own. The first mistake was expecting the armed forces to dabble in politics. Westmoreland, Abrams and ARVN generals were not qualified to run a country, especially with a war raging at the same time. That was different from being asked to govern a defeated nation after hostilities ended, like Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.
Regulating destruction and construction was, and still is, the black magic of nation building. The default U.S. response in Vietnam was throwing money at the problem and when that failed, B-52 diplomacy. That was no way to link military operations with political stability.
Usually overlooked is that vital factories that supplied North Vietnam were located in China and Eastern Europe, thus it was not possible to bomb those industrial targets without risking a nuclear war. Some optimists have tried to use South Korea as a model but the possibility of a strong communist insurgency there was severely restricted by geography, with just 160 miles of land border compared to 1,000 miles in South Vietnam.
The author Gregory Daddis also takes the reader through a timeline that shows the ultimately hostile relationship of President Richard Nixon and General Creighton Abrams.
America withdrew from a stalemate because General Abrams could not build a South Vietnamese nation based on voluntary cooperation of the masses, and capable of standing on its own. The first mistake was expecting the armed forces to dabble in politics. Westmoreland, Abrams and ARVN generals were not qualified to run a country, especially with a war raging at the same time. That was different from being asked to govern a defeated nation after hostilities ended, like Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.
Regulating destruction and construction was, and still is, the black magic of nation building. The default U.S. response in Vietnam was throwing money at the problem and when that failed, B-52 diplomacy. That was no way to link military operations with political stability.
Usually overlooked is that vital factories that supplied North Vietnam were located in China and Eastern Europe, thus it was not possible to bomb those industrial targets without risking a nuclear war. Some optimists have tried to use South Korea as a model but the possibility of a strong communist insurgency there was severely restricted by geography, with just 160 miles of land border compared to 1,000 miles in South Vietnam.
February 27, 2020
Having grown up during the Vietnam war and watched many news reels on the war I had never really understood the situation. This really put it into perspective and also showed that it was a war that never going to be won bu the USA:
December 31, 2017
Well documented history of the final years of the Vietnam war.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews