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Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East
Though it lasted for only six tense days in June, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war never really ended. Every crisis that has ripped through this region in the ensuing decades, from the Yom Kippur War of 1973 to the ongoing intifada, is a direct consequence of those six days of fighting. Michael B. Oren’s magnificent Six Days of War, an internationally acclaimed bestseller, is the first comprehensive account of this epoch-making event.
Writing with a novelist’s command of narrative and a historian’s grasp of fact and motive, Oren reconstructs both the lightning-fast action on the battlefields and the political shocks that electrified the world. Extraordinary personalities—Moshe Dayan and Gamal Abdul Nasser, Lyndon Johnson and Alexei Kosygin—rose and toppled from power as a result of this war; borders were redrawn; daring strategies brilliantly succeeded or disastrously failed in a matter of hours. And the balance of power changed—in the Middle East and in the world. A towering work of history and an enthralling human narrative, Six Days of War is the most important book on the Middle East conflict to appear in a generation.
Writing with a novelist’s command of narrative and a historian’s grasp of fact and motive, Oren reconstructs both the lightning-fast action on the battlefields and the political shocks that electrified the world. Extraordinary personalities—Moshe Dayan and Gamal Abdul Nasser, Lyndon Johnson and Alexei Kosygin—rose and toppled from power as a result of this war; borders were redrawn; daring strategies brilliantly succeeded or disastrously failed in a matter of hours. And the balance of power changed—in the Middle East and in the world. A towering work of history and an enthralling human narrative, Six Days of War is the most important book on the Middle East conflict to appear in a generation.
480 pages, Kindle Edition
First published June 6, 2001
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About the author
Michael B. Oren
15 books137 followersMichael Bornstein Oren is an American-Israeli diplomat, essayist, historian, novelist, and politician. He is a former Israeli ambassador to the United States (2009–2013), former member of the Knesset for the Kulanu party and a former Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Office.
Oren has written books, articles, and essays on Middle Eastern history and foreign affairs, and is the author of the New York Times best-selling Ally: My Journey Across the American-Israeli Divide, Power, Faith and Fantasy, and Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, which won the Los Angeles Times History Book of the Year Award and the National Jewish Book Award. Oren has taught at Harvard, Yale, and Georgetown universities in the United States and at Ben-Gurion and Hebrew universities in Israel. He was a Distinguished Fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem and a contributing editor to The New Republic. The Forward named Oren one of the five most influential American Jews, and The Jerusalem Post listed him as one of the world's ten most influential Jews.
Oren retired as ambassador to the United States in 2013, and was replaced by Ron Dermer. In the 2015 Israeli election, Oren was elected to the Knesset for the Kulanu party.
Oren has written books, articles, and essays on Middle Eastern history and foreign affairs, and is the author of the New York Times best-selling Ally: My Journey Across the American-Israeli Divide, Power, Faith and Fantasy, and Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, which won the Los Angeles Times History Book of the Year Award and the National Jewish Book Award. Oren has taught at Harvard, Yale, and Georgetown universities in the United States and at Ben-Gurion and Hebrew universities in Israel. He was a Distinguished Fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem and a contributing editor to The New Republic. The Forward named Oren one of the five most influential American Jews, and The Jerusalem Post listed him as one of the world's ten most influential Jews.
Oren retired as ambassador to the United States in 2013, and was replaced by Ron Dermer. In the 2015 Israeli election, Oren was elected to the Knesset for the Kulanu party.
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February 24, 2023
“The lead formations [of Israeli jets] had now passed over the sea where, using electronic jamming equipment, they were able to elude detection by Soviet vessels. At 7:30 Israel time, the first targets came into view. In the huge bases of Fa’id and Kibrit…which Egyptian intelligence had erroneously concluded were out of Israel’s range, the jets were parked on the aprons, in rows or in semicircular revetments. Many airfields had only one runway – block it and the planes supposed to use it were doomed…In the sky, the visibility was excellent, the wind factor close to zero. Conditions were optimal for attack. The Israeli jets now swooped up sharply to as high as 9,000 feet, exposing themselves to Egyptian radar and sending Egyptian pilots out to the tarmac, scrambling. Few would reach their planes…”
- Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East
Minute by minute, hour by hour, few wars have been as impactful as the Six Day War of 1967, fought by Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. After the eponymous time-period ended, the lines on the Middle Eastern map were redrawn in ways that charted the future of the region, and impact the world still today.
In Six Days of War, Michael B. Oren delivers a sturdily methodical, no frills account of this momentous near-week in which thousands of men died, thousands more were wounded, and thousands of square miles changed hands.
***
Context is obviously important to any event. In Six Days of War, Oren takes it quite seriously. Fully one-half of the 327-pages of text is devoted to the deep background of the war, the precipitating crisis, and the last-minute maneuvering before the planes took flight and the guns started firing.
Oren begins with the historical setting. Obviously, the peoples of the Middle East, their memories, and their grievances go back fully thousands of years. For ease of purpose, however, Oren chooses to start in 1948, with the creation of the State of Israel, and the subsequent Arab-Israeli War.
Israel won that war, and later outfought Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956, though Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the canal made him immensely popular in the Arab World. As a result of the Crisis, the Sinai was demilitarized and United Nations observers put in place. Meanwhile, Nasser set out to modernize his army, and to form a coalition with King Hussein of Jordan, and Nureddin al-Atassi of Syria.
After giving the long view, Oren focuses on the situation immediately preceding hostilities. In doing so, he looks at both the domestic and geopolitical positions of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and – to a lesser extent – Syria. He does a good job exploring the various motivations underlying the principals’ actions, and explaining the environment in which decisions were made. King Hussein of Jordan, for instance, did not necessarily want a war, but as two-thirds of his kingdom – by his own reckoning – consisted of Palestinian refugees, he had to take a hard stance in public, lest his reign, or even his life, end in a revolt.
All this played out as part of the larger Cold War, with Arab countries generally backed by the Soviet Union, and Israel supported by the United States. Oren plays close attention to this angle, and for good reason. The Soviet Union’s false intelligence regarding an alleged Israeli plan to invade Syria provided a fateful nudge towards open conflict. Specifically, President Nasser Abdel Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, ejected UN observers, and moved troops into the Sinai. This brought him great acclaim from ordinary Egyptians, who filled the streets to cheer him on. Unfortunately, it also led Israel – hemmed in on three sides, and with a nine-mile waistline at its narrowest point – to formulate a plan to strike first.
***
The war opened with the Israeli Air Force annihilating the Egyptian Air Force in a massively successful first strike. From this point, Oren devotes a chapter to each day of the war, balancing tactical descriptions with diplomacy and politics. For all sides, there was an emphasis on gaining as much territory before the UN imposed a ceasefire.
Initially, Israel wished to confine its actions to Egypt, even giving King Hussein the opportunity to stay on the sidelines. Hussein did not, however, which allowed Israel to capture the West Bank, including the entirety of Jerusalem. Ultimately, using Syrian shelling as a casus belli, Israel took the Golan as well.
In describing this action, Oren notes the tendency of the Egyptians and Jordanians to delude themselves as to the war’s progress. They told their people they were winning, and winning big, instead of being honest with themselves and suing for peace. This proved to be a costly bit of self-deception. Their hopes that the Soviets would intercede also turned out to be misplaced. Despite Soviet posturing, the Kremlin did not relish potentially sparking a third world war.
In these chapters, I preferred the political machinations to the military explanations, which are clinically detailed but hard to follow. There are maps, to be sure, but each one tries to do everything at once, so there are arrows – each a different shade of black or gray – covering the page in an attempt to capture every movement during all six days. A few first-person accounts enliven the proceedings, and Oren occasionally delivers a well-executed scene – Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty, for instance, is solid – but his battlefield descriptions feel academic, like a staff ride, leeched of drama.
***
Oren writes in a matter-of-fact manner, with very little by way of flourishes. That is to say, you will probably not find yourself crocheting lines of prose onto a throw pillow, and then displaying that pillow prominently on the best couch in your house. Truth be told, this is a bit on the dry side, which is also a function of Oren compressing a lot of information into a relatively short book.
***
Talk about the Middle East and you will find strong opinions. Thus, the issue of objectivity is going to be of utmost importance.
To that end, it should be noted that Oren is an American-born Israeli, who – years after Six Days of War was published in 2003 – served as the Israeli ambassador to the United States. Nevertheless, Oren does not write from the Israeli perspective, but puts himself into all the various halls of power, and – in my opinion – does an able job of looking out the eyes of others. Certainly, he is not disrespectful towards the Arab nations or individuals, and judges them by what they knew, and what they faced.
In addition, Oren has consulted a wide variety of sources, from all the participant countries. To underscore this point, he even includes a photo of himself chatting with Jordanian Brigadier Ata Ali Haza’a.
Of course, when it comes to Oren’s impartiality, I’m judging from a distant remove. The Six Day War occurred well-over a half-century ago, but the struggle is ongoing, and is a daily lived experience for many. Others might detect a slant I didn’t perceive.
***
Middle Eastern history has long been one of my blind spots. Not because I don’t think it important, but because it seems like a moving target. The Second World War is static. I can study it, and know what it means. With the Six Day War, though, the meaning is constantly shifting as the region’s hopes for peace waxes and wanes. While the subtitle of Six Days of War claims to describe “the making of the modern Middle East,” Oren himself is more equivocal on this point, noting that this short, distant war is liable to erupt again, once more changing our interpretation.
- Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East
Minute by minute, hour by hour, few wars have been as impactful as the Six Day War of 1967, fought by Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. After the eponymous time-period ended, the lines on the Middle Eastern map were redrawn in ways that charted the future of the region, and impact the world still today.
In Six Days of War, Michael B. Oren delivers a sturdily methodical, no frills account of this momentous near-week in which thousands of men died, thousands more were wounded, and thousands of square miles changed hands.
***
Context is obviously important to any event. In Six Days of War, Oren takes it quite seriously. Fully one-half of the 327-pages of text is devoted to the deep background of the war, the precipitating crisis, and the last-minute maneuvering before the planes took flight and the guns started firing.
Oren begins with the historical setting. Obviously, the peoples of the Middle East, their memories, and their grievances go back fully thousands of years. For ease of purpose, however, Oren chooses to start in 1948, with the creation of the State of Israel, and the subsequent Arab-Israeli War.
Israel won that war, and later outfought Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956, though Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the canal made him immensely popular in the Arab World. As a result of the Crisis, the Sinai was demilitarized and United Nations observers put in place. Meanwhile, Nasser set out to modernize his army, and to form a coalition with King Hussein of Jordan, and Nureddin al-Atassi of Syria.
After giving the long view, Oren focuses on the situation immediately preceding hostilities. In doing so, he looks at both the domestic and geopolitical positions of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and – to a lesser extent – Syria. He does a good job exploring the various motivations underlying the principals’ actions, and explaining the environment in which decisions were made. King Hussein of Jordan, for instance, did not necessarily want a war, but as two-thirds of his kingdom – by his own reckoning – consisted of Palestinian refugees, he had to take a hard stance in public, lest his reign, or even his life, end in a revolt.
All this played out as part of the larger Cold War, with Arab countries generally backed by the Soviet Union, and Israel supported by the United States. Oren plays close attention to this angle, and for good reason. The Soviet Union’s false intelligence regarding an alleged Israeli plan to invade Syria provided a fateful nudge towards open conflict. Specifically, President Nasser Abdel Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, ejected UN observers, and moved troops into the Sinai. This brought him great acclaim from ordinary Egyptians, who filled the streets to cheer him on. Unfortunately, it also led Israel – hemmed in on three sides, and with a nine-mile waistline at its narrowest point – to formulate a plan to strike first.
***
The war opened with the Israeli Air Force annihilating the Egyptian Air Force in a massively successful first strike. From this point, Oren devotes a chapter to each day of the war, balancing tactical descriptions with diplomacy and politics. For all sides, there was an emphasis on gaining as much territory before the UN imposed a ceasefire.
Initially, Israel wished to confine its actions to Egypt, even giving King Hussein the opportunity to stay on the sidelines. Hussein did not, however, which allowed Israel to capture the West Bank, including the entirety of Jerusalem. Ultimately, using Syrian shelling as a casus belli, Israel took the Golan as well.
In describing this action, Oren notes the tendency of the Egyptians and Jordanians to delude themselves as to the war’s progress. They told their people they were winning, and winning big, instead of being honest with themselves and suing for peace. This proved to be a costly bit of self-deception. Their hopes that the Soviets would intercede also turned out to be misplaced. Despite Soviet posturing, the Kremlin did not relish potentially sparking a third world war.
In these chapters, I preferred the political machinations to the military explanations, which are clinically detailed but hard to follow. There are maps, to be sure, but each one tries to do everything at once, so there are arrows – each a different shade of black or gray – covering the page in an attempt to capture every movement during all six days. A few first-person accounts enliven the proceedings, and Oren occasionally delivers a well-executed scene – Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty, for instance, is solid – but his battlefield descriptions feel academic, like a staff ride, leeched of drama.
***
Oren writes in a matter-of-fact manner, with very little by way of flourishes. That is to say, you will probably not find yourself crocheting lines of prose onto a throw pillow, and then displaying that pillow prominently on the best couch in your house. Truth be told, this is a bit on the dry side, which is also a function of Oren compressing a lot of information into a relatively short book.
***
Talk about the Middle East and you will find strong opinions. Thus, the issue of objectivity is going to be of utmost importance.
To that end, it should be noted that Oren is an American-born Israeli, who – years after Six Days of War was published in 2003 – served as the Israeli ambassador to the United States. Nevertheless, Oren does not write from the Israeli perspective, but puts himself into all the various halls of power, and – in my opinion – does an able job of looking out the eyes of others. Certainly, he is not disrespectful towards the Arab nations or individuals, and judges them by what they knew, and what they faced.
In addition, Oren has consulted a wide variety of sources, from all the participant countries. To underscore this point, he even includes a photo of himself chatting with Jordanian Brigadier Ata Ali Haza’a.
Of course, when it comes to Oren’s impartiality, I’m judging from a distant remove. The Six Day War occurred well-over a half-century ago, but the struggle is ongoing, and is a daily lived experience for many. Others might detect a slant I didn’t perceive.
***
Middle Eastern history has long been one of my blind spots. Not because I don’t think it important, but because it seems like a moving target. The Second World War is static. I can study it, and know what it means. With the Six Day War, though, the meaning is constantly shifting as the region’s hopes for peace waxes and wanes. While the subtitle of Six Days of War claims to describe “the making of the modern Middle East,” Oren himself is more equivocal on this point, noting that this short, distant war is liable to erupt again, once more changing our interpretation.
August 21, 2023
I thought this was a great overview of Six-Day War for someone like me who came into this topic knowing very little. The author kept to the facts and did not editorialize. Though, I recognize that no one comes to this topic completely unbiased, and there are some critics who say Oren is biased towards the Israeli position. These critics seem to be in the minority though.
That's all I have to say for now, as I feel rather overwhelmed with what I don't know or don't fully understand to be able to comment more.
That's all I have to say for now, as I feel rather overwhelmed with what I don't know or don't fully understand to be able to comment more.
December 7, 2025
This definitely is the most comprehensive work to date on the Six Day War. The author has consulted vastly documents, newspapers, books and interviews with important players.
Michael Oren interviewed such figures as former Jordanian Brigade Commander Ata Ali, Egyptian historian Issam Darraz former Syrian Ambassador to the UN, George Tomeh, former MOSSAD chief, Meir Amit, former Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, widow of PM Levi Eshkol, Miriam Eshkol, former IDF Chief of Operations and later President, Ezer Weizmann and former Deputy IDF Chief of Staff and later Tourism Minister, Rechavam Ze'evi, interviewed a month before his brutal murder by terrorists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine , in the corridor of a Jerusalem hotel , former members of the Supreme Soviet and Soviet military advisors to the Egyptians and Syrians and former Le Monde correspondent , Eric Rouleau , just to name a few of the Syrians , Egyptians , Jordanians , Israelis , French , British and Russians that Oren interviewed.
The novel is written in real time , as we trace events as they happened-it is really like watching the Six Day War , and the preceding and subsequent events unfold. He does not write to prove political points or to fit in with what it is currently fashionable to believe, like the malignant anti-Zionist `new historians' do.
Ultimately it is a history book about Israel's fight for survival, as we read of the bellicose threats of the Arabs and their Soviet backers, to destroy Israel and drive the Jews into the sea. Hence reading some of the Arab promises of genocide, much like they had threatened in 1948, and much as they threaten today, one can only gain a greater understanding of what Israel faces if it is ever - G-D forbid- defeated.
Here are some of the chilling promises of a second holocaust thundered by Arab leaders , and their evil Soviet instigators , before and during the Six Day War.
Ahmed Shuqayri, the first leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, said: "We shall destroy Israel and its inhabitants."
"Leading to the purification of Arab land from reaction, imperialism and Zionism."
Damascus Radio, April 10 1967.
"If war comes it will be total, and the objective will be Israel's destruction...this is Arab power."
Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser
"We have decided that this battle will be one for the final liberation from imperialism and Zionism...We shall meet in Tel Aviv.
Syrian President Attasi.
"The United Sates, oh Arabs, is the enemy of all peoples, the killer of life, the shedder of blood,, that is preventing you from liquidating Israel"
President Nasser
"If Israelis become drunk with success, and pursue their aggression further , the future of this little country will be a very sad one indeed"
Soviet Ambassador to Israel, Sergei Chuvakhin
"The cream of our troops stands at the front. Strike the enemy settlements, turn them into dust, pave the Arab roads with the skulls of Jews. Strike them without mercy.
Syrian Air Force Commander Hafez al Assad.
Essentially a reading of the book demonstrates how a combination of bellicose Arab rhetoric, threatening behaviour and, ultimately, an act of war left Israel no choice but pre-emptive action.
It is instructive to read the words of Israel's Prime Minister at the time Levi Eshkol who reminded the world:" We cannot afford to lose. This may be our last stand in history. The Jewish people have something to give to the world. I believe that if you look at our history and at all the difficulties that we have survived, it means that history wants us to continue. We cannot survive if we experience again what happened to us under Hitler...I believe that you should understand us."
Reading about the worlds equanimity over Arab plans to destroy Israel, and over Syrian shelling into Israel and PLO terror attacks into Israel, before the war, compared to the strident outcry against Israel when it hit back, gives one a chilling sense of de ja vu today.
I felt a cold anger at the Soviet Union condemmning Israel for ` aggression' and `imperialism', while half the world groaned under the Communist jackboot.
The same type of rhetoric is even more prevalent today in leftist academia, the UN, the international media , the so-called Non Aligned Movement , much of the European Union etc .
The malignant high priest of leftist totalitarian ideology Noam `Wormtongue' Chomsky simply perfected Soviet/Red Chinese and Arab rhetoric , and sold it to millions.
Sadly there was more understanding for Israel's plight in much of the world in 1967 than there is today. The fact that today the world has turned so viciously on Israel, as that tiny country still struggles to survive, is an indictment of a world that is clearly more evil today in 2004 than it was in 1967.
It is also worth noting that the Arabs are not very good fighters against soldiers, but like the Amalekites of old , are very good at killing Jewish women and children.
Merged review:
This definitely is the most comprehensive work to date on the Six Day War. The author has consulted vastly documents, newspapers, books and interviews with important players.
Michael Oren interviewed such figures as former Jordanian Brigade Commander Ata Ali, Egyptian historian Issam Darraz former Syrian Ambassador to the UN, George Tomeh, former MOSSAD chief, Meir Amit, former Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, widow of PM Levi Eshkol, Miriam Eshkol, former IDF Chief of Operations and later President, Ezer Weizmann and former Deputy IDF Chief of Staff and later Tourism Minister, Rechavam Ze'evi, interviewed a month before his brutal murder by terrorists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine , in the corridor of a Jerusalem hotel , former members of the Supreme Soviet and Soviet military advisors to the Egyptians and Syrians and former Le Monde correspondent , Eric Rouleau , just to name a few of the Syrians , Egyptians , Jordanians , Israelis , French , British and Russians that Oren interviewed.
The novel is written in real time , as we trace events as they happened-it is really like watching the Six Day War , and the preceding and subsequent events unfold. He does not write to prove political points or to fit in with what it is currently fashionable to believe, like the malignant anti-Zionist `new historians' do.
Ultimately it is a history book about Israel's fight for survival, as we read of the bellicose threats of the Arabs and their Soviet backers, to destroy Israel and drive the Jews into the sea. Hence reading some of the Arab promises of genocide, much like they had threatened in 1948, and much as they threaten today, one can only gain a greater understanding of what Israel faces if it is ever - G-D forbid- defeated.
Here are some of the chilling promises of a second holocaust thundered by Arab leaders , and their evil Soviet instigators , before and during the Six Day War.
Ahmed Shuqayri, the first leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, said: "We shall destroy Israel and its inhabitants."
"Leading to the purification of Arab land from reaction, imperialism and Zionism."
Damascus Radio, April 10 1967.
"If war comes it will be total, and the objective will be Israel's destruction...this is Arab power."
Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser
"We have decided that this battle will be one for the final liberation from imperialism and Zionism...We shall meet in Tel Aviv.
Syrian President Attasi.
"The United Sates, oh Arabs, is the enemy of all peoples, the killer of life, the shedder of blood,, that is preventing you from liquidating Israel"
President Nasser
"If Israelis become drunk with success, and pursue their aggression further , the future of this little country will be a very sad one indeed"
Soviet Ambassador to Israel, Sergei Chuvakhin
"The cream of our troops stands at the front. Strike the enemy settlements, turn them into dust, pave the Arab roads with the skulls of Jews. Strike them without mercy.
Syrian Air Force Commander Hafez al Assad.
Essentially a reading of the book demonstrates how a combination of bellicose Arab rhetoric, threatening behaviour and, ultimately, an act of war left Israel no choice but pre-emptive action.
It is instructive to read the words of Israel's Prime Minister at the time Levi Eshkol who reminded the world:" We cannot afford to lose. This may be our last stand in history. The Jewish people have something to give to the world. I believe that if you look at our history and at all the difficulties that we have survived, it means that history wants us to continue. We cannot survive if we experience again what happened to us under Hitler...I believe that you should understand us."
Reading about the worlds equanimity over Arab plans to destroy Israel, and over Syrian shelling into Israel and PLO terror attacks into Israel, before the war, compared to the strident outcry against Israel when it hit back, gives one a chilling sense of de ja vu today.
I felt a cold anger at the Soviet Union condemmning Israel for ` aggression' and `imperialism'
The malignant high priest of leftist totalitarian ideology Noam `Wormtongue' Chomsky simply perfected Soviet/Red Chinese and Arab rhetoric , and sold it to millions.
Sadly there was more understanding for Israel's plight in much of the world in 1967 than there is today. The fact that today the world has turned so viciously on Israel, as that tiny country still struggles to survive, is an indictment of a world that is clearly more evil today in 2025 than it was in 1967.
It is also worth noting that the Arabs are not very good fighters against soldiers, but like the Amalekites of old , are very good at killing Jewish women and children.
Michael Oren interviewed such figures as former Jordanian Brigade Commander Ata Ali, Egyptian historian Issam Darraz former Syrian Ambassador to the UN, George Tomeh, former MOSSAD chief, Meir Amit, former Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, widow of PM Levi Eshkol, Miriam Eshkol, former IDF Chief of Operations and later President, Ezer Weizmann and former Deputy IDF Chief of Staff and later Tourism Minister, Rechavam Ze'evi, interviewed a month before his brutal murder by terrorists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine , in the corridor of a Jerusalem hotel , former members of the Supreme Soviet and Soviet military advisors to the Egyptians and Syrians and former Le Monde correspondent , Eric Rouleau , just to name a few of the Syrians , Egyptians , Jordanians , Israelis , French , British and Russians that Oren interviewed.
The novel is written in real time , as we trace events as they happened-it is really like watching the Six Day War , and the preceding and subsequent events unfold. He does not write to prove political points or to fit in with what it is currently fashionable to believe, like the malignant anti-Zionist `new historians' do.
Ultimately it is a history book about Israel's fight for survival, as we read of the bellicose threats of the Arabs and their Soviet backers, to destroy Israel and drive the Jews into the sea. Hence reading some of the Arab promises of genocide, much like they had threatened in 1948, and much as they threaten today, one can only gain a greater understanding of what Israel faces if it is ever - G-D forbid- defeated.
Here are some of the chilling promises of a second holocaust thundered by Arab leaders , and their evil Soviet instigators , before and during the Six Day War.
Ahmed Shuqayri, the first leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, said: "We shall destroy Israel and its inhabitants."
"Leading to the purification of Arab land from reaction, imperialism and Zionism."
Damascus Radio, April 10 1967.
"If war comes it will be total, and the objective will be Israel's destruction...this is Arab power."
Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser
"We have decided that this battle will be one for the final liberation from imperialism and Zionism...We shall meet in Tel Aviv.
Syrian President Attasi.
"The United Sates, oh Arabs, is the enemy of all peoples, the killer of life, the shedder of blood,, that is preventing you from liquidating Israel"
President Nasser
"If Israelis become drunk with success, and pursue their aggression further , the future of this little country will be a very sad one indeed"
Soviet Ambassador to Israel, Sergei Chuvakhin
"The cream of our troops stands at the front. Strike the enemy settlements, turn them into dust, pave the Arab roads with the skulls of Jews. Strike them without mercy.
Syrian Air Force Commander Hafez al Assad.
Essentially a reading of the book demonstrates how a combination of bellicose Arab rhetoric, threatening behaviour and, ultimately, an act of war left Israel no choice but pre-emptive action.
It is instructive to read the words of Israel's Prime Minister at the time Levi Eshkol who reminded the world:" We cannot afford to lose. This may be our last stand in history. The Jewish people have something to give to the world. I believe that if you look at our history and at all the difficulties that we have survived, it means that history wants us to continue. We cannot survive if we experience again what happened to us under Hitler...I believe that you should understand us."
Reading about the worlds equanimity over Arab plans to destroy Israel, and over Syrian shelling into Israel and PLO terror attacks into Israel, before the war, compared to the strident outcry against Israel when it hit back, gives one a chilling sense of de ja vu today.
I felt a cold anger at the Soviet Union condemmning Israel for ` aggression' and `imperialism', while half the world groaned under the Communist jackboot.
The same type of rhetoric is even more prevalent today in leftist academia, the UN, the international media , the so-called Non Aligned Movement , much of the European Union etc .
The malignant high priest of leftist totalitarian ideology Noam `Wormtongue' Chomsky simply perfected Soviet/Red Chinese and Arab rhetoric , and sold it to millions.
Sadly there was more understanding for Israel's plight in much of the world in 1967 than there is today. The fact that today the world has turned so viciously on Israel, as that tiny country still struggles to survive, is an indictment of a world that is clearly more evil today in 2004 than it was in 1967.
It is also worth noting that the Arabs are not very good fighters against soldiers, but like the Amalekites of old , are very good at killing Jewish women and children.
Merged review:
This definitely is the most comprehensive work to date on the Six Day War. The author has consulted vastly documents, newspapers, books and interviews with important players.
Michael Oren interviewed such figures as former Jordanian Brigade Commander Ata Ali, Egyptian historian Issam Darraz former Syrian Ambassador to the UN, George Tomeh, former MOSSAD chief, Meir Amit, former Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, widow of PM Levi Eshkol, Miriam Eshkol, former IDF Chief of Operations and later President, Ezer Weizmann and former Deputy IDF Chief of Staff and later Tourism Minister, Rechavam Ze'evi, interviewed a month before his brutal murder by terrorists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine , in the corridor of a Jerusalem hotel , former members of the Supreme Soviet and Soviet military advisors to the Egyptians and Syrians and former Le Monde correspondent , Eric Rouleau , just to name a few of the Syrians , Egyptians , Jordanians , Israelis , French , British and Russians that Oren interviewed.
The novel is written in real time , as we trace events as they happened-it is really like watching the Six Day War , and the preceding and subsequent events unfold. He does not write to prove political points or to fit in with what it is currently fashionable to believe, like the malignant anti-Zionist `new historians' do.
Ultimately it is a history book about Israel's fight for survival, as we read of the bellicose threats of the Arabs and their Soviet backers, to destroy Israel and drive the Jews into the sea. Hence reading some of the Arab promises of genocide, much like they had threatened in 1948, and much as they threaten today, one can only gain a greater understanding of what Israel faces if it is ever - G-D forbid- defeated.
Here are some of the chilling promises of a second holocaust thundered by Arab leaders , and their evil Soviet instigators , before and during the Six Day War.
Ahmed Shuqayri, the first leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, said: "We shall destroy Israel and its inhabitants."
"Leading to the purification of Arab land from reaction, imperialism and Zionism."
Damascus Radio, April 10 1967.
"If war comes it will be total, and the objective will be Israel's destruction...this is Arab power."
Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser
"We have decided that this battle will be one for the final liberation from imperialism and Zionism...We shall meet in Tel Aviv.
Syrian President Attasi.
"The United Sates, oh Arabs, is the enemy of all peoples, the killer of life, the shedder of blood,, that is preventing you from liquidating Israel"
President Nasser
"If Israelis become drunk with success, and pursue their aggression further , the future of this little country will be a very sad one indeed"
Soviet Ambassador to Israel, Sergei Chuvakhin
"The cream of our troops stands at the front. Strike the enemy settlements, turn them into dust, pave the Arab roads with the skulls of Jews. Strike them without mercy.
Syrian Air Force Commander Hafez al Assad.
Essentially a reading of the book demonstrates how a combination of bellicose Arab rhetoric, threatening behaviour and, ultimately, an act of war left Israel no choice but pre-emptive action.
It is instructive to read the words of Israel's Prime Minister at the time Levi Eshkol who reminded the world:" We cannot afford to lose. This may be our last stand in history. The Jewish people have something to give to the world. I believe that if you look at our history and at all the difficulties that we have survived, it means that history wants us to continue. We cannot survive if we experience again what happened to us under Hitler...I believe that you should understand us."
Reading about the worlds equanimity over Arab plans to destroy Israel, and over Syrian shelling into Israel and PLO terror attacks into Israel, before the war, compared to the strident outcry against Israel when it hit back, gives one a chilling sense of de ja vu today.
I felt a cold anger at the Soviet Union condemmning Israel for ` aggression' and `imperialism'
The malignant high priest of leftist totalitarian ideology Noam `Wormtongue' Chomsky simply perfected Soviet/Red Chinese and Arab rhetoric , and sold it to millions.
Sadly there was more understanding for Israel's plight in much of the world in 1967 than there is today. The fact that today the world has turned so viciously on Israel, as that tiny country still struggles to survive, is an indictment of a world that is clearly more evil today in 2025 than it was in 1967.
It is also worth noting that the Arabs are not very good fighters against soldiers, but like the Amalekites of old , are very good at killing Jewish women and children.
August 25, 2009
New review: Aug 09
Since I have been spending the last year reading about Israel and Palestine, I may now class this book as shameless and apologetic when it comes to Israeli militarism. My review below is shameless in many ways and I'm a bit embarrased about it. Oren says he is givng everyone equal treatment, but how can you be Israeli embassador to the US and not be biased?
This book supports Israel myths about itself and its military might and does little to acknowledge that the 1967 war was part of a catalyst of pain and suffering of the Palestinian people. With the Israeli silence surrounding criticism of their own history, you wonder what this "comprehensive book" left out and for what purpose.
Old review:
Though the author says that he sets out to provide an objective history of the Six Day War, there are two glowing descretions: He's Jewish and Israeli. And though, again, objectivity was the goal, why did I find myself, someone unsure of how he falls on the Jews for Israel scale, thinkng, "Woo! Way to go Israel!" in response to the military narrative.
Yes, it is a good book, and it is probably as objective as possible, eliciting some sympathy for King Hussein and Nasser, while loathing/loving Moshe Dayan--that is, you get to see how it ran from the inside. You get to see read about the involvement of the USSR and USA (especially ambivalent) and Israel's plans for the Palestinians as it became apparent that they would end up with the West Bank and Gaza.
Spoiler Alert!: The Israelis were wary of harming mosques on the way into East Jerusalem, handed the Dome of the Rock over to Muslim authorities ASAP, and wanted to make a federated Palestinian state autonomous to Israel. Of course, still not something that Yasser Arafat would accept; just not impossible enough. And there are always your people who think that the West Bank should be annexed and the Palestinians ousted, but thank goodness these people were on the Israeli margins in 1967. Israel is seen best as a thriving democracy, shown through its fractious cabinet, its loathing of the prime minister, and its fear of international sanction, while the fatal error of the Arab countries was their inability to estimate Israel as such. After the Egyptians lost their air force in the first few hours, it was reported on Cairo radio that the army was penetrating Israel and laying seige to Tel Aviv. Even Nasser was a victim of his own system; no one told him the truth until it was much too late.
A fast read. Finished in less than a week.
Since I have been spending the last year reading about Israel and Palestine, I may now class this book as shameless and apologetic when it comes to Israeli militarism. My review below is shameless in many ways and I'm a bit embarrased about it. Oren says he is givng everyone equal treatment, but how can you be Israeli embassador to the US and not be biased?
This book supports Israel myths about itself and its military might and does little to acknowledge that the 1967 war was part of a catalyst of pain and suffering of the Palestinian people. With the Israeli silence surrounding criticism of their own history, you wonder what this "comprehensive book" left out and for what purpose.
Old review:
Though the author says that he sets out to provide an objective history of the Six Day War, there are two glowing descretions: He's Jewish and Israeli. And though, again, objectivity was the goal, why did I find myself, someone unsure of how he falls on the Jews for Israel scale, thinkng, "Woo! Way to go Israel!" in response to the military narrative.
Yes, it is a good book, and it is probably as objective as possible, eliciting some sympathy for King Hussein and Nasser, while loathing/loving Moshe Dayan--that is, you get to see how it ran from the inside. You get to see read about the involvement of the USSR and USA (especially ambivalent) and Israel's plans for the Palestinians as it became apparent that they would end up with the West Bank and Gaza.
Spoiler Alert!: The Israelis were wary of harming mosques on the way into East Jerusalem, handed the Dome of the Rock over to Muslim authorities ASAP, and wanted to make a federated Palestinian state autonomous to Israel. Of course, still not something that Yasser Arafat would accept; just not impossible enough. And there are always your people who think that the West Bank should be annexed and the Palestinians ousted, but thank goodness these people were on the Israeli margins in 1967. Israel is seen best as a thriving democracy, shown through its fractious cabinet, its loathing of the prime minister, and its fear of international sanction, while the fatal error of the Arab countries was their inability to estimate Israel as such. After the Egyptians lost their air force in the first few hours, it was reported on Cairo radio that the army was penetrating Israel and laying seige to Tel Aviv. Even Nasser was a victim of his own system; no one told him the truth until it was much too late.
A fast read. Finished in less than a week.
June 6, 2018
I found this book about the Six Days of War by Michael B. Oren most interesting. At the time I remember following the news about the war on T. V. I have read biographies of many of the key people in this book so I am very familiar with the events. It was great to have all the information in one place in chronological order. It helped me to understand the events better as well as what is going on today in Israel.
The book is well written and meticulously researched. The author covered in detail all the events leading to the war as well as the war itself. I noted the author was born and educated in the United States but moved to Israel in 1973. Oren became Israel’s Ambassador to the United States. He writes with the understanding of the workings of the Israeli government. Oren did not present an unbiased review of the events. If you are interested in the history of Israel or the Middle East this book will provide information about an important event.
I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. The book is almost eighteen hours. Robert Whitfield does an excellent job narrating the book.
The book is well written and meticulously researched. The author covered in detail all the events leading to the war as well as the war itself. I noted the author was born and educated in the United States but moved to Israel in 1973. Oren became Israel’s Ambassador to the United States. He writes with the understanding of the workings of the Israeli government. Oren did not present an unbiased review of the events. If you are interested in the history of Israel or the Middle East this book will provide information about an important event.
I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. The book is almost eighteen hours. Robert Whitfield does an excellent job narrating the book.
January 29, 2013
Egyptian and Syrian military incompetence and the sense that Israel's back was against the wall; these were my impressions of the war as it was acted out. Ambassador Oren's narrative confirms those vague impressions, but he also provides the detail to flesh out the story. Nervous breakdown, fog of war, big-power politics and numerous other features are added to provide a clear picture of this uniquely short war that is still going on. With maps handy (I used MapQuest's terrain and satellite maps) it is an easy read that provides a full background, gives just enough operational detail and connects the events of June,1967 to the ongoing Arab-Israeli contest. I recommend it.
August 19, 2009
Michael B. Oren's Six Days of War is probably the most comprehensive book published on Israel's 1967 conflict with the Arab world to date. Painstakingly researched and scrupulously fair, Oren's strength is dealing with the causes and effects of the war. He discusses every diplomatic move and counter-move that the belligerent countries and their superpower allies (the U.S. and U. S. S. R.) made, and how those decisions impact Middle East policy to this day. Oren is noticeably weaker when discussing the actual tactics of the war, choosing to view the military units as pieces in a diplomatic chess game rather than giving the reader a sense of what the soldier on the ground was feeling, although he does do a fantastic job in describing the climactic battle for Jerusalem.
Six Days is absolutely essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the politics of the region.
Six Days is absolutely essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the politics of the region.
October 3, 2017
Ignorance Can be the greatest ally or the greatest enemy of an army at war. In the book Six Days of War, Michael B. Oren explains in considerable detail how Arab ignorance and mistrust was the real key to the vastly outnumbered Israelis defeating three Arab armies in just six days.
Oren shows how the Israelis called up all of their reserves and prepared for weeks to attack Egypt before Egypt attacked them, or to defend if Egypt attacked first. And yet the Israeli attack on June 5, 1967, came as a complete surprise to the commander of the Egyptian Army.
The reasons are complicated, but Oren makes a strong case that Field Marshall Abdel Hakim Amer, supreme commander of Egyptian forces, filled the upper ranks of the Egyptian military with cronies, shoving aside talented leaders preparing for a coup against his childhood friend President Gamel Abdel Nasser.
The Israelis put Moshe Dayan in charge of the military just months before the war, another signal to anyone paying attention that the war plans were for an attack. Also, just months before the war, the Egyptians blockaded the Israeli port in Elat and all shipping. Time pressure pushed the Israelis to act, and yet, the Egyptians blustered and waited and did not prepare for an attack, let alone prepare for their own.
On June 5, nearly the entire Israeli Air Force attacked air bases all across Egypt. By the afternoon, more than 80% of the Egyptian Air Force was burning wreckage, most of it on the ground. Cratering charges made the airfields useless. At the same time, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) rolled into Sinai in a multi-pronged attack that succeeded so fast and so well that the most optimistic Israeli leaders could not believe it.
With so much of the IDF fighting on the ground and in the air in Sinai driving toward Egypt, if the Jordanian and Syrian armies had attacked, Israel would have to stop the attack and defend itself, at minimum pulling all air support away from Egypt.
Both the Syrians and the Jordanians had sworn mutual aid in case of attack.
But nothing happened. Iraq also was to attack in support of Egypt. It's forces sat in Jordan and Syria.
On June 7, fighting started near Jerusalem. The Israelis had no plans to recapture Jerusalem, but the Jordanians fired on the IDF from the Mount Scopus and other heights in Jerusalem. the IDF attacked to take out the guns and by the night of June 9-10, retook Jerusalem and had the Jordanian army, including the vaunted Arab Legion in full retrat all across the West Bank of the Jordan River.
During this period, the Syrians shelled Israeli settlements. The settlers on the frontier howled for help. On June 10, the IDF attacked in the North toward Syria. If the Syrians had attacked, the Israelis would have been obliged to stop their offensives in Jordan and Egypt. But the Syrians shelled civilians and stayed still. Their army, like the other two Arab armies was in headlong retreat on June 11.
In war, the mistakes of the enemy are often as important as the plans of the winners. In this case, arrogance and mistrust among the Egyptian leaders was followed by a betrayal by their allies. The end was Israel more than doubling in territory and smashing three Arab armies.
Oren explains battles in great detail, especially retaking Jerusalem and the air attack that won the war on the first day. He also gives the reader a lot of detail about propaganda. Egypt used its media to deny their losses and tell the world they were winning the war. Part of the hesitation of the Jordanians and Syrians to come to the aid of Egypt was the glowing reports Egypt was sending of their great victories.
The other overwhelming impression the book gave me is of how ignorant the Egyptians were of what the Israelis were doing despite the evidence in front of them. The rest of the world was also largely ignorant of how bad the situation was on the ground and how fast everything changed. It reminded me of how the world blundered into war in 1914.
This book tells a complicated story very well.
Oren shows how the Israelis called up all of their reserves and prepared for weeks to attack Egypt before Egypt attacked them, or to defend if Egypt attacked first. And yet the Israeli attack on June 5, 1967, came as a complete surprise to the commander of the Egyptian Army.
The reasons are complicated, but Oren makes a strong case that Field Marshall Abdel Hakim Amer, supreme commander of Egyptian forces, filled the upper ranks of the Egyptian military with cronies, shoving aside talented leaders preparing for a coup against his childhood friend President Gamel Abdel Nasser.
The Israelis put Moshe Dayan in charge of the military just months before the war, another signal to anyone paying attention that the war plans were for an attack. Also, just months before the war, the Egyptians blockaded the Israeli port in Elat and all shipping. Time pressure pushed the Israelis to act, and yet, the Egyptians blustered and waited and did not prepare for an attack, let alone prepare for their own.
On June 5, nearly the entire Israeli Air Force attacked air bases all across Egypt. By the afternoon, more than 80% of the Egyptian Air Force was burning wreckage, most of it on the ground. Cratering charges made the airfields useless. At the same time, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) rolled into Sinai in a multi-pronged attack that succeeded so fast and so well that the most optimistic Israeli leaders could not believe it.
With so much of the IDF fighting on the ground and in the air in Sinai driving toward Egypt, if the Jordanian and Syrian armies had attacked, Israel would have to stop the attack and defend itself, at minimum pulling all air support away from Egypt.
Both the Syrians and the Jordanians had sworn mutual aid in case of attack.
But nothing happened. Iraq also was to attack in support of Egypt. It's forces sat in Jordan and Syria.
On June 7, fighting started near Jerusalem. The Israelis had no plans to recapture Jerusalem, but the Jordanians fired on the IDF from the Mount Scopus and other heights in Jerusalem. the IDF attacked to take out the guns and by the night of June 9-10, retook Jerusalem and had the Jordanian army, including the vaunted Arab Legion in full retrat all across the West Bank of the Jordan River.
During this period, the Syrians shelled Israeli settlements. The settlers on the frontier howled for help. On June 10, the IDF attacked in the North toward Syria. If the Syrians had attacked, the Israelis would have been obliged to stop their offensives in Jordan and Egypt. But the Syrians shelled civilians and stayed still. Their army, like the other two Arab armies was in headlong retreat on June 11.
In war, the mistakes of the enemy are often as important as the plans of the winners. In this case, arrogance and mistrust among the Egyptian leaders was followed by a betrayal by their allies. The end was Israel more than doubling in territory and smashing three Arab armies.
Oren explains battles in great detail, especially retaking Jerusalem and the air attack that won the war on the first day. He also gives the reader a lot of detail about propaganda. Egypt used its media to deny their losses and tell the world they were winning the war. Part of the hesitation of the Jordanians and Syrians to come to the aid of Egypt was the glowing reports Egypt was sending of their great victories.
The other overwhelming impression the book gave me is of how ignorant the Egyptians were of what the Israelis were doing despite the evidence in front of them. The rest of the world was also largely ignorant of how bad the situation was on the ground and how fast everything changed. It reminded me of how the world blundered into war in 1914.
This book tells a complicated story very well.
December 8, 2014
This was a book I'd been meaning to read for a very long time, and one that sat on my (virtual) shelf for nearly two years. I'd bought it on a lark back then, and my expectations going into it now were that it would be a detailed, unbiased telling of the 1967 Middle Eastern conflict, and that it would live up to the subtitle and draw connections to contemporary personalities and events (from 2002, when it was published). I'd say it met those expectations for the most part as a narrative, but I'm left wanting more synthesis and insight from the author, Michael B Oren. (Who, interestingly enough, gave up his American citizenship to serve as Israel's ambassador to Washington. That the book is mostly objective, if not without bias and blind spots was a pleasant surprise to me therefore).
This is a well researched book and weaves the palace intrigues as reported by various key political and military players with information gleaned from official records and first hand accounts from the field to give a blow by blow account of the war. It takes its time to establish the context of the war, which I appreciated given how dynamic the Middle East is/ was. The six days of action are also well narrated and I had little trouble if any with following the action, though I did digress several times to look up maps and Wikipedia entries on people, places, and events, as any good history buff should when reading. I just wish the author had been as careful in recounting the aftermath and that the book had elaborated on the thesis implied by that subtitle: the last chapter does a somewhat hurried job of this and disappoints a bit in by questioning whether or not this conflict on its own was as significant as suggested or not! I felt a bit cheated!
Taking a step back, reading this book did help me understand the region better, and I (again) found it remarkable how the more things change, the more they remain the same - or if you'll forgive another cliché, how history repeats itself. 1967 had a militant Assad, a belligerent Israel, an indecisive but meddling America, an aggrieved Palestine, an Egypt in turmoil, a Jordan caught in the middle... sounds familiar? Well, except there's no more USSR...
It's also quite a depressing read in a way, because you can't help but feel that way as you realize how messed up that hoary region's history is, and how deep the grievances behind the Israel/ Palestine issue really run. A worthwhile read in the end, if you're a history buff!
This is a well researched book and weaves the palace intrigues as reported by various key political and military players with information gleaned from official records and first hand accounts from the field to give a blow by blow account of the war. It takes its time to establish the context of the war, which I appreciated given how dynamic the Middle East is/ was. The six days of action are also well narrated and I had little trouble if any with following the action, though I did digress several times to look up maps and Wikipedia entries on people, places, and events, as any good history buff should when reading. I just wish the author had been as careful in recounting the aftermath and that the book had elaborated on the thesis implied by that subtitle: the last chapter does a somewhat hurried job of this and disappoints a bit in by questioning whether or not this conflict on its own was as significant as suggested or not! I felt a bit cheated!
Taking a step back, reading this book did help me understand the region better, and I (again) found it remarkable how the more things change, the more they remain the same - or if you'll forgive another cliché, how history repeats itself. 1967 had a militant Assad, a belligerent Israel, an indecisive but meddling America, an aggrieved Palestine, an Egypt in turmoil, a Jordan caught in the middle... sounds familiar? Well, except there's no more USSR...
It's also quite a depressing read in a way, because you can't help but feel that way as you realize how messed up that hoary region's history is, and how deep the grievances behind the Israel/ Palestine issue really run. A worthwhile read in the end, if you're a history buff!
December 22, 2009
Five stars with a caveat -- you have to really, really want to learn about the Six Day War in order to get through this book without succumbing to the temptation to skim or abandon it. It's an impressive work, no question, and highly educational. If I wanted to write a dissertation on the Six Day War in particular, or even on Israeli history in general, I would probably view this book as a godsend. As a mere layperson with an average level of curiosity, I found it a bit overwhelming. It was readable and interesting, but quite dense and detail-heavy. I'm not sorry I pushed my way through, but I only suggest attempting it if you're very committed to the topic.
December 31, 2008
This is a wonderfully concise, well-written history of the war between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan that lasted only six days in June 1967. The Arabs got pounded, and Israel seized the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. The war, though won by Israel, also brought that country decades of additional strife that continues to this day. It also made the Arab nations more determined to wipe out the Jewish state.
Oren has written a fair history, with all sides presented with no apparent bias or judgment. He gained access to previously undisclosed material, so he has records of internal meetings with all the political parties involved.
And there are lots of them. The Middle East doesn't exist in a vacuum. Other nations have stuck their noses into the region. In this case, the Soviet Union sided with Egypt and Syria, but only to an extent, never daring to get involved in the actual fighting. The U.S. played a similar role with Israel, pledging undying support but no military involvement. So while outside actors did their best to shape events, the real fighting and dying were done by Israelis, Egyptians, Syrians, and Jordanians.
It's true the Arab armies were routed, but they did fight hard, especially Jordan's troops in the West Bank and Syrian soldiers on the Golan. The Israelis could have easily conquered Cairo, Damascus, and Amman, but such actions would have had brought the Jewish state solid international condemnation, including from the United States. It must be very frustrating for Israel - its enemies fight for its destruction, and it cannot retaliate in kind. And somehow, the Israelis are considered the bad guys by many people.
If you wish to gain a greater understanding of the Middle East, and find out why they still fight over there, reading this book would be a great start.
Oren has written a fair history, with all sides presented with no apparent bias or judgment. He gained access to previously undisclosed material, so he has records of internal meetings with all the political parties involved.
And there are lots of them. The Middle East doesn't exist in a vacuum. Other nations have stuck their noses into the region. In this case, the Soviet Union sided with Egypt and Syria, but only to an extent, never daring to get involved in the actual fighting. The U.S. played a similar role with Israel, pledging undying support but no military involvement. So while outside actors did their best to shape events, the real fighting and dying were done by Israelis, Egyptians, Syrians, and Jordanians.
It's true the Arab armies were routed, but they did fight hard, especially Jordan's troops in the West Bank and Syrian soldiers on the Golan. The Israelis could have easily conquered Cairo, Damascus, and Amman, but such actions would have had brought the Jewish state solid international condemnation, including from the United States. It must be very frustrating for Israel - its enemies fight for its destruction, and it cannot retaliate in kind. And somehow, the Israelis are considered the bad guys by many people.
If you wish to gain a greater understanding of the Middle East, and find out why they still fight over there, reading this book would be a great start.
February 7, 2014
CHERISHED ZIONIST MYTHS GET A VENEER OF RESPECTABILITY
Michael Oren (between bouts in the Israeli Defence Forces disseminating the Israeli point of view for the media) has apparently written this majesterial and impartial history of the 1967 war. By strange coincidence it more or less absolves the Israelis from starting the war. Apparently they werent even interested in seizing territories it just kinda happened!
Having almost as many footnotes as Joan Peters ground breaking "From Time Immemorial" (ground breaking in the sense that Peters probably wished the ground would open up and swallow her after it was exposed as a fraud) Orens book has a veneer of academic respectability that is only slightly more plausible than Peters infamous fantasy. The author constantly selects the evidence to fit into his account of the war and ignores evidence that does not fit into his schema.
It is hardly suprising that a book such as this has been written by an admirer of Ariel Sharon, who went on to become Israels ambassador in Washington; what is a little surprising is the wide spread acclaim for this book by people who ought to know better.
A far better history of the 1967 war is Jeremy Bowens "Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East" which gives a better picture of the reality of that war rather than the pseudo propaganda that Oren has manufactured.
Avoid, or at any rate read it metaphorically holding your nose.
Michael Oren (between bouts in the Israeli Defence Forces disseminating the Israeli point of view for the media) has apparently written this majesterial and impartial history of the 1967 war. By strange coincidence it more or less absolves the Israelis from starting the war. Apparently they werent even interested in seizing territories it just kinda happened!
Having almost as many footnotes as Joan Peters ground breaking "From Time Immemorial" (ground breaking in the sense that Peters probably wished the ground would open up and swallow her after it was exposed as a fraud) Orens book has a veneer of academic respectability that is only slightly more plausible than Peters infamous fantasy. The author constantly selects the evidence to fit into his account of the war and ignores evidence that does not fit into his schema.
It is hardly suprising that a book such as this has been written by an admirer of Ariel Sharon, who went on to become Israels ambassador in Washington; what is a little surprising is the wide spread acclaim for this book by people who ought to know better.
A far better history of the 1967 war is Jeremy Bowens "Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East" which gives a better picture of the reality of that war rather than the pseudo propaganda that Oren has manufactured.
Avoid, or at any rate read it metaphorically holding your nose.
June 6, 2017
An excellent history of the 1967 war, this books is even more useful in its coverage of the months leading up to the war. While it is written from a pro-Israeli perspective, the facts are not cherry-picked or outright falsified (as is common in more ideological books, from both the Left and the Right). Every important detail (and some unimportant ones..the book is long) is covered and the bias is usually limited to careful word choice or perspective, and does not extend to misreporting the "hard facts". For example, the attack on the USS Liberty is presented accurately but it is clear that the order and tone in which the facts are presented is consciously meant to justify the Israeli story (which I personally think is likely to be close to the truth in any case, so there is always that).
Of course the author believes Israel has every right to exist in that region, and his Arab (and increasingly, his Western SJW) critics start from the assumption that the attempt to create a Jewish state where Ottoman Palestine and its inhabitants already existed was illegal and immoral from the git go... If one starts from the second position then the significance and valence of the Arab and Israeli positions in the lead up to the war and the way one sees the war itself can become very different. But at the same time, those events themselves did take place more or less as described. The significance and moral valence are yours to judge.
One laughs (or cries, it depends) at the yawning gap between the Arab leaders grandiose and extravagant claims and military moves in the months prior to the war (whether they meant any of it or not is almost besides the point; they probably did not, but they all said it, and they, especially the Egyptians, moved troops around as if they meant it) and the actual abilities of their tinpot regimes. The lower level Arab units were brave enough, but the senior echelons (except in the relatively competent Jordanian army) were sub-standard and the top leadership was criminally incompetent and utterly buffoonish. Whether Israel laid a trap and they fell into it, or it was a series of accidents and bad decisions, or something in between, the bare facts are brutal. Perhaps the best way to look at it is to note that the gap between the two cultures was just too great; the Arab buffoonery and grandstanding itself being just one manifestation of that tremendous cultural gap. And 15-20,000 ordinary soldiers and junior officers paid the ultimate penalty for it.
The book includes extensive quotes from both Israeli and Arab sources and fully captures the flavor of the time and the participants hopes and expectations at each stage. The self-doubt and arguments within the Israeli leadership are interesting, but perhaps a bit overplayed in an attempt to counter those who say it was all a premeditated Israeli trap. These arguments will no doubt continue.
It is fascinating to read what all the Arab leaders thought of each other..and how the "street" and their own delusions forced each country to join a "coalition" that was too united to avoid joint disaster and too disunited to do anything seriously coordinated...The way Egypt misled its own "ally" Jordan to sucker them into the war and how Syria lied to everyone from day one to day six are classics in the annals of useless alliances. There may be other examples like this somewhere in history, but offhand I cannot think of another example of a multi-national "coalition" as inept and self-defeating as this one.
Of course, one cannot fail to be impressed by the chutzpah, initiative, courage and competence of Israel's citizen army. At the same time, their undoubtedly impressive performance was greatly enhanced by buffoonery and incompetence at the highest levels of the Egyptian and Syrian armies. The Egyptian army could well have stood and fought a much bloodier and longer battle in the Sinai if "Field Marshal" Amer had not ordered them into headlong retreat after he personally fell to pieces on the second day of the war. And the Syrian collapse in the Golan was no less dramatic (and also caused partly by the high command losing its nerve). But while the overall picture is well presented and ground level anecdotes are aplenty (and not just from the Israeli side, though naturally, Israeli exploits get more play), this is not a "military history" book. If you are into the kind of book that shows countless maps and arrows and individual units and their maneuvers, you will need to add another book to this one.
Overall, well worth a read.
PS: I mentioned to a friend about how celebrations broke out across the Arab world on the first day of the war, as the population imagined that the long promised "march to Tel Aviv" had begun (and as their own radio related tales of great victories). This friend reminded me that such demonstrations did not just happen in the Arab world, they also took place in far away Pakistan. He recalled that in his locality in Karachi, people came out on the streets and distributed sweets (no doubt having heard, as radio Cairo was claiming, that hundreds of Israeli planes had been downed and the Egyptian army was marching into Negev). By the second day, some of the better informed had figured out (presumably from listening to the BBC) that the Arabs were actually losing, but most people refused to believe them. By the third day, general depression had set in. I am sure this patterns was repeated across the Muslim world.
https://youtu.be/pvisd4N3tZI
Of course the author believes Israel has every right to exist in that region, and his Arab (and increasingly, his Western SJW) critics start from the assumption that the attempt to create a Jewish state where Ottoman Palestine and its inhabitants already existed was illegal and immoral from the git go... If one starts from the second position then the significance and valence of the Arab and Israeli positions in the lead up to the war and the way one sees the war itself can become very different. But at the same time, those events themselves did take place more or less as described. The significance and moral valence are yours to judge.
One laughs (or cries, it depends) at the yawning gap between the Arab leaders grandiose and extravagant claims and military moves in the months prior to the war (whether they meant any of it or not is almost besides the point; they probably did not, but they all said it, and they, especially the Egyptians, moved troops around as if they meant it) and the actual abilities of their tinpot regimes. The lower level Arab units were brave enough, but the senior echelons (except in the relatively competent Jordanian army) were sub-standard and the top leadership was criminally incompetent and utterly buffoonish. Whether Israel laid a trap and they fell into it, or it was a series of accidents and bad decisions, or something in between, the bare facts are brutal. Perhaps the best way to look at it is to note that the gap between the two cultures was just too great; the Arab buffoonery and grandstanding itself being just one manifestation of that tremendous cultural gap. And 15-20,000 ordinary soldiers and junior officers paid the ultimate penalty for it.
The book includes extensive quotes from both Israeli and Arab sources and fully captures the flavor of the time and the participants hopes and expectations at each stage. The self-doubt and arguments within the Israeli leadership are interesting, but perhaps a bit overplayed in an attempt to counter those who say it was all a premeditated Israeli trap. These arguments will no doubt continue.
It is fascinating to read what all the Arab leaders thought of each other..and how the "street" and their own delusions forced each country to join a "coalition" that was too united to avoid joint disaster and too disunited to do anything seriously coordinated...The way Egypt misled its own "ally" Jordan to sucker them into the war and how Syria lied to everyone from day one to day six are classics in the annals of useless alliances. There may be other examples like this somewhere in history, but offhand I cannot think of another example of a multi-national "coalition" as inept and self-defeating as this one.
Of course, one cannot fail to be impressed by the chutzpah, initiative, courage and competence of Israel's citizen army. At the same time, their undoubtedly impressive performance was greatly enhanced by buffoonery and incompetence at the highest levels of the Egyptian and Syrian armies. The Egyptian army could well have stood and fought a much bloodier and longer battle in the Sinai if "Field Marshal" Amer had not ordered them into headlong retreat after he personally fell to pieces on the second day of the war. And the Syrian collapse in the Golan was no less dramatic (and also caused partly by the high command losing its nerve). But while the overall picture is well presented and ground level anecdotes are aplenty (and not just from the Israeli side, though naturally, Israeli exploits get more play), this is not a "military history" book. If you are into the kind of book that shows countless maps and arrows and individual units and their maneuvers, you will need to add another book to this one.
Overall, well worth a read.
PS: I mentioned to a friend about how celebrations broke out across the Arab world on the first day of the war, as the population imagined that the long promised "march to Tel Aviv" had begun (and as their own radio related tales of great victories). This friend reminded me that such demonstrations did not just happen in the Arab world, they also took place in far away Pakistan. He recalled that in his locality in Karachi, people came out on the streets and distributed sweets (no doubt having heard, as radio Cairo was claiming, that hundreds of Israeli planes had been downed and the Egyptian army was marching into Negev). By the second day, some of the better informed had figured out (presumably from listening to the BBC) that the Arabs were actually losing, but most people refused to believe them. By the third day, general depression had set in. I am sure this patterns was repeated across the Muslim world.
https://youtu.be/pvisd4N3tZI
October 30, 2017
I had somewhat of a sketchy rememberance of the 6 Day War from 1967, but digging into the details was rather eye opening. I'd never heard of a professional army so completely breaking and running in the face of enemy. Politically appointed officers is always a red flag for combat forces, and stories are plentiful of the incompetence of political officers in the field, but in the example of the Egyptian Army, the senior officers broke and ran away immediately...and the rest of the army simply followed. Appalling. This was a very well researched and well written book.
March 31, 2016
An engaging, comprehensive and balanced day-by-day history of the Six Day War that puts it into the context of the wider Cold War, with more of a focus on the war’s politics and diplomacy than the battles.
Oren ably presents Nasser’s role in the lead-up to the war, describing his role in forcing the UN out of the Sinai and to illegally closing the Tiran strait to Israeli shipping, which amounted to an act of war by every observer. Oren then covers Israel’s search for an effective and legitimate military response and its efforts to bring both the US and the Soviets on board, and the dilemmas of the US, then involved in its own war in Vietnam, and the Israeli government, which was loath to risk losing US support. Oren then describes how Israel’s preemptive attack created a chain reaction that drew in Jordan and Syria and forced the Israelis to improvise on a daily basis, and how Nasser’s own officers were often unwilling to present him with the full picture, (at one point with Egyptian troops retreating and at the same time claiming to be advancing on Tel Aviv).
Oren describes how Israel’s objectives evolved along with the situation and how its ultimate objective was always to eliminate the threat posed by the Arab armies, with very little discussion of occupying either Jerusalem or the West Bank, and how in spite of this the Israelis opened a front on the Syrian border for both military and political reasons, and how the decisions to take East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan were made arbitrarily and on the spot by commanders on the ground. Oren also argues that Israeli policies toward the Palestinians were largely reactive and contingent.
Other times, it seems like Oren downplays Israel’s refusal to negotiate with Egypt or Syria, and he also seems to downplay Israel’s pre-war military activity (which he calls “activism” but what the Arab states saw as provocations) Some more discussion of these events would have helped. And contrary to what the title suggests, there is little on the war’s aftermath and impact: the displacement of the Palestinians gets only a single paragraph, for example (Oren refers to it as an “exodus” rather than expulsion) although Oren does cover the Palestinian guerrilla attacks. There is little on the Arab states’ postwar attempts to negotiate a settlement with Israel on the basis of an Israeli withdrawal from the captured territory. The coverage of the tactical level is a bit confusing, and there are also a few annoying typos.
Still, a great history of the war, with strong coverage of the politics and strategy.
Oren ably presents Nasser’s role in the lead-up to the war, describing his role in forcing the UN out of the Sinai and to illegally closing the Tiran strait to Israeli shipping, which amounted to an act of war by every observer. Oren then covers Israel’s search for an effective and legitimate military response and its efforts to bring both the US and the Soviets on board, and the dilemmas of the US, then involved in its own war in Vietnam, and the Israeli government, which was loath to risk losing US support. Oren then describes how Israel’s preemptive attack created a chain reaction that drew in Jordan and Syria and forced the Israelis to improvise on a daily basis, and how Nasser’s own officers were often unwilling to present him with the full picture, (at one point with Egyptian troops retreating and at the same time claiming to be advancing on Tel Aviv).
Oren describes how Israel’s objectives evolved along with the situation and how its ultimate objective was always to eliminate the threat posed by the Arab armies, with very little discussion of occupying either Jerusalem or the West Bank, and how in spite of this the Israelis opened a front on the Syrian border for both military and political reasons, and how the decisions to take East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan were made arbitrarily and on the spot by commanders on the ground. Oren also argues that Israeli policies toward the Palestinians were largely reactive and contingent.
Other times, it seems like Oren downplays Israel’s refusal to negotiate with Egypt or Syria, and he also seems to downplay Israel’s pre-war military activity (which he calls “activism” but what the Arab states saw as provocations) Some more discussion of these events would have helped. And contrary to what the title suggests, there is little on the war’s aftermath and impact: the displacement of the Palestinians gets only a single paragraph, for example (Oren refers to it as an “exodus” rather than expulsion) although Oren does cover the Palestinian guerrilla attacks. There is little on the Arab states’ postwar attempts to negotiate a settlement with Israel on the basis of an Israeli withdrawal from the captured territory. The coverage of the tactical level is a bit confusing, and there are also a few annoying typos.
Still, a great history of the war, with strong coverage of the politics and strategy.
March 24, 2017
Prior to my work on the 1967 war, I believed the politics in the Middle East—as elsewhere in the world—were the product of rational decision making, a reflection of cogent analyses on the part of Arab and Israeli leaders. Today I know differently. Of all the insights I gleaned from my research—the extent of Egyptian war planning, for example, or the depth of Israeli fears—none altered my thinking more than the realization that politics in the Middle East are, more often than not, random and unpredictable, arbitrary in their course and potentially explosive in their outcome.
This quote is from an interview in the appendix of my edition, an interview with the author, but it summarises the book well - a relatively even-handed description what went down before, during, and after the Six-Day War which arguably shaped the Middle East into the form it is today. It's a great read - lots and lots of dialogues taken from the archives, great if you're into politics or large scale plans:
The Big Lie had boomeranged. Instead of prodding the Soviets to come to the Arabs’ assistance, it impelled them to pursue a cease-fire. The Arabs, in turn, were incensed. By the third day of the war, Nasser was not only talking in terms of Western collaboration with Israel, but of an implicit Soviet-American understanding not to come to blows in the Middle East. For the Soviets, the only way out of this vicious circle was to ignore the Arab dimension for now, and focus their attention on Israel.
The only little criticism is that while Oren extensively uses archives to summarise what the Arab nations, Israel and the US were doing, there's very little detail on what the Soviet Union was doing behind the scenes. That would have been interesting. Anyway, if you want a concise, very readable and interesting summary of what went down you can't go wrong with this one.
Read
January 20, 2009This is a very interesting book about Israel-Arab war. Because our generation witnessed this war and not looking at it only in retrospect it is especially interesting for me. I still clearly remember all propaganda Soviets conducted at that time... I remeber wwhat was written at that time in Soviet newspapers and what was broadcasted...
In a century I believe the military historians will compare this war with the most famous wars in all times. The book has a lot of not “everyone knows” details, and gives the info gotten from all possible sources and languages. It is a fascinating story (I mean six day war) written seriously and objectively.
Recommended for all especially for those who is interested to know more facts about in Israeli-Arab conflict. Especially interesting in a view of a current Israel war with Palestinian terrorism. Especially interesting in a view of a current Israel war with Palestinian terrorism. In 1967 and 2009 wars Arabs were defeated completely and in both cases announced and celebrated the great victories
In a century I believe the military historians will compare this war with the most famous wars in all times. The book has a lot of not “everyone knows” details, and gives the info gotten from all possible sources and languages. It is a fascinating story (I mean six day war) written seriously and objectively.
Recommended for all especially for those who is interested to know more facts about in Israeli-Arab conflict. Especially interesting in a view of a current Israel war with Palestinian terrorism. Especially interesting in a view of a current Israel war with Palestinian terrorism. In 1967 and 2009 wars Arabs were defeated completely and in both cases announced and celebrated the great victories
May 30, 2014
I read this in a flash a few years ago. It isn't a social history nor is it investigative. It yields a basis for an ideology. I accept that. I just read this review http://www.ussliberty.org/orenbook.htm and it upset my indifference. What can I say? I'm exhausted.
December 5, 2007
Reads like an action novel but it's all true. The best history of the six-day war I have read. Covers all the major players and conflicting motivations. Outstanding.
February 28, 2021
Written by an Israeli diplomat, this book should be read with a grain of salt.
May 2, 2010
My review published in the San Francisco Chronicle in 2002:
A necessary light
'Six Days' goes far to help sort out Mideast conflict's tangled web
Reviewed by Steve Kettmann
Sunday, July 28, 2002
Six Days of War
June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East
By Michael B. Oren
OXFORD; 446 PAGES; $30
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It's a natural impulse to seek distance when confronted with a seemingly hopeless spiral of violence. That's what President Bush tried to do with Middle East diplomacy early in his administration. So much can go wrong. So little can go right. Why take chances?
That's also true, morally and intellectually, for many other Americans, whose capacity for imaginative empathy has long since been eroded by the parade of horrors flashing on their television screens from Israel and the West Bank. Details are so hard to follow. Haunting images almost rule out comprehension.
But a little context can go a long way in offering some insight -- especially for a general reader. There's much of that to be had in "Six Days of War," Israeli scholar Michael Oren's workmanlike, richly detailed study of the 1967 war that established Israel's reputation as a formidable military power.
The book offers some much-needed relief from fatalism. If anything emerges with any clarity in reconsidering the details of what Israelis call "The Six Day War" and Arabs try not to call anything at all, it's the minute distance that can separate one course of events from another.
Chance and the vicissitudes of human nature both played major roles in the stunning drama that unfolded in June 1967. Israel attacked Egypt with devastating success, eventually occupying all of Sinai, and humiliated both Jordan and Syria, moving into Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights.
"Capriciousness characterized the process leading to the outbreak of the war," Oren writes. "The last-minute cancellation of Operation Dawn -- Egypt's one chance to do to Israel what Israel would soon do to Egypt [that is: attack first] -- poignantly illustrated the process' randomness.
"Yet even that chaos had its context. Only within the unique milieu of the Arab-Israeli conflict could elements as diverse as Syrian radicalism and Israeli politicking, inter-Arab rivalry and America's preoccupation with Vietnam, Soviet fears and Egyptian aspirations, combine in a chain reaction culminating in war."
Oren, a military historian who earned his doctorate at Princeton, does better with straight narrative than with summing up what it all means. His analysis can have a tossed-salad feel to it. But here the point is clear enough, and it's important for anyone trying to come to terms with recent Middle East history.
Looking back, it's easy to conjure an air of inevitability; what happened had to have happened. But that's often an illusion. June 1967 did not have to transpire the way it did -- and neither did July 2000. That was when Bill Clinton did his best to push Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat together at Camp David. Just how narrowly the effort failed may never be known, but the bracing insider account Oren offers here of 1967 vividly demonstrates how real events on the ground are often only poorly understood, either by contemporary observers, or by history.
The human details are what linger longest. Oren dug into a variety of source material -- a long bibliography lists books in English, French, Spanish,
Hebrew, Arabic and Russian -- and found many tasty tidbits.
Describing the buildup of tensions that preceded the war, and the at times bizarre events, he tells of the Egyptian press going big with a story about an Arab Legion defector named Capt. Rashid al-Hamarsha, who allegedly confessed to "masterminding subversion" in Syria.
"Jordan dismissed al-Hamarsha as a Zionist spy, 'in liaison with an Israeli belly dancer named Aurora Galili or Furora Jelli,' and then produced its own deserter," he writes.
The hapless U.N. leader U Thant, quick to withdraw his forces and create the conditions for war, puts off an emergency visit to Cairo for three critical days until "his horoscope said it was propitious for him to travel."
Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser, the charismatic enigma at the center of the drama, greets Jordan's King Hussein for a key private meeting, and then summons Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the first PLO chairman, who was "wearing a rumpled Mao-style uniform and looking disoriented." Nasser informs Shuqayri that he's to leave for Jordan immediately with Hussein. "Then he turned to Hussein: 'If he gives you any trouble, throw him into one of your towers and rid me of him! ' "
Later, after days of ludicrous Egyptian lies over the airwaves about Israeli forces being routed, its army slips into full, ignominious retreat -- in shocking, every-man-for-himself fashion. "Maj. Gen. Uthman Nassar, for example, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, told his officers that he had an urgent meeting in headquarters, packed up, and left," Oren tells us. "He was later seen frequenting cafes in Cairo."
Soviet Ambassador Sergei Chuvakhin privately informs Abba Eban that his government has decided to sever relations with Israel, "then, to the foreign minister's astonishment, the Soviet ambassador burst into tears."
Oren accomplishes much, much more here than bringing alive his important tale with the kind of texture so essential to avoid falling into a gray recitation of troop strengths, battle readiness or political backdrops. But as in "War and Peace," the dynamics of battle stand up on the page much more readily when the reader's capacity for surprise -- or wonder, or outrage -- has been coaxed into high alert.
Most of all, by painting his portrait with such care and thoroughness, Oren reminds us of a basic fact: The question when it comes to Israel-Arab dynamics does not always have to be about being biased against one or the other, but rather about seeing how both sides have suffered and sacrificed, and both urgently deserve something other than endless iterations of warfare and conflict.
Steve Kettmann has written for the New Republic, the New York Times and Salon.com.
A necessary light
'Six Days' goes far to help sort out Mideast conflict's tangled web
Reviewed by Steve Kettmann
Sunday, July 28, 2002
Six Days of War
June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East
By Michael B. Oren
OXFORD; 446 PAGES; $30
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It's a natural impulse to seek distance when confronted with a seemingly hopeless spiral of violence. That's what President Bush tried to do with Middle East diplomacy early in his administration. So much can go wrong. So little can go right. Why take chances?
That's also true, morally and intellectually, for many other Americans, whose capacity for imaginative empathy has long since been eroded by the parade of horrors flashing on their television screens from Israel and the West Bank. Details are so hard to follow. Haunting images almost rule out comprehension.
But a little context can go a long way in offering some insight -- especially for a general reader. There's much of that to be had in "Six Days of War," Israeli scholar Michael Oren's workmanlike, richly detailed study of the 1967 war that established Israel's reputation as a formidable military power.
The book offers some much-needed relief from fatalism. If anything emerges with any clarity in reconsidering the details of what Israelis call "The Six Day War" and Arabs try not to call anything at all, it's the minute distance that can separate one course of events from another.
Chance and the vicissitudes of human nature both played major roles in the stunning drama that unfolded in June 1967. Israel attacked Egypt with devastating success, eventually occupying all of Sinai, and humiliated both Jordan and Syria, moving into Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights.
"Capriciousness characterized the process leading to the outbreak of the war," Oren writes. "The last-minute cancellation of Operation Dawn -- Egypt's one chance to do to Israel what Israel would soon do to Egypt [that is: attack first] -- poignantly illustrated the process' randomness.
"Yet even that chaos had its context. Only within the unique milieu of the Arab-Israeli conflict could elements as diverse as Syrian radicalism and Israeli politicking, inter-Arab rivalry and America's preoccupation with Vietnam, Soviet fears and Egyptian aspirations, combine in a chain reaction culminating in war."
Oren, a military historian who earned his doctorate at Princeton, does better with straight narrative than with summing up what it all means. His analysis can have a tossed-salad feel to it. But here the point is clear enough, and it's important for anyone trying to come to terms with recent Middle East history.
Looking back, it's easy to conjure an air of inevitability; what happened had to have happened. But that's often an illusion. June 1967 did not have to transpire the way it did -- and neither did July 2000. That was when Bill Clinton did his best to push Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat together at Camp David. Just how narrowly the effort failed may never be known, but the bracing insider account Oren offers here of 1967 vividly demonstrates how real events on the ground are often only poorly understood, either by contemporary observers, or by history.
The human details are what linger longest. Oren dug into a variety of source material -- a long bibliography lists books in English, French, Spanish,
Hebrew, Arabic and Russian -- and found many tasty tidbits.
Describing the buildup of tensions that preceded the war, and the at times bizarre events, he tells of the Egyptian press going big with a story about an Arab Legion defector named Capt. Rashid al-Hamarsha, who allegedly confessed to "masterminding subversion" in Syria.
"Jordan dismissed al-Hamarsha as a Zionist spy, 'in liaison with an Israeli belly dancer named Aurora Galili or Furora Jelli,' and then produced its own deserter," he writes.
The hapless U.N. leader U Thant, quick to withdraw his forces and create the conditions for war, puts off an emergency visit to Cairo for three critical days until "his horoscope said it was propitious for him to travel."
Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser, the charismatic enigma at the center of the drama, greets Jordan's King Hussein for a key private meeting, and then summons Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the first PLO chairman, who was "wearing a rumpled Mao-style uniform and looking disoriented." Nasser informs Shuqayri that he's to leave for Jordan immediately with Hussein. "Then he turned to Hussein: 'If he gives you any trouble, throw him into one of your towers and rid me of him! ' "
Later, after days of ludicrous Egyptian lies over the airwaves about Israeli forces being routed, its army slips into full, ignominious retreat -- in shocking, every-man-for-himself fashion. "Maj. Gen. Uthman Nassar, for example, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, told his officers that he had an urgent meeting in headquarters, packed up, and left," Oren tells us. "He was later seen frequenting cafes in Cairo."
Soviet Ambassador Sergei Chuvakhin privately informs Abba Eban that his government has decided to sever relations with Israel, "then, to the foreign minister's astonishment, the Soviet ambassador burst into tears."
Oren accomplishes much, much more here than bringing alive his important tale with the kind of texture so essential to avoid falling into a gray recitation of troop strengths, battle readiness or political backdrops. But as in "War and Peace," the dynamics of battle stand up on the page much more readily when the reader's capacity for surprise -- or wonder, or outrage -- has been coaxed into high alert.
Most of all, by painting his portrait with such care and thoroughness, Oren reminds us of a basic fact: The question when it comes to Israel-Arab dynamics does not always have to be about being biased against one or the other, but rather about seeing how both sides have suffered and sacrificed, and both urgently deserve something other than endless iterations of warfare and conflict.
Steve Kettmann has written for the New Republic, the New York Times and Salon.com.
May 17, 2024
Like many people I’m desperately trying to catch up on reading about the Middle East. This was good but not great. Crazy how things got so out of control so quickly. 4.2 stars
March 3, 2018
1967 is a pivotal year in the Middle East. The war that Israel launched and won overwhelmingly created what are now core issues in the area that hinder peace negotiations and give the appearance of a forever conflict. The book Six Days of War by Michael B. Oren covers a lot of the military aspects of the Six Day War with its focus on the Israeli side.
In many ways this is the war that Gamal Nasser, Egypt’s leader, wanted. His bluster and support for the Palestinian refugees kept relations with Israel on nearly a war-like footing. Nasser may have felt more powerful because of the size of his nation’s population in comparison to Israel, and also with the cheap equipment that the Soviets were supplying to the Egyptian Army. But it was Nasser who made mistakes. His building up of military forces on the border in a way that was obvious. When he ordered the withdrawal of United Nations troops from the border they shared with Israel it served as a warning better than any radar. Then his occupying Sharm el Sheik at the tip of the Sinai Peninsula that cut off Israel’s access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans was the final mistake. It was not so much a mistake in doing it but in that they failed to follow up with decisive action. Egypt was prepared to strike first, but did not. Nasser got cautious. Where he failed Israel would not.
In Israel in the time leading up to the war, there was a feeling of being under siege. To go with the rhetoric that surrounded them, there were military raids upon them. And the Syrians would constantly shell Israel. Israel responses had led the Syrians to ask for help, a unified front against Israel. The leadership in the Middle East on the Arabian side in each nation wanted to prove they were more anti-Israel than the other and Nasser was caught up in this in his attempts to be the leader of the Pan-Arabic world.
Israel had to plan to figure out how they would handle the situation they faced militarily. Being surrounded on three sides and on the fourth was the sea. They had done some studies from their War of Independence and the 1956 conflict. They had created a solid plan and knew that air supremacy was to be the key to their survival. As Michael Oren points out, a lot would hinge on the first strike. As Oren shows, the Israelis knew how to press their advantage after their first strike that went a lot better than they expected. The Egyptians were devastated by the first strike and, now being victims, it became expected for their allies to help out. Oren shows that the Israelis warned Jordan, to no avail. The Israelis had anticipated that and had a battle plan for taking Jerusalem. Israel knew taking the entire city was going to hurt them internationally and in peace negotiations but they did not care. This is still a main stumbling block to peace.
What made me wonder is the Syrian response. There was probably a bit of guilt knowing that Egypt had been attacked because they were supporting Syria. But they had to notice how the Egyptian army was reeling and despite the Israeli warning, decided to attack anyway. This was done was in a hope perhaps that Israel could not handle war on three fronts, but with control of the skies Israel could inflict serious damage on any enemy and did. For Syria’s refusal to listen, the Israelis took the Golan Heights, the high ground Syria was using to great effect to terrorize Israel.
At the end of this short war, Israel had doubled in size and now had a large buffer zone to defend against Egypt, the more defendable positions to fight Syria, and the entire city of Jerusalem and the entire west bank of the Jordan river. It is one of the greatest victories of any nation in the history of warfare. The scale of victory was so large that the Soviet Union immediately began re-equipping its allies. Israel on the other hand was now seen as a powerful nation that beat up on weaker foes, so some of the military equipment they ordered and paid for before the war was slow in being delivered. The Egyptian Army took years to recover from and it is questionable whether they were fully recovered by the time of the war in 1973.
Michael Oren’s book is a detailed examination of the war. It is a great military history but no so much a political one. The Israelis won the war but never won the peace. The ineffectiveness of the Arab armies lead to the growth of terrorist networks designed to attack Israel at every opportunity. The thinking being that since Israel could not be beaten conventionally, terror might wear them down. These are things that Oren does not examine in the book, not does he look at the long term impact of the war on the region. He does a great job examining the time of the war and the war within this context but it leaves the reader short in the long term repercussions of the conflict. This book is an excellent military history but not one to get a grasp on the modern Middle East.
In many ways this is the war that Gamal Nasser, Egypt’s leader, wanted. His bluster and support for the Palestinian refugees kept relations with Israel on nearly a war-like footing. Nasser may have felt more powerful because of the size of his nation’s population in comparison to Israel, and also with the cheap equipment that the Soviets were supplying to the Egyptian Army. But it was Nasser who made mistakes. His building up of military forces on the border in a way that was obvious. When he ordered the withdrawal of United Nations troops from the border they shared with Israel it served as a warning better than any radar. Then his occupying Sharm el Sheik at the tip of the Sinai Peninsula that cut off Israel’s access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans was the final mistake. It was not so much a mistake in doing it but in that they failed to follow up with decisive action. Egypt was prepared to strike first, but did not. Nasser got cautious. Where he failed Israel would not.
In Israel in the time leading up to the war, there was a feeling of being under siege. To go with the rhetoric that surrounded them, there were military raids upon them. And the Syrians would constantly shell Israel. Israel responses had led the Syrians to ask for help, a unified front against Israel. The leadership in the Middle East on the Arabian side in each nation wanted to prove they were more anti-Israel than the other and Nasser was caught up in this in his attempts to be the leader of the Pan-Arabic world.
Israel had to plan to figure out how they would handle the situation they faced militarily. Being surrounded on three sides and on the fourth was the sea. They had done some studies from their War of Independence and the 1956 conflict. They had created a solid plan and knew that air supremacy was to be the key to their survival. As Michael Oren points out, a lot would hinge on the first strike. As Oren shows, the Israelis knew how to press their advantage after their first strike that went a lot better than they expected. The Egyptians were devastated by the first strike and, now being victims, it became expected for their allies to help out. Oren shows that the Israelis warned Jordan, to no avail. The Israelis had anticipated that and had a battle plan for taking Jerusalem. Israel knew taking the entire city was going to hurt them internationally and in peace negotiations but they did not care. This is still a main stumbling block to peace.
What made me wonder is the Syrian response. There was probably a bit of guilt knowing that Egypt had been attacked because they were supporting Syria. But they had to notice how the Egyptian army was reeling and despite the Israeli warning, decided to attack anyway. This was done was in a hope perhaps that Israel could not handle war on three fronts, but with control of the skies Israel could inflict serious damage on any enemy and did. For Syria’s refusal to listen, the Israelis took the Golan Heights, the high ground Syria was using to great effect to terrorize Israel.
At the end of this short war, Israel had doubled in size and now had a large buffer zone to defend against Egypt, the more defendable positions to fight Syria, and the entire city of Jerusalem and the entire west bank of the Jordan river. It is one of the greatest victories of any nation in the history of warfare. The scale of victory was so large that the Soviet Union immediately began re-equipping its allies. Israel on the other hand was now seen as a powerful nation that beat up on weaker foes, so some of the military equipment they ordered and paid for before the war was slow in being delivered. The Egyptian Army took years to recover from and it is questionable whether they were fully recovered by the time of the war in 1973.
Michael Oren’s book is a detailed examination of the war. It is a great military history but no so much a political one. The Israelis won the war but never won the peace. The ineffectiveness of the Arab armies lead to the growth of terrorist networks designed to attack Israel at every opportunity. The thinking being that since Israel could not be beaten conventionally, terror might wear them down. These are things that Oren does not examine in the book, not does he look at the long term impact of the war on the region. He does a great job examining the time of the war and the war within this context but it leaves the reader short in the long term repercussions of the conflict. This book is an excellent military history but not one to get a grasp on the modern Middle East.
March 7, 2019
This book was supposed to be an unbiased opinion. Interesting idea when the author moved to Israel and became the ambassador to the United States. At this time Oren, The author, is a member of a rightwing coalition in the Israel parliament. I didn’t know this when I started the book.
I noticed right from the beginning it was very pro Israel and it’s amazing military might and strategy.
The whole incident with attacking the American ship,the Liberty, was a big oopsie. It as a mistake anyone would have made.
My big problem with this book and the six day war is that Israel started the whole mess and Oren just rationalizes the mess in Israel’s favor. In other words, Israel had no choice. I do not believe that for one second. Israel is a big bully, continually breaks the law. A case for genocide could also be argued by the killing of Egyptian pows, just for starters.
The following is a review I wish I had seen prior to beginning this BS.
http://www.ussliberty.org/orenbook.htm
I noticed right from the beginning it was very pro Israel and it’s amazing military might and strategy.
The whole incident with attacking the American ship,the Liberty, was a big oopsie. It as a mistake anyone would have made.
My big problem with this book and the six day war is that Israel started the whole mess and Oren just rationalizes the mess in Israel’s favor. In other words, Israel had no choice. I do not believe that for one second. Israel is a big bully, continually breaks the law. A case for genocide could also be argued by the killing of Egyptian pows, just for starters.
The following is a review I wish I had seen prior to beginning this BS.
http://www.ussliberty.org/orenbook.htm
November 12, 2012
I think the best way to describe this book is "exhaustive but not exhausting." This is a very detailed narrative of the Six Days War in June of 1967, and it follows all of the major military and political threads as events unfolded. I think Oren did an admirable job of being objective about the circumstances and events of the war, although with any book about such an ideological war I think there is never any complete lack of slant. Still, I felt like it was a balanced narrative and it gave me a much, much broader and deeper understanding of political dynamics in the Middle East.
January 29, 2024
A well-researched, well-described tale of the events of the war and the issues surrounding it. A more detailed tick-tock of the war, while also connecting the events to the outer world. A mess that seemed to be easily avoided because of oversized egos and uncompromising leaders, the Six Day War really establishes Israel as a world power and set the tone for the rest of the 20th Century. A highly readable but well detailed history. Great book to read and ponder about.
April 1, 2012
I, think that Michael B. Oren has created a classic in the story on the Six Days War that will be very hard to beat.With first hand interviews from all sides involved. It is a must read for all modern middle east studies.
January 3, 2018
This is a highly detailed and meticulously researched history of the Six Days War and the events and players involved. It is a great resource for anyone interested in this time period. I give it a rare five star rating for the effort and detail exercised by the author.
January 16, 2018
One of the more readable tracts on the Israeli offensive. It has a solid socio-political framework fleshed out with authentic military insights into the epitome of Israeli military prowess.
June 2, 2018
Michael Oren does a great job diving into this historical event and building up suspense and making a gripping story.
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