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Perfect Deterrence
This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using non-cooperative game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. The book's distinctive approach yields some surprising conclusions, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace.
442 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2000
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September 26, 2021
A sound game-theoretic approach to deterrence based on the "game theory with incomplete information". I think the approach can be seen as some kind of major disruption with the older literature more based on ad hoc explanations, or unsound thinking like deterrence based on irrational/incredible threats.
The Perfect Deterrence Theory also solves the conflict between Classical Deterrence Theory believing in nuclear weapons ensuring deterrence success and the competing Spiral Theory which claims the probability of escalation to all-out-war is always very probable by analyzing the conditions under which the deterrence success is more probable and those conditions under which they are less probable.
The book also shows theoretically that a Flexible response - based on two-level threats (first level based on a threat of use of conventional weapons or tactical nuclear weapons, second level based on the use of strategical nuclear weapons) - really increases the probability of deterrence success compared to Massive relation (based on the threat of using Strategic nuclear weapons´) in case of an attack on a near ally).
This was to me also an introduction to the subject of deterrence and nuclear deterrence. As such this was a very very heavy read. Many questions remained open. The deterrence success is never for sure (!) but it is more probably successful - in an asymmetric situation where e.g. Russia/China is challenging the status quo - when the defender is defending homeland or when the challenger is not totally unsatisfied with the status quo. In situations when the ally of the defender is strongly linked to the defender - like using the NATO fifth article - the deterrence is also quite possible.
My personal interest was mainly to understand how to deter Russia from (again) attacking the people of Eastern Europe or the similar situation of China attacking Taiwan - and possibly the two acting coordinated and so threatening the West to come in a two-front conflict. The risk of a conflict looks quite high in 2021 due to the dissatisfaction of both China and Russia with the status quo and some very uncommitted presidents having been in power in the US before Biden. Biden has taken deterrence seriously by e.g. creating the AUKUS agreement. AUKUS agreement is e.g. according to Pekka Virkki probably also to the benefit of Europe. The risk of two-front conflict is decreased and thus also the risk of Russian aggression against Europe. http://www.suomensotilas.fi/aukus-on-...
The Perfect Deterrence Theory also solves the conflict between Classical Deterrence Theory believing in nuclear weapons ensuring deterrence success and the competing Spiral Theory which claims the probability of escalation to all-out-war is always very probable by analyzing the conditions under which the deterrence success is more probable and those conditions under which they are less probable.
The book also shows theoretically that a Flexible response - based on two-level threats (first level based on a threat of use of conventional weapons or tactical nuclear weapons, second level based on the use of strategical nuclear weapons) - really increases the probability of deterrence success compared to Massive relation (based on the threat of using Strategic nuclear weapons´) in case of an attack on a near ally).
This was to me also an introduction to the subject of deterrence and nuclear deterrence. As such this was a very very heavy read. Many questions remained open. The deterrence success is never for sure (!) but it is more probably successful - in an asymmetric situation where e.g. Russia/China is challenging the status quo - when the defender is defending homeland or when the challenger is not totally unsatisfied with the status quo. In situations when the ally of the defender is strongly linked to the defender - like using the NATO fifth article - the deterrence is also quite possible.
My personal interest was mainly to understand how to deter Russia from (again) attacking the people of Eastern Europe or the similar situation of China attacking Taiwan - and possibly the two acting coordinated and so threatening the West to come in a two-front conflict. The risk of a conflict looks quite high in 2021 due to the dissatisfaction of both China and Russia with the status quo and some very uncommitted presidents having been in power in the US before Biden. Biden has taken deterrence seriously by e.g. creating the AUKUS agreement. AUKUS agreement is e.g. according to Pekka Virkki probably also to the benefit of Europe. The risk of two-front conflict is decreased and thus also the risk of Russian aggression against Europe. http://www.suomensotilas.fi/aukus-on-...
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