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336 pages, Hardcover
First published July 1, 2017
There is a strong overlap between sectarian, regional and tribal identities where the compact minorities are concerned, and these can have a mutually strengthening effect. Such an overlap can make it difficult to determine which categories play a role in a particular situation, and there is a risk therefore of interpreting tribal, or extended family loyalties as sectarian loyalties, for instance. Overlap may be due to the regional concentration of particular religious communities, tribes and extended families; to the fact that tribal and extended family groups as a whole usually belong to the same religious community; and to the fact that tribal, extended family and sectarian elements are sometimes inseparably linked to one another. In this respect, the compact religious communities, and the tribes and extended families belonging to these minorities, serve as clear examples. But it should be added that when it comes to loyalties or allegiances, quite different factors can play an equally or sometimes more important role, such as ideology, social class, inter-generational conflict, personal ambition and opportunism. (p.18)
The takeover by lower-middle class and poorer rural minoritarian Ba'thists in 1963 led to a social revolution: rural minorities which earlier had been discriminated against, and traditionally had belonged to the more if not most backward segments of Syrian society, went through an abrupt process of national emancipation (p.61)
Calls for freedom in Syria were understandable and justified, but expecting a transformation of the Syrian political system ito a democracy to be possible without severe bllodshed was therefore wishful thinking. (66)
The Arab League froze the membership of the Syrian Arab Republic, but this turned out to be rather counterproductive because it further polarised relations between Syria and other Arab states. (77)
It was not a Shi'i alliance, as has sometimes been suggested. And many Iranian Shi'is may not even consider Syrian Alawis as Twelver Shi'is like themselves. As was mentioned above, this also applies to some of the Syrian Alawi Shayks, who consider Alawis to be different in religion from the Iranian Shi'is. The link between Syria and Hizballah was strategic as well, and had little to do with religion. Each party had its own motives. (90)
Many Syrians for the time being preferred to preserve their livelihoods under the existing dictatorship, rather than having their livelihoods, their ships and spare sources of income and belongings (if any) destroyed as a result of the internal war, let alone having themselves and their families killed, or forced to become refugees. (125)
According to de Mistura, none of the Syrian delegates could possibly be in favour of terrorism, and therefore there should be nothing against discussing it. The problem was, however, that both the opposition and the regime continued to accuse one another of being 'terrorist' and of supporting 'terrorism.' And as long as the regime and the opposition did not have the slightest intention of sharing substantial power with one another, it appeared to be premature to discuss the proposed subjects in depth, except by way of confidence-building measures. But there was no mutual trust or confidence, the more so as the bloody war in Syria continued in all its ferocity. (157)