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Columbia Global Reports
A Explosão do Populismo: Como a Grande Recessão Transformou a Política nos Estados Unidos e na Europa
O Ocidente está a presenciar uma enorme reviravolta política. Como que da noite para o dia, episódios como o Brexit, a vitória de Donald J. Trump ou o crescimento da direita francesa parecem comprovar que o populismo não é um fenómeno do passado. Pelo contrário, urge compreender todas as suas facetas, desde as raízes no século XIX às novas ocorrências que testemunhamos todos os dias.
O populismo, transversal à esquerda e à direita, caracteriza-se pela preponderância do povo contra o status quo, pela escolha de temas em que há um forte consenso entre as elites, como a imigração e o aquecimento global, e alimenta-se de um descontentamento geral e indefinido que se impõe cada vez mais.
A Explosão do Populismo, descrito pelo New York Times como um livro fundamental para conhecer as linhas condutoras deste fenómeno sociopolítico global, é fruto da profunda investigação de John B. Judis, um dos politólogos norte-americanos mais influentes da atualidade.
O populismo, transversal à esquerda e à direita, caracteriza-se pela preponderância do povo contra o status quo, pela escolha de temas em que há um forte consenso entre as elites, como a imigração e o aquecimento global, e alimenta-se de um descontentamento geral e indefinido que se impõe cada vez mais.
A Explosão do Populismo, descrito pelo New York Times como um livro fundamental para conhecer as linhas condutoras deste fenómeno sociopolítico global, é fruto da profunda investigação de John B. Judis, um dos politólogos norte-americanos mais influentes da atualidade.
184 pages, Paperback
First published October 15, 2016
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About the author
John B. Judis
19 books57 followersJohn B. Judis is an American journalist. Born in Chicago he attended Amherst College and received B.A. and M.A. degrees in Philosophy from the University of California at Berkeley. He is a senior editor at The New Republic and a contributing editor to The American Prospect.
A founding editor of Socialist Revolution (now Socialist Review) in 1969 and of the East Bay Voice in the 1970s, Judis started reporting from Washington in 1982, when he became a founding editor and Washington correspondent for In These Times, a democratic-socialist weekly magazine.
He has also written for GQ, Foreign Affairs, Mother Jones, The New York Times Magazine, and The Washington Post.
In 2002, he published a book (co-written with political scientist Ruy Teixeira) arguing that Democrats would retake control of American politics, thanks in part to growing support from minorities and well-educated professionals. The title, The Emerging Democratic Majority, was a deliberate echo of Kevin Phillips' 1969 classic, The Emerging Republican Majority. The book was named one of the year's best by The Economist magazine.
A founding editor of Socialist Revolution (now Socialist Review) in 1969 and of the East Bay Voice in the 1970s, Judis started reporting from Washington in 1982, when he became a founding editor and Washington correspondent for In These Times, a democratic-socialist weekly magazine.
He has also written for GQ, Foreign Affairs, Mother Jones, The New York Times Magazine, and The Washington Post.
In 2002, he published a book (co-written with political scientist Ruy Teixeira) arguing that Democrats would retake control of American politics, thanks in part to growing support from minorities and well-educated professionals. The title, The Emerging Democratic Majority, was a deliberate echo of Kevin Phillips' 1969 classic, The Emerging Republican Majority. The book was named one of the year's best by The Economist magazine.
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August 4, 2017
Political scientists of the world unite!
I admit to being a poli sci nerd prior to leveling up in law school. Still must kick it old school and get back to my roots sometimes.
Writer and political analyst John Judis makes this an informative and fun exercise as he sets out a well-researched and well put together dissertation of all things populist in his 2016 publication.
So what is a populist and where do they roam? If you find one, what should you feed it? Should you vote for a populist and would you object to one marrying your sister?
Judis correctly defines the various genus and species of the collective family of politicos known as populist. This is really more of an umbrella term, a heterogeneous and motley crew of like-minded nationalists, jingoists, and those who see the world as “us against them”.
The author also takes time to outline the current campaigns of both Trump and Sanders and how these seemingly divergent ideologues share the populist stripe. Yes, good citizens, they can be right-wingers and pinkos, you just never know. We also learn to distinguish the American versions from their European and Asian cousins with some fun case studies.
Erudite and informed, Judis has created a cool blend of dry statistics and personality in this sparklingly relevant, sophisticated modern political essay.
I admit to being a poli sci nerd prior to leveling up in law school. Still must kick it old school and get back to my roots sometimes.
Writer and political analyst John Judis makes this an informative and fun exercise as he sets out a well-researched and well put together dissertation of all things populist in his 2016 publication.
So what is a populist and where do they roam? If you find one, what should you feed it? Should you vote for a populist and would you object to one marrying your sister?
Judis correctly defines the various genus and species of the collective family of politicos known as populist. This is really more of an umbrella term, a heterogeneous and motley crew of like-minded nationalists, jingoists, and those who see the world as “us against them”.
The author also takes time to outline the current campaigns of both Trump and Sanders and how these seemingly divergent ideologues share the populist stripe. Yes, good citizens, they can be right-wingers and pinkos, you just never know. We also learn to distinguish the American versions from their European and Asian cousins with some fun case studies.
Erudite and informed, Judis has created a cool blend of dry statistics and personality in this sparklingly relevant, sophisticated modern political essay.
June 9, 2021
I have deeply despaired that many million Americans voted for a man devoid of virtue and intellect. And have watched American friends founder as they realize that all their treasured beliefs about the goodness of American democracy and values must be pure bunk. Even John Oliver, who normally breaks down complex situations into understandable chunks (with plenty of sarcasm) has fallen into shallow abuse and ad-hominem attacks that only make me angrier.
The Populist Explosion brought sweet relief by helping me to see populism as an eruption of a significant part of "the people" who find themselves poorly served, misunderstood, and largely unheard by the existing political parties. I thought that populism was a right-wing phenomenon, but the author, John B. Judis, shows that it may come from left, right, or center, using examples from American history like Huey Long, George Wallace, and Ross Perot. I was surprised that most of the issues driving the populist revolt that Donald Trump so effectively harnessed are of very long standing, and have real merit, even if a lucky few of us were unaffected by them and considered them illiberal. I felt ashamed that I had readily subscribed to the inevitability of working class and lower-middle class people losing 2.4 million jobs to China and Mexico. I didn't care, because I believed the economists who proclaimed the value of lower costs and international trade, and the other tenets of neoliberalism that most politicians have accepted, and that Hillary Clinton would have continued without question. It's difficult to ignore Trump, but we must. The 63 million people who voted for Trump have been unfairly vilified as bigots, racists, and idiots, but they must be heard. Their concerns about jobs, immigrants, Islamic violence, and fairness may not always be supported by science or fact, but they are real to them, and there are elements of truth in them. It is far better to address them without an arrogant tone of intellectual superiority than to let Trump harness and manipulate them to his own ends.
The book was published just before the 2016 election, which Judis did not expect Trump to win, but his analyses of the populist Trump and Sanders phenomena are spot on. He then takes on the almost impossible task of explaining the history of the populist movements in each of twelve European countries, and how they relate to the European Union and Brexit.
This small book is a quick read, and we can all benefit from it. Thank you, John Judis!
The Populist Explosion brought sweet relief by helping me to see populism as an eruption of a significant part of "the people" who find themselves poorly served, misunderstood, and largely unheard by the existing political parties. I thought that populism was a right-wing phenomenon, but the author, John B. Judis, shows that it may come from left, right, or center, using examples from American history like Huey Long, George Wallace, and Ross Perot. I was surprised that most of the issues driving the populist revolt that Donald Trump so effectively harnessed are of very long standing, and have real merit, even if a lucky few of us were unaffected by them and considered them illiberal. I felt ashamed that I had readily subscribed to the inevitability of working class and lower-middle class people losing 2.4 million jobs to China and Mexico. I didn't care, because I believed the economists who proclaimed the value of lower costs and international trade, and the other tenets of neoliberalism that most politicians have accepted, and that Hillary Clinton would have continued without question. It's difficult to ignore Trump, but we must. The 63 million people who voted for Trump have been unfairly vilified as bigots, racists, and idiots, but they must be heard. Their concerns about jobs, immigrants, Islamic violence, and fairness may not always be supported by science or fact, but they are real to them, and there are elements of truth in them. It is far better to address them without an arrogant tone of intellectual superiority than to let Trump harness and manipulate them to his own ends.
The book was published just before the 2016 election, which Judis did not expect Trump to win, but his analyses of the populist Trump and Sanders phenomena are spot on. He then takes on the almost impossible task of explaining the history of the populist movements in each of twelve European countries, and how they relate to the European Union and Brexit.
This small book is a quick read, and we can all benefit from it. Thank you, John Judis!
April 6, 2017
The unexpected emergence of Donald Trump as a major-party candidate for the White House has triggered a great deal of punditry about how the Republican Party managed to put forward such a bigoted and ignorant champion. Speculation has swirled around the nature of the political forces he represents. Some observers insist he, though home-grown, bears more resemblance to Benito Mussolini than to any democratic political leader. Others think of Trump’s candidacy as populist; they describe him as the embodiment of grassroots frustration with the failure of Republican leadership to deliver on its promises.
Rejecting facile definitions of populism
Veteran journalist John Judis wades into this debate with a slim volume entitled The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics. Judis’ subject is not the 2016 election but the much broader topic of the politics of protest. His argument spans more than a century, beginning with the emergence of the People’s Party in the United States late in the 19th century. Rejecting many of the facile definitions of the term, Judis insists that “there is no set of features that exclusively defines movements, parties, and people that are called populist — from the Russian Narodniks to Huey Long, and from France’s Marine Le Pen to the late congressman Jack Kemp.”
Describing populism on both the Left and the Right
However, the author manages to simplify the question by describing both left-wing and right-wing populism. “Leftwing populists champion the people against an elite or an establishment,” he writes. “Theirs is a vertical politics of the bottom and middle arrayed against the top. Rightwing populists champion the people against an elite that they accuse of coddling a third group, which can consist, for instance, of immigrants, Islamists, or African American militants.” Unfortunately, this distinction doesn’t much help to understand Donald Trump and the millions who back his candidacy. The views he claims on the campaign trail fit both leftwing and rightwing definitions.
Populism and the rejection of the “neoliberal consensus”
The fundamental premise in Judis’ argument is that populists on both the Right and the Left have come into prominence because of their loud opposition to what he terms the “neoliberal consensus.” He uses the term neoliberal in a fashion that encompasses Bill Clinton, the New Democrats, and (up to a point) Barack Obama as well as the uncompromising right-wing intellectuals who dominated the administration of George W. Bush. That “neoliberal consensus” includes advocacy for free trade agreements, an expansive foreign policy, low barriers to immigration, a hands-off policy toward Wall Street, and other policies that tend to widen the gap between rich and poor. Leftwing populists such as Bernie Sanders have railed against free trade, an aggressive foreign policy, deregulation, and the failure to narrow the income and wealth gaps. Rightwing populists single out intervention in the affairs of other countries as well as free trade. Donald Trump’s often self-contradictory policies encompass both left-wing and right-wing populist positions.
Trump: not easy to pigeonhole
Judis explains: “Trump’s political base was among the party’s white working- and middle-class voters — precisely the voters who had originally flocked to [George] Wallace and then to Nixon, who had been attracted to [Ross] Perot and [Pat] Buchanan.” Caricatures aside, all these “conservative” populist leaders went against the Republican grain to oppose tax cuts for the rich and dismantling Social Security and Medicare, just as is the case with Trump. Judis also makes the point that Trump’s position on healthcare, for example, is closer to Bernie Sanders’ than it is to today’s Republican leadership’s. Yes, he wants to repeal the Affordable Care Act. But, like Sanders, sincerely or not, he advocates universal health care.
Trump as a fascist? Judis says no
Judis dismisses the contention that Donald Trump is a fascist. “Trump is a one-man show whose initial target was other Republicans,” he argues, “and who has not built a movement around himself. He has displayed anti-democratic tendencies, but they are idiosyncratic. If he has any correlate in European history, it is Italy’s Silvio Belusconi, not Mussolini nor Hitler.” However, Lawrence Rosenthal, Executive Director of the Center for Right-Wing Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, has a different view. He argues in the Huffington Post that it’s unfair to compare Trump’s campaign with the mature fascism of Mussolini. Instead, he finds a much closer correlate between Trump and the early fascist movement in Italy, which was much more difficult to pigeonhole.
Populism in both Europe and the US
Don’t be misled: The Populist Explosion is not in large part an analysis of the 2016 presidential election campaign. It’s a study of populism writ large, with examples liberally drawn from European as well as American politics over the last 130 years. If anything, Judis devotes more time to reviewing the rise of left-wing populist parties in Southern Europe (Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, the Five Star Movement in Italy) and right-wing populist movements in Northern Europe (the UK Independent Party, the National Front in France, the Freedom Parties in Austria and Holland, the People’s Party in Denmark). Though circumstances vary greatly from one country to another, Judis maintains that the Great Recession created the conditions for populist movements to gain momentum not only in the United States but throughout most of Europe as well. The widening separation between rich and poor presents a rich opportunity for the politics of protest.
About the author
John Judis began his career as a journalist nearly half a century ago. For many years, he wrote for democratic socialist periodicals, several of which he helped to found. In later years he has worked for more moderate publications such as The New Republic, The American Prospect, and, now, the digital magazine The National Journal.
Rejecting facile definitions of populism
Veteran journalist John Judis wades into this debate with a slim volume entitled The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics. Judis’ subject is not the 2016 election but the much broader topic of the politics of protest. His argument spans more than a century, beginning with the emergence of the People’s Party in the United States late in the 19th century. Rejecting many of the facile definitions of the term, Judis insists that “there is no set of features that exclusively defines movements, parties, and people that are called populist — from the Russian Narodniks to Huey Long, and from France’s Marine Le Pen to the late congressman Jack Kemp.”
Describing populism on both the Left and the Right
However, the author manages to simplify the question by describing both left-wing and right-wing populism. “Leftwing populists champion the people against an elite or an establishment,” he writes. “Theirs is a vertical politics of the bottom and middle arrayed against the top. Rightwing populists champion the people against an elite that they accuse of coddling a third group, which can consist, for instance, of immigrants, Islamists, or African American militants.” Unfortunately, this distinction doesn’t much help to understand Donald Trump and the millions who back his candidacy. The views he claims on the campaign trail fit both leftwing and rightwing definitions.
Populism and the rejection of the “neoliberal consensus”
The fundamental premise in Judis’ argument is that populists on both the Right and the Left have come into prominence because of their loud opposition to what he terms the “neoliberal consensus.” He uses the term neoliberal in a fashion that encompasses Bill Clinton, the New Democrats, and (up to a point) Barack Obama as well as the uncompromising right-wing intellectuals who dominated the administration of George W. Bush. That “neoliberal consensus” includes advocacy for free trade agreements, an expansive foreign policy, low barriers to immigration, a hands-off policy toward Wall Street, and other policies that tend to widen the gap between rich and poor. Leftwing populists such as Bernie Sanders have railed against free trade, an aggressive foreign policy, deregulation, and the failure to narrow the income and wealth gaps. Rightwing populists single out intervention in the affairs of other countries as well as free trade. Donald Trump’s often self-contradictory policies encompass both left-wing and right-wing populist positions.
Trump: not easy to pigeonhole
Judis explains: “Trump’s political base was among the party’s white working- and middle-class voters — precisely the voters who had originally flocked to [George] Wallace and then to Nixon, who had been attracted to [Ross] Perot and [Pat] Buchanan.” Caricatures aside, all these “conservative” populist leaders went against the Republican grain to oppose tax cuts for the rich and dismantling Social Security and Medicare, just as is the case with Trump. Judis also makes the point that Trump’s position on healthcare, for example, is closer to Bernie Sanders’ than it is to today’s Republican leadership’s. Yes, he wants to repeal the Affordable Care Act. But, like Sanders, sincerely or not, he advocates universal health care.
Trump as a fascist? Judis says no
Judis dismisses the contention that Donald Trump is a fascist. “Trump is a one-man show whose initial target was other Republicans,” he argues, “and who has not built a movement around himself. He has displayed anti-democratic tendencies, but they are idiosyncratic. If he has any correlate in European history, it is Italy’s Silvio Belusconi, not Mussolini nor Hitler.” However, Lawrence Rosenthal, Executive Director of the Center for Right-Wing Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, has a different view. He argues in the Huffington Post that it’s unfair to compare Trump’s campaign with the mature fascism of Mussolini. Instead, he finds a much closer correlate between Trump and the early fascist movement in Italy, which was much more difficult to pigeonhole.
Populism in both Europe and the US
Don’t be misled: The Populist Explosion is not in large part an analysis of the 2016 presidential election campaign. It’s a study of populism writ large, with examples liberally drawn from European as well as American politics over the last 130 years. If anything, Judis devotes more time to reviewing the rise of left-wing populist parties in Southern Europe (Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, the Five Star Movement in Italy) and right-wing populist movements in Northern Europe (the UK Independent Party, the National Front in France, the Freedom Parties in Austria and Holland, the People’s Party in Denmark). Though circumstances vary greatly from one country to another, Judis maintains that the Great Recession created the conditions for populist movements to gain momentum not only in the United States but throughout most of Europe as well. The widening separation between rich and poor presents a rich opportunity for the politics of protest.
About the author
John Judis began his career as a journalist nearly half a century ago. For many years, he wrote for democratic socialist periodicals, several of which he helped to found. In later years he has worked for more moderate publications such as The New Republic, The American Prospect, and, now, the digital magazine The National Journal.
September 9, 2017
Informative and interesting. I especially enjoyed the sections on Huey Long, George Wallace, and Ross Perot, important figures in the history the author traces of U.S. populism, culminating in its surge back into prominence in this country in the 2016 election. Judis looks at the distinguishing features of populism both in its left and right manifestations, and at how it has been used effectively by various political parties and politicians to galvanize dissatisfied voters and rally them to various ends.
In his introduction, Judis explains
Of the eight chapters, including the “Introduction” and the “Conclusion,” three are devoted to U.S. politics and three to European. I struggled a bit to keep up with the information presented in the chapter on Greece and Spain, with which I have only minimal familiarity (and also, the events in southern Europe seemed less relevant to the situation in the U.S., which is my main interest), but the populist movements in northern Europe, particularly Great Britain and France, turned out to be very interesting to me. The conflicts and concerns focusing on immigration in those countries, and the changing political allegiances and priorities of voters as a result of those worries, were unmistakeably familiar.
One “drawback” of this book is that, writing in 2016, the author is quite confident that Donald Trump will lose the election, and that Hillary Clinton will win. He then goes on to consider what the two major parties will “learn” from their latest brush with populism. If only!
Snort! With Trump now in the White House, amusing himself by taking pot shots at Republicans and Democrats with equal opportunity viciousness and clearly promoting no one's interests but his own, this faith that the election would follow conventional expectations is sadly touching. Such are the risks of writing political books in an election year, I suppose. Still, the information on populism itself is still valuable.
I listened to this as an audiobook read by Coleen Marlo, and I do not recommend this format. She sounds like a robot, and I was only sure that a real person actually was reading the book because, especially early in the book, she mispronounces so many words. The worst was “Ku Klux Klan,” which she repeatedly reads as “Klu Klux Klan.” A robot wouldn't do that.
Reservations aside, this is a useful little book that covers a lot of ground and gave me a better understanding of a movement that seems likely to be part of our political landscape for a while to come.
In his introduction, Judis explains
”Leftwing populists champion the people against an elite or an establishment. Theirs is a vertical politics of the bottom and middle arrayed against the top. Rightwing populists champion the people against an elite that they accuse of coddling a third group, which can consist, for instance, of immigrants, Islamists, or African American militants. Leftwing populism is dyadic. Rightwing populism is triadic. It looks upward, but also down upon an out group.”
Of the eight chapters, including the “Introduction” and the “Conclusion,” three are devoted to U.S. politics and three to European. I struggled a bit to keep up with the information presented in the chapter on Greece and Spain, with which I have only minimal familiarity (and also, the events in southern Europe seemed less relevant to the situation in the U.S., which is my main interest), but the populist movements in northern Europe, particularly Great Britain and France, turned out to be very interesting to me. The conflicts and concerns focusing on immigration in those countries, and the changing political allegiances and priorities of voters as a result of those worries, were unmistakeably familiar.
One “drawback” of this book is that, writing in 2016, the author is quite confident that Donald Trump will lose the election, and that Hillary Clinton will win. He then goes on to consider what the two major parties will “learn” from their latest brush with populism. If only!
”How much this shift in debate will be reflected after the November election remains unclear. If Trump is soundly defeated, as seems likely at this writing, the Republican congressional and business leadership will argue that his defeat was due not only to his intemperate and amateurish campaigning, but to his populism. After Barry Goldwater was defeated in 1964, leading Republicans made similar arguments. But in the case of Goldwater, more polished imitators sprung up who eventually transformed the Republican Party. If Trump's campaign does spawn imitators, the Republicans will face a continuing conflict between its white working class and business supporters.
Sanders's campaign is likely to have a more certain impact on the Democratic Party even if he himself fades from the scene. Sanders's outlook is well represented in Congress by senators Elizabeth Warren and Sherrod Brown and by the House Progressive Caucus, which Sanders helped to found. If Hillary Clinton does win the presidency, they are likely to provide a counter-weight to the neoliberal influence of Wall Street and Silicon Valley among the Democrats. That should lead to continuing conflict within the party.
In the near term, however, the United States is not likely to experience a political earthquake that would overturn neoliberalism and realign the parties.”
Snort! With Trump now in the White House, amusing himself by taking pot shots at Republicans and Democrats with equal opportunity viciousness and clearly promoting no one's interests but his own, this faith that the election would follow conventional expectations is sadly touching. Such are the risks of writing political books in an election year, I suppose. Still, the information on populism itself is still valuable.
I listened to this as an audiobook read by Coleen Marlo, and I do not recommend this format. She sounds like a robot, and I was only sure that a real person actually was reading the book because, especially early in the book, she mispronounces so many words. The worst was “Ku Klux Klan,” which she repeatedly reads as “Klu Klux Klan.” A robot wouldn't do that.
Reservations aside, this is a useful little book that covers a lot of ground and gave me a better understanding of a movement that seems likely to be part of our political landscape for a while to come.
December 15, 2017
It's good, but I wanted so much more. This book just describes populism and links it to history (at least in the U.S.). There isn't much analysis or insight though. No linking of the past populists with the present. Too much mixing of left and right. Yes, there are common threads between Trump and Sanders voters, but there are drastic differences as well. I need another book about populism that fills in the meat that this one left out.
November 20, 2016
An excellent and (I thought) very even-handed look at the rise of populist movements in the U.S. and Europe, both on the left and the right. All this year's headline-makers are in here -- Nigel Farage, Bernie Sanders, and of course Donald Trump -- but Judis also looks backward at protopopulists like Huey Long and George Wallace in order to trace the development of support for political figures who buck the mainstream and are able to redirect growing voter dissatisfaction against the establishment. Last summer's Brexit referendum and last week's stunning U.S. presidential election results are starting to make (a very tiny bit) more sense to me as a result.
October 7, 2016
A good short read with some strong insights into a global phenomenon.
In a nutshell, Judis traces populism origins in America and relates a number of post Great Recession instances to these roots, distinguishing them from the normal left-right axis. Judis's argument is that these movements are a symptom of the breakdown of the "neoliberal" order that emerged in the 1970s in response to a number of shocks that undermined the Keynesian consensus of the immediate post-war period.
While showing that today's populist movements defy easy left/right definitions, he notes differences between left-wing-derived populism which pit the "people" versus the "establishment" and the right-wing-derived populisms that include the establishment's favoring of some out group as part of how they disregard the popular will.
These are all very interesting insights and I suspect as the next several years unfold, they will be put into sharper focus. There are a few problems with Judis's claims where I think he is putting the finger on the scale of the left-wing. For example, drawing a line from George Wallace to Perot to Trump on the base of their support dances very close to the edge of reducing everything back to a racial issue, which Judis, in a recent interview at Slate at least, seems to deny. Judis does point out that claims that the right-wing populists are "fascists" is merely rhetorical on the major basis that there is no imperial or expansionist motive in them; on the contrary, they are largely isolationist. More on this below.
Also, I think a deeper dig into American populism shows some essential traits that Judis says are only the most tenuous links. Garry Wills lays some of those traits out in A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust of Government. Amateurism, authenticity, provincial, candid, traditional, populist, organic, and spontaneous are some of those traits. There opposite are associated with the "establishment" going back to the Revolutionary period. There's more of a link than Judis suspects.
But here are the major quibbles I have:
(1) It's not just the "neoliberal order" that is breaking down. I suspect that it's the entire post-WWII order that is in a process of decay as it rotates out of living memory and the lessons it taught become merely vicarious and not visceral. Economics explain a lot, but they do not explain how a major party candidate can have a cavalier attitude about NATO, for example. It's not just because we're paying for it. Indeed, the entire idea of a more isolationism means that the belief that the oceans separate us from the world's problems—something Pearl Harbor and 9/11 both seem to refute—has come back into fashion. When was the last time that the UN satisfyingly resolved an international crisis?
Judis spends a lot of time linking the "neoliberalism" imposed by the EU to the genesis of European populism and their morphing from right-wing to something different. (What do you call a politics that is OK with redistribution but only between people in the nation.... national...) But while he mentions the origins of the EU he neglects to connect the dots to it too being part of the Post-WWII order that only accidentally took on "neoliberal" features, the same as the IMF which initially did not impose "Washington Consensus" neoliberalism. The EU was not established as a Thatcherite union; instead it was meant to tie European countries so tightly together they could never engage in a destructive war again. The Eurozone has become less about neoliberalism and more about tight money.
(2) What is the "neoliberal" order? Judis identifies it with Thatcherism/Reaganism and Globalization (I think). But this term is so abused at this point, it's best to throw it out. If the Great Recession was the breakdown of anything, it was of unregulated liberalism. In reality, most arguments against "neoliberalism" amount to arguments against capitalism and trade, and most lefty arguments against trade are really arguments against capitalism. But it was capitalism in a modified form that drove the postwar boom too.
I tend to believe that the mother of the Great Recession was fraud. That's maybe a darker take on it, but it's not the capitalist system per se. It doesn't have to be that way.
As for the trade issue, Judis seems to take it for granted that it has been harmful. Even accepting for the sake of the argument that liberalized trade has hurt the United States, has it hurt the whole world? There are parts of the world that have less people living in poverty now, more stable governments on average now, and higher development indexes than they did before the "neoliberal" move of the 1970s.
(3) Left-wing groups also accuse the establishment of coddling certain groups. Perhaps the right-wing tends to argue that it's illegal immigrants or some other disadvantaged group, but it's a difference of the target, not the existence of a target. Left-wing populists believe the establishment coddles, variously, billionaires, defense contractors, oil companies, the police, Zionists, corporations, and so on. It's merely a question of politics who the out group is. This isn't to say that there's no value difference in whom you choose to blame for the world's problems. Some people deserve more blame than others. But it does mean that there is no scapegoat on the left.
(4) Unrealistic demands. Judis identifies populists as largely using unrealistic demands as a means of separating the people from the establishment and gives several examples including Trump's wall. But his inclusion of Bernie Sanders in this seems a bit misplaced. Sanders indeed ran on a platform that was unlikely to pass Congress, but unrealistic strikes me as a bit odd since many countries have most or all of his ideas, especially universal healthcare and free college.
I don't deny that Sanders's followers had a populist tinge to the manner in which they supported him, but I think there was a lot of that in Obama's 2008 campaign as well. Sanders would have been a conventional politician in the end, just a social democratic one.
In a nutshell, Judis traces populism origins in America and relates a number of post Great Recession instances to these roots, distinguishing them from the normal left-right axis. Judis's argument is that these movements are a symptom of the breakdown of the "neoliberal" order that emerged in the 1970s in response to a number of shocks that undermined the Keynesian consensus of the immediate post-war period.
While showing that today's populist movements defy easy left/right definitions, he notes differences between left-wing-derived populism which pit the "people" versus the "establishment" and the right-wing-derived populisms that include the establishment's favoring of some out group as part of how they disregard the popular will.
These are all very interesting insights and I suspect as the next several years unfold, they will be put into sharper focus. There are a few problems with Judis's claims where I think he is putting the finger on the scale of the left-wing. For example, drawing a line from George Wallace to Perot to Trump on the base of their support dances very close to the edge of reducing everything back to a racial issue, which Judis, in a recent interview at Slate at least, seems to deny. Judis does point out that claims that the right-wing populists are "fascists" is merely rhetorical on the major basis that there is no imperial or expansionist motive in them; on the contrary, they are largely isolationist. More on this below.
Also, I think a deeper dig into American populism shows some essential traits that Judis says are only the most tenuous links. Garry Wills lays some of those traits out in A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust of Government. Amateurism, authenticity, provincial, candid, traditional, populist, organic, and spontaneous are some of those traits. There opposite are associated with the "establishment" going back to the Revolutionary period. There's more of a link than Judis suspects.
But here are the major quibbles I have:
(1) It's not just the "neoliberal order" that is breaking down. I suspect that it's the entire post-WWII order that is in a process of decay as it rotates out of living memory and the lessons it taught become merely vicarious and not visceral. Economics explain a lot, but they do not explain how a major party candidate can have a cavalier attitude about NATO, for example. It's not just because we're paying for it. Indeed, the entire idea of a more isolationism means that the belief that the oceans separate us from the world's problems—something Pearl Harbor and 9/11 both seem to refute—has come back into fashion. When was the last time that the UN satisfyingly resolved an international crisis?
Judis spends a lot of time linking the "neoliberalism" imposed by the EU to the genesis of European populism and their morphing from right-wing to something different. (What do you call a politics that is OK with redistribution but only between people in the nation.... national...) But while he mentions the origins of the EU he neglects to connect the dots to it too being part of the Post-WWII order that only accidentally took on "neoliberal" features, the same as the IMF which initially did not impose "Washington Consensus" neoliberalism. The EU was not established as a Thatcherite union; instead it was meant to tie European countries so tightly together they could never engage in a destructive war again. The Eurozone has become less about neoliberalism and more about tight money.
(2) What is the "neoliberal" order? Judis identifies it with Thatcherism/Reaganism and Globalization (I think). But this term is so abused at this point, it's best to throw it out. If the Great Recession was the breakdown of anything, it was of unregulated liberalism. In reality, most arguments against "neoliberalism" amount to arguments against capitalism and trade, and most lefty arguments against trade are really arguments against capitalism. But it was capitalism in a modified form that drove the postwar boom too.
I tend to believe that the mother of the Great Recession was fraud. That's maybe a darker take on it, but it's not the capitalist system per se. It doesn't have to be that way.
As for the trade issue, Judis seems to take it for granted that it has been harmful. Even accepting for the sake of the argument that liberalized trade has hurt the United States, has it hurt the whole world? There are parts of the world that have less people living in poverty now, more stable governments on average now, and higher development indexes than they did before the "neoliberal" move of the 1970s.
(3) Left-wing groups also accuse the establishment of coddling certain groups. Perhaps the right-wing tends to argue that it's illegal immigrants or some other disadvantaged group, but it's a difference of the target, not the existence of a target. Left-wing populists believe the establishment coddles, variously, billionaires, defense contractors, oil companies, the police, Zionists, corporations, and so on. It's merely a question of politics who the out group is. This isn't to say that there's no value difference in whom you choose to blame for the world's problems. Some people deserve more blame than others. But it does mean that there is no scapegoat on the left.
(4) Unrealistic demands. Judis identifies populists as largely using unrealistic demands as a means of separating the people from the establishment and gives several examples including Trump's wall. But his inclusion of Bernie Sanders in this seems a bit misplaced. Sanders indeed ran on a platform that was unlikely to pass Congress, but unrealistic strikes me as a bit odd since many countries have most or all of his ideas, especially universal healthcare and free college.
I don't deny that Sanders's followers had a populist tinge to the manner in which they supported him, but I think there was a lot of that in Obama's 2008 campaign as well. Sanders would have been a conventional politician in the end, just a social democratic one.
March 27, 2020
Книга читається доволі швидко. Багато соціологічних даних, огляд ситуації у США і Європі. Праві і трохи лівих. Основні постаті і партії - все можна побачити у короткому огляді.
Мене розчарувало інше: мало аналітики, дещо застаріла історія, оскільки ситуація зараз вже змінилася. Не знайшов для себе відповіді щодо української ситуації із популізмом - оскільки немає аналітики власне по механіці популізму як такого. Багато історії та фактажу, однак аналітики, філософії тут мені не вистачає. Шукаю відповідей далі.
Мене розчарувало інше: мало аналітики, дещо застаріла історія, оскільки ситуація зараз вже змінилася. Не знайшов для себе відповіді щодо української ситуації із популізмом - оскільки немає аналітики власне по механіці популізму як такого. Багато історії та фактажу, однак аналітики, філософії тут мені не вистачає. Шукаю відповідей далі.
November 12, 2018
Update November 11, 2018
I finished rereading this short book this morning. It made much more sense on the second read. The Kindle books has been updated and while there is still no link in the text to the endnotes, the spelling errors and misprints have been corrected. I think it provides useful information for someone trying to make some sense of what's going on in world politics.
I wondered as I was reading this time, whether the author had published any more recent work that addressed what is going on in the world now, so I did a little searching and found the following articles:
https://newrepublic.com/article/15114...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/op...
Both articles are good followups and provide food for thought.
This is a very useful short book to use to obtain an understanding of populism in the context of politics. As the author explains, populism can arise on the left and the right of the political spectrum. Generalizing, he defines "leftwing populism" as being the bottom and the top of the class scale against the top (the 99% v. the 1%) and "rightwing populism" as being the middle against those considered elites who are believed to be "coddling" a third group (those who've lost or are afraid they will lose their jobs because the elites are permitting/encouraging immigrants - legal and illegal - to take jobs for less money and get benefits). He describes populist movements in the US focusing on those led by Huey Long, George Wallace, Ross Perot, and Pat Buchanan. He explores US populist movements -- People's Party, Tea Party, and Occupy Wall Street. He explains how the Bernie Saunders and Donald Trump campaigns were populist movements. He also looks at current populist movements in Europe, e.g., those resulting in Brexit and those active in Denmark, Greece, Spain, and France. He concludes with a chapter called "The Past and Future of Populism" in which he explains why he doesn't think that Trump's campaign, rightwing populist European parties, and the "left-center Five Star Movement" in Europe are not fascist because they are not seeking "to replace democracy with a dictatorship" or "imperial domination." He considers populist movements to be "early warning" signals that "point to problems through demands that are unlikely to be realized in the present political circumstances" and considers them as showing "tears in the fabric of accepted political wisdom."
If I understand the author correctly, he considers current populist movements (starting with Perot) as being against what he calls "neoliberalism" that he says both the Republican and Democrat parties support. He describes it in the US as being the "modification, but not wholesale abandonment, of New Deal liberalism -- support for the New Deal safety net, but beyond that, priority to market imperatives," and in Europe as meaning "the partial return to an older free market liberalism."
Learning about various populists movements and leaders in both the US and Europe was interesting. The author's discussion of his opinion of what is behind recent movements was interesting and provides food for thought. I tend to agree that they point to problems that need to be looked at from different points of view. I will need to do more work to better understand his "neoliberalism" theory and its viability. In short, I would recommend this book to anyone wondering about how we got where we are today, e.g., the election of Donald Trump and Brexit.
To end, I would recommend not reading this on Kindle. There are end notes that have no indicator in the text. You can go from the end note to the Kindle page to which the note is relevant but it is very awkward. Also, there are some annoying spelling errors and misprints in the text.
I finished rereading this short book this morning. It made much more sense on the second read. The Kindle books has been updated and while there is still no link in the text to the endnotes, the spelling errors and misprints have been corrected. I think it provides useful information for someone trying to make some sense of what's going on in world politics.
I wondered as I was reading this time, whether the author had published any more recent work that addressed what is going on in the world now, so I did a little searching and found the following articles:
https://newrepublic.com/article/15114...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/op...
Both articles are good followups and provide food for thought.
This is a very useful short book to use to obtain an understanding of populism in the context of politics. As the author explains, populism can arise on the left and the right of the political spectrum. Generalizing, he defines "leftwing populism" as being the bottom and the top of the class scale against the top (the 99% v. the 1%) and "rightwing populism" as being the middle against those considered elites who are believed to be "coddling" a third group (those who've lost or are afraid they will lose their jobs because the elites are permitting/encouraging immigrants - legal and illegal - to take jobs for less money and get benefits). He describes populist movements in the US focusing on those led by Huey Long, George Wallace, Ross Perot, and Pat Buchanan. He explores US populist movements -- People's Party, Tea Party, and Occupy Wall Street. He explains how the Bernie Saunders and Donald Trump campaigns were populist movements. He also looks at current populist movements in Europe, e.g., those resulting in Brexit and those active in Denmark, Greece, Spain, and France. He concludes with a chapter called "The Past and Future of Populism" in which he explains why he doesn't think that Trump's campaign, rightwing populist European parties, and the "left-center Five Star Movement" in Europe are not fascist because they are not seeking "to replace democracy with a dictatorship" or "imperial domination." He considers populist movements to be "early warning" signals that "point to problems through demands that are unlikely to be realized in the present political circumstances" and considers them as showing "tears in the fabric of accepted political wisdom."
If I understand the author correctly, he considers current populist movements (starting with Perot) as being against what he calls "neoliberalism" that he says both the Republican and Democrat parties support. He describes it in the US as being the "modification, but not wholesale abandonment, of New Deal liberalism -- support for the New Deal safety net, but beyond that, priority to market imperatives," and in Europe as meaning "the partial return to an older free market liberalism."
Learning about various populists movements and leaders in both the US and Europe was interesting. The author's discussion of his opinion of what is behind recent movements was interesting and provides food for thought. I tend to agree that they point to problems that need to be looked at from different points of view. I will need to do more work to better understand his "neoliberalism" theory and its viability. In short, I would recommend this book to anyone wondering about how we got where we are today, e.g., the election of Donald Trump and Brexit.
To end, I would recommend not reading this on Kindle. There are end notes that have no indicator in the text. You can go from the end note to the Kindle page to which the note is relevant but it is very awkward. Also, there are some annoying spelling errors and misprints in the text.
February 7, 2017
Brief but worthwhile history of populist movements in America and Europe, with some shrewd insights in how populist politics work, undermined by Judis' euphemistic take on the racial politics of Trump/Le Pen/AfD. Judis also didn't take seriously enough how little Trump's economic policies would ultimately differ from conventional Republican dogma. (Granted that this book was released last October, but all of this was there to be seen while the 2016 campaign was going on.) Unfortunately Judis, like many white center-left and left writers over the last two years, has trouble seeing the political dynamics clearly enough because he doesn't put white supremacy at the center of the story.
February 2, 2017
A short primer on the rise of populism that steers fairly clear of bias. I wish there were more sections on populism in Nordic countries and Germany, but loved sections on countries I wasn't very familiar with (Spain, Greece).
November 21, 2017
highly recommended for understanding politics in the past 50ish years
February 3, 2017
The rise of Trump's brand of populism has left many in the U.S. and around the world in a state of shock. How did we even get here? This short and sweet book not only explores the historic origins of populism in America, but also in Europe as well and traces their more recent ascension to the political fallout from the Great Recession of 2008 as well as anti-free trade sentiments and economic anxiety in the lower middle classes that have been underneath the surface of our politics since the end of the Cold War. What is great about this book is not just that Mr. Judis cuts to the root of our current political moment in the U.S. and Europe, but that he does so in a way that is easily accessible to the layman, yet infinitely useful to the scholar too. In fact, this is one of the few books where I will recommend that you read it at a quick clip as so much is packed into this book that a slow pace may keep one from remembering key points from chapter to chapter if taken at a slower speed. There are a few grammatical mistakes due to the (probably) rushed publication of this book (it was published in October of 2016 after all). Also, Mr. Judis, like nearly everyone else in America, assumed that Trump was going to lose the election, so his concluding chapter will need to be updated. Otherwise, this is a great book that is both timely and necessary for Americans to read about our current political climate.
February 2, 2017
More like a list of statistics, rather than an original thought piece with a central thesis. I felt like he glossed over a lot of interesting points that could have been developed further, and his arguments were not particularly convincing in some points.
Side note: The books's failure to impress probably wasn't helped by the fact that the Kindle edition I read did not include links to the inline citations at the end of the book. I got all the way through the book before I found the sources at the end.
Side note: The books's failure to impress probably wasn't helped by the fact that the Kindle edition I read did not include links to the inline citations at the end of the book. I got all the way through the book before I found the sources at the end.
November 13, 2017
Що таке популізм? Чому зараз він набирає все більшої сили в політичному житті Європи та США? І популізм є виключно негативним явищем, чи він має і позитивні наслідки?
Коротко відповідаю на ці питання, поставлені книгою Джона Б. Джудіса "Великий вибух популізму" в своєму влозі https://youtu.be/RxX7DqU_0w4
Коротко відповідаю на ці питання, поставлені книгою Джона Б. Джудіса "Великий вибух популізму" в своєму влозі https://youtu.be/RxX7DqU_0w4
April 21, 2022
John B Judis - A explosão do populismo
Nunca um subtítulo foi tão elucidativo “Como a grande recessão transformou a política nos Estados Unidos e na Europa”.
John B Judis no seu livro “A explosão do populismo”, relata-nos a história dos movimentos populistas europeus e americanos desde o populismo russo de Narodniks - elites urbanas cultas da Rússia que nas décadas de 1860 e 1870, que numa postura romântica desconfiavam das cortes czaristas, da vida urbana, da industrialização e da ciência e propunham um regresso à vida no campo, a num socialismo agrário politicamente assente numa representação local inspirada no bom selvagem de JJ Rosseau; até às formas populistas americanas e europeias de finais dos anos 20 do século XXI.
Não tendo o populismo uma definição fácil, o autor aceita, pelo menos como ponto de partida a sugestão de Michael Kazin que identifica o populismo como uma linguagem de confronto, cujos intervenientes identificam o povo como um grupo não limitado a nenhuma classe social, e as elites como os adversários naturais. Na definição de Michael Karin há dois aspectos devem ser sublinhados. O primeiro é que no populismo há um aproveitamento por um líder desses sentimentos populares e uma massa popular. Essa dualidade está quase sempre presente. O segundo aspecto é que há sempre um confronto sem compromissos entre as elites e o povo.
Não havendo propriamente populismo de esquerda ou de direita, este pode ser dessa forma conotado de acordo com as suas origens. Os populismos de esquerda tendem a ser verticais, i.e., das classes inferiores contras o “establishment”, enquanto que os de direita tendem a não ser classicistas. Orientam-se contra as elites, mas também e em especial no do norte da europa contra a imigração em especial contra a islamita e a subsariana.
O populismo tal como o conhecemos nos séculos XX e XXI teve as suas origens na democracia representativa americana. O processo eleitoral americano ao proteger a formação de maiorias não deixa espaço para outras posições minoritárias ou dos extremos do especto político. É ao centro que se ganham eleições. Ora daqui decorre os partidos tendem a aproximar as suas posições ao centro de onde resultam habitualmente compromissos, alguma sobreposição de posições e um deliberado descuido das posições dos extremos. Estes quando crescem assumem proporções de peso e podem influenciar o governo, e por vezes tomar esse mesmo governo. Neste processo não há propriamente fronteiras e é habitual verem-se movimentos com mudanças de posição da esquerda para a direita ou em sentido oposto.
Há uma distinção entre políticos e massas populistas. Os líderes políticos são todos eles populistas. Na sua condição de líder, sejam eleitos ou designados têm sempre de se sentir reconhecidos e acarinhados pelos que lideram, ainda que alguns, os mais ditatoriais e autocráticos remetam para um imaginário junguiano – “a população no fundo apoia-me só não o sabem ou não o manifestam” - todo um apoio popular. Ninguém governa sem achar que o faz bem, o melhor que sabe e no interesse da comunidade. Neste sentido todos são populistas porque é no bem comum que centram a sua governação. O grau de intensidade e explicitude com que o fazem é que é variável. São tacticistas e dissimulados.
As massas, o povo, esse é sempre genuíno. Bem ou mal defende o que acredita num dado momento. As massas populistas acreditam, e o populismo é uma forma de ver a política, em que o povo se sente prejudicado em relação a outros grupos. Este sentimento de injustiça é ainda agravado quando lhes foram dadas expectativas de um futuro radiante. Este é talvez o core comum às várias formas de populismo.
Para populismos com origem em grupos de menores rendimentos, o ressentimento de injustiça é dirigido para os grupos situados acima. Hostilizam por isso todas as elites, sejam elas económicas, sociais, culturais ou políticas. Noutras latitudes onde o descontentamento e sentimento de injustiça surge num grupo com espectativas mais elevadas, por exemplo na classe média, os ressentimentos viram-se para as classes em extratos superiores mas também para grupos socialmente inferiores. Manifestam-se assim contra imigração e todas as formas de importação de mão de obra que promovam a redução dos custos pelo lado da mão de obra. É por isso que são xenófobos e racistas. Mas também o são porque os governos desses países protegem os mais desfavorecidos dando-lhes regalias ou que não são concedidas à classe média. Existe assim um sentimento de revolta contra as elites e os mais desfavorecidos, sendo ambos vistos como a causa do “escorrega social”.
Para a classe média a externalização da economia industrial e a aposta nos sectores financeiros, da eletrónica e da informática como sendo os geram empregos bem pagos, faz com que tudo o que qualquer política que lembre globalização ou se assemelhe a neoliberalismo seja de imediato diabolizado.
Nas formas de populismo que emanam dos sectores da esquerda, sectores com maior escolaridade, a frustração vem do sentimento da sociedade se estar a transformar, e não para melhor, tanto pela deslocalização e externalização de sectores industriais produtivos, mas também pela transformação da sociedade numa miscelânea de sector financeiro com novas tecnologias. Estes sectores populistas de esquerda, tentaram ultrapassar a dialética da luta de classes (aliás não poderia ser de outra forma dado que o clássico capitalista se tinha mudado para outras longitudes) para assumirem causas fraturantes como: ambiente; inclusão racial; orientação sexual; igualdade de género; medidas de proteção social - Bernard Saunders.
Os movimentos populistas nos EUA surgiram em finais do seculo XIX quando o “People’s Party” se formou no Kansas enquanto associação de agricultores. Por esta altura, os partidos clássicos, democratas e republicanos, entendiam que o papel do governo era o de regular a moeda. Esta ausência de intervenção na economia permitiu que o monopólio dos caminhos de ferro estabelecesse. O agravamento dos custos dos transportes acrescido ao facto das pequenas explorações agrícolas estarem a dar lugar às grandes explorações, as quais baseavam a sua laboração numa mão de obra barata (imigrante) levou à falência de muitas unidades e ao aparecimento de um movimento popular dos que não se sentiam protegidos pelo governo de então. Estes movimentos tentaram-se apoiar em vários partidos políticos da época, maioritariamente da área socialista e influenciaram as políticas de então. Estes movimentos extinguiram-se tendo alguns anos e alguns dos seus elementos migraram para movimentos de extrema-direita como o Ku Klux Klan. Os ganhos destes movimentos foram espúrios mas a semente ficou e ao longo do século seguinte germinou por mais de uma vez.
Por vezes os movimentos populistas confundem-se com os seus líderes em especial se estes tiverem qualidade. Huey Long foi provavelmente o primeiro a expor esta relação. Nos anos 20 enquanto a europa tentava recuperar da grande guerra os EUA entraram no período que ficou conhecido como a grande depressão. Era na altura presidente dos EUA Herbert Hoover, e posteriormente em 1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt. Este último teve de lidar a depressão económica e ficou para a história como responsável pela elaboração de um plano de recuperação. Este plano, conhecido como “New Deal” não lidava com as desigualdades económicas, e tendia pelo contrário ao seu agravamento. Hey Long, um político do Louisiana foi candidato às eleições de 1936 (não foi a votos pois foi assassinado em 1935), e esteve na origem do movimento “Share our Wealth” em que foram usados slogans como “todos os homens são reis, mas nenhum usa coroa”. O sucesso foi tal que acabou por influenciar o “New Deal” e Roosevelt teve de incluir políticas sociais conducentes à redução das assimetrias.
A implementação do “New Deal” criou novas assimetrias sociais (ou não lhes deu resposta). George Wallace (Partido Democrata) tentou aproveitar este descontentamento ao defender o americano médio, que afirmava ser a principal vítima de um governo que protegia os ricos e tentava apoiar as classes mais desfavorecidas. Sendo um fervoroso apoiante do americano médio não se via como um político de direita ou de esquerda, nem como conservador ou liberal. Tal como Huey Long foi vítima de um atentado que o afastou da política, tendo reaparecido aquando da eleição Jimmy Carter. Apesar de nunca ter sido eleito, as suas posições marcaram definitivamente muitos candidatos presidenciais que desde então sempre se viram como antielitistas e antipolíticos de Washington.
O liberalismo do “New Deal” (1932 e 1968), se por um lado era favorável ao mundo dos negócios também tentava contrariar as tendências do capitalismo nomeadamente para o desemprego, desigualdades sociais, monopólios e destruição do ambiente. Na década de 70, com o aparecimento do neoliberalismo, a economia passou a ser promovida pelo lado da oferta, i.e., apoiando os sectores produtivos e o mundo do capital. Esta mudança na década de 70 levou ao abandono das políticas sociais e aumentou a clivagem entre o povo e as elites. Este afastamento deu espaço para o descontentamento dos que viam no fluxo de imigrantes, nos acordos comerciais (NAFTA), e numa nova elite de empregos bem remunerados no mundo da finança, tecnologia e eletrónica a origem do seu infortúnio. Dois líderes populistas corporizaram este descontentamento. Ross Perot que representava um populismo de esquerda, e Pat Buchanan um de direita. Contudo, nenhum deles se encaixava no conflito entre Repub. e Democ., tendo apenas como bandeira a do descontentamento popular.
Ross Perot, multimilionário americano compreendeu que para as multinacionais não existe responsabilidade social ou sentido de honra nos compromissos. Tudo o que existe são accionistas, estes dividem-se em contentes e descontentes. Numa altura em que as políticas neoliberais (externalização; deslocalização) levavam a uma destruição do tecido produtivo, Ross Perôt intuiu que estas políticas levariam a um aumento do desemprego e/ou a uma menor qualidade do mesmo. E foram estas massas populares que o político reformista (Republicano nos últimos anos) tentou mobilizar na sua oposição à globalização, aos grandes grupos económicos, à externalização das indústrias e aos acordos comerciais (NAFTA).
Pat Buchanan foi outro político da área republicana que concorreu às eleições presidenciais de 1992 e 1996. Visto como candidato de protesto, não almejou o sucesso que pretendia, mas as suas posições de alerta económico contra concorrentes como o japão e a Europa ocidental ficaram registados no subconsciente das hostes republicanas. Opunha-se à globalização, aos acordos comerciais como o GATT e o NAFTA. Opunha-se também à imigração ilegal quando afirmava “quem perde o controlo das fronteiras deixa de ter controlo do país”. Mas as políticas neoliberais pareciam estar a resultar. No meio deste sucesso, os movimentos populistas perderam um ímpeto que só veio a ser retomado aquando da crise de 2008.
O boom das tecnologias disponibilizou elevados recursos monetários que foram investidos no mundo financeiro. Aí e depois de devidamente maquilhados insuflaram o sector financeiro onde resultaram numa enorme bolha de déficit que estoirou em 2008. Mas esta crise não teve só aí a sua origem. Com a deslocalização dos sectores produtivos para países asiáticos, durante as presidências de Carter, Reagan e Clinton geram-se nesses países asiáticos superavits que foram reinvestidos no sector financeiro. Quando a bolha rebentou a pressão populista fez-se sentir de imediato. Mas enquanto no consulado de Roosevelt esta veio dos sectores da esquerda por Roos Perôt, com Obama ela surgiu da direita. Obama não soube reconhecer este descontentamento, governou ao centro e manteve uma posição de deferência com o mercado livre, Wall Street e o consumo. E a par destas posição teve políticas com apoio a bancos insolúveis, e criou o Obama Care para a população de mais baixos rendimentos. Tratava-se num novo programa social-democracia pós-new deal que o americano médio não aceitou, e o resultado foi o surgimento do movimento Tea Party. Este nunca foi uma organização unificada, tendo sido palco de variadas cisões de variadas áreas políticas. Raramente conseguiram uma acção concertada, exceção para o momento em que foram capturados por Donald Trump.
Mas o descontentamento popular não surgiu apenas nos sectores da direita. Também à esquerda surgiram movimentos populistas como o “Occupy Wall Street”. E as acusas não eram muito diferentes das dos populismos de direita. Apenas a prespectivas eram diferente bem como as soluções. O slogan usado era “nos somos os 99% que já não tolera a ganância e a corrupção dos um porcento”. O neoliberalismo, a globalização tinha falhado. O mundo financeiro, e o baseado nas novas tecnologias tinha falhado. A maré que tinha acompanhado o neoliberalismo afinal não tinha subido todos os barcos.
Mas estes movimentos foram inconsequentes e ineficientes na promoção de uma qualquer mudança. Para que estas viessem a acontecer seria necessário surgir uma liderança e uma que fosse eficaz, genuína e marcasse a diferença. Foi o caso de Donald Trump e Bernie Sanders.
O caso de Trump é muito curioso, pois sendo um liberal Keynisiano na economia, beneficiou muito da tradição populista da área republicana (Tea Party), da maioria silenciosa (Richard Nixon), e da tradição populista de Perôt e Buchanan. Mas rapidamente se apercebeu que isso não era suficiente, e a estes conceitos associou uma postura xenófoba, sexista, isolacionista (América first), antiglobalização, anti corporações, anti-imigração, anti comercio livre, anti Outsourcing e anti Offshoring. Soube magistralmente colar-se a esta roupagem e para a sua nova apresentação recorreu às suas competências mediáticas e de capacidade em chocar os adversários de modo a sublinhar no americano comum a clivagem entre o nós e os outros. Um populista nato a defender toda uma horda de populistas (expressões com por exemplo vamos construção de um muro e vamos obrigá-los a pagá-lo, mais não era do que propaganda e palavras de ordem). Curiosamente quando foi às urnas contra Hilary Clinton conseguiu recolher boa parte do apoio dos populistas da esquerda.
O caso de Bernie Sanders era diferente. Era genuíno, não usava as técnicas mediáticas de Trump, não tinha também uma posição racista, sexista ou anti-imigrantes, e defendia uma maior intervenção do estado na coisa pública e nas políticas sociais. Era anti-globalização, também isolacionista sem ser nacionalista e claramente defendia os 99% contra os 1%. Deu corpo ao movimento “Occupy Wall Street” e à sua genuinidade e combatividade pode ser atribuído o seu sucesso nomeadamente junto dos mais jovens.
Nunca um subtítulo foi tão elucidativo “Como a grande recessão transformou a política nos Estados Unidos e na Europa”.
John B Judis no seu livro “A explosão do populismo”, relata-nos a história dos movimentos populistas europeus e americanos desde o populismo russo de Narodniks - elites urbanas cultas da Rússia que nas décadas de 1860 e 1870, que numa postura romântica desconfiavam das cortes czaristas, da vida urbana, da industrialização e da ciência e propunham um regresso à vida no campo, a num socialismo agrário politicamente assente numa representação local inspirada no bom selvagem de JJ Rosseau; até às formas populistas americanas e europeias de finais dos anos 20 do século XXI.
Não tendo o populismo uma definição fácil, o autor aceita, pelo menos como ponto de partida a sugestão de Michael Kazin que identifica o populismo como uma linguagem de confronto, cujos intervenientes identificam o povo como um grupo não limitado a nenhuma classe social, e as elites como os adversários naturais. Na definição de Michael Karin há dois aspectos devem ser sublinhados. O primeiro é que no populismo há um aproveitamento por um líder desses sentimentos populares e uma massa popular. Essa dualidade está quase sempre presente. O segundo aspecto é que há sempre um confronto sem compromissos entre as elites e o povo.
Não havendo propriamente populismo de esquerda ou de direita, este pode ser dessa forma conotado de acordo com as suas origens. Os populismos de esquerda tendem a ser verticais, i.e., das classes inferiores contras o “establishment”, enquanto que os de direita tendem a não ser classicistas. Orientam-se contra as elites, mas também e em especial no do norte da europa contra a imigração em especial contra a islamita e a subsariana.
O populismo tal como o conhecemos nos séculos XX e XXI teve as suas origens na democracia representativa americana. O processo eleitoral americano ao proteger a formação de maiorias não deixa espaço para outras posições minoritárias ou dos extremos do especto político. É ao centro que se ganham eleições. Ora daqui decorre os partidos tendem a aproximar as suas posições ao centro de onde resultam habitualmente compromissos, alguma sobreposição de posições e um deliberado descuido das posições dos extremos. Estes quando crescem assumem proporções de peso e podem influenciar o governo, e por vezes tomar esse mesmo governo. Neste processo não há propriamente fronteiras e é habitual verem-se movimentos com mudanças de posição da esquerda para a direita ou em sentido oposto.
Há uma distinção entre políticos e massas populistas. Os líderes políticos são todos eles populistas. Na sua condição de líder, sejam eleitos ou designados têm sempre de se sentir reconhecidos e acarinhados pelos que lideram, ainda que alguns, os mais ditatoriais e autocráticos remetam para um imaginário junguiano – “a população no fundo apoia-me só não o sabem ou não o manifestam” - todo um apoio popular. Ninguém governa sem achar que o faz bem, o melhor que sabe e no interesse da comunidade. Neste sentido todos são populistas porque é no bem comum que centram a sua governação. O grau de intensidade e explicitude com que o fazem é que é variável. São tacticistas e dissimulados.
As massas, o povo, esse é sempre genuíno. Bem ou mal defende o que acredita num dado momento. As massas populistas acreditam, e o populismo é uma forma de ver a política, em que o povo se sente prejudicado em relação a outros grupos. Este sentimento de injustiça é ainda agravado quando lhes foram dadas expectativas de um futuro radiante. Este é talvez o core comum às várias formas de populismo.
Para populismos com origem em grupos de menores rendimentos, o ressentimento de injustiça é dirigido para os grupos situados acima. Hostilizam por isso todas as elites, sejam elas económicas, sociais, culturais ou políticas. Noutras latitudes onde o descontentamento e sentimento de injustiça surge num grupo com espectativas mais elevadas, por exemplo na classe média, os ressentimentos viram-se para as classes em extratos superiores mas também para grupos socialmente inferiores. Manifestam-se assim contra imigração e todas as formas de importação de mão de obra que promovam a redução dos custos pelo lado da mão de obra. É por isso que são xenófobos e racistas. Mas também o são porque os governos desses países protegem os mais desfavorecidos dando-lhes regalias ou que não são concedidas à classe média. Existe assim um sentimento de revolta contra as elites e os mais desfavorecidos, sendo ambos vistos como a causa do “escorrega social”.
Para a classe média a externalização da economia industrial e a aposta nos sectores financeiros, da eletrónica e da informática como sendo os geram empregos bem pagos, faz com que tudo o que qualquer política que lembre globalização ou se assemelhe a neoliberalismo seja de imediato diabolizado.
Nas formas de populismo que emanam dos sectores da esquerda, sectores com maior escolaridade, a frustração vem do sentimento da sociedade se estar a transformar, e não para melhor, tanto pela deslocalização e externalização de sectores industriais produtivos, mas também pela transformação da sociedade numa miscelânea de sector financeiro com novas tecnologias. Estes sectores populistas de esquerda, tentaram ultrapassar a dialética da luta de classes (aliás não poderia ser de outra forma dado que o clássico capitalista se tinha mudado para outras longitudes) para assumirem causas fraturantes como: ambiente; inclusão racial; orientação sexual; igualdade de género; medidas de proteção social - Bernard Saunders.
Os movimentos populistas nos EUA surgiram em finais do seculo XIX quando o “People’s Party” se formou no Kansas enquanto associação de agricultores. Por esta altura, os partidos clássicos, democratas e republicanos, entendiam que o papel do governo era o de regular a moeda. Esta ausência de intervenção na economia permitiu que o monopólio dos caminhos de ferro estabelecesse. O agravamento dos custos dos transportes acrescido ao facto das pequenas explorações agrícolas estarem a dar lugar às grandes explorações, as quais baseavam a sua laboração numa mão de obra barata (imigrante) levou à falência de muitas unidades e ao aparecimento de um movimento popular dos que não se sentiam protegidos pelo governo de então. Estes movimentos tentaram-se apoiar em vários partidos políticos da época, maioritariamente da área socialista e influenciaram as políticas de então. Estes movimentos extinguiram-se tendo alguns anos e alguns dos seus elementos migraram para movimentos de extrema-direita como o Ku Klux Klan. Os ganhos destes movimentos foram espúrios mas a semente ficou e ao longo do século seguinte germinou por mais de uma vez.
Por vezes os movimentos populistas confundem-se com os seus líderes em especial se estes tiverem qualidade. Huey Long foi provavelmente o primeiro a expor esta relação. Nos anos 20 enquanto a europa tentava recuperar da grande guerra os EUA entraram no período que ficou conhecido como a grande depressão. Era na altura presidente dos EUA Herbert Hoover, e posteriormente em 1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt. Este último teve de lidar a depressão económica e ficou para a história como responsável pela elaboração de um plano de recuperação. Este plano, conhecido como “New Deal” não lidava com as desigualdades económicas, e tendia pelo contrário ao seu agravamento. Hey Long, um político do Louisiana foi candidato às eleições de 1936 (não foi a votos pois foi assassinado em 1935), e esteve na origem do movimento “Share our Wealth” em que foram usados slogans como “todos os homens são reis, mas nenhum usa coroa”. O sucesso foi tal que acabou por influenciar o “New Deal” e Roosevelt teve de incluir políticas sociais conducentes à redução das assimetrias.
A implementação do “New Deal” criou novas assimetrias sociais (ou não lhes deu resposta). George Wallace (Partido Democrata) tentou aproveitar este descontentamento ao defender o americano médio, que afirmava ser a principal vítima de um governo que protegia os ricos e tentava apoiar as classes mais desfavorecidas. Sendo um fervoroso apoiante do americano médio não se via como um político de direita ou de esquerda, nem como conservador ou liberal. Tal como Huey Long foi vítima de um atentado que o afastou da política, tendo reaparecido aquando da eleição Jimmy Carter. Apesar de nunca ter sido eleito, as suas posições marcaram definitivamente muitos candidatos presidenciais que desde então sempre se viram como antielitistas e antipolíticos de Washington.
O liberalismo do “New Deal” (1932 e 1968), se por um lado era favorável ao mundo dos negócios também tentava contrariar as tendências do capitalismo nomeadamente para o desemprego, desigualdades sociais, monopólios e destruição do ambiente. Na década de 70, com o aparecimento do neoliberalismo, a economia passou a ser promovida pelo lado da oferta, i.e., apoiando os sectores produtivos e o mundo do capital. Esta mudança na década de 70 levou ao abandono das políticas sociais e aumentou a clivagem entre o povo e as elites. Este afastamento deu espaço para o descontentamento dos que viam no fluxo de imigrantes, nos acordos comerciais (NAFTA), e numa nova elite de empregos bem remunerados no mundo da finança, tecnologia e eletrónica a origem do seu infortúnio. Dois líderes populistas corporizaram este descontentamento. Ross Perot que representava um populismo de esquerda, e Pat Buchanan um de direita. Contudo, nenhum deles se encaixava no conflito entre Repub. e Democ., tendo apenas como bandeira a do descontentamento popular.
Ross Perot, multimilionário americano compreendeu que para as multinacionais não existe responsabilidade social ou sentido de honra nos compromissos. Tudo o que existe são accionistas, estes dividem-se em contentes e descontentes. Numa altura em que as políticas neoliberais (externalização; deslocalização) levavam a uma destruição do tecido produtivo, Ross Perôt intuiu que estas políticas levariam a um aumento do desemprego e/ou a uma menor qualidade do mesmo. E foram estas massas populares que o político reformista (Republicano nos últimos anos) tentou mobilizar na sua oposição à globalização, aos grandes grupos económicos, à externalização das indústrias e aos acordos comerciais (NAFTA).
Pat Buchanan foi outro político da área republicana que concorreu às eleições presidenciais de 1992 e 1996. Visto como candidato de protesto, não almejou o sucesso que pretendia, mas as suas posições de alerta económico contra concorrentes como o japão e a Europa ocidental ficaram registados no subconsciente das hostes republicanas. Opunha-se à globalização, aos acordos comerciais como o GATT e o NAFTA. Opunha-se também à imigração ilegal quando afirmava “quem perde o controlo das fronteiras deixa de ter controlo do país”. Mas as políticas neoliberais pareciam estar a resultar. No meio deste sucesso, os movimentos populistas perderam um ímpeto que só veio a ser retomado aquando da crise de 2008.
O boom das tecnologias disponibilizou elevados recursos monetários que foram investidos no mundo financeiro. Aí e depois de devidamente maquilhados insuflaram o sector financeiro onde resultaram numa enorme bolha de déficit que estoirou em 2008. Mas esta crise não teve só aí a sua origem. Com a deslocalização dos sectores produtivos para países asiáticos, durante as presidências de Carter, Reagan e Clinton geram-se nesses países asiáticos superavits que foram reinvestidos no sector financeiro. Quando a bolha rebentou a pressão populista fez-se sentir de imediato. Mas enquanto no consulado de Roosevelt esta veio dos sectores da esquerda por Roos Perôt, com Obama ela surgiu da direita. Obama não soube reconhecer este descontentamento, governou ao centro e manteve uma posição de deferência com o mercado livre, Wall Street e o consumo. E a par destas posição teve políticas com apoio a bancos insolúveis, e criou o Obama Care para a população de mais baixos rendimentos. Tratava-se num novo programa social-democracia pós-new deal que o americano médio não aceitou, e o resultado foi o surgimento do movimento Tea Party. Este nunca foi uma organização unificada, tendo sido palco de variadas cisões de variadas áreas políticas. Raramente conseguiram uma acção concertada, exceção para o momento em que foram capturados por Donald Trump.
Mas o descontentamento popular não surgiu apenas nos sectores da direita. Também à esquerda surgiram movimentos populistas como o “Occupy Wall Street”. E as acusas não eram muito diferentes das dos populismos de direita. Apenas a prespectivas eram diferente bem como as soluções. O slogan usado era “nos somos os 99% que já não tolera a ganância e a corrupção dos um porcento”. O neoliberalismo, a globalização tinha falhado. O mundo financeiro, e o baseado nas novas tecnologias tinha falhado. A maré que tinha acompanhado o neoliberalismo afinal não tinha subido todos os barcos.
Mas estes movimentos foram inconsequentes e ineficientes na promoção de uma qualquer mudança. Para que estas viessem a acontecer seria necessário surgir uma liderança e uma que fosse eficaz, genuína e marcasse a diferença. Foi o caso de Donald Trump e Bernie Sanders.
O caso de Trump é muito curioso, pois sendo um liberal Keynisiano na economia, beneficiou muito da tradição populista da área republicana (Tea Party), da maioria silenciosa (Richard Nixon), e da tradição populista de Perôt e Buchanan. Mas rapidamente se apercebeu que isso não era suficiente, e a estes conceitos associou uma postura xenófoba, sexista, isolacionista (América first), antiglobalização, anti corporações, anti-imigração, anti comercio livre, anti Outsourcing e anti Offshoring. Soube magistralmente colar-se a esta roupagem e para a sua nova apresentação recorreu às suas competências mediáticas e de capacidade em chocar os adversários de modo a sublinhar no americano comum a clivagem entre o nós e os outros. Um populista nato a defender toda uma horda de populistas (expressões com por exemplo vamos construção de um muro e vamos obrigá-los a pagá-lo, mais não era do que propaganda e palavras de ordem). Curiosamente quando foi às urnas contra Hilary Clinton conseguiu recolher boa parte do apoio dos populistas da esquerda.
O caso de Bernie Sanders era diferente. Era genuíno, não usava as técnicas mediáticas de Trump, não tinha também uma posição racista, sexista ou anti-imigrantes, e defendia uma maior intervenção do estado na coisa pública e nas políticas sociais. Era anti-globalização, também isolacionista sem ser nacionalista e claramente defendia os 99% contra os 1%. Deu corpo ao movimento “Occupy Wall Street” e à sua genuinidade e combatividade pode ser atribuído o seu sucesso nomeadamente junto dos mais jovens.
January 8, 2021
A very effective little book that provides a great way to understand the return of populism in the US and Europe. Populism, according to Judis, can be either right or left, and even its right leaning manifestations today (Trump, UKIP, FN, Geert Wilders) are not small gov't free market conservatives. Populism is usually a movement to try to break some kind of bipartisan, elite consensus (like neoliberalism or, in the case of the original Populists, free market capitalism and the gold standard) that is harmful to many common people by designing a politics that puts the virtuous people against the iniquitous elite. Left populism (the People's Party, Long, Perot maybe, Bernie) pits the people against the economic elite, but it isn't always or necessarily socialist. Podemos in Spain, for instance, has softened much of its socialism recently. Right populism (UKIP, Trump, Wallace, Buchanan, FN), in contrast, pits the people against the elite but with more emphasis on the cultural/intellectual elite (elitists). Right populism also frequently tars a marginalized group (Muslim immigrants, African-Americans, Jews, the unemployed) as siphoning wealth from the hard working everyman. Right populism sees a conspiratorial alliance between the iniquitous minorities and the elite and seeks to return the "real people" to power to break up that alliance.
Judis walks through how the Great Recession worsened ordinary people's economic situations and lowered their faith in government, the neoliberal consensus, and in the existing parties. In the US, this manifested in the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street, Sanders, and Trump, all of which opposed neoliberalism and the elite (at least rhetorically). In Europe, where you also had the crisis of the Euro itself, which ran deeper than the 2008 collapse, you had a spike in popularity of parties opposing the EU, free trade, immigration and multiculturalism, and the EU itself. These parties haven't quite taken over, but they have shifted the political ground and become a permanent part of the landscape. Of course, the inherent challenge of being a populist party is that you can only have that outsider cool and energy and legitimacy for so long; eventually, to exercise power and change laws, you have to institutionalize, which leaves one vulnerable to charges of becoming the new establishment.
Judis ends with a wise assessment of populism. Populism obviously comes with a certain self-righteousness, and especially on the right it has included significant racism, conspiracism, and other bad stuff. Populists, when they actually get power, often have no idea what they are doing. However, Judis notes that we need to see populism as a sort of political canary or warning sign: populist surges are legitimacy crises. They usually suggest that the existing political paradigm isn't serving a vast swathe of the people and that the parties may be too similar. Whatever you think of the flaws and excesses of modern populism, and they are many, these parties are responding to (at least politically, if not in reality) real problems: deindustrialization, offshoring of jobs, wage competition with newcomers, a sense of cultural decay, etc. Deal with the problems, and you can take the winds out of populist sails.
I recommend this to anyone looking to get a sense of recent shifts in European and American politics as well as what exactly populism is. I'm also going to read his "Nationalist Revival" to get the cultural/intellectual side of these politics shifts. Some of the financial details in here are a bit dull, but Judis keeps things moving, and overall the book is very interesting.
Judis walks through how the Great Recession worsened ordinary people's economic situations and lowered their faith in government, the neoliberal consensus, and in the existing parties. In the US, this manifested in the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street, Sanders, and Trump, all of which opposed neoliberalism and the elite (at least rhetorically). In Europe, where you also had the crisis of the Euro itself, which ran deeper than the 2008 collapse, you had a spike in popularity of parties opposing the EU, free trade, immigration and multiculturalism, and the EU itself. These parties haven't quite taken over, but they have shifted the political ground and become a permanent part of the landscape. Of course, the inherent challenge of being a populist party is that you can only have that outsider cool and energy and legitimacy for so long; eventually, to exercise power and change laws, you have to institutionalize, which leaves one vulnerable to charges of becoming the new establishment.
Judis ends with a wise assessment of populism. Populism obviously comes with a certain self-righteousness, and especially on the right it has included significant racism, conspiracism, and other bad stuff. Populists, when they actually get power, often have no idea what they are doing. However, Judis notes that we need to see populism as a sort of political canary or warning sign: populist surges are legitimacy crises. They usually suggest that the existing political paradigm isn't serving a vast swathe of the people and that the parties may be too similar. Whatever you think of the flaws and excesses of modern populism, and they are many, these parties are responding to (at least politically, if not in reality) real problems: deindustrialization, offshoring of jobs, wage competition with newcomers, a sense of cultural decay, etc. Deal with the problems, and you can take the winds out of populist sails.
I recommend this to anyone looking to get a sense of recent shifts in European and American politics as well as what exactly populism is. I'm also going to read his "Nationalist Revival" to get the cultural/intellectual side of these politics shifts. Some of the financial details in here are a bit dull, but Judis keeps things moving, and overall the book is very interesting.
September 13, 2017
This fairly brief book takes a look at recent popular movements that have evolved since the 2008 banking crisis and resulting recession. Judis zeroes in on the Tea Party movement during Obama's first year in office, the Occupy Wall Street movement that followed, and rounds things out with the populists supporting both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential primary and election.
More importantly Judis places these into a context in American history and from that is able to pinpoint fairly common outcomes from those popular movements. He looks at the early "free silver" drive that pushed William Jennings Bryant into his runs for the presidency. He also reviews the various movements that arose out of the Great Depression, from the groups that supported FDR's election to some of the counter movements with figures as varied as Father Coughlin and Huey Long. He also looks at the conservative populists supporting George Wallace's run in 1968 and the difficult-to-categorize run of Ross Perot in 1996.
Judis shows how these movements can drive both allied and opposition parties into unexpected directions, such as the Bryant populists helping to move Theodore Roosevelt into Republican progressivism and Long's potential primary run moving FDR further left in 1936.
The history of popular movements certainly goes deeper into history than the late 19th century depressions. America was both created and nearly destroyed by popular movements. In an English language context you could go back as far as John Ball or internationally to Spartacus. Judis was probably wise to keep things within the framework of the modern US two-party system, and he does contrast that with the more flexible parliamentary systems in Europe that allow ... or force ... coalitions providing populist groups a greater voice in government.
It's a plain-spoken book that doesn't take on (or deserve) scholarly pretensions. Judis covers his history with enough interesting tidbits to help the book flow well. For anyone pondering current political movements or scratching his head after 2016 it's a useful overview.
More importantly Judis places these into a context in American history and from that is able to pinpoint fairly common outcomes from those popular movements. He looks at the early "free silver" drive that pushed William Jennings Bryant into his runs for the presidency. He also reviews the various movements that arose out of the Great Depression, from the groups that supported FDR's election to some of the counter movements with figures as varied as Father Coughlin and Huey Long. He also looks at the conservative populists supporting George Wallace's run in 1968 and the difficult-to-categorize run of Ross Perot in 1996.
Judis shows how these movements can drive both allied and opposition parties into unexpected directions, such as the Bryant populists helping to move Theodore Roosevelt into Republican progressivism and Long's potential primary run moving FDR further left in 1936.
The history of popular movements certainly goes deeper into history than the late 19th century depressions. America was both created and nearly destroyed by popular movements. In an English language context you could go back as far as John Ball or internationally to Spartacus. Judis was probably wise to keep things within the framework of the modern US two-party system, and he does contrast that with the more flexible parliamentary systems in Europe that allow ... or force ... coalitions providing populist groups a greater voice in government.
It's a plain-spoken book that doesn't take on (or deserve) scholarly pretensions. Judis covers his history with enough interesting tidbits to help the book flow well. For anyone pondering current political movements or scratching his head after 2016 it's a useful overview.
December 10, 2020
We are currently undergoing the third reverse wave of democratization (Huntington) or what others called the third wave of autocratization (Levitsky). In other words, representative democracy as a political model is facing a crisis which has been encouraging an outbreak of populist parties and campaigns, mostly in Western Europe and Latin America, but also the US and Eastern Europe. The thread connecting all of these critical symptoms is representation and, more specifically, the extent to which citizen representation is still capable of keeping rulers accountable and ensuring legitimacy.
Therefore, in this context, populism -an abstract political logic- has emerged as a warning sign of different political crisis. It is also in this context that Judis analyses the populist explosion led by politicians such as Pat Buchanan, Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen or Pablo Iglesias among others.
Most of the populist movements in the US and Western Europe have flourished when they are in opposition but have sometimes suffered identity crisis when they have entered government (UKIP, Syriza, etc). This could explain why many academics have approached populism as a discoursive theory (Laclau & Mouffe). But as some of these populist parties were able to win elections many others began to wonder what happens when populists take over (Orban, Chavez, Trump etc…)?
Overall, the main difference between populism in the US & Western Europe and populism in LATAM is that the latter have sometimes tried to subvert the democratic competition for power, while the populist campaigns and parties from the first two have embraced it. Therefore, populism does not inevitably bring democracy or democratization. On the contrary, it often institutes a hybrid plesbiscitarian regime where liberal democracy is either weakened or overruled.
Therefore, in this context, populism -an abstract political logic- has emerged as a warning sign of different political crisis. It is also in this context that Judis analyses the populist explosion led by politicians such as Pat Buchanan, Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen or Pablo Iglesias among others.
Most of the populist movements in the US and Western Europe have flourished when they are in opposition but have sometimes suffered identity crisis when they have entered government (UKIP, Syriza, etc). This could explain why many academics have approached populism as a discoursive theory (Laclau & Mouffe). But as some of these populist parties were able to win elections many others began to wonder what happens when populists take over (Orban, Chavez, Trump etc…)?
Overall, the main difference between populism in the US & Western Europe and populism in LATAM is that the latter have sometimes tried to subvert the democratic competition for power, while the populist campaigns and parties from the first two have embraced it. Therefore, populism does not inevitably bring democracy or democratization. On the contrary, it often institutes a hybrid plesbiscitarian regime where liberal democracy is either weakened or overruled.
February 16, 2019
2.5 ⭐
Я рада що в цій книгі не 300 сторінок, бо я б мабуть не дочитала! Таке враження, що тепер мені знайома вся історія демократії в США з точки зору популізму (не буду сперечатися, для американців вона має бути корисною і знайомою). Та я більше шукала теорії: що таке популізм, які його риси, як він впливає на політичну ситуацію в країні, тощо.
Звичайно ці висновки можна зробити і самому через наявні приклади з історії США. Але хотілося щоб більше було Європи, і менше нюансів, хто з ким і як, бо імена американських політиків починаючи з 1800—тих одразу вивітрилися з моєї голови. Хоча про Трампа, Брексіт, та добу 60-х (рухи проти сегрегації, феміністичні рухи, анти-воєнні рухи) мені було цікаво дізнатись, як там все крутилось і вертілося.
Так що ж таке той популізм?
Популізм - концепція "народу", що протистоїть еліті, яка відмовляється або уникає задоволення вимог щодо необхідних реформ у країні.
А ще підйом популістичних рухів в країні свідчить про глибоку політичну кризу, та необхідність проведення змін.
І популісти завжди видумують, якісь нереальні плани, і грають на надіях зневіреної більшості. І це не означає, що прийшовши до влади вони зможуть зробити щось краще.
Не вірте популістам і в розових словників, думайте логічно!
Я рада що в цій книгі не 300 сторінок, бо я б мабуть не дочитала! Таке враження, що тепер мені знайома вся історія демократії в США з точки зору популізму (не буду сперечатися, для американців вона має бути корисною і знайомою). Та я більше шукала теорії: що таке популізм, які його риси, як він впливає на політичну ситуацію в країні, тощо.
Звичайно ці висновки можна зробити і самому через наявні приклади з історії США. Але хотілося щоб більше було Європи, і менше нюансів, хто з ким і як, бо імена американських політиків починаючи з 1800—тих одразу вивітрилися з моєї голови. Хоча про Трампа, Брексіт, та добу 60-х (рухи проти сегрегації, феміністичні рухи, анти-воєнні рухи) мені було цікаво дізнатись, як там все крутилось і вертілося.
Так що ж таке той популізм?
Популізм - концепція "народу", що протистоїть еліті, яка відмовляється або уникає задоволення вимог щодо необхідних реформ у країні.
А ще підйом популістичних рухів в країні свідчить про глибоку політичну кризу, та необхідність проведення змін.
І популісти завжди видумують, якісь нереальні плани, і грають на надіях зневіреної більшості. І це не означає, що прийшовши до влади вони зможуть зробити щось краще.
Не вірте популістам і в розових словників, думайте логічно!
January 20, 2021
Джон Джудіс написав книжку про популізм, яка пояснює феномен електоральної підтримки Трампа, ще до його перемоги на президентських виборах в 2016-му. І книжка залишається актуальною навіть після програшу Трампа на виборах 2020-го. «Великий вибух популізму» розповідає, чому популізм з’явився в Америці не в день обрання Трампа, а виник в США ще в XIX столітті, і чому він нікуди не зникне в довгостроковій перспективі: ані в США, ані у світі.
Популізм потрібно розуміти краще, тим паче, що і український президент Зеленський виграв вибори саме як популіст. Якщо спробувати звести книжку до одного речення, то напишу так: популісти піднімають реальні проблеми, які пануючі еліти (як влада, так і опозиція) не помічають в силу різних причин. І навіть якщо популісти не приходять до влади, їх ідеї поступово змінюють політичну адженду, оскільки проблеми самі собою не зникають.
Популізм потрібно розуміти краще, тим паче, що і український президент Зеленський виграв вибори саме як популіст. Якщо спробувати звести книжку до одного речення, то напишу так: популісти піднімають реальні проблеми, які пануючі еліти (як влада, так і опозиція) не помічають в силу різних причин. І навіть якщо популісти не приходять до влади, їх ідеї поступово змінюють політичну адженду, оскільки проблеми самі собою не зникають.
August 26, 2017
This book is a treatise on the history of populism and persuades me that its current rise in the US and Europe can be explained primarily by economics. As capital and immigrants can move around the globe, workers earning low wages are threatened. Populist movements arise to curb the outflow of capital (keep factories in America to keep jobs in America) and the inflow of immigrants (build the wall to prevent cheap labor from depressing wages, especially of low-skilled jobs). Many middle- and lower-middle class people are struggling, scared, and pessimistic. The major political parties have ignored or belittled their worries. Populism is their angry response.
The chapter on Greece and Spain is weakest.
The chapter on Greece and Spain is weakest.
February 22, 2018
A bit dry though concise overview of the changes in European and American politics as a result of economic crisis and immigration: populism. Judis terms a 'left-wing' dyadic populism (Bernie Sanders; Podemos) that aims it arrows at the financial and political elites and a 'right-wing' tryadic kind (Trump, Le Pen), which attacks a lower-class out-group as well. Judis shows historical roots of American populism, discussing among others Wallace, Perot, Buchanan. In its core, the populist "explosion" is framed as a gradual erosion of the neoliberal consensus (sketchy term, but well outlined in the book), a vacuum filled from the left as well as from the right.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
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February 6, 2017Historisch overzicht van populisme, vooral in de VS. Laat zien dat de populisten het economische programma links overnemen. Ross Perrot was al tegen de handelsverdragen. Het boek is geschreven voordat de overwinning van Trump bekend was en uit de tekst blijkt dat de auteur hierover wel verbaasd zal zijn geweest.
November 8, 2018
Mr John B. Judis brilliantly goes into depth of populism and triggers my opinions, inspiration and interest. As a young reader intrigued in politics and wanting to know more, I unfortunately abandoned this book, as I spent a lot of time researching and not being able to keep up with the information and ideas written. I am aware that this book is targeted at an older audience, but if you haven't learnt or read about politics before, this may be a difficult read.
May 1, 2019
It is hard to say, as with most contemporary discussions of political trends, to what degree this book is providing an insightful commentary or spinning a narrative out of whole cloth that ultimately confuses causation and correlation. However, it sets out an interesting frame for considering the evolution of populism in America and Europe since the Great Recession.
July 15, 2022
A good overview on politics and specifically populistic politics around the world. The last 15% of the book does a very good summary of the current status across the globe. Although Asia has been left out in most of the case studies, but it is justified as well. I enjoyed reading the book
September 11, 2021
This book was a good, quick survey briefly covering all the places mentioned in the title in just a few pages each--an inch deep and a mile long.
August 26, 2024
Ok ngl I skimmed the Europe chapters
This was kind of interesting but also a little dull. Also aged sooooo bad by predicting trump was unlikely to win in 2016
This was kind of interesting but also a little dull. Also aged sooooo bad by predicting trump was unlikely to win in 2016
September 16, 2022
It was a useful book for me. I knew about populist as a political force, but not so deep as the author described.
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