Timothy Morton’s attitude toward environmentalism is both essential and rooted in reductionist assertions, which makes this book rather complicated. On the one hand, he creatively applies to environmental concerns his philosophical approach to how we interpret phenomena, how we understand wholes and parts, and how we differentiate existence from presence in an accessible and popular style; on the other hand, he romanticizes non-hierarchical, pre-Neolithic human existence and somehow attributes all injustice and oppression to civic monotheism which, for more than ten-thousand years, has evidently ensnared us in its tendrils and made it difficult to think in new, more innovative and more just ways. While it is hard to pin down Morton’s thesis (since this book, albeit slim, touches on so much), his main claim is that the most ubiquitous form of environmental discourse at present—wherein scientists, philosophers, politicians, and activists “dump” massive quantities of information on a relatively uninformed public in an effort to persuade us all to act quickly and definitively to avoid climate catastrophe—impedes the very outcomes we desire most. These immense data dumps both reinforce the myth that climate catastrophe is imminent, rather than presently upon us, and the myth that we still have time to remake our society or restructure our economic behaviors—colossal tasks that still perpetuate our human lust for domination and control. This type of data dump discourse, Morton writes, is “exactly the opposite of what we need in order to comprehend where we are and why—to start to live the data.” The question that everyone asks in this mode of discourse—“so what can we do?”—“wants to see ahead and anticipate and know what to do, in advance. That’s what we can’t do,” Morton insists. “That’s exactly why all this happened.”
In the first half of the book, Morton takes pains to defend this thesis. He sketches why any so-called objective notion of truth is suspicious and, with a nod toward Stephen Colbert, defends a notion of truthiness. This may strike some readers as peculiar—why, when so many climate deniers impede efforts to address climate justice, should we rely less on facts?—yet Morton’s point is philosophical, and spot on. We can never entirely know an object: when we see or touch or bite into an apple, we access apple data, never the apple itself. We have no idea what it is like for a worm to tunnel into the apple, for instance, nor do we know each and every scientific property of any apple we eat. And even if we did have this data, we would still never know the essence of the apple, the apple itself. For Morton, there are other, less obvious objects that exist and are not entirely present to us: these he calls “hyper-objects,” such as climate, evolution, and the biosphere. He meticulously explains—in rather quirky, non-philosophical prose—why hyper-objects exist in the same way as apples, even if such objects contain many parts. One could think that the biosphere, for instance, insofar as it contains all lifeforms (Morton’s preferred term), is a whole, and that this whole exceeds the sum of its parts. People, apples, trees, rocks, etc. are all parts of the biosphere, yet the biosphere outstrips them all in its very existence. This, Morton persuasively demonstrates, is profoundly mistaken: the biosphere is an object like any other object, a phenomenon like any other phenomenon, and it exists in the same way and on the same level as any one of its smaller parts. While hyper-objects are massive in scope and thus distributed across vast time and space, they elude our efforts to know them fully for the same reason the apple eludes our attempts to know it and therefore control it. We can never access the biosphere or the climate fully, we are in fact parts of the biosphere and the climate, and yet the biosphere and climate are each smaller than the sum total of their respective parts. Once we have a handle on this, Morton believes, we can start to think and act in a more environmentally-conscious manner.
Part and parcel of Morton’s effort to reorient how we think about our relationship with what we call Nature (a term Morton in fact wants to dismiss, since it implies a radical distance between us humans and the environment in which we live, as if we could neatly separate those interconnected “realms” of existence), is his attempt to show how radically interrelated all objects are. He is up-front about the fact that such “web of life” discourse is ubiquitous and cliché, yet he aptly observes how so few people can explain what they mean when they repeat such platitudes. Morton nonetheless defends this rather kitsch axiom with recourse to thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. When we apprehend an object, he explains, there is never just the I, the subject, and the object, which passively awaits my contemplation. Each object is part of a manifold, a complex context or interpretive system wherein the object has various connotations and denotations and is used in a myriad of ways by countless different lifeforms. So while I, a human eater of apples, eat the apple, the worm, a tunneler of apples, tunnels into it, and the scientist, an observer of apples, observes its skin underneath a microscope. To push this further, whereas the apple is a source of nourishment and enjoyment for me, the forbidden fruit also exerts powerful symbolism in some people’s recollection of Genesis (nota bene: Genesis never states that the fruit is in fact an apple). Every object is a manifold, no object is just itself, and thus each object resists our anthropocentric efforts to manipulate it at will. We can never fully possess an object since an object always exists in a different way or for a different purpose in another context. With respect to environmental issues, the upshot of such manifold ubiquity is “explosive” interconnectedness that, in Morton’s view, levels out some “monotheistic” hierarchy of existence (a reductionist characterization, more on this later). To echo an earlier point, once we appreciate this “context explosion,” Morton believes, we can more successfully avoid the pitfalls of data-dump environmentalism mode and better appreciate the serious issues we face.
For all his deconstructive efforts, Morton’s project is ultimately constructive as well. He is, as noted, deeply suspicious of our “constant and very particular orientation to the future—what needs to be done. . . . You think future and you think radically different than the present.” Yet Morton wants to drive at a more fundamental, more existential, and less utilitarian reorientation toward the world that involves what he calls attunement, rather than plans for revolutions to remake society. When we are attuned to our environment, to creatures both biotic and abiotic, we relate to such creatures for “no particular reason.” This is a rather indistinct notion that Morton develops for most of the book; the essential point is, however, that each and every object and lifeform we encounter can speak to us, as it were, and that we should attend to this expression, relate to it, and let it determine us and our actions. In effect, Morton refutes the supremacy of Kant’s transcendental subject and re-enchants the nonhuman environment with the power to meet and confront us from a place of real, non-illusory alterity.
Morton does this with philosophical dexterity; for all his apparent mysticism, Morton is not a mystic, and the case he presents in this book is scrupulously philosophical. In attunement, we are “tuned” by what we encounter insofar as we can never, via our own efforts at perception, interpretation, etc., impose an exhaustive identity on an object, just as we can never determine its essence with any certainty. It exists outside of us and actively exerts power over us: art, for example, draws us in, captures our attention, reorients the way we approach other objects. “Art is telepathic—it’s spooky action at a distance,” Morton writes. He even wants to say that art and other objects temporalize us—that is, they literally provide us with time, albeit a more fundamental time than clock-time. “How it looks, how it feels . . . its mass, its shape—all that, which we could call appearance, is the past.” How the art will affect me, how it will prompt certain reflections and projections in me, how it shapes the way I look at it and other objects hereafter, when I see in some other object that which I see now, in this object—all this is the future. The present is “a sort of train-station” wherein past and future meet, “a kind of relative motion between . . . past and future. I call it nowness to differentiate it from a reified atomic ‘present’ that I actually don’t think truly exists,” Morton explains. To the correlationists—such as the post-structuralists, who maintain that what we say objects are are in fact cultural constructs, “discursive products of epistemic formations” or “concepts we project onto certain lumps of matter”—Morton responds that “there has to be a correlatee as well as a correlator: there is a violin sonata, not just a violinist.” To be sure, we do decide what is real to a certain extent, yet this does not also mean that the correlator, be it the Kantian subject, the Nietzschean will to power, or Dasein, is more real than the objects we encounter. We do not simply determine them; they too, speak to us and consequently determine themselves.
Morton seeks to rediscover and recover the non-violent, non-dominant attunement he believes pre-Neolithic peoples practiced in accordance with their environment, and herein lies one of the book’s major flaws. Not unlike some of the thinkers he admires, Morton paints with an unfathomably broad brush; it is not hyperbolic to say that he attributes most, if not all of our modern woes, and most certainly climate catastrophe, to Neolithic domestication and concomitant monotheism. When humans started to farm, they were subsequently forced to continue to farm in order to stay alive, and the institutional structures that materialized as part of this revolution in human history were hierarchical, oppressive, and rooted in systematic domination. Humans came to see the environment as mere mindless, plastic stuff upon which they could act unilaterally, heedless to how and whether matter could speak to them, summon them, and transform them, as it had in the pre-Neolithic era. Fortunately, the philosophies of Immanuel Kant, Edmund Husserl, and subsequent twentieth century thinkers rediscovered how objects are both what they are and how they appear to us, and particularly that how they appear to us betrays some sense of what they actually are. This development, coupled with deconstructive efforts from the likes of Jacques Derrida and others, upended the traditional, static-substance metaphysics that arose when Neolithic humans started to farm; deconstruction has thus helped us rethink dichotomies between the human and non-human, the conscious and non-conscious, the sentient and non-sentient. As per this narrative, Morton contends, a new, leveled-out metaphysics has resurfaced, one which resembles the pre-Neolithic attunement practiced by earlier humans. Morton calls this metaphysics the spectral plain, and a less violent, more playful, perhaps even more indifferent posture toward the lifeforms that inhabit this spectral plain is the mode in which we should attend to climate catastrophe and the earth system more broadly.
There are numerous elements of this narrative that are both historically accurate and philosophically persuasive. The metaphysics toward which Morton alludes is the best defense of non-anthropocentric eco-centrism that I have thus far encountered. And his analysis of care is, albeit unintuitive and at first ostensibly unethical, much needed at a time when “what to do” dominates and actively undermines our conversations about the climate crisis. Yet Morton’s story weirdly romanticizes pre-Neolithic humans and pretends as if no other humans for more than ten-thousand years have also practiced what he calls attunement. Moreover, Morton unpersuasively maintains that Christianity particularly excludes such an attitude and its concomitant metaphysics, which is patently not the case. The monolithic narrative wherein Christian philosophers inherited from Plato a stark mind-body dualism and an otherworldly metaphysical orientation is reductionist and historically imprecise, and Morton simply seems to accept this narrative rather than provide evidence to justify his wholesale rejection of Christian or any other “monotheistic” philosophy. One need only read Thomas Aquinas and other medieval thinkers to see how important sense-perception is in their metaphysics, and one need only peruse Book XIV of City of God for an explicit patristic rejection of the mind-body dualism purportedly apparent in Platonism (which, for some philosophers, is not so obvious even in Plato).
To be sure, orthodox Christian metaphysics is hierarchical, yet hierarchy need not entail domination and, properly conceived, can more appropriately attend to relationality between different types of creatures and objects. Humans are, after all, profoundly different than prokaryotes, which is not to necessarily say we are better than them, or that our interests should always come first; nevertheless, it is to say that I have a metaphysically different sort of responsibility to other humans than I do to the bacteria that cover my skin and live inside my intestines, with whom I do, as Morton wants to stress, collaborate on a daily basis. Moreover, it is just not true that a Christian hierarchical view of the creation is at its core otherworldly. When Morton cherry-picks a quote from Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew—“Store up your treasure in heaven”—then explains that this “means you don’t need to worry so much about what happens down here, because it’s less real and less important,” he betrays a remarkably uncharitable and poor comprehension of creation metaphysics. As someone like Rowan Williams could inform Morton, an orthodox Christian view of the creation cultivates what Williams calls “a solidarity in creatureliness” that rejects the myth of self-creation and therefore dominance, which Morton likewise wants to unsettle. On a Christian view, the creation is not mindless, plastic stuff, even if, at the same time, it alone cannot provide the metaphysical fulfillment we all seek. Yet this latter accession need not—or rather should not, not ever—allay any Christian’s anxiety about what happens here, on earth, to the earth system. Just as God is utterly for the world—“God desires to be God for what is not God,” which is to be God, Williams explains—then we, in openness to the divine action, likewise strive to be for the world in the same way.
Consequently, monotheistic traditions—or at least the one with which I am most familiar—do not fit so neatly into the narrative Morton presents here; more importantly, they are not so hostile to his ultimate project as he seems to think. If we are to embody the non-calculative, non-dominant praxis that attunement reflects, we should attend to how other traditions and worldviews can inform, correct, or make more persuasive the case for such praxis. Grand, reductionist (and rather caustic) narratives of the history of “Neolithic” philosophy can only undermine this effort. Thus, while Morton adds so much to our impoverished environmental discourse, he needlessly excludes a whole host of helpful voices from such discourse. And this ultimately makes this book poorer than it otherwise could have been.