The Structural Evolution of Morality

by J. McKenzie Alexander

It is certainly the case that morality governs the interactions that take place between individuals. But what if morality exists because of these interactions? This book, first published in 2007, argues for the claim that much of the behaviour we view as 'moral' exists because acting in that way benefits each of us to the greatest extent possible, given the socially structured nature of society. Drawing upon aspects of evolutionary game theory, the theory of bounded rationality, and computational models of social networks, it shows both how moral behaviour can emerge in socially structured environments, and how it can persist even when it is not typically viewed as 'rational' from a traditional economic perspective. This book also provides a theory of how moral principles and the moral sentiments play an indispensable role in effective choice, acting as 'fast and frugal heuristics' in social decision contexts.

Genres: Philosophy

312 pages, Hardcover

First published January 14, 2007

Reviews

[Karl Strobl · Rating 2 out of 5]

Title: Extensive modelling, thin explanation
The premise is genuinely exciting: explain moral behaviour as what boundedly rational agents converge on when they interact in structured social networks rather than well-mixed populations. Alexander has the tools for it, and the book is the most thorough treatment of local-interaction models applied to cooperation, trust, fairness, and retribution that you'll find in one place.
The execution is the problem. Each chapter works through a long series of simulation variants — lattice topologies, neighbourhood sizes, update rules — and reports what emerges under each. It dorwns in specificity when it is fast paced, and then is tediously slow and repetitive in the few spots where it actually touches on generalizable truths. What's missing is the argument connecting any particular configuration to actual human social structure. The results turn out to be quite sensitive to the setup choices, which means the reader is left with a catalogue of "fairness emerges under this arrangement but not under that one" findings and no principled basis for deciding which arrangement, if any, is the relevant one. Robustness is asserted more than demonstrated.
The prose compounds it. The book is long-winded where it should be decisive, and it spends its energy on model bookkeeping rather than on the philosophical payoff promised in the opening pages.
Worth having on the shelf as a reference for the modelling literature circa 2007. As an introduction to the evolution of morality, readers would do better with Cailin O'Connor's The Origins of Unfairness, which uses the same toolkit to answer a real question, or Joseph Henrich's The Secret of Our Success for the empirically grounded version of the story.
Overall, however, a comprehensive overview of modelling tools and theories that give realistic and generalizable insights for social realities and for the wonderful puzzle of how social contracts emerge in reality is still sorely missing today, nearly 20 years later.