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As If: Idealization and Ideals
Idealization is a fundamental feature of human thought. We build simplified models in our scientific research and utopias in our political imaginations. Concepts like belief, desire, reason, and justice are bound up with idealizations and ideals. Life is a constant adjustment between the models we make and the realities we encounter. In idealizing, we proceed "as if" our representations were true, while knowing they are not. This is not a dangerous or distracting occupation, Kwame Anthony Appiah shows. Our best chance of understanding nature, society, and ourselves is to open our minds to a plurality of imperfect depictions that together allow us to manage and interpret our world.
The philosopher Hans Vaihinger first delineated the "as if" impulse at the turn of the twentieth century, drawing on Kant, who argued that rational agency required us to act as if we were free. Appiah extends this strategy to examples across philosophy and the human and natural sciences. In a broad range of activities, we have some notion of the truth yet continue with theories that we recognize are, strictly speaking, false. From this vantage point, Appiah demonstrates that a picture one knows to be unreal can be a vehicle for accessing reality.
As If explores how strategic untruth plays a critical role in far-flung areas of inquiry: decision theory, psychology, natural science, and political philosophy. A polymath who writes with mainstream clarity, Appiah defends the centrality of the imagination not just in the arts but in science, morality, and everyday life.
The philosopher Hans Vaihinger first delineated the "as if" impulse at the turn of the twentieth century, drawing on Kant, who argued that rational agency required us to act as if we were free. Appiah extends this strategy to examples across philosophy and the human and natural sciences. In a broad range of activities, we have some notion of the truth yet continue with theories that we recognize are, strictly speaking, false. From this vantage point, Appiah demonstrates that a picture one knows to be unreal can be a vehicle for accessing reality.
As If explores how strategic untruth plays a critical role in far-flung areas of inquiry: decision theory, psychology, natural science, and political philosophy. A polymath who writes with mainstream clarity, Appiah defends the centrality of the imagination not just in the arts but in science, morality, and everyday life.
240 pages, Hardcover
Published August 14, 2017
24 people are currently reading
255 people want to read
About the author
Kwame Anthony Appiah
113 books440 followersKwame Anthony Appiah, the president of the PEN American Center, is the author of The Ethics of Identity, Thinking It Through: An Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy, The Honor Code and the prize-winning Cosmopolitanism. Raised in Ghana and educated in England, he has taught philosophy on three continents and is a former professor at Princeton University and currently has a position at NYU.
Series:
* Sir Patrick Scott Mystery (as Anthony Appiah)
Series:
* Sir Patrick Scott Mystery (as Anthony Appiah)
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
March 23, 2018
Like watching an action film when you're so close to being black-out drunk that you keep coming in and out of consciousness, this book gives you glimpses of exciting stuff interspersed with frequent periods of adamantly refusing to give any memorable information.
I think the topic of idealization is incredibly important, and so further attention is good. But there has already been a lot of work on this, and Appiah's book barely seems to engage with this. In particular, there are three strands of already existing work, namely
1. Idealizations in science
2. Social Constructivsm
3. Ideal vs non-ideal theory in political philosophy/political science
Philosophers, sociologists, historians, etc., have already said quite a lot about all of these. Philosophers of science, for example, have been categorizing the different kinds of idealizations and abstractions, and thinking about their implications for realism and progress for at least decades now. Sociologists and historians have been talking about how ideas and norms, often unattainable, can shape and limit humans, using speculation and anthropological studies of various cultures and times. And the question of what you should do ethically and how theory relates to what is actually psychologically possible and good isn't particularly novel either, eg: the notion of "supererogation" in moral philosophy, the common objection that some moral accounts might just be asking too much, and the rule utilitarians arguing for Appiah's "counter-normatives".
These are not exactly what is being talked about here, but they're the messier versions of what Appiah has abstracted away, and so they're messier but also more insightful to think about. It's true that in many cases, especially outside the philosophy of science, people haven't called what they were thinking about "idealization", but in part this is because thinking about the idealization in some abstract way obscures the roles they play in various contexts. So Appiah, drawing from a forgotten German philosopher Hans Vaihinger, mentions that these idealizations are made to deal with the world, but he isn't able to go into how this works because he's abstracted too much instead of going into historic and sociocultural depth. For example, he mentions Foucault's work about the creation of the category of "homosexual", but compared to Foucault's rich historic work, he ends up doing some dull logic chopping about philosophy of language here.
Finally, although he does engage a little with the existing literature from related fields mentioned above, it is very very superficial. Nancy's Cartwright's nomological machines (from what I remember) are curious things, and her view is that science's success isn't due to the machines resembling the real world, as much as us making the world resemble the machines as much as possible (eg: we try to replicate devices which are shielded from external influences to mimic our idealized set-ups as much as possible). Cartwright's views are interesting but kinda controversial, but Appiah just assumes that they are peachy and completely uncontroversial. This is hardly deep engagement. For someone who knows Cartwright's work, this is baffling, and for someone who doesn't, this is just going to be highly misleading.
(And this line: "A committed Rawlsian, Jerry Cohen argued, should be willing to be productive without the incentive of extra pay: Rawls may not be idealizing enough" made me uncomfortable, because it isn't wrong, but this is a tiny part of Cohen's much bigger and different argument, plus Cohen's views on ideal vs non-ideal theory is very different, not to mention richer, because it is a lot more historically situated than Appiah's. So it might have been good to actually engage with Cohen's substantive views, but maybe this is unfair criticism since Appiah can't be expected to do everything in one book)
Overall, it was poorly signposted, so I didn't really know what the broader point was a lot of the time. And even where the book was clear, the content seemed like it might be interesting to someone who has never thought about these issues, but for most people self-aware about the fact that what we're using isn't usually a perfectly true representation, there seems to me to be very little of value.
If this actually was pushing the envelope and opening up a new field, this book would have been perfectly fine, but repeating ideas already thought through, even if in an unusually general way, doesn't seem all that impressive.
I think the topic of idealization is incredibly important, and so further attention is good. But there has already been a lot of work on this, and Appiah's book barely seems to engage with this. In particular, there are three strands of already existing work, namely
1. Idealizations in science
2. Social Constructivsm
3. Ideal vs non-ideal theory in political philosophy/political science
Philosophers, sociologists, historians, etc., have already said quite a lot about all of these. Philosophers of science, for example, have been categorizing the different kinds of idealizations and abstractions, and thinking about their implications for realism and progress for at least decades now. Sociologists and historians have been talking about how ideas and norms, often unattainable, can shape and limit humans, using speculation and anthropological studies of various cultures and times. And the question of what you should do ethically and how theory relates to what is actually psychologically possible and good isn't particularly novel either, eg: the notion of "supererogation" in moral philosophy, the common objection that some moral accounts might just be asking too much, and the rule utilitarians arguing for Appiah's "counter-normatives".
These are not exactly what is being talked about here, but they're the messier versions of what Appiah has abstracted away, and so they're messier but also more insightful to think about. It's true that in many cases, especially outside the philosophy of science, people haven't called what they were thinking about "idealization", but in part this is because thinking about the idealization in some abstract way obscures the roles they play in various contexts. So Appiah, drawing from a forgotten German philosopher Hans Vaihinger, mentions that these idealizations are made to deal with the world, but he isn't able to go into how this works because he's abstracted too much instead of going into historic and sociocultural depth. For example, he mentions Foucault's work about the creation of the category of "homosexual", but compared to Foucault's rich historic work, he ends up doing some dull logic chopping about philosophy of language here.
Finally, although he does engage a little with the existing literature from related fields mentioned above, it is very very superficial. Nancy's Cartwright's nomological machines (from what I remember) are curious things, and her view is that science's success isn't due to the machines resembling the real world, as much as us making the world resemble the machines as much as possible (eg: we try to replicate devices which are shielded from external influences to mimic our idealized set-ups as much as possible). Cartwright's views are interesting but kinda controversial, but Appiah just assumes that they are peachy and completely uncontroversial. This is hardly deep engagement. For someone who knows Cartwright's work, this is baffling, and for someone who doesn't, this is just going to be highly misleading.
(And this line: "A committed Rawlsian, Jerry Cohen argued, should be willing to be productive without the incentive of extra pay: Rawls may not be idealizing enough" made me uncomfortable, because it isn't wrong, but this is a tiny part of Cohen's much bigger and different argument, plus Cohen's views on ideal vs non-ideal theory is very different, not to mention richer, because it is a lot more historically situated than Appiah's. So it might have been good to actually engage with Cohen's substantive views, but maybe this is unfair criticism since Appiah can't be expected to do everything in one book)
Overall, it was poorly signposted, so I didn't really know what the broader point was a lot of the time. And even where the book was clear, the content seemed like it might be interesting to someone who has never thought about these issues, but for most people self-aware about the fact that what we're using isn't usually a perfectly true representation, there seems to me to be very little of value.
If this actually was pushing the envelope and opening up a new field, this book would have been perfectly fine, but repeating ideas already thought through, even if in an unusually general way, doesn't seem all that impressive.
November 8, 2025
240522: this is analytic philosophy. not my usual interest. begins by dismissing pesky 'metaphysics', goes on to extensive language logic, iff, probabilities, necessities, coherence etc. chapters cover: 1 useful untruths as asserted by Hans Vaihinger, 2 measure of belief by Frank Ramsey, 3 political ideals by John Rawls...
'idealization' is useful in all domains of human thought, theory, experience, society, best phrased 'as if'. this means science or everyday determinations can be useful if we ignore aspects corrupting ideal state of affairs. 'as if' makes sense to me only when he comes to suggest work or art such as play does not stimulate 'suspension' of disbelief, but 'suspension' of responding 'as if' this is only play and not only real. plays are make believe as children play...
the rest of the book are strenuous arguments about force, validity, essential nature of 'as if' for any human projects, but the suggestions of art are enough for me. 'polymath' seems so much over and over le meme chose...
question: as this is analytic Phil why did I give it 4? answer: easy to read in one day. clear, concise, compete. does not extend into reals of little significance for project, eg. pesky metaphysics. curiosity.
'idealization' is useful in all domains of human thought, theory, experience, society, best phrased 'as if'. this means science or everyday determinations can be useful if we ignore aspects corrupting ideal state of affairs. 'as if' makes sense to me only when he comes to suggest work or art such as play does not stimulate 'suspension' of disbelief, but 'suspension' of responding 'as if' this is only play and not only real. plays are make believe as children play...
the rest of the book are strenuous arguments about force, validity, essential nature of 'as if' for any human projects, but the suggestions of art are enough for me. 'polymath' seems so much over and over le meme chose...
question: as this is analytic Phil why did I give it 4? answer: easy to read in one day. clear, concise, compete. does not extend into reals of little significance for project, eg. pesky metaphysics. curiosity.
March 21, 2025
The sort of pragmatism that encourages ethical progress - let the fiction of our truths guide us. It also argues against the purity of a position or worldview if it eludes praxis. As Eliot sad: "human kind / Cannot bear very much reality."
November 17, 2021
Brilliant again from Appiah!
He writes how ideals shape how we think, and should think. For a small book, this is a challenging read and full of rich philosophical depth. My biggest take is that things don't have to necessarily be true to be useful. This is a profound statement in multiple ways.
His reflection on political ideals with reference to Rawls was particularly insightful, and I very much enjoy how Appiah deals with ethical considerations.
We all formulate ideals which drive us to action. A critical assessment of the concept of ideals is well needed, and Appiah does this skillfully.
He writes how ideals shape how we think, and should think. For a small book, this is a challenging read and full of rich philosophical depth. My biggest take is that things don't have to necessarily be true to be useful. This is a profound statement in multiple ways.
His reflection on political ideals with reference to Rawls was particularly insightful, and I very much enjoy how Appiah deals with ethical considerations.
We all formulate ideals which drive us to action. A critical assessment of the concept of ideals is well needed, and Appiah does this skillfully.
July 7, 2018
In this book, Appiah takes up the subject seemingly paradoxical use of untruths (describing the world as it factually *isn't*) to derive or approximate truths and facts. How can the deployment of "as if" statements serve ethical purposes in the sciences, philosophy, law, and arts? As usual, Appiah's discussions are interesting and clear. I'll admit that, for me, the book had a few rough patches because I am just an interested layman, not a trained philosophy, and about 50 pages of the book's 187 pages were a bit technical for me. Nevertheless, I seemed to catch the gist, and the last 30 or so pages of his argument provided a conclusion that was clear and (for me) coherent.
October 31, 2019
As a philosopher and cultural theorist, Kwame Anthony Appiah’s work frequently addresses issues of ethics, morality and their representations in social and political systems. Whether questioning meritocracy or identity, the British-Ghanaian history professor is keen to recognize contradictions in theory and practices that signal epistemological, historical, or shear mental gaps. These inquiries continue with As If: Idealization and Ideals (2017) in which Appiah revives Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of as if to show how many of the empirical theories modern societies function under are based upon intentional fictions. Appiah’s thesis is that by consciously suspending ones beliefs in thought (much the way one does when encountering art) it becomes easier to understand, not just control, ones relationship to a complex world. By doing so, a host of possible truths may unfold from which it becomes possible to make political choices that improve society.
The book of 172 pages, not including notes and acknowledgments, is organized in three sections. The first chapter introduces the value of idealizations as purposeful untruths that reflect how certain features of mental life often contradict what follows in real life. The political theory of Adam Smith for example intentionally omits the factor of human sympathy in order to produce an economic system based on rational egoism. Appiah sees this strategy as a means of comprehending ones standing in the world through a practical process of make-believe. This is not to be confused with believing in or telling lies, but rather behaving as if some things are true in order to function in society. The second chapter continues to unpack Vaihinger’s theories explaining that measurements of human agency, assumed to be driven by beliefs and desires, are based on imprecise methods of observation. Humans are irrational, forgetful and idealizations that they are computationally perfect do not guarantee behaviors that align with what ought to occur based on a belief. Recognizing the limits of such subjective probabilities provides an opportunity to examine the form and content of ones beliefs and desires. This is relevant for constructing ideas of justice which are then implemented in organizing systems.
Finally, the third chapter grounds the above consequences in political theories of race, sexuality and immigration. These more explicit examples show how ideas of justice influence socio-economic and justice systems (and thereby the treatment of human beings). Here Appiah asks, what truths might be ignored to the benefit of attending to these complex circumstances—the need for immigration or the existence of sexual and racial inequalities—otherwise excluded in the ideal conception of society? How might examining the falsehoods previously assumed to be true about human nature (say, their lack of sympathy for instance) encourage people to function as if factors of money or egoism where not of primary value? Ultimately, these questions are left to the process of self-reflection that idealization engenders with the hopeful notion that they provide some clue about what truths are possible to enact. Judging from the myriad references made to theorists and theories across disciplines, it seems likely that Appiah has intentionally excluded some truths in order to arrive to this very point.
The book of 172 pages, not including notes and acknowledgments, is organized in three sections. The first chapter introduces the value of idealizations as purposeful untruths that reflect how certain features of mental life often contradict what follows in real life. The political theory of Adam Smith for example intentionally omits the factor of human sympathy in order to produce an economic system based on rational egoism. Appiah sees this strategy as a means of comprehending ones standing in the world through a practical process of make-believe. This is not to be confused with believing in or telling lies, but rather behaving as if some things are true in order to function in society. The second chapter continues to unpack Vaihinger’s theories explaining that measurements of human agency, assumed to be driven by beliefs and desires, are based on imprecise methods of observation. Humans are irrational, forgetful and idealizations that they are computationally perfect do not guarantee behaviors that align with what ought to occur based on a belief. Recognizing the limits of such subjective probabilities provides an opportunity to examine the form and content of ones beliefs and desires. This is relevant for constructing ideas of justice which are then implemented in organizing systems.
Finally, the third chapter grounds the above consequences in political theories of race, sexuality and immigration. These more explicit examples show how ideas of justice influence socio-economic and justice systems (and thereby the treatment of human beings). Here Appiah asks, what truths might be ignored to the benefit of attending to these complex circumstances—the need for immigration or the existence of sexual and racial inequalities—otherwise excluded in the ideal conception of society? How might examining the falsehoods previously assumed to be true about human nature (say, their lack of sympathy for instance) encourage people to function as if factors of money or egoism where not of primary value? Ultimately, these questions are left to the process of self-reflection that idealization engenders with the hopeful notion that they provide some clue about what truths are possible to enact. Judging from the myriad references made to theorists and theories across disciplines, it seems likely that Appiah has intentionally excluded some truths in order to arrive to this very point.
August 25, 2020
A lot of stuff w/ Appiah seems to fall in a pretty good spot w/r/t the "pop philosophy"-"academic philosophy" spectrum. As in any not-exceedingly-long book on a subject this broad, feel like I have more questions than answers, but the third section on political ramifications of idealization caused me to think about Rawls in some ways I hadn't before. Generally after reading a book like this I always think I should have just read the paper this book is based on, but I think reading the whole book was valuable in this case!
April 10, 2018
Interesting, clearly and compellingly written.
It might be a bit too technical for an average reader who isn't already interested in the topic and a bit too shallow for actual philosophers, but as an economist I spend a lot of time thinking about what's the point of models we know are fundamentally wrong and it was fascinating to hear a philosopher's take.
It might be a bit too technical for an average reader who isn't already interested in the topic and a bit too shallow for actual philosophers, but as an economist I spend a lot of time thinking about what's the point of models we know are fundamentally wrong and it was fascinating to hear a philosopher's take.
Want to read
September 13, 2022RK NOOK
October 20, 2023
Pretty Gud but kinda shies away from some more controversial methodological points after mentioning them
May 23, 2024
Fascinating, dense, a bit hard to follow at times, but a very interesting overview into a topic whose board application and principles I haven't heard much discussed.
July 5, 2025
One of my favorite books of all time.
abandoned
March 17, 2018I gave it the old college try but too complicated for me... I like Appiah a lot when he’s writing for a general audience but this short book is better for those who have really studied philosophy.
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews