Η τζιχάντ και ο θάνατος

by Olivier Roy, Κίττυ Ξενάκη (translator)

Από τον Χαλίντ Κελκάλ το 1995 έως την επίθεση της Νίκαιας το 2016, όλοι οι τρομοκράτες ανατινάζονται μόνοι τους ή σκοτώνονται από την αστυνομία, χωρίς να επιδιώξουν στ’ αλήθεια να διαφύγουν και χωρίς ο θάνατός τους να είναι οπωσδήποτε απαραίτητος για την επιτυχία της επίθεσης. Ο Μοχάμεντ Μερά θα επαναλάβει τη διάσημη φράση που αποδίδεται στον Οσάμα μπιν Λάντεν και επανέρχεται συστηματικά σε διάφορες παραλλαγές: "Εμείς αγαπάμε τον θάνατο, εσείς αγαπάτε τη ζωή". Ο θάνατος του τρομοκράτη δεν είναι μια πιθανότητα ή μια ατυχής συνέπεια της πράξης του, αλλά βρίσκεται στην καρδιά του σχεδίου του. Την ίδια έλξη προς τον θάνατο παρατηρούμε και στον τζιχαντιστή που προσχωρεί στο Daech. Οι τζιχαντιστές αντιλαμβάνονται την επίθεση αυτοκτονίας ως τον κατεξοχήν σκοπό της στράτευσής τους. Κι αν είναι αυτός ο πραγματικός κίνδυνος; Όχι η καταστροφή που προκαλείται, αλλά το κλίμα τρόμου που δημιουργείται. Γιατί η δύναμη του Daech έγκειται στο ότι εκμεταλλεύεται τους φόβους μας. Και αυτός ο φόβος είναι ο φόβος του Ισλάμ. Ο μόνος στρατηγικός αντίκτυπος των επιθέσεων είναι το ψυχολογικό τους αποτέλεσμα: δεν πλήττουν τη στρατιωτική ικανότητα των Δυτικών· δεν πλήττουν την οικονομία παρά ελάχιστα· δεν θέτουν σε κίνδυνο τους θεσμούς παρά μόνο στον βαθμό που εμείς οι ίδιοι τους θέτουμε υπό αμφισβήτηση, με την ατελείωτη συζήτηση περί σύγκρουσης μεταξύ ασφάλειας και κράτους δικαίου. Ο φόβος είναι ο φόβος της έκρηξης των ίδιων μας των κοινωνιών.

Genres: Islam, Nonfiction, Religion, Middle East, Terrorism, History, Politics

176 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2017

About the author

A professor at the European University Institute in Florence (Italy); he was previously a research director at the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and a lecturer for both the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS) and the Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris (IEP).

From 1984 to 2008, he has acted as a consultant to the French Foreign Ministry.

In 1988, Roy served as a United Nations Office for Coordinating Relief in Afghanistan (UNOCA) consultant.

Beginning in August 1993, Roy served as special OSCE representative to Tajikistan until February 1994, at which time he was selected as head of the OSCE mission to Tajikistan, a position he held until October 1994.

Roy received an "Agrégation" in Philosophy and a Master's in Persian language and civilization in 1972 from the French Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales.

In 1996, he received his PhD in Political Science from the IEP.

Roy is the author of numerous books on subjects including Iran, Islam, Asian politics. These works include Globalized Islam: The search for a new ummah, Today's Turkey: A European State? and The Illusions of September 11.

He also serves on the editorial board of the academic journal Central Asian Survey.

His best-known book, L'Echec de l'Islam politique; The Failure of Political Islam. It is a standard text for students of political Islam.

Roy wrote widely on the subject of the 2005 civil unrest in France saying they should not be seen as religiously inspired as some commentators said.

His most recent work is Secularism Confronts Islam (Columbia, 2007). The book offers a perspective on the place of Islam in secular society and looks at the diverse experiences of Muslim immigrants in the West. Roy examines how Muslim intellectuals have made it possible for Muslims to live in a secularized world while maintaining the identity of a "true believer."

Reviews

[Murtaza · Rating 4 out of 5]

The premise of Olivier Roy's theory of jihadism is that is a uniquely modern phenomenon, tied to the idea of generational revolt. Radical jihadists, distinct from previous generations of militants and volunteer fighters, are the product of a de-cultured form of Islam that has been created by globalization. Shorn from a solid sense of identity and revolting against their own parents culturally-rooted Islam, some young people became footsoldiers of an idea that could be called Utopian but is more accurately called nihilist. By pledging themselves to an ahistorical "Islamic State" they have decided to revolt against the world in its entirety, retrofitting a rebellious and death-seeking form of Islam to serve this purpose. Abandoning their own confused backgrounds and bewildered families, they sought to create an entirely new tribe of people who exist and act outside of even current events. ISIS cadres are not activists about issues like the Israel-Palestine conflict or Islamophobia, seldom addressing them except in the vaguest manner (they are literally pro-Islamophobia, in fact). Rather than seeking to build a new society, their goal is literally to die, rejecting even the possibility of change in this world. Contrary to popular belief, the Islamic State's short lived "Caliphate" was never intended to endure, but to herald the return of the Antichrist and beginning of the end of the world.

In his writings on ISIS, Roy situates them somewhere between Red Guards and an apocalyptic doomsday cult. He does not "exonerate Islam," but explains how it came to become a form of mobilization for a number of people who sought to not just kill and die, but to reject the life, tout court. They have "rebelled" in the fullest sense of the word possible. But this is not an ideology that can have a long shelf-life. Unlike Nazism and other totalitarian ideologies, radical jihadism does not have a mass base. It has been unable to mobilize either broad middle classes or the poor, instead recruiting off the fringes of society or amid the rubble of societies that have already been destroyed. In his framing of the group Roy achieves a significant feat, managing to take their ideology seriously without exaggerating its power.

I was already familiar with Roy's research from reading his essays on jihadism (this is a good recent one: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017...). This book is very short and not rigorously cited on all its points. Its very much written in the stereotypically airy style of French philosophers, but I think this is forgivable in this case. After devoting an entire lifetime to the intimate study of a subject I would argue that an author is entitled to express a short opinion about his findings. His arguments generally ring true, but they're also blessed with the virtue of being internally coherent. Islamic State, the "second-generation of jihadism," is the burnout phase of a decades-long string of events that is coming to its violent apex. Roy does a good job of demystifying this ideology, which is the first step towards rationally addressing it.

[Eslam · Rating 3 out of 5]

أحاول دوماً دفع قناعتي السابقة أو انطباعي - بدرجة خطاب أقل - بأن أوليفييه روا "اعتذاري" فيما يتعلق بخطابه حول الإسلام.

كتابه يقوم هنا على عدة محاور، لعل أبرزها كما أتصور هو تزايد العدمية السياسية في أفعال الجهاديين والمتطرفين، خصوصاً عند أبناء الجيل الثاني كما أسماهم (اللاحقون على بن لادن وتنظيمه، الدواعش)، فلا يوجد عندهم نزوع لأي محاولات هروب ممنهجة أو تفكير حتى في النجاة بحياتهم بعد تنفيذ العملية ... هناك نزوع أكبر، ورغبة في الموت .. "ليس موت الإرهابي احتمالاً أو نتيجة مؤسفة لعمله، بل هو في صلب مشروعه".

لعل ما ساعدني بشكل ضئيل للغاية في طرحه الأخير هو قوله بأن "مستعرضية ثقافة عنف لا تعني "إعفاء" الإسلام، وحقيقة أن (هؤلاء) يختارون الإسلام كبنية تفكير وعمل أمر جوهري". بالإضافة لحديثه عن أن حبَ الموت يتداخل مع إخفاق سياسي وتشاؤم عميق في الوقت نفسه" نسبه لخطاب سيد قطب.

لي مقال عن سيد قطب منذ سنوات، وفيه تحدثت عن اليأس من الواقع كمحرك لخطاب سيد قطب في تطوره:

https://www.ida2at.com/sayed-qutb-bet...

يتحدث أولفييه، وهذه مشكلتي معه، على "أسلمة للتطرف" وبما يعني أسبقية التطرف أو الرغبة فيه ومن ثمّ إلباسه لبوس الإسلام أو استخدام سرديات الإسلام في زركشة التطرف الأساسي.

عنده كذلك فصل بين السلفيين والجهاديين، ويرى أن السلفيين يرون في التفجيرات الجسدية أمرًا انتحارياً، أي إنه استباق لإرادة الله!

هذا التمييز يمكنني فهمه في حالة واحدة فقط، وهي تحويل الموضوع برمته لـ "ثقافة"، بمعنى فهم الإسلام وتطوراته في فرنسا بشكل مختلف عن الشرق الأوسط، لأنه لا توجد إدانة واضحة وصريحة، مُجْمًع عليها، للجرائم التفجيرية الجسدية في سياق الشرق الأوسط.

هنا ربما نجد سلفيتين، سلفية شرقية وسلفية فرنسية (ينشغل أوليفييه بالأخيرة، بشكل كبير في كتابه هذا، ولا يتجاوزها إلا في مواضع نادرة).

نقطة أخيرة، أوليفييه يوارب الباب في نقطة تستحق فتح الباب بالكامل، حين يشير إلى أن قطاعات الجهاديين "محبي الموت" منفصلون بالأساس عن اجتماعهم، مما يعني وجود أسباب فوق-اجتماعية أو من خارجه على الأقل تساهم في الربط بين الجهاد والموت بشكل أساسي.

لكنه لم يتحدث، ولا مرة، عن قابليات العنف في النصوص الثقافية المؤسسة للذهنية المسلمية، وكذلك الشعور والوجدان المسلم، وربما يحاول غرز الموضوع أكثر، وربطه بشكل أوثق، بالسياسات الدولتية والتنظيمات الكبرى.

هذا يجعلني أحكم على أن مقاربته اعتذارية.

لي رأي في مجلة ذوات" عن أزمة الهوية في خطاب الإسلام السياسي بشكل عام تجده هنا:

http://magazine.mominoun.com/flash/th...

وفيه قمت بنسب الأفكار في تأسيسها لثالوث المودودي، البنا، وقطب.

لكن في سياق آخر، في بحث ليس مطولاً عن "مفهوم المواطنة في دولة الإسلام السياسي"، أقوم في النهاية بقول ما يلي:

"والحق أنَّ العديد من المحاولات المنهجية قامت لحلِّ إشكالية "الاستعلاء" الإسلامي التي يتم التأسيس لها، بشكل أوّلي ومركزي، في النصوص المؤسسة للإسلام نفسه، لكن تبني هذه المقاربات أو الاشتغال عليها سيستغرق وقتًا طويلًا قد يستهلك أعمار أجيال متتالية تسير في اتجاه تجاوز المخاوف التي رسمها أمامهم الإسلام السياسي وخطاباته". وأشرت بالتحديد لخطابي نصر حامد أبو زيد وعلي مبروك. ويمكنني أن أضيف هنا مقاربة عبد الجواد ياسين للقضية في كتابه "الدين والتدين".

وهذا هو رابط البحث كاملاً:

http://hafryat.com/…/%D9%85%D9%81%D9%...

الغياب الكامل لأي اشتباك مع النصوص المؤسسة وتفكيك خطاب العنف فيها هو جوهر أزمتي مع أوليفييه.

[Sagheer Afzal · Rating 3 out of 5]

The problem with this book is its brevity. It reads more like an essay as opposed to a well-researched, book. Roy does make some interesting points in his book; but as an insight into the mind of potential suicide bomber, it does not work. No examples are given to support his view that Jihadi's are in effect nihilists whose fascination with death compels them to acts of murder. Given Roy's erudition and learning, it is surprising that he has not really made me a deeper analysis of suicide bombers. He does however present an interesting analogy by equating Nazism with the ideology of ISIS. In both cases, normal people were induced into acts of shocking brutality, empowered by the notion that they were superior to the rest of mankind.

In both cases; the masses were inculcated with the notion of their overarching superiority to the rest of mankind and became comfortable with spectacular acts of brutality. Oliver Roy also asserts that Jihadis are all failed individuals but this is not always the case. A large number of such people were well-educated and had affluent backgrounds. Osama bin Laden being the most striking example. The fact that Oliver Roy ignores such facts highlights a deep flaw within the book; it is overly opinionated and under-researched.

The fact that it has attracted such glowing reviews is strange. There seems to be an unofficial goodwill club between public intellectuals. Nothing wrong with that; but if you are paying well above the normal retail price for such a slender book; then you should get an honest, accurate appraisal of what you are buying.

[SCARABOOKS · Rating 3 out of 5]

Saggio agile, modello istant book. Tentativo utile di spiegare il fenomeno Isis-terrorismo islamico in generale. C’è un aspetto politico legato al mondo musulmano e mediorientale e c’è un aspetto legato al reclutamento in occidente. Sul primo non si scopre niente di particolarmente originale, però ci si può fare una visione schematica chiara. Sul secondo versante invece la tesi centrale è interessante. Riassumibile in tre brevi citazioni.
“La dimensione generazionale appare fondamentale”
“il terrorismo deriva non dalla radicalizzazione dell’Islam ma dall’islamizzazione della radicalità”
“agli occhi dei jihadisti la questione della pratica religiosa non è fondamentale: la morte lava tutte le mancanze. Il nichilismo (l’inanità della vita) è parte integrante del loro misticismo (raggiungere Dio)”
Misticismo mi sembra un parolone per la fattispecie, ma la fascinazione dell’estremo a cui predispongono rabbia e disperazione in effetti sembra un fattore decisivo. Ed è un fattore che ha poco a vedere con islam e religiosità. Al contrario ha le radici piantate nella cultura occidentale del novecento. Per chi sta compulsando il Corano per trovare l’origine del Male sarà una frustrante sorpresa.

Manca in Roy la dimensione economica nel disegno delle cause; quella che sta sopra a rabbia e disperazione. Manca perché la considera marginale. E sbaglia, a modesto parere. Le cause che individua però sono degne di considerazione e spesso argomentate in modo convincente. La stessa contiguità-continuità del terrorismo islamico, sul piano psicologico, culturale e sociale con il terrorismo europeo di matrice politica, soprattutto di sinistra, degli ultimi decenni del ‘900 scandalizzerà molti, ma è tutt’altro che peregrina.

[Hristos Dagres · Rating 2 out of 5]

This was a really disappointing book. Firstly, the author failed to define the phenomenon that he’s actually going to investigate, leaving open to interpretation what actually “jihad” is. On top of this, he failed to define the methodology of collecting his information and how he was going to analyze his data.

This led to a collection of poorly justified and loosely connected personal opinions. The author took the liberty to jump from one topic to another without providing a coherent description of each idea. There are some interesting ideas in the book, like for example the idea that the radicalized jihadists present in a cultural context that moves beyond traditional salafism. More or less, they use symbols and communication medias (music, videos, clothes, speach) borrowed from western culture in order to bring a message of terror and violence. According to the author, these people arelooking for a heroic way to die and this has nothing to do with salafism.

But then, why does this phenomenon express itself ONLY within Islam? Why don’twe see radicalized, marginalized (many jihadists actually are far from marginalized) angry chinese or vietnamese youth exploding themeselves in a crowd, or drive through the crowd with a speeding lorry? Why is this a soleley islamic phenomenon?

And if the modern jihadists are acting outside the main body of ummah, then how can Olivier Roy explain the fact the dozens of thousands (if not, hundrents of thousands) of social media attenders apploud the suicide bombing in Ariana Grante’s concert in Manchester? What does Olivier Roy has to say about the thousands of hate-speech soap-box preachers of Islam across Europe? Even if they do not express traditional Islam do they represent a threat to european culture or civilization? Do they offer the context of action for these determinedto die jihadists, or not?

His final suggestion that we should bring back religion back to the public space is more that disappointing. It’s dangerous! Olivier Roy actually suggest that we should declare them winners, that the states of Europe should surrenter to their demands and accept their hate speech in order to prevent them from escalating their actions. Bring Sharia Law in public space as something acceptable; as an alternative option for people to choose. It’s a pathetic proposal. Something like this will actually give a deadly wrong message: that violence is paying; that Europe is ready to negotiate its future.

[Anita · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not quite sure how to approach this. While the book did have many valid arguments and a new entry point to the subject, there is still something left to desire. While bits of it created some kind of clarity, as e.g.

"The only weakness ISIS reveals is the weakness we see in ourselves"

which might sound a bit simplified, but there is a reasoning behind it in the book left for those who seek a deeper understanding of the statement. While other parts were not as convincing. While I do agree to the largest extent with Roy in which he does not explain the phenomenon of ISIS (IS) as a radicalized form of Islam, but rather the Islamization of radicalism, some of the the explanations as to why, mostly young men, decided to join ISIS, left me wanting more.

Roy for example wants to explain this more in the sense of seeking the violence and less about psychological factors. As well as the fact that he dismisses the idea of "deradicalization" as a concept. It feels quite simplified to explain the phenomenon to some extent as wanting to fall back onto violence, but that is a discussion too long to get into here.

Overall, the book was a great contribution to the little knowledge I do know about ISIS as a phenomenon. Much appreciate the explanations that separate the ISIS members as muslims or as some have tended to do; put the blame on Salafism to some extent , e.g. "[...] but it does show that the source of radicalization is not Salafism, although its success rests on social and generational mechanisms that also work with radicals."

Lastly, the discussion about a majority of ISIS-members being second generations and converts in secularized countries was highly interesting, especially when seeking an explanation, where Roy further continues and writes that this has to do with losing the culturally rooted religion of their parents, which leaves them open to religious fundamentalism. As well as the fact that many of the members do not even act in countries they claim to support, but in countries with a muslim majority. There is a lot to learn from this and it was an enjoyable read.

[D R · Rating 4 out of 5]

Olivier Roy, an academic who is viewed as an authority on Islam , explores Jihadi terrorism from 1995 until the time of writing his book, Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of the Islamic States. His key findings on Jihadi terrorism contrast the narrative that is currently mainstream, which is interesting and refreshing to read. It also brings the needed nuance in the (academic) debates about the causes of religious extremism, as well as the problems that these pose.

He starts with the notion that contemporary Jihadi terrorism differs from Jihadi terrorism before 1995, as there is a new feature of the terrorist attacks pursued by Jihadis. The contemporary Jihadi terrorists are young and their goal is to die during their attack, or after the attack (by being killed by the police). Violence is being used as an end instead of a means to an end, like the Jihadi terrorists before 1995, who always planned to escape after their act of terror. In fact, despite the fact that suicide terrorism is now used mostly by ISIS (which in the remaining part of this review will be called Da’esh), or al-Qaeda, it was not coined by these Islamic terrorist groups, but was done at first by the Tamil Tigers, a nationalist terrorist group in Sri Lanka. This is why Roy argues in his book that in contrast to the mainstream narrative, the Islam is not the cause of radicalisation, but radicalisation is Islamised. By this, Roy means that terrorist violence by contemporary Jihadi terrorists does not stem from the religious radicalisation of Islam through Salafism, which is often believed among other scholars. Instead, radicalised individuals choose the Islam as a foundation for their ideas and violent actions. Another important point is that Roy argues that the contemporary Jihadi terrorist is young, which is why he thinks that Jihadi terrorism can best be seen through to the lens of generational revolt, and therefore he compares it to extreme-left revolutionaries.

In chapter three, the scholar goes more into depth in the topic of the relation between religion and radicalisation. Salafism is not the direct source of radicalisation, as the Jihadi terrorists do not have a strong relationship with the Islam. They have not read the Quran, do not attend the mosques and essentially dismiss the religion of their parents, believing it is not the right way to be a muslim. This notion comes from the deculturation of the religious spheres, paired with the secularisation in the West, which leaves space for a version of the religion without cultural and social foundations. Drawing from empirical examples, Roy then comes to the conclusion that most Jihadi terrorists actually contradict the ideology of Salafism to some extents, which is in my opinion a good argument to back up his claim regarding the idea that Salafism is not a direct source of radicalisation. The Jihadi terrorists are essentially rebellious youngsters who have found a foundation for their ideas and violent acts within the Islam. What is also added by Roy, is that while Salafism is not a direct source of radicalisation, it does play a role when it comes to the idea that Salafi’s want a society isolated in a way that Da’esh wants to have the Caliphate, which is a nuance that is more than welcome. An important point made by Roy relevant for this, is that Da’esh uses this notion of deculturation for its benefit, in order to create a new narrative, which is appealing to the radicalised individuals that are being recruited. This is worded like that, because Roy notes that radicalisation often precedes actual recruitment by for example Da’esh. The narrative is about their version of Islam being the rightful one, and by committing violent acts, the young Jihadi is considered to be a hero for the umma.

Coming back to the main purpose of the contemporary Jihadi terrorist, to die during the attack, implies that there is not a political strategy attached to the purpose of the attack, and as Roy argues, it is ‘not the construction of a utopia’ (p. 4). Roy explains that this is mainly because despite the fact that Da’esh claims to aim to restore the caliphate, choosing the modus operandi of suicide attacks makes it impossible to achieve anything political. This is due to the fact that the concept of an Islamic State, or caliphate is a mere fantasy among the members of Da’esh, and that they actually do not want to change anything. They're iconoclastic and want to set a reset in motion. Adding to that, the radicalised Jihadi’s are not individuals that are actually concerned with the struggles that certain Muslim populations face, such as the Israel-Palestina conflict, or Islamophobia, which is an interesting perspective that is new to me, and is illustrated with clear examples. In fact, Da’esh fought against Shia muslims for not believing in the ‘right’ Islam. As Roy argues, the connection between the radicalised Jihadi’s and the conflict is based on the imaginary, as there will be no caliphate.

Drawing from a database containing 140 Jihadi’s that were involved in terrorism, Roy explores the profile of the radicals that have committed terrorist attacks in Europe. The profile of a Jihadi terrorist shows that there is no causal link between socioeconomical aspects and terrorism, as well as a link between psychological problems and Jihadi terrorism. What can be seen however, is that most Jihadi terrorists in Europe are second generation immigrants, have a history of petty crime, speak the language of the country they grew up in, have re-converted to Islam after leading a secular life, and lastly, the radicalisation of those terrorists took place in social settings, rather than places where most of the people assume the radicalisation took place: (Salafi) mosques and imams that recruit individuals. Roy mentions prisons as one of the most prominent places where Jihadi terrorists radicalised, which also points to the ‘continuity of networks’, as these individuals (sent to prison for petty crimes) often met with individuals that had a history of radicalisation or terrorism, who also had been radicalised because they met a radicalised person in prison.

Another point that Roy brings up, is that these Jihadi terrorists are not the product of political issues, such as social exclusion, Islamophobia of muslims (although the two are of course often intertwined), or the colonial history of the West in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The argument of Roy regarding the dismissal of political causes of radicalisation is in my opinion a bit shortsighted. Can it not be that social exclusion actually makes an individual more likely to be interested in the narrative of someone that suddenly seems to care about that person? Of course, not every individual experiences the problem of social exclusion, however, I believe that social exclusion could make an individual more vulnerable, and even more open to the idea of violence, especially combined with losing the culturally rooted religion of their parents, which Roy points out. The point of social exclusion of muslims leading to radicalisation is for example illustrated by Abbas (2019). He comes to the conclusion in his book ‘Islamophobia and Radicalisation: A Vicious Cycle’ that there is a vicious cycle where muslims are being radicalised because of social exclusion and Islamophobia, which in turn leads to more Islamophobia and then again to more radicalisation in the UK (Abbas, 2019). I do believe that his point regarding the idea that there is no link between socioeconomic factors and radicalisation a strong one, since terrorism studies have almost reached a consensus when it comes to this point. This does not mean that there are no terrorists that have socioeconomic disadvantages, but these individuals do not radicalise because of those socioeconomic disadvantages.

Another point of critique could be directed to the comparison of contemporary Jihadi terrorism and extreme-leftist terrorism. While there can indeed be comparisons drawn between the extreme-left terrorists and contemporary Jihadi terrorists when it comes to the notion of iconoclasm present in the strategies of both groups, as well as the dimension of generational revolt, there are also differences. While the contemporary Jihadi terrorist commits a terrorist attack with the purpose of dying and not so much with a focus on political strategies such as creating or restoring a caliphate, the extreme-left terrorist commits a terrorist attack in its fight against capitalism, trying to actually construct a new system after it has defeated capitalism. So the Jihadi terrorists is not concerned with constructing a utopia, where the extreme-left terrorists were.

[Olle · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kort och intressant bok om IS och radikalisering främst utifrån ett franskt perspektiv. Författaren, vars teori är att det vi ser är en slags generationsrevolt, ger vissa väldigt insiktsfulla kommentarer om vilka det är som radikaliseras och deras gemensamma nämnare: 2:a generationens invandrare, ofta småbrott i bagaget, inte särskilt religiösa utan har genomgått en relativt snabb eller plötslig omvändelse, inte heller föräldrarna är särskilt religiösa etc.

Efter att tidigare ha tagit del av svenska böcker, texter och podcasts i ämnet blir jag väldigt osäker på i vilken utsträckning det Roy skriver stämmer även i en svensk kontext. Där har jag fått uppfattningen att moskéerna är centrala för spridandet av det radikala budskapet och inte minst rekryteringen till IS, något som uppenbarligen inte alls sker i Frankrike där detta snarare är något som främst sker på internet och bland personer som inte frekventerar moskén. Med fördel kan därför böcker som The Islamist Phoenix: Islamic State and the Redrawing of the Middle East och Svenska IS-krigare läsas parallellt för att ge en mer övergripande men också svensk bild av detta fenomen.

Slutligen är det lite synd att den svenska översättningen inte verkar ha korrekturlästs i tillräcklig utsträckning. Många slarvfel i vissa delar av boken.

[Aureo Toledo · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mais um ensaio do que um estudo sistemático sobre o Estado Islâmico, o livro deixa algumas pontas soltas e faz afirmações muito universalizantes, carecendo, a meu juízo, de maior embasamento. No entanto, o capítulo sobre a ascensão do Estado Islâmico é muito interessante.

[servanereads]

Il est toujours difficile pour moi de noter des livres de non fictions comme ils représentent un point de vue, une recherche d'un académique.
Néanmoins, j'ai beaucoup appris, ce livre est court mais dresse un portrait très intéressant de Daech et de leur rapport à la mort et leur but premier.
J'ai lu ce livre dans le cadre de mon cours intitulé Religion, Politics and Violence.

[Nicholas · Rating 4 out of 5]

With delightful prose, Olivier Roy again ventures bravely to a domain less traveled by most scholarship on terrorism. Instead of taking a step back from the senseless violence to ponder about its root causes (many were postulated, be it theological, sociological, political, or psychological), Roy begins by examining the senseless-ness of such violence to argue how terrorism today, as espoused first by Al-Qaeda and then ISIS, is a nihilist enterprise undertaken by second-generation immigrants that are facing the consequences of secularisation, deculturation, and globalisation, all themes adroitly explored by Roy in his previous masterpiece, Globalised Islam (GI). In fact, one could actually this relatively thin book as an expansion pack of GI, with most arguments repeated, albeit with a sharper focus on violent jihadism. Extending from his original and by large highly convincing views in GI, Roy can be surmised to have written this as a response (and rebuttal) piece to the vast scholarship about ISIS out there, staking a strong claim about how the radical was made religious, rather than it is the religion that made radicals. The conflict is generational and not civilisational, Roy asserts.

Yet, in spite of this thought-provoking (and understandably contentious) claim, the strength in this book lies somewhere else: Roy's tactful organisation of his thesis that sheds the much-needed clarity and nuance on the subject; that there's on one hand an unfolding Middle-Eastern geopolitical crisis, and on the other an emerging form of religiosity that produces radicals and non-radicals alike; militants and quietists hand-in-hand. Roy paints a discernible picture in this largely complex and grossly politicised picture (with no less culpability from the experts themselves) by teasing out how different trends over time and space intersect and mirror each other, how individuals can be masters of narratives instead of victims of lobotomy as the brainwashing theorists tend to portray, how the recruiting strategist need not be the maker of radicals and how the structural and geographical can merge, even as they contradict each other. Great emphasis was placed on the individual (something scholars prone to sweeping essentialisation of Muslims or Islam wouldn't entertain), yet as usual, Roy is careful not to foreclose the sociological. Roy's brilliance lies as much in his grasp of epic history and granular details as his disregard of academic stigma in analysing the imaginary. He pronounces ISIS's strategy as delusional terror, yet it is the delusion he seeks to unpack, microscopically tweezing out meanings from the nihilist, the obsession with death from the youthful and living.

If there is a weakness of this book, it is that it reads incomplete without Globalised Islam, from which its theoretical framework is drawn. Nevertheless, for readers of Globalised Islam (GI), there is also two unsettling questions that awaits resolution. The first continues from GI—the seemingly non-fitting (or at least, the lack of attempt to do so) of Southeast Asia in these models; which is becoming less and less excusable considering the recent siege of Marawi, if the fact that the world’s largest Muslim dominated polity resides there is not convincing enough. The second comes from the reading GI for the reader is now left to ponder, how, pray tell, given all the similarities in the demography and push factors (the common matrix, as he puts it), where and how does the divergence between a neo-fundamentalist and an ISIS militant occur? Considering the efforts dedicated to separate ISIS militancy from Salafism, it is surprising that the author only addresses those who chose death over life, but not those who chose to live over death.

Lastly, one also wonder if the book could have done a better job in inducting readers that are new to the study of jihadist terrorism, although a book seemingly written for a debate instead of initiating one may have less thought for that. Even so, Roy’s unfearful gaze into a spectre that has long revelled for being understood through fearful eyes makes this a crucial reading for experts, policymakers, and the public alike.

[Laabidi Raissi · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ce livre est un peu court par rapport au sujet traité et surtout à l'expertise de son auteur.
Olivier Roy commence par introduire son idée principale du nouveau djihadisme: l'islamisation de la radicalité. Pour ce faire, il explore les profils types de djihadistes allant de Khaled Kelkal à Abaoud en passant par David Vallat et Mohamed Merah. Dans la plupart, ce sont des profils jeunes, "bien intégrés" au début, et qui se radicalisent et trouvent dans le djihadisme une cause qui donne du sens à leur nihilisme. Ce profil type est stable et majoritaire depuis 25 ans.
Pour Roy, ces djihadistes rentrent bien (ou presque) dans le cadre du syndrôme de Columbine: tueries en masse de collègues/profs de lycée au US. Ces terroristes diffèrent peu de Breivik (attentats du 22 juillet 2011 en Norvège) et du pilote de Germanwings.
Ici je me pose deux questions:
1. Sur la validité de ce qu'on appelle "être bien intégré". Ceci signifie-t-il boire de l'alcool, aller en boites et baiser comme laisse entendre l'auteur ?
2. Sur la différence de profils. Pour Roy, Abaoud et Abdeslem ont les mêmes personnalités que Ahmed Atta et le reste du groupe du 11/09. Ici, je rejoins l'opinion de Scot Attran qui expose plusieurs vague de djihadistes. Attran, en opposition à Roy, présente deux types de djihadistes: ceux qui cherchent un modèle exemplaire de violence "role models who stress violence... like Zarqawi" et ce sont ceux-ci les nihilistes dont parle Roy, et ceux qui cherchent à justifier le terrorisme via un raisonnement moral (Abdallah Azzam et Al-Qaida) (Scott Atran, Talking to the Enemy).
Ensuite, Roy essaie d'expliquer l'origine de cette islamisation de la radicalité et la trouve dans la "déculturation du religieux" qui "explique sa reconstruction [le religieux] sous forme fondamentaliste". La déculturation est elle même enracinée dans l'immigration, la globalisation et en particulier la sécularisation.
Ici , je trouve que Roy limite un peu les variables. Et je rejoins encore une fois Scott Atran dans sa critique de l'échec des pays occidentaux dans l'intégration des immigrants des années 1970-1980. Ces vagues d'immigration étaient composées essentiellement de main d'oeuvre qui parle (jusqu'aujourd'hui) à peine les langues de ces pays. Ceci s'est accompagné par l'émergence du néo-libéralisme des années 1980: on ne construit plus de bibliothèques publiques car on veut baisser encore les impôts des plus riches.
Néanmoins, Roy soulève un point très important sur la radicalité des séculiers (français et maghrebins en pariculier). Il voit dans l'interdiction du religieux des lieux publiques une attaque contre le religieux et une contradiction avec la loi 1905 qui définit plutôt une neutralité de l'État.
Le discour de l'extrême droite en Europe (et aussi des "nouveaux athées") à propos de l'Islam (comme si il y en qu'un seul) est sans fondement pour Roy:
"Jamais l'essentialisme culturel n'a cependant été à ce point appliqué à l'islam. Tout ce qu'un musulman nominal fait de négatif est attribué à l'islam (du harcèlement sexuel à la folie meurtrière), alors que les comportements des non-musulmans sont soigneusement individualisés. Et pourtant, nous sommes bien entrés dans un monde de meurtres de masse, où Breivick comme le pilote de la Germanwings ont aussi leur place".
Finalement, Roy s'oppose à l'intervention des islamologues et des politiques dans la réforme de l'islam. Je trouve cet avertissement bien fondé en particulier par rapport à certains séculiers tunisiens qui ont cherché à éliminer le religieux avec l'appui de la dictature de Bourguiba et Ben Ali. Méthode qui a donné un effet opposé après la révolution et qui manquait tout respect des droits de l'homme sous la dictature.

[Dan's · Rating 5 out of 5]

Με δυσκόλεψε απίσευτα με ισλαμικα ονόματα αλλά και αποσπάσματα των π(που είτε έφερνε αυτούσια) είτε έφερνε στο φως τη δικιά του κριτική θέση μέσα απ αυτά με ξεκάθαρα κριτική διάθεση.

Αλλα σε αποζημιώνει με το παραπάνω στο κλείσιμο - περιμενωντας τον AAl ghodo - όπου κάνει με δυεισητικη ακρίβεια το ψυχογράφημα του νέου τζιχαντιστη και παράλληλα σκιαγραφεί τις ατέλειες τις γαλλ κυβέρνησης, που άθελά της (¿) δημιουργεί εμπόδια, στο να δώσει έδαφος στη νέα τάξη μουσουλμάνων να ενσωματωθούν στο κοσμικό κράτος
<προφανώς εννοεί κάποιον έμπορο/ή άτομο με status, τοπικό άρχοντα που είναι διατεθειμένος να ετεροκαθοριστει και να κλείσει το χάσμα μεταξύ τους >
Αξιοπερίεργο εντω μεταξύ, ότι έχουμε high paid clerics, μέσα στις τάξεις του στρατού, που έχουν και τρομερή μόρφωση παράλληλα (ως αξιωματικοί - memo research για μενα εδώ) σε αντίθεση με τους ιμαμηδες, από τρίτες χώρες (όπως την Αλγερία) που έρχονται για να βρουν απλά μια θέση στη κοινότητα, και εισάγονται απο τριτκοσμικες χώρες ¥ για να πάρουν θέση σ'ένα κοκοπληρωμενο & άχαρο επάγγελμα. Σε πλήρη αντίθεση με τους νέους τζιχαντις που τους απωθεί

¥Ωραίο σημείο σύγκρισης εδώ, με την κρίση του Καθολικισμου, που κάνει ακριβώς το ίδιο κόλπο

[Micky · Rating 4 out of 5]

3.5 stars - Olivier Roy absolutely does not offer an introductory take on this material, jumping right in and using terms that I was not wholly familiar with. He also provides little context for events that occured in the Middle East. This is reflected in the brevity of the book, and it made parts of it difficult for me to understand. None of this is critique of the book, just wanted to note that this is an advanced take on Middle Eastern conflict and terrorism that is in conversation with other texts.

That being said, I feel that I learned quite a bit from this book. I had, prior to reading this, believed that terrorists that claimed to commit violence in the name of Islam were not reflective of Muslims as a whole and that they were instead radical members of Islam. Roy disproves this take, explaining that these "members of Islam" were recent converts that used Islam and the fictional idea of "global jihad" to mobilize their already radical beliefs, separate from Islam. I am grateful to have read the early chapters of this book. However, chapter 4 and the conclusion are rather disjointed and difficult to follow. I feel that some level of expositional cushion would have benefitted the flow of this book.

[Hamad T Alotaibi · Rating 3 out of 5]

الكتاب جيد لا اكثر ، اهم ما جاء فيه إثبات ان اغلب ( الدواعش الجدد ) ضعيفي التربية الإسلامية أساساً وان اغلب تقارير الاستخبارات او غيرها لاحظت قلة انخراط الملتزمين دينياً في الجماعات الجهادية ، مما يعني ولا ادري اذا كان الكاتب الفرنسي يقصدها ام لا مما يعني ان الأسر المتدينة السلفيه قل ما نجد من ذويهم منخرطين في تلك الجماعات ، كما يتم الفصل بين الدواعش و السلفين بشكل عام

[Salam · Rating 4 out of 5]

«إن الدين كل دين،ليس أداة للتطرف أو لاستئصال التطرف. له كرامته بحد ذاته، ويبسط فضاءه الخاص وهو فضاء لا اجتماع ولا إقليمي، لكنه روحي. الدين هنا، وعلمنته تفرده بدلاً من أن تدمره. للتطرف أسباب متعددة ومعقدة،لكنه في نهاية المطاف خيار، خيار شخصي يصير خياراً سياسيا وليس من المفيد ولا المنتج في الوقت عينه أن نجعل منه نوعاً من غسل الدماغ وكسوف الذات»

[Axel · Rating 3 out of 5]

Stutt bók en að mörgu leyti sniðug og vel sett fram. Ekki fyrsta bókin sem ég myndi mæla með hvað varðar þetta tiltekna efni. Höfundi tekst að koma efninu frá sér á þann hátt að flestir ættu að geta klórað sig nokkuð örugglega í gegnum það.

[Ella Verstappen]

This is a good, clear, well written book. This being assigned reading, I wasn't particularly preoccupied with the appeal of IS for young radicals, and yet I read this with full attention and interest. And I now know at least a little about middle eastern conflicts, wich is also a good +

[Ioannis Savvas · Rating 4 out of 5]

Πολύ κατατοπιστική ανάλυση του προφίλ των τζιχαντιστών τρομοκρατών. Ο απο-πολιτισμός της νέας γενιάς είναι η κεντρική ιδέα της ισλαμοποίησης της ριζοσπαστικότητας.

[Ebrahim Buhijji · Rating 2 out of 5]

الترجمة غير موفقه إلى حدا ما

[Jaan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Read this for a class, its okay tbh but im only including this in my goodreads because all ive been (re)reading is thrashy (and I mean THRASHY) smut and idk how to feel about that….

[Lucy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Concerning conclusion. Explains the recent election results in Europe.

[Peter · Rating 4 out of 5]

The French political scientist Oliver Roy published a study on why people joined the Islamic State in 2017. The book is entitled Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State. Cynthia Schooch translated the book from French into English. The book has a section of notes. The book has a bibliography and an index. Roy believes that the Islamic State has more to do with the “Islamization of Radicalism” (Roy & Schooch 6). Roy feels that the Islamic State has very little to do with Salafism and Islam generally. Roy defines Salafism in his book as having little to do with the Islamic State. I find Roy’s argument to be convincing. Roy feels the Islamic State has more in common with generational revolts such as the “Chinese Cultural Revolution” (Roy & Schooch 2). Roy and Schooch write the Chinese Cultural Revolution “was turned not against a social class but against an age group. The Khmer Rouge and Islamic State embraced this hatred of their forefathers” (Roy & Schooch 2-3). Roy believes that at the root of the Islamic State is a feeling of generational nihilism (Roy & Schooch 71-74). Roy and Schooch write, “the suicidal mass killer is unfortunately a very contemporary figure” around the world (Roy & Schooch 71). Nihilism is “the futility of life” (Roy & Schooch 53). Roy and Schooch write that according to the ideology of Islamic State, a victory of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) means “hails the arrival of the Antichrist, and thus the end of all human society, whether Islamic or not” (Roy & Schooch 54). I read the book on my Kindle. This short book covers a lot of ground. Roy’s and Schooch’s book was very well done. I found the Goodreads reviewer Murtaza's review helpful in writing this ‘review.’

[Sherrymoon]

https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/kultur/b...