What do you think?
Rate this book
Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination
Virtually everyone supports religious liberty, and virtually everyone opposes discrimination. But how do we handle the hard questions that arise when exercises of religious liberty seem to discriminate unjustly? How do we promote the common good while respecting conscience in a diverse society?
This point-counterpoint book brings together leading voices in the culture wars to debate such John Corvino, a longtime LGBT-rights advocate, opposite Ryan T. Anderson and Sherif Girgis, prominent young social conservatives.
Many such questions have arisen in response to same-sex How should we treat county clerks who do not wish to authorize such marriages, for example; or bakers, florists, and photographers who do not wish to provide same-sex wedding services? But the conflicts extend well beyond the LGBT rights arena. How should we treat hospitals, schools, and adoption agencies that can't in conscience follow antidiscrimination laws, healthcare mandates, and other regulations? Should corporations ever get exemptions? Should public officials?
Should we keep controversial laws like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or pass new ones like the First Amendment Defense Act? Should the law give religion and conscience special protection at all, and if so, why? What counts as discrimination, and when is it unjust? What kinds of material and dignitary harms should the law try to fight-and what is dignitary harm, anyway?
Beyond the law, how should we treat religious beliefs and practices we find mistaken or even oppressive? Should we tolerate them or actively discourage them?
In point-counterpoint format, Corvino, Anderson and Girgis explore these questions and more. Although their differences run deep, they tackle them with civility, clarity, and flair. Their debate is an essential contribution to contemporary discussions about why religious liberty matters and what respecting it requires.
This point-counterpoint book brings together leading voices in the culture wars to debate such John Corvino, a longtime LGBT-rights advocate, opposite Ryan T. Anderson and Sherif Girgis, prominent young social conservatives.
Many such questions have arisen in response to same-sex How should we treat county clerks who do not wish to authorize such marriages, for example; or bakers, florists, and photographers who do not wish to provide same-sex wedding services? But the conflicts extend well beyond the LGBT rights arena. How should we treat hospitals, schools, and adoption agencies that can't in conscience follow antidiscrimination laws, healthcare mandates, and other regulations? Should corporations ever get exemptions? Should public officials?
Should we keep controversial laws like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or pass new ones like the First Amendment Defense Act? Should the law give religion and conscience special protection at all, and if so, why? What counts as discrimination, and when is it unjust? What kinds of material and dignitary harms should the law try to fight-and what is dignitary harm, anyway?
Beyond the law, how should we treat religious beliefs and practices we find mistaken or even oppressive? Should we tolerate them or actively discourage them?
In point-counterpoint format, Corvino, Anderson and Girgis explore these questions and more. Although their differences run deep, they tackle them with civility, clarity, and flair. Their debate is an essential contribution to contemporary discussions about why religious liberty matters and what respecting it requires.
351 pages, Kindle Edition
First published April 14, 2017
33 people are currently reading
300 people want to read
About the author
John Corvino
4 books12 followersJohn Corvino, Ph.D., is professor of philosophy and the former dean of the Irvin D. Reid Honors College at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. He is the author or co-author of three books from Oxford University Press (OUP)—most recently, Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination, with counterpoint by Ryan T. Anderson and Sherif Girgis (2017). He is currently working on a book for OUP tentatively titled, The Other Side: How, When, and Why to Engage with Culture-War Opponents.
Corvino has lectured at over 300 venues worldwide on sexuality, marriage, religion, and related topics, and his online videos have received over four million views. Corvino has contributed to The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Detroit Free Press, the Huffington Post, The New Republic, Slate, Commonweal, and other popular venues.
Corvino has lectured at over 300 venues worldwide on sexuality, marriage, religion, and related topics, and his online videos have received over four million views. Corvino has contributed to The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Detroit Free Press, the Huffington Post, The New Republic, Slate, Commonweal, and other popular venues.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
October 31, 2017
I must grudgingly admit I have a new found respect for the opposing view. It's interesting to see the deeper workings past the surface argument for so turbulent an issue.
July 8, 2017
Since I agree with Anderson and Girgis' case, I'll focus here on John Corvino's case:
John Corvino presents the best case that I've read for a more restrictive view of religious liberty than currently exists in light of state and federal RFRAs. Yet, for all that, he still fails to provide a convincing case against the arguments of Anderson and Girgis. Anderson and Girgis have a more developed philosophy for freedoms of religion and conscience. The best Corvino can do at times is to try and poke holes in it here and there and present hypothetical scenarios (e.g., Mr. Burqa or Mr. Dawkins-Hitchens) that he hopes the reader will intuitively agree with. That's not to say that Corvino has no philosophy for freedoms of religion and conscience (I address some of that below). And for the large number of people who already share Corvino's moral and political intuitions, presenting such hypothetical scenarios will be more than enough to convince them that religious liberty needs to have more restrictions (e.g., in the form of SOGI laws).
Now let me address some of Corvino's system building and why I don't find it persuasive. In addressing the issue of why we should have religious liberty exemptions Corvino explores four possible reasons: (1) religion is a proxy for deep, important commitments, (2) religious believers find religious claims to be highly binding, (3) religion is a fundamental good, and (4) people have often discriminated against persons on the basis of religion.
Option number three was (and is) my own rationale prior to reading the book. Corvino’s objections to this are twofold: (a) religion can be and has been a force for evil and (b) if we understand the fundamental good of religion to consist in its facilitation of persons grappling with fundamental questions (e.g., the purpose of life) and living in accordance with one’s answers to such questions then religion does not *uniquely* perform this function and so we should not have laws, like RFRAs, that uniquely favor religion.
Although I don’t think objection (a) is convincing (it’s not enough to show that religion has been a force for evil, it needs to be demonstrated that it is just as much a force for evil as good; for, consider that free speech can be and has been a force for evil), I do think it sheds light on the problem of speaking about “religion” in the abstract. The modern liberal tends to view all religions as basically the same and, hence, as equal in value (or equally lacking in value). However, the modern conservative rejects this notion. It is an obvious fact to the majority of conservatives that not all religions are the same and that not all religions have equal value to society. Perhaps speaking about the value of “religion” was easier in the time of America’s founding fathers when their imagination of “religion” could not stray too far from the Judeo-Christian context that they were steeped in. In our contemporary context, in which Scientology, Hinduism, and Islam shape our understanding of the word “religion” just as much as Christianity or Judaism (and especially as Islam struggles internally to find peaceful expressions that can win out over violence), asserting the fundamental good of “religion” is less plausible. Nevertheless, Anderson and Girgis make a convincing case that the sort of integrity one achieves by being able to live according to their conscience (religious or not and true or not) is a good thing that is worth protecting unless there are overriding considerations which they spell out in detail in their chapter.
Concerning objection (b), I do not think that non-religious systems—and especially modern secularism—are capable of providing the necessary foundations for ultimate purpose and perseverance in the pursuit of that purpose. In fact it is not simply that modern secularism fails to provide the necessary foundations for these goods, but that it actually erodes them.
Corvino agrees the most with rationale number 4—especially in the case of systemic discrimination—but has several caveats and notes that other factors besides religion have been and are the basis for discrimination. This serves as a starting point to build his case for why religious discrimination should not be privileged above, say, sexual orientation discrimination. However, I don’t find it convincing since I don’t think our only or even our primary basis for exemption laws or for special protections are whether you or your group is a target of discrimination. Anderson and Girgis ask whether Corvino would be more willing to allow Quakers certain exemptions than evangelicals, given that Quakers have historically been more abused. However, it seems that Corvino would be just as unwilling to grant them something like a RFRA. Part of the problem here is that Corvino's system, what he bothers to flesh out, is so thin. I think we can combine reasons 3 and 4: religious exemption laws make sense because religion (though not broadly defined) is a fundamental good (reason 3) *and* this fundamental good is a basis for discrimination (reason 4). Since sexual orientation can’t make claims to both reasons there is no basis for treating it as equal to religious liberty, under Corvino's scheme.
Even if we just take reason 4 as our basis for exemptions and protections I don’t think this provides an obvious case for those who support SOGI laws and/or oppose RFRAs. Corvino notes that “We’ve moved rapidly… to a time when many people think opposition to homosexuality so obviously wrong as to not merit further inquiry” (p. 96). Corvino then discusses the case of Brendan Eich who was driven out of his job as the CEO of Mozilla because of his support for traditional marriage and notes that this “troubles me, especially as someone old enough to remember when it was very common for people to fear losing jobs on the grounds of being gay or progay” (p. 98). Thus, it is far from obvious that LGBT folks are the subject of more social animus than, say, an Evangelical conservative. Corvino presents some data to suggest that LGBT folk are disenfranchised in society, but I think Anderson and Girgis do a good job debunking parts of it and calling other parts into question. Prior to reading Anderson and Girgis' section I wrote the following: Where is the systematic oppression of LGBT folks? The business sector favors LGBT causes. The judicial branch of gov’t certainly favors LGBT causes. The media industry favors LGBT causes. Virtually all the major academic institutions in higher education and lower education are favorable towards LGBT people and causes. In the executive branch our current president, Trump, is the first president to enter office as supportive of gay marriage and transgender bathroom use. Despite leftist hysteria about Trump being bad for or against LGBT people, Trump has entered office as more pro-LGBT than Obama in his first term! The only place one might argue that a system or institution is against LGBT is the legislative branch with regard to RFRAs… yet this is precisely the point of dispute and, thus, it would be begging the question as to whether this is a form of discrimination.
Corvino favors a particular approach towards balancing religious liberty and equality on the basis that "otherwise few businesses might otherwise serve [LGBT persons]" (p. 88). But this seems detached from reality and Corvino undercuts his own point, I think, when he acknowledges that "diversity and inclusion are good for business" (p. 105). Maybe Corvino would want to say that his two ideas are consistent because he doesn't think many people realize that diversity and inclusion are good for business. But our empirical observations say otherwise: the majority of businesses are pro-LGBT or, at least, do not discriminate. This is precisely why Google, Apple, Microsoft, etc, etc, have been vocal about being pro-LGBT: they recognize the commercial value among the general public. As mentioned above, Corvino does cite a study which found that LGBT people report facing just as much discrimination as racial minorities, but I'm skeptical of self-reports and can point to several instances of fake hate crimes. Our culture has elevated victimhood status to a virtue and, hence, we have many people actually attempting to be victimized (or perceived as such) because it provides them with "intersectional" credibility.
John Corvino presents the best case that I've read for a more restrictive view of religious liberty than currently exists in light of state and federal RFRAs. Yet, for all that, he still fails to provide a convincing case against the arguments of Anderson and Girgis. Anderson and Girgis have a more developed philosophy for freedoms of religion and conscience. The best Corvino can do at times is to try and poke holes in it here and there and present hypothetical scenarios (e.g., Mr. Burqa or Mr. Dawkins-Hitchens) that he hopes the reader will intuitively agree with. That's not to say that Corvino has no philosophy for freedoms of religion and conscience (I address some of that below). And for the large number of people who already share Corvino's moral and political intuitions, presenting such hypothetical scenarios will be more than enough to convince them that religious liberty needs to have more restrictions (e.g., in the form of SOGI laws).
Now let me address some of Corvino's system building and why I don't find it persuasive. In addressing the issue of why we should have religious liberty exemptions Corvino explores four possible reasons: (1) religion is a proxy for deep, important commitments, (2) religious believers find religious claims to be highly binding, (3) religion is a fundamental good, and (4) people have often discriminated against persons on the basis of religion.
Option number three was (and is) my own rationale prior to reading the book. Corvino’s objections to this are twofold: (a) religion can be and has been a force for evil and (b) if we understand the fundamental good of religion to consist in its facilitation of persons grappling with fundamental questions (e.g., the purpose of life) and living in accordance with one’s answers to such questions then religion does not *uniquely* perform this function and so we should not have laws, like RFRAs, that uniquely favor religion.
Although I don’t think objection (a) is convincing (it’s not enough to show that religion has been a force for evil, it needs to be demonstrated that it is just as much a force for evil as good; for, consider that free speech can be and has been a force for evil), I do think it sheds light on the problem of speaking about “religion” in the abstract. The modern liberal tends to view all religions as basically the same and, hence, as equal in value (or equally lacking in value). However, the modern conservative rejects this notion. It is an obvious fact to the majority of conservatives that not all religions are the same and that not all religions have equal value to society. Perhaps speaking about the value of “religion” was easier in the time of America’s founding fathers when their imagination of “religion” could not stray too far from the Judeo-Christian context that they were steeped in. In our contemporary context, in which Scientology, Hinduism, and Islam shape our understanding of the word “religion” just as much as Christianity or Judaism (and especially as Islam struggles internally to find peaceful expressions that can win out over violence), asserting the fundamental good of “religion” is less plausible. Nevertheless, Anderson and Girgis make a convincing case that the sort of integrity one achieves by being able to live according to their conscience (religious or not and true or not) is a good thing that is worth protecting unless there are overriding considerations which they spell out in detail in their chapter.
Concerning objection (b), I do not think that non-religious systems—and especially modern secularism—are capable of providing the necessary foundations for ultimate purpose and perseverance in the pursuit of that purpose. In fact it is not simply that modern secularism fails to provide the necessary foundations for these goods, but that it actually erodes them.
Corvino agrees the most with rationale number 4—especially in the case of systemic discrimination—but has several caveats and notes that other factors besides religion have been and are the basis for discrimination. This serves as a starting point to build his case for why religious discrimination should not be privileged above, say, sexual orientation discrimination. However, I don’t find it convincing since I don’t think our only or even our primary basis for exemption laws or for special protections are whether you or your group is a target of discrimination. Anderson and Girgis ask whether Corvino would be more willing to allow Quakers certain exemptions than evangelicals, given that Quakers have historically been more abused. However, it seems that Corvino would be just as unwilling to grant them something like a RFRA. Part of the problem here is that Corvino's system, what he bothers to flesh out, is so thin. I think we can combine reasons 3 and 4: religious exemption laws make sense because religion (though not broadly defined) is a fundamental good (reason 3) *and* this fundamental good is a basis for discrimination (reason 4). Since sexual orientation can’t make claims to both reasons there is no basis for treating it as equal to religious liberty, under Corvino's scheme.
Even if we just take reason 4 as our basis for exemptions and protections I don’t think this provides an obvious case for those who support SOGI laws and/or oppose RFRAs. Corvino notes that “We’ve moved rapidly… to a time when many people think opposition to homosexuality so obviously wrong as to not merit further inquiry” (p. 96). Corvino then discusses the case of Brendan Eich who was driven out of his job as the CEO of Mozilla because of his support for traditional marriage and notes that this “troubles me, especially as someone old enough to remember when it was very common for people to fear losing jobs on the grounds of being gay or progay” (p. 98). Thus, it is far from obvious that LGBT folks are the subject of more social animus than, say, an Evangelical conservative. Corvino presents some data to suggest that LGBT folk are disenfranchised in society, but I think Anderson and Girgis do a good job debunking parts of it and calling other parts into question. Prior to reading Anderson and Girgis' section I wrote the following: Where is the systematic oppression of LGBT folks? The business sector favors LGBT causes. The judicial branch of gov’t certainly favors LGBT causes. The media industry favors LGBT causes. Virtually all the major academic institutions in higher education and lower education are favorable towards LGBT people and causes. In the executive branch our current president, Trump, is the first president to enter office as supportive of gay marriage and transgender bathroom use. Despite leftist hysteria about Trump being bad for or against LGBT people, Trump has entered office as more pro-LGBT than Obama in his first term! The only place one might argue that a system or institution is against LGBT is the legislative branch with regard to RFRAs… yet this is precisely the point of dispute and, thus, it would be begging the question as to whether this is a form of discrimination.
Corvino favors a particular approach towards balancing religious liberty and equality on the basis that "otherwise few businesses might otherwise serve [LGBT persons]" (p. 88). But this seems detached from reality and Corvino undercuts his own point, I think, when he acknowledges that "diversity and inclusion are good for business" (p. 105). Maybe Corvino would want to say that his two ideas are consistent because he doesn't think many people realize that diversity and inclusion are good for business. But our empirical observations say otherwise: the majority of businesses are pro-LGBT or, at least, do not discriminate. This is precisely why Google, Apple, Microsoft, etc, etc, have been vocal about being pro-LGBT: they recognize the commercial value among the general public. As mentioned above, Corvino does cite a study which found that LGBT people report facing just as much discrimination as racial minorities, but I'm skeptical of self-reports and can point to several instances of fake hate crimes. Our culture has elevated victimhood status to a virtue and, hence, we have many people actually attempting to be victimized (or perceived as such) because it provides them with "intersectional" credibility.
April 25, 2018
Wow - this is a fascinating book. Not a quick read (I kept rereading paragraphs to make sure I understood it all) but I appreciated hearing two sides of the religious liberty debate. One author (a gay man) told his perspective, then 2 others (including Ryan T. Anderson, my favorite marriage advocate) told their perspective, then each side replied to the others’ assertions. I agree with Ryan Anderson’s very thoughtful and well-researched points but appreciated hearing a calm rebuttal and explanation of why LGBT’s might need special sympathy and treatment. Corvino (the SSM proponent) didn’t change my mind, but I appreciated learning the history of many discrimination and religious liberty court cases.
My main disagreements are with Corvino’s desire to punish ideological dissent and force social acceptance of SSM, plus his concern about “dignitary harm” the LGBT’s might encounter when someone disagrees with them. That’s fine for him to feel that way, but it is wrong for others to force me at the point of a gun (e.g. using laws and government) to affirm LGBT lifestyles. I don’t demand that others approve of my decision to have five children, and I didn’t try to pass laws to punish those who humiliated me by mocking my “fertility” in public. We’re adults; we can deal with hurt feelings, not pass laws trying to punish those who hurt our feelings (see “Colorado cake baker” and “Oregon Sweet Cakes bakery”). “(T)here is no right not to be offended.” (p. 237) We all make different choices, and we should treat each other politely and respectfully, even if we have different opinions and lifestyle choices. But it is wrong to force others to participate in the celebration of something they disagree with. When people live with integrity and hold firmly to deeply-held beliefs about the sanctity of innocent human life and the importance of children having a mother and a father, it is wrong to punish those people for living by their beliefs. Integrity suffers, which is much different than just making a different choice (such as picking a different baker to make a cake).
This is a thought-provoking book, if you’ve ever been frustrated by “the unwillingness of some progressives -progressive Puritans- to take carefully laid paths to peaceful coexistence.” (p. 124) It can be hard to have a conversation with people who think having a right to a personalized SSM cake is more important than someone living true to their beliefs about marriage, so I appreciate this book’s analysis of the cases of wedding planners (florists, bakers, etc) being sued and/or put out of business because they believe differently than the LGBT lobby.
One point I learned is that “conscience protections” should be included along with “religious protections”; why should a Christian health care provider be allowed to opt-out of performing abortions, while atheists who believe the scientific proof that an unborn baby is an innocent human being with a beating heart might not have the same recourse? Both should be able to opt out of participating in abortions, fertility treatments to same-sex couples, and transgender mutilation surgeries, if they believe those treatments are harmful to the patient or to her children.
Quotes:
“...it isn’t simply that the benefits of liberty barely outweigh the costs. It’s that the benefits to people’s integrity or livelihood are great; and the costs vanishingly small.” -p. 119
“You can pick your projects at will, but not your moral and religious convictions… If one option (project) is off the table but enough alternatives remain, you can pursue another without seeing your self-determination suffer. To protect the latter, the state need only leave you a rich range of options. Not so with religious and moral integrity.” - p. 138
“The state cannot play crony capitalist with ideas, giving stronger protections to those it finds congenial...We imperil political reform by weighing dignitary harm against religious liberty -- assuming that ‘dignitary harm’ refers to the pain of being told that you’re acting immorally.” - pp. 172-3
“The law isn’t about siphoning evil out of every heart. It’s about setting up and keeping up the conditions under which everyone can adequately pursue the basic goods of human life.” -p. 176
“But here we aren’t debating trivial choices that social conventions happen to render disrespectful. We’re dealing with choices people make to preserve their integrity.” -p. 181
“Indeed the most important difference between laws on SOGI (Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) and race - or religion or disability or sex or virtually any other protected status - is this: over and over, SOGI laws impose gratuitously on important personal and social goods. They’re not simply about preventing ‘no LGBT people allowed’ policies. They’re designed and applied to needlessly penalize conscientious refusals to participate in morally controversial actions to which many people reasonably object, wounding moral and religious integrity and depressing pluralism. And that’s a sharp contrast indeed.” - p. 185
“...the main thing left for legal coercion to accomplish would be the symbolic value of making outlaws of their ideological opponents. It would be the illiberal goal of stifling moral dissent.” -p. 187
“An evangelical’s reason for refusing to bake same-sex wedding cakes is manifestly NOT to avoid contact with gay people on equal terms. It’s to avoid complicity in what she considers one distortion of marriage among others...The refusals of the bakers and photographers, charities and universities discussed here have nothing like the sweep or shape of racist practices… they’re about avoiding complicity with certain choices, not contact with groups.” -p. 191, 194
My main disagreements are with Corvino’s desire to punish ideological dissent and force social acceptance of SSM, plus his concern about “dignitary harm” the LGBT’s might encounter when someone disagrees with them. That’s fine for him to feel that way, but it is wrong for others to force me at the point of a gun (e.g. using laws and government) to affirm LGBT lifestyles. I don’t demand that others approve of my decision to have five children, and I didn’t try to pass laws to punish those who humiliated me by mocking my “fertility” in public. We’re adults; we can deal with hurt feelings, not pass laws trying to punish those who hurt our feelings (see “Colorado cake baker” and “Oregon Sweet Cakes bakery”). “(T)here is no right not to be offended.” (p. 237) We all make different choices, and we should treat each other politely and respectfully, even if we have different opinions and lifestyle choices. But it is wrong to force others to participate in the celebration of something they disagree with. When people live with integrity and hold firmly to deeply-held beliefs about the sanctity of innocent human life and the importance of children having a mother and a father, it is wrong to punish those people for living by their beliefs. Integrity suffers, which is much different than just making a different choice (such as picking a different baker to make a cake).
This is a thought-provoking book, if you’ve ever been frustrated by “the unwillingness of some progressives -progressive Puritans- to take carefully laid paths to peaceful coexistence.” (p. 124) It can be hard to have a conversation with people who think having a right to a personalized SSM cake is more important than someone living true to their beliefs about marriage, so I appreciate this book’s analysis of the cases of wedding planners (florists, bakers, etc) being sued and/or put out of business because they believe differently than the LGBT lobby.
One point I learned is that “conscience protections” should be included along with “religious protections”; why should a Christian health care provider be allowed to opt-out of performing abortions, while atheists who believe the scientific proof that an unborn baby is an innocent human being with a beating heart might not have the same recourse? Both should be able to opt out of participating in abortions, fertility treatments to same-sex couples, and transgender mutilation surgeries, if they believe those treatments are harmful to the patient or to her children.
Quotes:
“...it isn’t simply that the benefits of liberty barely outweigh the costs. It’s that the benefits to people’s integrity or livelihood are great; and the costs vanishingly small.” -p. 119
“You can pick your projects at will, but not your moral and religious convictions… If one option (project) is off the table but enough alternatives remain, you can pursue another without seeing your self-determination suffer. To protect the latter, the state need only leave you a rich range of options. Not so with religious and moral integrity.” - p. 138
“The state cannot play crony capitalist with ideas, giving stronger protections to those it finds congenial...We imperil political reform by weighing dignitary harm against religious liberty -- assuming that ‘dignitary harm’ refers to the pain of being told that you’re acting immorally.” - pp. 172-3
“The law isn’t about siphoning evil out of every heart. It’s about setting up and keeping up the conditions under which everyone can adequately pursue the basic goods of human life.” -p. 176
“But here we aren’t debating trivial choices that social conventions happen to render disrespectful. We’re dealing with choices people make to preserve their integrity.” -p. 181
“Indeed the most important difference between laws on SOGI (Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) and race - or religion or disability or sex or virtually any other protected status - is this: over and over, SOGI laws impose gratuitously on important personal and social goods. They’re not simply about preventing ‘no LGBT people allowed’ policies. They’re designed and applied to needlessly penalize conscientious refusals to participate in morally controversial actions to which many people reasonably object, wounding moral and religious integrity and depressing pluralism. And that’s a sharp contrast indeed.” - p. 185
“...the main thing left for legal coercion to accomplish would be the symbolic value of making outlaws of their ideological opponents. It would be the illiberal goal of stifling moral dissent.” -p. 187
“An evangelical’s reason for refusing to bake same-sex wedding cakes is manifestly NOT to avoid contact with gay people on equal terms. It’s to avoid complicity in what she considers one distortion of marriage among others...The refusals of the bakers and photographers, charities and universities discussed here have nothing like the sweep or shape of racist practices… they’re about avoiding complicity with certain choices, not contact with groups.” -p. 191, 194
January 14, 2018
As a long time fan of Anderson, this wasn’t his best (though, the second half of their first essay was better). The fourth star actually goes to Corvino. Though I don’t agree with his views, he provides the most accessible and well-articulated argument against religious privilege and for anti-SOGI discrimination law that I’ve read. Very enlightening view of “the other side.”
October 1, 2019
Clear explanation, strong argument from one side at least
The debate on religious liberty has grown more and more contentious and confusing lately, with secularists demanding to know why religions should get special treatment. It’s not a bad question. Thankfully it has a good answer, outlined in this book by Anderson and Girgis, who provide a systematic and clear case for protecting religious liberties.
Corvino’s case against it, especially where it impinges on certain sexual liberties, tends to be based on the assumption that LGBT activists’ views are right, and conservative religions’ views are wrong. (There’s more to his case than that, but that aspect underlies much of it.) So in effect, Corvino would have the government deny persons certain religious liberties on the grounds that their religious views are wrong — clearly an unconstitutional move for government to make.
But this is just one of many problems with his argument; Anderson and Girgis cover much more.
Back to that confusion I mentioned above: I suspect it’s widespread among supporters of religious liberty, not just detractors. With religious freedom under assault, we need to know how to answer the hard questions being raised. This book is an outstanding source of good thinking on the topic. Highly recommended
The debate on religious liberty has grown more and more contentious and confusing lately, with secularists demanding to know why religions should get special treatment. It’s not a bad question. Thankfully it has a good answer, outlined in this book by Anderson and Girgis, who provide a systematic and clear case for protecting religious liberties.
Corvino’s case against it, especially where it impinges on certain sexual liberties, tends to be based on the assumption that LGBT activists’ views are right, and conservative religions’ views are wrong. (There’s more to his case than that, but that aspect underlies much of it.) So in effect, Corvino would have the government deny persons certain religious liberties on the grounds that their religious views are wrong — clearly an unconstitutional move for government to make.
But this is just one of many problems with his argument; Anderson and Girgis cover much more.
Back to that confusion I mentioned above: I suspect it’s widespread among supporters of religious liberty, not just detractors. With religious freedom under assault, we need to know how to answer the hard questions being raised. This book is an outstanding source of good thinking on the topic. Highly recommended
December 2, 2019
Both arguments led me to agree with Corvino and Anderson at different points. While my thoughts sifted through their words in agreement or disagreement, I asked myself "well, what is the right answer!?" The truth is, in our age of pluralism and political theory, there seems to be no one right answer.
What Anderson failed to consider was what Critical Theory demands that we consider right now - the institutional barriers that bar certain people from their dignity and freedom. "Traditional" views on marriage and sex in the U.S are the majority. If we continue to give the majority exemptions, it will hurt the rest of our pluralist society - as it has been, yes, even in the market. These problems are institutionalized societal ills and the "tipping point" that was mentioned by Anderson several times has been reached already.
As a liberal, I am not seeking to eradicate religious views. I agree with Anderson that religious entities should have their rights but only if these entities are not burdening others and if there are other institutions available nearby. For instance, if a same-sex couple is seeking to adopt there are other adoption agencies besides the evangelical ones. However, if there isn't any other option - the state needs to incentivize a non-religious adoption agency. We must not force the closure of something that is overall good to society.
As with hospitals - If a health practitioner has their convictions - ok, fair enough. They can then work at a hospital that caters to their religious preference. The allegory of there only being 1% highly spread out religious health institutions is bullock in some areas of the U.S and as Covino points out, having a majority of such would seriously affect the greater good of society if every doctor could choose which patients they saw on the basis of their conscience or religious values.
My biggest problem with Anderson is that I am highly certain that if more Muslim / Sikh / Buddhist / Pagan / Hindu etc etc institutions started sprouting up - people with "traditional" would seriously oppose them and even fear-monger against it. For the most part, Anderson used his word space to describe the attack on religion with the majority example as those of Catholic/Christian. This then becomes a defense on the majority that has been suppressing people in this country the most.
What Anderson failed to consider was what Critical Theory demands that we consider right now - the institutional barriers that bar certain people from their dignity and freedom. "Traditional" views on marriage and sex in the U.S are the majority. If we continue to give the majority exemptions, it will hurt the rest of our pluralist society - as it has been, yes, even in the market. These problems are institutionalized societal ills and the "tipping point" that was mentioned by Anderson several times has been reached already.
As a liberal, I am not seeking to eradicate religious views. I agree with Anderson that religious entities should have their rights but only if these entities are not burdening others and if there are other institutions available nearby. For instance, if a same-sex couple is seeking to adopt there are other adoption agencies besides the evangelical ones. However, if there isn't any other option - the state needs to incentivize a non-religious adoption agency. We must not force the closure of something that is overall good to society.
As with hospitals - If a health practitioner has their convictions - ok, fair enough. They can then work at a hospital that caters to their religious preference. The allegory of there only being 1% highly spread out religious health institutions is bullock in some areas of the U.S and as Covino points out, having a majority of such would seriously affect the greater good of society if every doctor could choose which patients they saw on the basis of their conscience or religious values.
My biggest problem with Anderson is that I am highly certain that if more Muslim / Sikh / Buddhist / Pagan / Hindu etc etc institutions started sprouting up - people with "traditional" would seriously oppose them and even fear-monger against it. For the most part, Anderson used his word space to describe the attack on religion with the majority example as those of Catholic/Christian. This then becomes a defense on the majority that has been suppressing people in this country the most.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 11, 2017
This is a fascinating and important debate on one of the most pressing policy issues of our time: religious liberty. In an age when time-honored traditions such as marriage have been abruptly uprooted and transformed with implications for everybody, the public's attention has turned to liberties that have far preceded the public policy inventions of late.
John Corvino writes in favor of religious discrimination in the sense that he believes religion should not be favored in public policy. In other words, people should have the freedom to believe what they want in their own homes, but should not be "preferred" when it comes to exercise in the public sphere.
Ryan Anderson and Sherif Girgis, on the other hand, recount the fundamental right to religious freedom embedded with the U.S. Constitution, and describe it as one of a basket of goods that individuals should be able to pursue. They spend some length demonstrating that secularists have won the debate on redefining marriage for the time being, and should show some grace in allowing believers the freedom of conscience, particularly where the practical effects on celebrators of gay marriage are virtually nil.
I have to say that overall, John Corvino's writing is very clear and concise, making his arguments easier to grasp on first reading. Anderson and Girgis's initial essay is cumbersome and philosophical, making for a more tedious read. However, their arguments are more persuasive, most especially in their closing rebuttal. In a pluralistic society freedom of conscience is paramount and must not be sidelined with a chilling effect on the right of believers to exercise their rights.
I enjoyed the writers' modeling of civility on this topic of such sensitivity and import.
John Corvino writes in favor of religious discrimination in the sense that he believes religion should not be favored in public policy. In other words, people should have the freedom to believe what they want in their own homes, but should not be "preferred" when it comes to exercise in the public sphere.
Ryan Anderson and Sherif Girgis, on the other hand, recount the fundamental right to religious freedom embedded with the U.S. Constitution, and describe it as one of a basket of goods that individuals should be able to pursue. They spend some length demonstrating that secularists have won the debate on redefining marriage for the time being, and should show some grace in allowing believers the freedom of conscience, particularly where the practical effects on celebrators of gay marriage are virtually nil.
I have to say that overall, John Corvino's writing is very clear and concise, making his arguments easier to grasp on first reading. Anderson and Girgis's initial essay is cumbersome and philosophical, making for a more tedious read. However, their arguments are more persuasive, most especially in their closing rebuttal. In a pluralistic society freedom of conscience is paramount and must not be sidelined with a chilling effect on the right of believers to exercise their rights.
I enjoyed the writers' modeling of civility on this topic of such sensitivity and import.
September 27, 2017
This is an excellent book, more for the very fact that such a book exists than what's in it. It's incredibly rare to get opposing sides on a contentious issue to write and respond in book-length, and this exercise provides an experience quite different from simply reading two independent arguments. Here, John Corvino argues against religious exemptions to anti-discrimination laws, while Ryan T. Anderson and Sherif Girgis argue in favour. But they employ significantly different methods to do so.
Corvino takes for granted our current intuitions about the appropriateness of anti-discrimination laws in the cases of sexual orientation and gender identity, similar to those concerning race and religion. As he admits, he is "less interested in making the case for SOGI [sexual orientation and gender identity] anti-discrimination laws than in making the case against religious exemptions to them." His arguments then are mainly about why it would be unfair to give religious people exemptions, while assuming the general laws are good. But this specificity in his argument does open him up to legitimate criticism from his opponents when they charge that he "offers no general case for enacting SOGI antidiscrimination laws, no account of what qualifies as discrimination based on gender identity, no word on whether there should be exemptions for anyone but custom- service providers, and no more general principle on exemptions to point toward an answer." Indeed, we are left wondering whether discrimination laws themselves are necessary and to what extent, and here Corvino offers very few convincing answers.
Instead of relying on intuitions and reflective equilibrium, Anderson and Girgis try to create a framework so that plausible principles can be found and used. This method certainly has some success- their argument that religious conscience needs protections because of its property of "fragility" is especially compelling. However, by eschewing the complexity of intuitions and resorting to system building, they open themselves up to Corvino's rather devastating criticism: "I am skeptical of tidy system- building— where the apparent coherence often results less from principled consistency than from mental gerrymandering". For example, as Corvino points out, although they indicate they are in favour of anti-discrimination laws for race and religion, it is unclear if their system would even allow support for them today since most basic needs could probably be met without them.
One important point of disagreement amidst all this is what considerations should be taken as relevant for judging the merits of anti-discrimination laws. Corvino points that they would open minorities up to discrimination in various essential services, which Anderson and Girgis point out that as a matter of fact, not many cases of discrimination actually occur because market forces are arrayed against people who discriminate. The latter argument does seem a bit strange, and Corvino's narration of his personal experiences of anti-gay messages serve as a reminder of the non-homogeneous nature of sentiments about gay people. Would small out-of-the-way towns really be as accepting? And would market pressures have as big of an effect there? Anderson and Girgis are quick to add that even if there were a need to protect minorities, government laws may not be the best way. This is more compelling, but we still get a sense that they're leaving something out in their argument. Their seeming idealization of most anti-gay people as bigotry-free, principled thinkers leaves you feeling a little puzzled. This is puzzling but understandable: if most people were not serious thinkers but rather just people giving into their baser instincts, it seems easier to be in favour of anti-discrimination laws and not cede religious exemptions, since they would mostly just be cloaks for animus. Corvino's point about the "mental gerrymandering" involved seems quite appropriate, because the opponents' whole argument only works by considering a certain idealization instead of messy reality.
Both sides do have some arguments that stumble- Corvino argues that complicity shouldn't be a concern if the marriage would go on anyway, while Anderson and Girgis argue that unless progressive activists water down their demands to be more acceptable to the mainstream, then the activists do not think their goals are important. Despite these, it's an excellent book because it lays bare what approaches are taken by difference sides, and what their advantages and disadvantages are.
Corvino takes for granted our current intuitions about the appropriateness of anti-discrimination laws in the cases of sexual orientation and gender identity, similar to those concerning race and religion. As he admits, he is "less interested in making the case for SOGI [sexual orientation and gender identity] anti-discrimination laws than in making the case against religious exemptions to them." His arguments then are mainly about why it would be unfair to give religious people exemptions, while assuming the general laws are good. But this specificity in his argument does open him up to legitimate criticism from his opponents when they charge that he "offers no general case for enacting SOGI antidiscrimination laws, no account of what qualifies as discrimination based on gender identity, no word on whether there should be exemptions for anyone but custom- service providers, and no more general principle on exemptions to point toward an answer." Indeed, we are left wondering whether discrimination laws themselves are necessary and to what extent, and here Corvino offers very few convincing answers.
Instead of relying on intuitions and reflective equilibrium, Anderson and Girgis try to create a framework so that plausible principles can be found and used. This method certainly has some success- their argument that religious conscience needs protections because of its property of "fragility" is especially compelling. However, by eschewing the complexity of intuitions and resorting to system building, they open themselves up to Corvino's rather devastating criticism: "I am skeptical of tidy system- building— where the apparent coherence often results less from principled consistency than from mental gerrymandering". For example, as Corvino points out, although they indicate they are in favour of anti-discrimination laws for race and religion, it is unclear if their system would even allow support for them today since most basic needs could probably be met without them.
One important point of disagreement amidst all this is what considerations should be taken as relevant for judging the merits of anti-discrimination laws. Corvino points that they would open minorities up to discrimination in various essential services, which Anderson and Girgis point out that as a matter of fact, not many cases of discrimination actually occur because market forces are arrayed against people who discriminate. The latter argument does seem a bit strange, and Corvino's narration of his personal experiences of anti-gay messages serve as a reminder of the non-homogeneous nature of sentiments about gay people. Would small out-of-the-way towns really be as accepting? And would market pressures have as big of an effect there? Anderson and Girgis are quick to add that even if there were a need to protect minorities, government laws may not be the best way. This is more compelling, but we still get a sense that they're leaving something out in their argument. Their seeming idealization of most anti-gay people as bigotry-free, principled thinkers leaves you feeling a little puzzled. This is puzzling but understandable: if most people were not serious thinkers but rather just people giving into their baser instincts, it seems easier to be in favour of anti-discrimination laws and not cede religious exemptions, since they would mostly just be cloaks for animus. Corvino's point about the "mental gerrymandering" involved seems quite appropriate, because the opponents' whole argument only works by considering a certain idealization instead of messy reality.
Both sides do have some arguments that stumble- Corvino argues that complicity shouldn't be a concern if the marriage would go on anyway, while Anderson and Girgis argue that unless progressive activists water down their demands to be more acceptable to the mainstream, then the activists do not think their goals are important. Despite these, it's an excellent book because it lays bare what approaches are taken by difference sides, and what their advantages and disadvantages are.
December 18, 2020
Corvino is an intellectual heavyweight. I could count on one hand the writers who are truly impressive I'm this way. The point counterpoint style is a good one for controversial topics such as this. A must read.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 14, 2019
So good
This book makes for a good entry point for those wanting to hear both sides of the religious exemption/LGBTQ civil rights issue
This book makes for a good entry point for those wanting to hear both sides of the religious exemption/LGBTQ civil rights issue
Read
November 21, 2019This is yet another dialogue between two liberals, disguised as a dialogue between left and right. Taken alone, Corvino's advocacy of limiting free speech drastically (to get those gay cakes baked by Christians, thus not being pro-free-speech) is a more right-wing tendency than his nominally rightwing opponent, Anderson.
January 1, 2019
An excellent point-counterpoint book that will exercise your critical thinking skills!
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews