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Angola, Clausewitz, and the American Way of War
For over twenty years, the South African Border War was fought to counter the influence of Marxism-Leninism and to maintain control of Namibia. The South African people relied on cultural tools and adaptive strategies to protect their own interests. John S. McCain IV isn’t interested in taking sides on this issue; instead, he analyzes the military’s tactics, operational effectiveness, and strategy.
Angola, Clausewitz, and the American Way of War explores the concept of strategy making in war within the context of the South African Border War. It describes the danger of leaning on middle-range theories over general theories and of starting the decision-making process in the middle rather than at the top.
Wars should not be forced into a type as one thing or another—and then assumed to be all the same, based on that type. Each individual war should be seen for what it is, unique, and those in charge should be prepared to make changes and reevaluate every step of the way to account for all the moving pieces and the realities on the ground.
In the same vein as The Direction of War by Hew Strachan, McCain recognizes that US wars since 9/11 have been poorly strategized. This heavily researched volume challenges traditional approaches to conflict and suggests ways they could be improved.
Angola, Clausewitz, and the American Way of War explores the concept of strategy making in war within the context of the South African Border War. It describes the danger of leaning on middle-range theories over general theories and of starting the decision-making process in the middle rather than at the top.
Wars should not be forced into a type as one thing or another—and then assumed to be all the same, based on that type. Each individual war should be seen for what it is, unique, and those in charge should be prepared to make changes and reevaluate every step of the way to account for all the moving pieces and the realities on the ground.
In the same vein as The Direction of War by Hew Strachan, McCain recognizes that US wars since 9/11 have been poorly strategized. This heavily researched volume challenges traditional approaches to conflict and suggests ways they could be improved.
100 pages, Paperback
First published April 11, 2017
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28 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
April 27, 2019
This is a most interesting little book and I could not help but write a few thoughts down immediately after finishing it. This book has that kind of effect and can be read rather quickly. The writing is very simple and the prose direct. John S. McCain IV, a US Navy helicopter pilot and son of the late Vietnam Veteran, US Senator and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain, really uncovered a largely unknown topic in his self-published “Angola, Clausewitz, and the American Way of War,” a study of the myriad counterinsurgency and anticommunist efforts conducted by the South African Defense Forces under the Apartheid Governments from the 1970’s after the Portuguese left Angola until the withdrawal of Cuban troops in 1988 and eventual grating of full independence to Namibia by South Africa. Unfortunately, the conflict known as the “Angolan Civil War” really lasted until 2002 when UNITA and the MPLA signed a peace agreement in April 2002.
McCain’s book is compelling not because of its level of detail or originality in research but because of its freshness: here is a young US Navy Officer looking past well-trodden “American Way of War” classic case studies such as Gettysburg, Operation Torch, the landings at Normandy, or the Tet Offensive for something so much newer. As a historian focused upon conflicts and wars in Africa—I applaud his originality. He correctly notes that war outside the narrow confines of “The Western Way of War” (i.e. decisive battle) is quite rare—and studies of African conflicts rarer still.
I do have some refinements I think worthy to note. First, I could not find a central, unifying, and overarching argument. His leitmotif is the Clausewitzian dictum “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish by that test [that war is an instrument of policy] the kind of war which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.” And I agree with his observation that “Hybrid” warfare is a meaningless category used by an American defense establishment consumed with warfare typologies instead of seeking to understand war—most importantly the relationship between battle and the political object of war, peace. However, these are not in themselves arguments and while unified by the force of Clausewitz’s treatise “On War,” I would like to see McCain’s argument clearly laid out. Which gets to my second recommendation, which I will admit is probably the result of me being a historian focused on military activities. I believe some primary research would greatly strengthen the examples described, the Koevet and the 32nd Battalion. There are a great many tactical and operational lessons to be learned from these examples and an burgeoning literature (largely coming from Southern Africa) including “The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent,” “Battle For Angola: The End of the Cold War in Africa 1975-89,” “The South African Defence Forces in the Border War 1966-1989,” “Mobile Warfare for Africa: On the Successful Conduct of Wars in Africa and Beyond - Lessons Learned from the South African Border War,” or even the more theoretical “Composite Warfare: The Conduct of Successful Ground Force Operations in Africa.” Of course, these are all very recent additions to the literature. Consistent with those recent studies about warfare in Southern Africa, McCain alludes to an “African Way of War,” when he notes “a style of fighting but also a distinct mind-set about warfare that was not seen anywhere else and that contains incredible lessons for the astute observer” (pg. 18). The relationship between culture and war, and warfare, is complex and it would be interesting to see that examined more closely. Finally, while I fully agree that politics must coincide and link with (military) strategy as described in the final chapter “Conclusion and implications,” I am unsure how to get at that as an Active Duty military officer. We are really quite apolitical. Of course, so was the Wehrmacht in WWII-much to its discredit and demise. In any case, an incredible introduction to the subject of war in Africa and a clarion call for the American military to look further afield to understand war. Thank you John!
McCain’s book is compelling not because of its level of detail or originality in research but because of its freshness: here is a young US Navy Officer looking past well-trodden “American Way of War” classic case studies such as Gettysburg, Operation Torch, the landings at Normandy, or the Tet Offensive for something so much newer. As a historian focused upon conflicts and wars in Africa—I applaud his originality. He correctly notes that war outside the narrow confines of “The Western Way of War” (i.e. decisive battle) is quite rare—and studies of African conflicts rarer still.
I do have some refinements I think worthy to note. First, I could not find a central, unifying, and overarching argument. His leitmotif is the Clausewitzian dictum “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish by that test [that war is an instrument of policy] the kind of war which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.” And I agree with his observation that “Hybrid” warfare is a meaningless category used by an American defense establishment consumed with warfare typologies instead of seeking to understand war—most importantly the relationship between battle and the political object of war, peace. However, these are not in themselves arguments and while unified by the force of Clausewitz’s treatise “On War,” I would like to see McCain’s argument clearly laid out. Which gets to my second recommendation, which I will admit is probably the result of me being a historian focused on military activities. I believe some primary research would greatly strengthen the examples described, the Koevet and the 32nd Battalion. There are a great many tactical and operational lessons to be learned from these examples and an burgeoning literature (largely coming from Southern Africa) including “The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent,” “Battle For Angola: The End of the Cold War in Africa 1975-89,” “The South African Defence Forces in the Border War 1966-1989,” “Mobile Warfare for Africa: On the Successful Conduct of Wars in Africa and Beyond - Lessons Learned from the South African Border War,” or even the more theoretical “Composite Warfare: The Conduct of Successful Ground Force Operations in Africa.” Of course, these are all very recent additions to the literature. Consistent with those recent studies about warfare in Southern Africa, McCain alludes to an “African Way of War,” when he notes “a style of fighting but also a distinct mind-set about warfare that was not seen anywhere else and that contains incredible lessons for the astute observer” (pg. 18). The relationship between culture and war, and warfare, is complex and it would be interesting to see that examined more closely. Finally, while I fully agree that politics must coincide and link with (military) strategy as described in the final chapter “Conclusion and implications,” I am unsure how to get at that as an Active Duty military officer. We are really quite apolitical. Of course, so was the Wehrmacht in WWII-much to its discredit and demise. In any case, an incredible introduction to the subject of war in Africa and a clarion call for the American military to look further afield to understand war. Thank you John!
November 3, 2022
This was a great read on strategy and a critical view of how the US prosecuted the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Don't worry, it is not in any way a defense of Apartheid. It does look at how the South Africans were effective at having civilian-military dialogue, planning, and goal setting in a way American leadership never was. Very much worth reading to be a better informed citizen, actually. We should expect better of our officials and, if in positions of leadership, aspire to provide better service to our citizens.
April 27, 2020
Jack McCain writes a tight study of the South African Border War and the lessons it holds for US strategy or lack thereof.
April 15, 2017
Well written criticism of current US lack of coherent strategy by comparison to the South African Border War. A short treatise with limited scope, makes me want a more thorough work on the topic.
May 1, 2017
A short exploration of an often forgotten war that draws good lessons for those interested in war, strategy, and civil-military relations. Worth your time.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews