Economic sanctions are intended to be a nonmilitary means used by states to force their prerogatives on other states, entities, and individuals. Yet while sanctions have been increasingly used as a foreign policy tool, they are ineffective if executed without a clear strategy that is responsive to the nature and changing behavior of the target. In The Art of Sanctions, Richard Nephew offers a much-needed practical framework that focuses not just on the design of sanctions but, crucially, on how to decide when sanctions have achieved maximum effectiveness and how to improve them along the way.
Nephew--a lead participant in the design and implementation of sanctions on Iran--develops guidelines for interpreting targets' responses to sanctions based on two critical factors: pain and resolve. The efficacy of sanctions lies in the application of pain against a target, but targets may have significant resolve to resist, tolerate, or overcome this pain. Understanding the interplay of pain and resolve is central to using sanctions successfully and humanely. With attention to these two key variables, and to how they change over the course of the sanctions regime, policy makers can pinpoint when diplomatic intervention is likely to succeed or when escalation is necessary. Focusing on lessons from sanctions on both Iran and Iraq, Nephew provides policy makers with practical guidance on how to calibrate pain and measure resolve in the service of strong and successful sanctions regimes.
«هنر تحریمها» جزو آن دسته کتابهایی است که اکنون، پس از خروج آمریکا از برجام، خواندنش برای اهالی سیاست، چه در عرصه نظر و چه در عرصه عمل، خالی از لطف نیست.
از ریچارد نفیو، نویسنده این کتاب، به عنوان یکی از معماران اصلی تحریمهای هستهای علیه ایران یاد میکنند. حتی به وی و تیمش لقب «چریکهای کت و شلواری» در جنگ تحریمها نیز دادهاند.
نفیو که سابقه فعالیت و کارشناسی در شورای امنیت ملی آمریکا و وزارت خارجه را دارد در طی جریان مذاکرات 5+1 با ایران جزو تیم کارشناسان آمریکایی بود و وظیفهاش تخریب یا تعلیق همان تحریمهایی بود که خود جزو معماران اصلی آن به شمار میرفت.
تمرکز کتاب بر روی موضوع ایران است اما نویسنده نگاهی به تحریمهای گسترده آمریکا علیه عراق، روسیه و کرهشمالی نیز دارد.
هدف نفیو در این کتاب بازگو کردن «آنچه شدِ» تحریمها است و نه «چگونگی» اعمال آنها. نفیو در این کتاب علاوه بر روایت داستان تحریمهای هستهای علیه ایران به اصول کلی و چهارچوبهای نظام تحریمها نیز میپردازد.
اینکه در اعمال چنین تحریمهایی چه چیزهایی را باید در نظر داشت، تا چه میزان باید از کشور موردنظر، تاریخ، فرهنگ، جامعه و دین آن شناخت داشت، چه اهدافی را باید دنبال کرد، بر چه قسمتهایی باید دست گذاشت، چگونه میتوان «درد» تحریمها را به موقع افزایش و به موقع کاهش داد و نیز چگونه میتوان «استقامت» کشور هدف را مورد ارزیابی قرار داد.
نفیو در این کتاب تاکید دارد که تحریمها تنها ابزاری برای اعمال فشار هستند تا از این طریق بر رفتار کشور موردنظر تاثیر بگذارند. نفیو همچنین تاکید دارد که اگر تحریمها به درستی انجام نشوند و کشور تحریمکننده برنامه و انعطاف مناسبی نداشته باشد تحریمها شکست خواهند خورد.
نکته بسیار مهمی که نفیو در این کتاب قصد دارد بگوید این است که برای اعمال تحریم شما باید کشور موردنظر را از خودش بهتر بشناسید.
برداشت شخصی از این کتاب این است که کشور تحریمکننده باید کشور هدف را همچون پروانهای در دست در نظر بگیرد، اگر پروانه را شل بگیری از دستت خواهد گریخت و اگر عرصه را بر این پروانه تنگ کنی ممکن است به فروپاشی برسد و خود این موضوع تبعات ناگواری بعدیای را در پی خواهد داشت.
به عبارتی وقتی عرصه بر کشور هدف تنگ گردد و کشور هدف دیگر چیزی برای از دست دادن نداشته باشد آنگاه است که تحریم نتیجه معکوس داده و ترکشِ انفجارِ این فروپاشی نه تنها بر کشور تحریمکننده بلکه بر نظام بینالملل نیز خواهد خورد.
This book is so full of lies I could fill another book pointing them out. The author congratulates himself for having "successfully" put sanctions on Iran during the early Obama years and never mentions that, oh yeah, the U.S. also launched the world's first cyber attack on Iran's nuclear centrifuges at the same time. Might that have had anything to do with that "success," buddy!? This omission makes the entire book a lie.
He also juxtaposes his "successful" sanctions with the "unsuccessful" sanctions on Iraq during the Saddam years but he repeats the same lies about Saddam that have long since been disproven such as Saddam not cooperating with weapons inspections, not cooperating with peace talks, etc. Saddam was a CIA asset not a rogue dictator so positioning him as an insane person whose ego was beyond sanction is also disingenuous.
This author never proves that Iran's nuclear program is NOT for nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency recently (August 2023) said that they are satisfied with Iran's uranium inspections but this author is just convinced that Iran's nuclear program is for nefarious reasons and that they shouldn't have it. Why can Israel have nuclear weapons, which we know that they do? Why can the U.S.? The author just assumes we're all on board with picking Iran to focus on and that we all want to crush their economy for this unproven assumption. Why should we trust the same government that lied about weapons of mass destruction? He doesn’t say. He operates on the premise that the U.S. government is trustworthy. Lol.
The author addresses the U.S. lies about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as an obstacle for the U.S. Not because it killed millions of innocent people, oh no. The problem with the WMD wars are that other countries are less prone to help the U.S. bully other countries now. YA THINK!? He presents this as something the U.S. has to overcome - not be contrite for but instead to work around!
And finally, the part that had me screaming as I read: the civilian deaths! He gives barely a half of a shit for the the people affected by deadly sanctions, the bastard! There is a reason that these are called "sanctions of mass destruction" but he does not address this as anything that keeps him up at night. How do you answer for this at the end of your life and hold your head up to your family!?
This book is exactly why other countries accuse us Americans of arrogance. One star for organization and proper grammar and a middle finger for content.
نویسنده این کتاب از طراحان اصلی تحریمهای ایران بوده و جنبه های مختلف تحریمها را بررسی می کند. بیشتر کتاب اختصاص به مورد کاوی تحریمهای ایران و رسیدن به برجام دارد اما به تجربیات تحریمهای کره شمالی و روسیه و عراق هم توجه شده است. به نظر من این کتاب از نظر پژوهشی هم اثر قابل توجهی است و به صورت ضمنی متدولوژی های اقدام پژوهی و مورد کاوی در آن استفاده شده است.
A nauseating insight into the worldview of a US State Department functionary. Sanctions should be imposed to cause "pain" in the population of any nation which refuses to abide by the neoliberal Washington consensus. Terrible. Read for research purposes.
The Art of Sanctions: A View from the Field by Richard Nephew is the study of sanctions as an effective diplomatic tool. Nephew is a nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Program and affiliated with the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative housed within the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence. He is also a research scholar and program director at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. His present research is focused on the use of sanctions for deterrence and impact on present U.S. foreign policy challenges.
Sanctions have a notorious perception of being ineffective as a diplomatic tool. The United States completely blocked Cuban imports and exports but Cuba continued on its path because of support from the USSR and other non-aligned countries and even American allies. For Americans wanting Cuban products, it was a simple trip to Canada or Mexico. Vietnam also fell into this category. Sanctions were and are seen as a failure in Iraq and Iran. Can sanctions be effective in despite apparent string of failures?
Nephew discusses Iraq as the start of his study. Sanctions are meant to cause pain to encourage change. Once the change is implemented the sanctions disappear or are replaced with aid. The problem with dictatorial countries like Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba is that there is no force of change in the country. Sanctions are applied and the corrupt and higher ups still have all they need. The people in general suffer. That suffering is often used as fuel by the local government. It is not the people's leaders who are making them suffer, it is the US (and or the West). In Cuba, bad times were often off set with rallies condemning the US. North Korea is so closed off that its people believe they have the second best economy, next to China. Also put forth is the belief that the US lost the Korean War and the food aid being sent to North Korea is actually war reparations.
In Iraq, the government was deeply entrenched and the opposition was usually imprisoned or executed. Hussein was not a rational player on the world stage. This made it difficult to pressure any change. Twice he went to war against his neighbors and was at a loss of allies which eventually allowed military intervention, twice. Nephews next turns to Iran which despite the US claim of being a rogue state, does, for the most part, act as a rational player. It has relations with 97 nations compared to North Korea's 24 nations with full diplomatic relations. Iran's nuclear program is an issue and a nuclear armed Iran is considered unacceptable by the US. Interesting to note that under the Shah the nuclear program was acceptable. Iran tends to better listen to the world than Iraq and other countries. Its people do have limited choice in the local and national elections. Blindly believing in the Western Devil has faded and there has been a rise in materialism. The massive death toll of the Iran- Iraq War still leaves a bitter taste in the population when the idea of war becomes the topic. Iran can be persuaded with sanctions as long as they are effective. However, the US ban on importing gasoline only lead to Iran developing and expanding its oil distillation infrastructure.
North Korea is the last main player (aside from Russia). With a shared border and a strong protectorship with China, sanctions prove difficult. Although ships heading in and out of North Korea may be searched and checked, only China can control its border with North Korea which provides a gaping hole in any economic sanction. North Korea also knows that there is little the US can do militarily. Seoul is only 35 miles south of the border and provides a more than adequate hostage being well with in range of conventional and nuclear forces. North Korea's missile flights over Japan also demonstrate another potential hostage in a military conflict.
Nephew examines the use of sanctions in the past and present while offering options of the future sanctions with Iran, North Korea, and Russia. He recognizes sanctions can be effective if correctly used. That becomes the main focus of this work, how and which sanctions are effective. The difficulty of correctly administering sanctions in an effective way. Varying alliances and the difficulty to get countries to commit are always problems. Corruption of the local governments prevent sanctions from being evenly distributed and autocratic governments can reflect the blame back onto the countries administering the sanctions. Sanctions, however, do and can be a successful alternative to military action. The problem remains in the execution. Nephew does an outstanding job at describing the problems and benefits of sanctions in today's world. Very well done
Available December 19, 2017
The reviewer also holds an MA in International Relations, Security Policy.
This book has some helpful reminders about not merely trusting to the academic consensus that sanctions tend to fail, since it constantly shows the reader the contingency and the specificity of sanctions. Sanctions don't just work or fail by chance. What works is specific types of "pain" that test a target countries "resolve," which needs to be discovered and acted upon. The author was a participant in the sanctions and then negotiations with Iran on it's nuclear program, and he believes that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed t0 in 2015 demonstrated a clear retreat of the Iranian government from it's previous hardline stance, and was the direct result of sanctions pressure, especially that of 2012, which caused oil exports to fall and the Iranian rial to collapse.
Although the US had been sanctioning Iran since 1979, and then especially since 1984 with its "State Sponsor of Terrorism" designation and again in 1996 with the Iran-Libya sanctions Act, it was the late 2002 revelations of Iran's nuclear program that spurred a truly international backlash. Despite the failure of the U.S. to find nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, it convinced the UN Security Council to impose it's first resolution against Iran in 2006, and strengthened it in 2008. The U.S. added more in 2010 with another U.S. sanction law. With the final financial cut of in 2012, Iran was squealing from pain, and that helped elect Hassan Rouhani the next year, and created the zone for an early Joint Plan of Action that November. Whatever one things of those agreements, they were certainly a stretch from Iran's negotiating position from even 2009, when they rejected a P5+ 1 (UN Security Council plus Germany) offer of working nuclear reactor rods with non-weapons fuel.
The book, however, does not give much insight into the actual process of negotiations (it notes it does not try to be a kiss-and-tell), can be tedious and repetitive, and has frequent errors. But it does give one an overview of the Iranian sanctions effort, and of how certain types of sanctions can work or fail.
first of all the price of hardcover is a third of my income due to the sanctions which this man started so I downloaded this book kinda illegally (living in Iran) 2d this book is one of the essential books that every Iranian should've read 3d this book should be considered documentation of crime against humanity (80 million people besides"AghaZadeh ha" and the ones who benefits from sanctions themselves which the writer admits they benefit from sanctions) and in the end FACTs speak for themselves read the book cuz everything that I say would be considered A "Regime Propaganda" by some idiots who oppose what they don't know من انگلیسیشو خوندم تا چیزای دیگه قاطیش نباشه