This is an extremely interesting book. The basic question it asks is why, if Emperor Hirohito was capable of bringing about Japan’s surrender in 1945, was he unable to prevent its onset. It is a fair question with a somewhat complicated answer but I came away convinced of the author’s evenhandedness in presenting the historical evidence and the correctness of the conclusions she drew from that evidence. There were a few potential issues that I thought the author could have addressed. For one thing, is it possible that the emperor was unable to stand up to the militarists in the army in the 1930’s becaue he was still relatively young and new to his position? Maybe not but I would have appreciated hearing the author’s analysis of that possibility. Another question I had concerned the Emperor’s verbal and written statements, which, as quoted in the book, seem tame and ambiguous. Is it possible something is lost in translation — i.e., that the statements were more laden with meaning in Japanese than they are in English? I suspect if this had been true, the author would have discussed it but it remains a question in my mind and I wish she had dealt with it.
It is tragic that Japan went to war against China in the 1930’s and against western powers in 1941. The resulting loss of life and destruction of property were staggering. Perhaps the leaders of the Japanese military sold the emperor on the idea that the forces under their command were invincible and would win the war without great difficulty. Eventually, during the war, Hirohito came to doubt their assurances and feigned confidence and he challenged them. Fortunately for the world, there was a peace faction in the Japanese government that was ready to work toward ending the war. The members of this faction had to work quietly for fear of punishment (and even assassination) by the militarists but, once Hirohito sided with the peace faction, their arguments prevailed and surrender came about.
It was very interesting to read the author’s discussion of the fact that it was not just the dropping of the atomic bombs that pushed Hirohito and others in the government to demand surrender but a combiniation of the a-bombs and the Soviet declaration of war, which apparently shocked the army’s high command. Also, Hirohito was growing increasingly concerned about the death and destruction resulting from the American air force’s strategic bombing campaign, which was laying waste to major portions of Tokyo and other cities. Thus, there were multiple factors that pushed the emperor and the cabinet to demand the army and navy agree to surrender.
I would encourage anyone interested in modern East Asian history, Japanese history and the history of the Second World War to read this book. It is not long and is clearly well researched and, in my opinion, its contentions are well argued. I congratulate the author for this interesting and persuasive contribution to the literature on an important subject.