A comprehensive history of one of the world's deadliest jihadist groups
Boko Haram is one of the world's deadliest jihadist groups. It has killed more than twenty thousand people and displaced more than two million in a campaign of terror that began in Nigeria but has since spread to Chad, Niger, and Cameroon as well. This is the first book to tell the full story of this West African affiliate of the Islamic State, from its beginnings in the early 2000s to its most infamous violence, including the 2014 kidnapping of 276 Nigerian schoolgirls.
Drawing on sources in Arabic and Hausa, rare documents, propaganda videos, press reports, and interviews with experts in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger, Alexander Thurston sheds new light on Boko Haram's development. He shows that the group, far from being a simple or static terrorist organization, has evolved in its worldview and ideology in reaction to events. Chief among these has been Boko Haram's escalating war with the Nigerian state and civilian vigilantes.
The book closely examines both the behavior and beliefs that are the keys to understanding Boko Haram. Putting the group's violence in the context of the complex religious and political environment of Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, the book examines how Boko Haram relates to states, politicians, Salafis, Sufis, Muslim civilians, and Christians. It also probes Boko Haram's international connections, including its loose former ties to al-Qaida and its 2015 pledge of allegiance to ISIS.
An in-depth account of a group that is menacing Africa's most populous and richest country, the book also illuminates the dynamics of civil war in Africa and jihadist movements in other parts of the world.
Thurston's one of the only actual left wingers who is versed in security studies stuff. His broader critiques of mainstream counterterror/security discourse is better outlined elsewhere (Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel) but he is definitely the best place to start for serious reporting on salafism in Africa
Discomfiting describes my very visceral reaction to this well written book. How do people like this arise in our world, especially corrupting the grace and wisdom of Islam in their reign of terror and destruction?
Nigeria confronts a myriad of challenges. BH is one. To understand this movement assists in diagnosing the country’s ills and elaborating the solutions.
Many analysts, skeptical of the explanatory power of religion, dismiss any effort to examine the religious content of jihadist movements; others are even keen to disassociate jihadism from Islam. Although it is impossible to say whether Boko Haram’s leaders really believe in the group’s message, religion is part of its structure. Religion does not necessarily refer to individual belief. For some it does, especially in the West where the individual is something, and good for them, but for others it unfortunately is not. Fringe movements sometimes start out with support from mainstream religious authorities. Dissidents can experience the loss of mainstream support as a critical juncture on the road to violence. As such, religion is a gateway to violence as much as it is a gateway to silence. This trend fits Boko Haram as well. It is important to show that Boko Haram’s ideas did not come out of thin air. The movement tried to harness and amplify certain ideas that were already circulating in the religious field, particularly during the period between 1999 and 2003, when northern Nigerian states were intensively implementing Islamic law (shari’a) - a development indispensable to understanding Boko Haram’s emergence. Overall, Boko Haram (Western Education is forbidden) represents the outcome of dynamic, locally grounded interactions between religion and politics. No, it is not part of a global jihadist movement. No, it is not the mere product of poverty, poor governance, and disparities between north and south: it is the application and interaction of ultraconservative religious ideas with local politics.
“Nigeria is an important country. It has, by far, Africa’s largest population, 180 million or more people. By 2050, Nigeria may have 400 million people. Corruption is widely seen by Nigerians as their country’s biggest problem. Some $380 billion has been stolen or wasted since the independence. It has one of the fastest growing economies in the world, yet population growth has outpaced economic growth. The result is that most Nigerians are poor. 43 percent of the population is under the age of 15. Between 1980 and 2006, the poverty rate in the North East zone rose from 35 to 72 percent.”
“A significant number of youth in Niger are not ideologically jihadist, but they valorize al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State as heroic, anti-Western organizations. Hardline religious rhetoric can intersect with political and socioeconomic grievances. Preachers and religious entrepreneurs on the fringes of the mainstream Salafi movement then seek to capitalize on a climate of anger.”
“One would almost forget that Muslim civilians themselves are the primary target of violence. A favorite Qur’anic verse being: “chaos is worse than killing.”
A very well-researched book on the religious, economic, political, and social factors that contributed to the rise of Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria and the neighbouring countries. It goes into great detail discussing the evolution of the group from a small religious sect into one of the deadliest jihadist terrorist groups in the world.
Thurston's 2018 review of one of the planets more notorious Islamist jihadist insurgent groups is well written and policy oriented despite having at times esoteric descriptions of Islamic concepts and Arabic phrasing. His PhD is in religious studies and it shows but he writes well enough for a political scientist to appreciate.
Boko Haram or "western education is prohibited" started in 2002 in NE Nigeria, a region rife with poverty, unemployment and religious conflict. Mohammed Yusuf rose to prominence by escalating the group into a more active and violent organization by bringing Koranic verse into public debate. His interpretation was more rigid than the normally more conservative Salafist view. ironically, hardliners on his right made him take this stance, drawing criticism from imams and traditional leaders.
His early terrorist activity in 2008 drew enough fear from Nigerian authorities to finally capture and summarily executed him in his father in laws barn in the summer if 2009. His successor, Abubakar Shekau was more violent and took the group to greater success and violence, capturing whole territories in Borno, Ademawa and Bauchi states and even crossing into neighboring countries like Chad, Cameroon and Niger in the Lake Chad region.
Shekau kidnapped and killed Christians, Muslims, police and soldiers alike while freeing BH fighters from jails. Civilian militias or vigilante groups or CJTF rose up to effectively counter BH enough to stabilize the national political system to allow Christian President Jonathan to stay in office until the 2015 national election of Muslim Muhammad Buhari, seen by many as a more effective combatant to the growing threat that grabbed global attention with kidnapping of hundreds of Chibok girls in 2014. U.S., British, French and African Union assets increased bringing in drones, foreign troops who often outperformed Nigerian units due to corruption or lack of equipment.
The war on terror addressed BH in a larger framework, creating the need to confront the group, much like al- Qai'da was.
Thurston concludes that BH can only be truly defeated with political will and dialogue and not just socioeconomic aid or reintegration of former insurgents into society. BH splintered twice into sects, first Ansaru, after AQIM considered affiliation and in 2015 with Islamic State led by Baghdadi. IS never trusted Shekau's hard-line attacks on Muslims living under Nigerian thus Western legal systems.
BH can either go the way of the Algerian spawned AQIM which today is isolated and much weaker in North Africa. Or it might evolve as AL Shabad, the youth, in Somalia and grow resistant and stronger over time better adapting ideology to fit a local context. Strongly recommend.
Great book. One thing it reminded me of, and something that perturbed me about Nigeria or the government of Nigeria was a stark unwillingness to examine the past, and see how actions from said past are inexplicably linked to the present. This is not to say that if the Nigerian government atoned for mishandling earlier uprisings in northern Nigeria, there wouldn’t be another ambitious upstart like Yusuf that would have taken advantage of the lack of education and infrastructure development in the region to stir up religious resentment. But! The government dropping the ball on several occasions exacerbated this crisis.
Comprehensive and dense, this is an incredibly detailed look at Boko Haram. Describing both internal disputes, militant activities and international attempts at dissolution in detail, it’s a fantastic resource. Written in 2018, I’m going to investigate myself whether Thurston’s assertion that political engagement may be the only method of rectification to assuage Boko Harams attacks was/is accurate.