Philosophical Studies

by G.E. Moore

Modern Idealism, if it asserts any general conclusion about the universe at all, asserts that it is spiritual. There are two points about this assertion to which I wish to call attention. These points are that, whatever be its exact meaning, it is certainly meant to assert (1) that the universe is very different indeed from what it seems, and (2) that it has quite a large number of properties which it does not seem to have. Chairs and tables and mountains seem to be very different from us; but, when the whole universe is declared to be spiritual, it is certainly meant to assert that they are far more like us than we think. The idealist means to assert that they are in some sense neither lifeless nor unconscious, as they certainly seem to be; and I do not think his language is so grossly deceptive, but that we may assume him to believe that they really are very different indeed from what they seem. And secondly when he declares that they are spiritual, he means to include in that term quite a large number of different properties. When the whole universe is declared to be spiritual, it is meant not only that it is in some sense conscious, but that it has what we recognise in ourselves as the higher forms of consciousness. That it is intelligent; that it is purposeful; that it is not mechanical; all these different things are commonly asserted of it. In general, it may be said, this phrase 'reality is spiritual' excites and expresses the belief that the whole universe possesses all the qualities the possession of which is held to make us so superior to things which seem to be inanimate: at least, if it does not possess exactly those which we possess, it possesses not one only, but several others, which, by the same ethical standard, would be judged equal to or better than our own. When we say it is spiritual we mean to say that it has quite a number of excellent qualities, different from any which we commonly attribute either to stars or planets or to cups and saucers.

Genres: Philosophy

162 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1922

About the author

George Edward "G. E." Moore OM, FBA was an English philosopher, one of the founders of the analytic tradition along with Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and (before them) Gottlob Frege. With Russell, he led the turn away from idealism in British philosophy, and became well known for his advocacy of common sense concepts, his contributions to ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics, and "his exceptional personality and moral character." He was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, highly influential among (though not a member of) the Bloomsbury Group, and the editor of the influential journal Mind. He was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 1918. He was a member of the Cambridge Apostles, the intellectual secret society, from 1894, and the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club.

Reviews

[Cassidy Brinn]

... from E. Jordan's review (1924) "Professor Moore's refutation would therefore have been important if it had relegated the mental state to its properly obscure place; but that would have contributed, not to a refutation of idealism, but to the necessity of a re-examination of the assumptions of realism. ... From the point of view of the problem of knowledge it appears very curious why one who is so interested to prove the independent existence of at least some non-mental elements should be nevertheless continuously occupied with mental states. The description of the mechanisms of perception and the analysis of the nature of sense data hardly seem the procedure through which the proof of the non-mental character of even some reals would be expected." (90)

... from John Laird's review (1923) "Philosophy may be pursued in many fashions, but two of these fashions seem dominant in their importance. The first of these, by an elaborately circular argument, tries to convert hypothesis into fact by making it big enough to support everything. The second, with infinite pertinacity seeks to find somiething which a reasonable man dare not dispute. Both ways have their disappointments. The first, to mention one point only, seems often to perplex the plainest questions without being able to deny their pertinence. The second may seem so preoccupied with its base that it has no time to operate from the base. We are older, now, than Descartes was, and less confident of our ability to reconstruct the sciences if only we discover a certain foundation. Yet the man who cannot learn from the second method has no philosophy in him. I do not say that we should all follow it. Each of us, I suppose, should go on in his own way. What I say is that we can all learn from it, and this is another way of saying that we have all a vast deal to learn from Mr. Moore."

... from James Pratt's review "Mr. Moore's Realism" (1923) "The extent to which Mr. Moore's view has been modified since 1903 is thus rather striking. The changes are due, of course, to the seventeen years of very honest and hard thinking that Mr. Moore has given to the subject. Abandoning, for good and solid reasons, a form of realism which seemed in many ways closely related to that of Professor Alexander and of Professor Laird, Mr. Moore now speaks of sense data in a way which comes very near to admitting them to be subjective; he holds to a representative theory of knowledge and perception; and he asserts that we perceive material objects through the sense-data which resemble them or take their source from them." (384)