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The Wehrmacht
The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: The German Campaigns of 1944-1945
By 1943, the war was lost, and most German officers knew it. Three quarters of a century later, the question persists: What kept the German army going in an increasingly hopeless situation? Where some historians have found explanations in the power of Hitler or the role of ideology, Robert M. Citino, the world’s leading scholar on the subject, posits a more straightforward solution: Bewegungskrieg, the way of war cultivated by the Germans over the course of history. In this gripping account of German military campaigns during the final phase of World War II, Citino charts the inevitable path by which Bewegungskrieg, or a “war of movement,” inexorably led to Nazi Germany’s defeat.
The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand analyzes the German Totenritt, or “death ride,” from January 1944—with simultaneous Allied offensives at Anzio and Ukraine—until May 1945, the collapse of the Wehrmacht in the field, and the Soviet storming of Berlin. In clear and compelling prose, and bringing extensive reading of the German-language literature to bear, Citino focuses on the German view of these campaigns. Often very different from the Allied perspective, this approach allows for a more nuanced and far-reaching understanding of the last battles of the Wehrmacht than any now available. With Citino’s previous volumes, Death of the Wehrmacht and The Wehrmacht Retreats, The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand completes a uniquely comprehensive picture of the German army’s strategy, operations, and performance against the Allies in World War II.
The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand analyzes the German Totenritt, or “death ride,” from January 1944—with simultaneous Allied offensives at Anzio and Ukraine—until May 1945, the collapse of the Wehrmacht in the field, and the Soviet storming of Berlin. In clear and compelling prose, and bringing extensive reading of the German-language literature to bear, Citino focuses on the German view of these campaigns. Often very different from the Allied perspective, this approach allows for a more nuanced and far-reaching understanding of the last battles of the Wehrmacht than any now available. With Citino’s previous volumes, Death of the Wehrmacht and The Wehrmacht Retreats, The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand completes a uniquely comprehensive picture of the German army’s strategy, operations, and performance against the Allies in World War II.
632 pages, Hardcover
First published November 30, 2017
37 people are currently reading
462 people want to read
About the author
Robert M. Citino
21 books114 followersRobert M. Citino is an American history professor, scholar and writer currently teaching at the University of North Texas. He specializes in German military history and has earned acclaim by writing several historical books on the subject. He has appeared as a consultant on the History Channel several times on the subject of World War II and German military tactics.
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Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
July 20, 2022
A lot of people ask the question: Why did the Wehrmacht keep fighting in 1944 and 1945? This book does a good job explaining that question. I think this book is quintessential for World War Two readers, because it answers these questions and explains the history of the war from the view of both the allies and the Wehrmacht, with the majority of it focused on the Wehrmacht. Citino hammers away the notions he talked about in his first and second book about the German art of war, and how World War Two ended Germany's ability to wage the war it had been doing for all of it's previous wars. I now consider Citino a new favorite author of mine after reading this through.
A few things I didn't like was how he didn't mention the Courland pocket much at all, and he didn't mention the Italian theatre or the Balkan theatre much more than I would've liked, but then again, his book isn't meant to cover these theatres with the detail I would like. However, It doesn't detract from the Five-star rating I give it, and neither do the typos I encountered.
A few things I didn't like was how he didn't mention the Courland pocket much at all, and he didn't mention the Italian theatre or the Balkan theatre much more than I would've liked, but then again, his book isn't meant to cover these theatres with the detail I would like. However, It doesn't detract from the Five-star rating I give it, and neither do the typos I encountered.
November 22, 2024
Besides being the culminating point of a career spent writing about the German military that fought World War II, and an examination of the death of the Prussian way of war, this book also represents Citino's coming to grips with the collapse of the Cold War myths of a "clean" German army and the recognition that the criminality of the Nazi regime was enabled by the German officer corps. In this analysis the paradigmatic German general is not Erwin Rommel, Gerd von Rundstedt, or even Heinz Guderian. Citino nominates Ferdinand Schorner for this position. Schorner being a man who was always willing to unquestioningly follow Hitler's orders, who continued to execute his men for nebulous failures in discipline even after Hitler's suicide, and who abandoned his post to try and surrender to the Americans; only to find himself unceremoniously handed over to the Soviets. Recommended.
Originally written: February 9, 2020.
Originally written: February 9, 2020.
February 9, 2020
The Wehrmacht's Last Stand by Dr. Robert Citino is, perhaps, the best book written in my lifetime devoted to the German equation of the final year and half of the Second War.
Part of an unofficial quadrille of books beginning with 'The German Way of War', and including 'Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns in 1942', and 'The Wehrmacht Retreats: the German Campaigns of 1943', Last Stand is an operational, and doctrinal history of the German campaigns in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as the fighting in central Italy, and Northwestern Europe as well as Germany herself.
The overall approach of Dr. Citino has been to analyze the Second War in the broader terms of an overarching German (read: Prussian) methodology of waging war.
Realizing that, strategically located on a relatively open plain in Central Europe, surrounded on all sides by powerful, resource rich powers that were often hostile, Prussia (later Germany as a whole) was dealt a bad hand, the Prussians needed to find a reliable strength (a force multiplier) by which they could overcome their systemic weaknesses. This strength was, in an equal measure both scientifically and artistically, in waging war in a way that accentuated, or created, their strengths.
Prussian, and later German, methods of war making put a premium on several ingredients that, when boiled together, created a truly lethal stew. Speed, flexibility, ruthless aggression, intellectual individual freedom of small unit commanders, mission oriented tactics, and the willingness to destroy an enemy on the field in a blood crazed fury that had its own term: the Kesselschlacht, or cauldron battle.
This typical German methodology, married to one of the most highly intellectual and mentally advanced cultures in creation, created a nearly unstoppable juggernaut on land. First the Prussian, and then the Imperial German Army was considered, correctly for a time, the worlds best. And it was certainly the most feared. The Bismarckian system of continental hegemony was policed by nothing more than the mere terror the sheer thought of the German Army brought to the rest of Europe.
Germany was a superpower without the need for overseas colonies, or a globe spanning Navy. It didn't need them. By fear of their own reputation, they ruled all of Europe.
However, the breakdown of the Bismarckian system with the ascension of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and his disastrous policy of Weltpolitik showcased another German trait that Citino brings up time and again in his discussions on the Second War.
The Germans were masters of the short, furious war. Of fighting, and winning, battles, and of showcasing brilliant, exciting even, operational maneuvers that befuddled the other military potent powers such as Russia, and France. However, and this is a key theme throughout Last Stand, the Germans never did master the one element that was vital to their survival.
Strategy.
By late 1943, early 1944, the Wehrmacht (the German Army, distinct of the Waffen-SS, though the SS is a player in this tale) was no longer the brilliantly led, superbly trained, and terrifying force on the field of battle. Certainly, they were still lethal. No other Army was as skilled as they were in tactics, not by a long shot. And neither the Soviets, the Americans, or the British-Canadians could quite match them in terms of operational flair.
But they were outmatched, and they knew it.
The Russians alone outnumbered, and outproduced, them. Add the industrial might of the British Empire, and worse still the Americans, and it is easy to look at the war with an almost fatalistic lens to scoff and wonder how the Germans were ever viewed as a threat.
Well, they were. As the millions of Soviet and Allied killed and wounded still to come would attest to.
However, German tactical excellence, and operational brilliance was poor compensation for bankrupt strategy, a total lack of comprehension of foreign policy, or of economics. If the German Panzers could shoot up three, to four Allied and Soviet tanks for every one of theirs, in the end, it couldn't save them from the fact that the Soviets had five tanks, and so did the Americans, and the British had two of their own to boot.
The much mythologized German technological brilliance, while accurate to a point (the Germans were lightyears ahead of everyone else in many areas of technology to include the world's first jet fighter, cruise missile, ballistic missile, guided missile, infrared sights, nightvision, and having some of the most lethal tanks and aircraft of the time period...none of which could be mass produced), fails to take into consideration the endemic corruption, and very un-German inefficiency rife within the National Socialist system.
The Germans were chronically short on fuel, ammunition, motorized transport, tanks, artillery, aircraft, and thanks to treating their allies in Italy, Finland, Romania, Hungary, and several others like second rate nobodies, they were also utterly alone. Even the Waffen-SS, taking hardened anti-Communist volunteers from all across Europe and the Soviet Union, could not make good the staggering manpower shortfalls that the Germans faced from January 1944.
And yet, despite all of that, it took damned near the whole world to truly finish them off.
Dr. Citino focuses his work on the operational history of the final year and a half of the war, and he tells the story from the German perspective. While doing so, he showcases as well how the various Allied players waged their war against the Germans.
The British and Canadians tended towards caution more than anything else. The British and Commonwealth forces were psychologically tired by this point, and Britain herself lacked the manpower to reliably sustain a large Army on the continent for long. The Americans, having stumbled, bumbled, and fallen on their ass more than once against the Germans in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, had learned their lessons and were a force to be reckoned with by 1944. Even so, the American home front was very wary of heavy casualties, and the Americans were never very tactically adept, and only on occasion showcased operational brilliance. They made up for this, however, by being the most mobile force in human history, and having close air support that even the Soviets envied.
Why risk men in battle when you can have your artillery and aircraft blow it to smithereens instead? (Especially when American records in small unit engagements were never all that great against the Germans until the last months)
And then there were the Russians.
It is inescapable, having read Citino's entire series, that it was truly the Soviets who defeated the Germans in the Second War. No other force was willing to be as ruthless both against their foes, and with their own, in order to win. The Soviets knew they weren't as tactically gifted as the Germans, and in a one on one affair would generally lose. They didn't care. Besides, why go one on one when you can go three on one in a chosen spot, and then collapse the rest of the enemy line as you plow through the hole you bled to make?
In fact, it was this Soviet acceptance of their tactical systemic inferiority which allowed them to focus on their strengths which made them the bete noir of the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army, by 1944, was an Army that would never be brilliant on a small unit level. They didn't need to be. The Russians thought bigger.
Go big, or go home.
If the Russians were at a disadvantage tactically against the Germans (as was everyone else until the last few months as Citino points out routinely), they were the grand masters of the game of strategy, and by 1944 the Red Army had proven itself to be equally as adept at operational brilliance as was the Wehrmacht.
The Soviets thought, and fought, on a grander scale, and the Germans could never fully compensate. While the Allied breakout of the Normandy beachhead, and the subsequent drive across France, was devastating to the Germans, bear in mind it was only a single episode, and the only time before the very end that the Western Allies achieved something that, by the middle of 1944, the Russians were doing on a routine basis.
The unrelenting series of constant Soviet offensives from early 1944 till the end of the war, what Soviet doctrine termed Concentric Operations, ground down and annihilated the Wehrmacht multiple times on the scale of Normandy. And even if Soviet losses were, overall, significantly higher (testifying to the genuine German genius in smaller unit tactics), they could, somewhat, afford those losses.
The Germans, waging a war against the world, could not.
In terms of how Citino told the story in this book, I have read so much on the Western Front in my time, I found myself skimming the chapters devoted to D-Day, Normandy and the Ardennes. For me, the meat of the book were the chapters devoted to the Eastern Front. The Eastern Front, post Kursk, is only rarely written about in Western academia, so any information on those campaigns from Kursk till Berlin are soaked up like a sponge.
And it should be born in mind that, like his previous volumes, Citino doesn't aim to tell the whole story, he aims to relate a theme, and what he tells sticks to that theme and relates to it. So if you're hoping for an exposition of say, the German spring offensives in Hungary in 1945, you will be disappointed. Or a detailed look at the Allies battle for the Rhineland, it isn't here.
Nevertheless, he presents more than enough to get his point across, and even if he skims over, or skips entirely, certain aspects of the titanic struggle, you more than get his thesis and you get the broad gist of the war in Europe.
For all of their genuine brilliance in the art of war, the Germans, literally, won their way into a trap. One that no amount of tactical, or operational excellence, was going to get them out of. And that really is the main takeaway of Citino's work. He presents this all within the broader perspective of the Prussian-German military ethos and tradition.
The end result is a must have collection for any military historians library.
Part of an unofficial quadrille of books beginning with 'The German Way of War', and including 'Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns in 1942', and 'The Wehrmacht Retreats: the German Campaigns of 1943', Last Stand is an operational, and doctrinal history of the German campaigns in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as the fighting in central Italy, and Northwestern Europe as well as Germany herself.
The overall approach of Dr. Citino has been to analyze the Second War in the broader terms of an overarching German (read: Prussian) methodology of waging war.
Realizing that, strategically located on a relatively open plain in Central Europe, surrounded on all sides by powerful, resource rich powers that were often hostile, Prussia (later Germany as a whole) was dealt a bad hand, the Prussians needed to find a reliable strength (a force multiplier) by which they could overcome their systemic weaknesses. This strength was, in an equal measure both scientifically and artistically, in waging war in a way that accentuated, or created, their strengths.
Prussian, and later German, methods of war making put a premium on several ingredients that, when boiled together, created a truly lethal stew. Speed, flexibility, ruthless aggression, intellectual individual freedom of small unit commanders, mission oriented tactics, and the willingness to destroy an enemy on the field in a blood crazed fury that had its own term: the Kesselschlacht, or cauldron battle.
This typical German methodology, married to one of the most highly intellectual and mentally advanced cultures in creation, created a nearly unstoppable juggernaut on land. First the Prussian, and then the Imperial German Army was considered, correctly for a time, the worlds best. And it was certainly the most feared. The Bismarckian system of continental hegemony was policed by nothing more than the mere terror the sheer thought of the German Army brought to the rest of Europe.
Germany was a superpower without the need for overseas colonies, or a globe spanning Navy. It didn't need them. By fear of their own reputation, they ruled all of Europe.
However, the breakdown of the Bismarckian system with the ascension of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and his disastrous policy of Weltpolitik showcased another German trait that Citino brings up time and again in his discussions on the Second War.
The Germans were masters of the short, furious war. Of fighting, and winning, battles, and of showcasing brilliant, exciting even, operational maneuvers that befuddled the other military potent powers such as Russia, and France. However, and this is a key theme throughout Last Stand, the Germans never did master the one element that was vital to their survival.
Strategy.
By late 1943, early 1944, the Wehrmacht (the German Army, distinct of the Waffen-SS, though the SS is a player in this tale) was no longer the brilliantly led, superbly trained, and terrifying force on the field of battle. Certainly, they were still lethal. No other Army was as skilled as they were in tactics, not by a long shot. And neither the Soviets, the Americans, or the British-Canadians could quite match them in terms of operational flair.
But they were outmatched, and they knew it.
The Russians alone outnumbered, and outproduced, them. Add the industrial might of the British Empire, and worse still the Americans, and it is easy to look at the war with an almost fatalistic lens to scoff and wonder how the Germans were ever viewed as a threat.
Well, they were. As the millions of Soviet and Allied killed and wounded still to come would attest to.
However, German tactical excellence, and operational brilliance was poor compensation for bankrupt strategy, a total lack of comprehension of foreign policy, or of economics. If the German Panzers could shoot up three, to four Allied and Soviet tanks for every one of theirs, in the end, it couldn't save them from the fact that the Soviets had five tanks, and so did the Americans, and the British had two of their own to boot.
The much mythologized German technological brilliance, while accurate to a point (the Germans were lightyears ahead of everyone else in many areas of technology to include the world's first jet fighter, cruise missile, ballistic missile, guided missile, infrared sights, nightvision, and having some of the most lethal tanks and aircraft of the time period...none of which could be mass produced), fails to take into consideration the endemic corruption, and very un-German inefficiency rife within the National Socialist system.
The Germans were chronically short on fuel, ammunition, motorized transport, tanks, artillery, aircraft, and thanks to treating their allies in Italy, Finland, Romania, Hungary, and several others like second rate nobodies, they were also utterly alone. Even the Waffen-SS, taking hardened anti-Communist volunteers from all across Europe and the Soviet Union, could not make good the staggering manpower shortfalls that the Germans faced from January 1944.
And yet, despite all of that, it took damned near the whole world to truly finish them off.
Dr. Citino focuses his work on the operational history of the final year and a half of the war, and he tells the story from the German perspective. While doing so, he showcases as well how the various Allied players waged their war against the Germans.
The British and Canadians tended towards caution more than anything else. The British and Commonwealth forces were psychologically tired by this point, and Britain herself lacked the manpower to reliably sustain a large Army on the continent for long. The Americans, having stumbled, bumbled, and fallen on their ass more than once against the Germans in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, had learned their lessons and were a force to be reckoned with by 1944. Even so, the American home front was very wary of heavy casualties, and the Americans were never very tactically adept, and only on occasion showcased operational brilliance. They made up for this, however, by being the most mobile force in human history, and having close air support that even the Soviets envied.
Why risk men in battle when you can have your artillery and aircraft blow it to smithereens instead? (Especially when American records in small unit engagements were never all that great against the Germans until the last months)
And then there were the Russians.
It is inescapable, having read Citino's entire series, that it was truly the Soviets who defeated the Germans in the Second War. No other force was willing to be as ruthless both against their foes, and with their own, in order to win. The Soviets knew they weren't as tactically gifted as the Germans, and in a one on one affair would generally lose. They didn't care. Besides, why go one on one when you can go three on one in a chosen spot, and then collapse the rest of the enemy line as you plow through the hole you bled to make?
In fact, it was this Soviet acceptance of their tactical systemic inferiority which allowed them to focus on their strengths which made them the bete noir of the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army, by 1944, was an Army that would never be brilliant on a small unit level. They didn't need to be. The Russians thought bigger.
Go big, or go home.
If the Russians were at a disadvantage tactically against the Germans (as was everyone else until the last few months as Citino points out routinely), they were the grand masters of the game of strategy, and by 1944 the Red Army had proven itself to be equally as adept at operational brilliance as was the Wehrmacht.
The Soviets thought, and fought, on a grander scale, and the Germans could never fully compensate. While the Allied breakout of the Normandy beachhead, and the subsequent drive across France, was devastating to the Germans, bear in mind it was only a single episode, and the only time before the very end that the Western Allies achieved something that, by the middle of 1944, the Russians were doing on a routine basis.
The unrelenting series of constant Soviet offensives from early 1944 till the end of the war, what Soviet doctrine termed Concentric Operations, ground down and annihilated the Wehrmacht multiple times on the scale of Normandy. And even if Soviet losses were, overall, significantly higher (testifying to the genuine German genius in smaller unit tactics), they could, somewhat, afford those losses.
The Germans, waging a war against the world, could not.
In terms of how Citino told the story in this book, I have read so much on the Western Front in my time, I found myself skimming the chapters devoted to D-Day, Normandy and the Ardennes. For me, the meat of the book were the chapters devoted to the Eastern Front. The Eastern Front, post Kursk, is only rarely written about in Western academia, so any information on those campaigns from Kursk till Berlin are soaked up like a sponge.
And it should be born in mind that, like his previous volumes, Citino doesn't aim to tell the whole story, he aims to relate a theme, and what he tells sticks to that theme and relates to it. So if you're hoping for an exposition of say, the German spring offensives in Hungary in 1945, you will be disappointed. Or a detailed look at the Allies battle for the Rhineland, it isn't here.
Nevertheless, he presents more than enough to get his point across, and even if he skims over, or skips entirely, certain aspects of the titanic struggle, you more than get his thesis and you get the broad gist of the war in Europe.
For all of their genuine brilliance in the art of war, the Germans, literally, won their way into a trap. One that no amount of tactical, or operational excellence, was going to get them out of. And that really is the main takeaway of Citino's work. He presents this all within the broader perspective of the Prussian-German military ethos and tradition.
The end result is a must have collection for any military historians library.
February 14, 2020
World War 2.
Pretty big subject. Pretty extensively covered subject. Pretty intensively covered subject. There are pages upon pages covering the impacts of individuals. Or bears. Or corpses.
But what about this book? Worth a read? Maybe…
First timer
This core of this book is explaining how rectangles festooned with odd doodles followed arrows from one side of a map to the other. Or didn't. Sometimes they would even go the wrong way.
Sit down and learn about the “operational level of warfare,” where one set of generals tried to move thousands of men and machines (and a surprising number of horses) to a point while another set of generals tried to stop them.
Citino looks at how the German group of generals thought and fought a particular way, and just how good they were at that. Here’s a hint:
None of this is beyond anyone's understanding. However, operational warfare is pretty thin gruel for an introductory taste to World War Two. It's all very comprehensible, but you might be left asking... is that it?
Veteran of a thousand pillow fights
“Errors on the strategic level are always the most serious, trumping operational brillance and tactical acumen.”
Citino is an engaging writer who matches narrative flow with well worked in opinions. He draws on a wide range of sources. He structures the chapters on the last year of the German Army intelligently. He turns the reader's attention to the operations on the Eastern Front, and little-known Western Europe ones (Operation Dragoon, Operation Nordwind and the the Ruhr Pocket).
Are Citino's opinions, which sometimes veer from the established canon (the value of Allied Deception efforts, or whether the German High Command really knew better than Hitler) correct? Who knows. World War Two might be one of the most well documented events prior to the digital age, and even after, but it’s the ultimate example that knowing more of what happened doesn’t immediately give the answer why it happened. It's all multivariate to the point of chaos, a butterfly flapping its wings just before an 88mm shell flattens it. Citino's positions at the very least are convincing on the face of them. Just don’t assume they are right.
Citino also punches holes in the concepts that the German Army fought "a good war"; that its commanders were operational geniuses; and that the generals thought Hitler was a really bad guy who with this one weird trick (the Soldier's Oath) bound those said generals into compliance. Clearly, as Citino presents, the German High Command were willing participants, and did quite well with their share of the loot ("dotations" in Citino's parlance)
But here’s the problem: Operational warfare is thin gruel. Full stop. Citino introduces the theme of the “Prussian Way of War” of manoeuvre, surrounding the enemy, and lightning strikes on internal lines of communication. He then sets out what happened in the context of the final year World War 2:
Reminder
How much did operational art really determine things in the wider context of strategy? As Citino repeatedly draws our attention to, faced with the strategy Hitler adopted, their Army had to “get it right” operationally a statistically implausible number of times for any chance of victory. Sure, the Prussian fast-charging method with little regard to logistics didn’t suit the overwhelming mass that the Soviets brought, or the firepower of the Western Allies, but really, within the constraints Germany was operating, what would have?
So Citino's focus on the operational element is by its very nature a restricted view which gives the narrative a misleading slant. As operational warfare has such limited explanatory power as to why Germany lost, it suggests to me that perhaps such a restrictive vision of World War 2 isn’t sustainable over the course of a book (or multiple books in this case).
Most of the popular histories of the past two decades (at least) feature the recollections of individual soldiers significantly in their narratives. Citino doesn’t and his reason for that is sound logically (it’s an operational overview, not a knifefight), but it still makes the book weaker than its contemporaries. Spinach may be healthy, but that doesn’t make it taste good.
This is a good book written by a talented author. But I don't know where it sits as a necessary read. You won't regret reading it, but you won't regret not reading it, either.
Pretty big subject. Pretty extensively covered subject. Pretty intensively covered subject. There are pages upon pages covering the impacts of individuals. Or bears. Or corpses.
But what about this book? Worth a read? Maybe…
First timer
This core of this book is explaining how rectangles festooned with odd doodles followed arrows from one side of a map to the other. Or didn't. Sometimes they would even go the wrong way.
Sit down and learn about the “operational level of warfare,” where one set of generals tried to move thousands of men and machines (and a surprising number of horses) to a point while another set of generals tried to stop them.
Citino looks at how the German group of generals thought and fought a particular way, and just how good they were at that. Here’s a hint:
None of this is beyond anyone's understanding. However, operational warfare is pretty thin gruel for an introductory taste to World War Two. It's all very comprehensible, but you might be left asking... is that it?
Veteran of a thousand pillow fights
“Errors on the strategic level are always the most serious, trumping operational brillance and tactical acumen.”
Citino is an engaging writer who matches narrative flow with well worked in opinions. He draws on a wide range of sources. He structures the chapters on the last year of the German Army intelligently. He turns the reader's attention to the operations on the Eastern Front, and little-known Western Europe ones (Operation Dragoon, Operation Nordwind and the the Ruhr Pocket).
Are Citino's opinions, which sometimes veer from the established canon (the value of Allied Deception efforts, or whether the German High Command really knew better than Hitler) correct? Who knows. World War Two might be one of the most well documented events prior to the digital age, and even after, but it’s the ultimate example that knowing more of what happened doesn’t immediately give the answer why it happened. It's all multivariate to the point of chaos, a butterfly flapping its wings just before an 88mm shell flattens it. Citino's positions at the very least are convincing on the face of them. Just don’t assume they are right.
Citino also punches holes in the concepts that the German Army fought "a good war"; that its commanders were operational geniuses; and that the generals thought Hitler was a really bad guy who with this one weird trick (the Soldier's Oath) bound those said generals into compliance. Clearly, as Citino presents, the German High Command were willing participants, and did quite well with their share of the loot ("dotations" in Citino's parlance)
But here’s the problem: Operational warfare is thin gruel. Full stop. Citino introduces the theme of the “Prussian Way of War” of manoeuvre, surrounding the enemy, and lightning strikes on internal lines of communication. He then sets out what happened in the context of the final year World War 2:
Reminder
How much did operational art really determine things in the wider context of strategy? As Citino repeatedly draws our attention to, faced with the strategy Hitler adopted, their Army had to “get it right” operationally a statistically implausible number of times for any chance of victory. Sure, the Prussian fast-charging method with little regard to logistics didn’t suit the overwhelming mass that the Soviets brought, or the firepower of the Western Allies, but really, within the constraints Germany was operating, what would have?
So Citino's focus on the operational element is by its very nature a restricted view which gives the narrative a misleading slant. As operational warfare has such limited explanatory power as to why Germany lost, it suggests to me that perhaps such a restrictive vision of World War 2 isn’t sustainable over the course of a book (or multiple books in this case).
Most of the popular histories of the past two decades (at least) feature the recollections of individual soldiers significantly in their narratives. Citino doesn’t and his reason for that is sound logically (it’s an operational overview, not a knifefight), but it still makes the book weaker than its contemporaries. Spinach may be healthy, but that doesn’t make it taste good.
This is a good book written by a talented author. But I don't know where it sits as a necessary read. You won't regret reading it, but you won't regret not reading it, either.
February 25, 2022
Citino certainly knows how to string a sentence together and his views are incisive and well articulated. His contention is that the German army of World War II was in may ways a continuation of older Prussian traditions, and how the history of the nation, particularly the events of 1918, affected it.
Yet, he can go too far. Calling Nordwind a victory is too much. The prose sings, but has moments that might be called flights of fancy. Furthermore, the analysis of the German generals in relation to Hitler somewhat downplays the tension between them. Certainly the old myth of non-political officers fighting a clean war was always bogus, but their loyalty to Hitler is also overplayed as of late. After all, among all the leaders of the top powers in World War II, only Hitler's generals actually tried to kill him. Lastly, while it is a long book, there is minimal discussion of Italy after Rome fell (a common flaw in many books) nor the hard fighting around Budapest in 1945.
The above flaws I mention mostly to give some balance. This is a superb book all around. It is a good read and deep in its analysis. History is rarely better than this.
Yet, he can go too far. Calling Nordwind a victory is too much. The prose sings, but has moments that might be called flights of fancy. Furthermore, the analysis of the German generals in relation to Hitler somewhat downplays the tension between them. Certainly the old myth of non-political officers fighting a clean war was always bogus, but their loyalty to Hitler is also overplayed as of late. After all, among all the leaders of the top powers in World War II, only Hitler's generals actually tried to kill him. Lastly, while it is a long book, there is minimal discussion of Italy after Rome fell (a common flaw in many books) nor the hard fighting around Budapest in 1945.
The above flaws I mention mostly to give some balance. This is a superb book all around. It is a good read and deep in its analysis. History is rarely better than this.
December 27, 2017
Detractors would argue that this book is another pointless addition to WWII operational literature. And they are right in that this book is operational at its core. However, The Wehrmacht's Last Stand does so better than any book I've ready about the time period. Citino combines a massive amount of sources while describing complex events with lucidity. The result is an excellent summary of the final two years of the war in Europe. And Citino's special spin is a close look at the culture of the Wehrmacht. Why did the men keep fighting? Where do their post-war memoirs diverge from reality? And what does their legacy mean to anyone today? Good book. Loved reading it.
February 10, 2023
The entire trilogy is 5 stars.
In my opinion this trilogy bridges the cap beautifully between narrative history and detailed theoretical history. Citino has a flair for narrative history that few in the field possess, while also being able to explain German theories of war easily.
He explains how the Germans fought ww2 exactly like the great Elector, Frederick the Great and moltke the elder fought their wars, always seeking a concentric attack and a kesselslacht. He explains how no matter how dire the situation the Germans always sought to maneuver and attack concentrically. He explains how this method of war while brilliant on an operational level was hopeless against a coalition of enemies that had more men better equipment and more industrial capacity.
In my opinion this trilogy bridges the cap beautifully between narrative history and detailed theoretical history. Citino has a flair for narrative history that few in the field possess, while also being able to explain German theories of war easily.
He explains how the Germans fought ww2 exactly like the great Elector, Frederick the Great and moltke the elder fought their wars, always seeking a concentric attack and a kesselslacht. He explains how no matter how dire the situation the Germans always sought to maneuver and attack concentrically. He explains how this method of war while brilliant on an operational level was hopeless against a coalition of enemies that had more men better equipment and more industrial capacity.
June 7, 2021
Very well researched and interesting info about individuals involved
September 7, 2019
n the sequel to Wehrmacht Retreats, The Wehrmacht's Last Stand, Robert M. Citino addresses another one of the war's most controversial decisions: Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark's decision to turn his army away from encircling General der Panzertruppe Heinrich von Vietinghoff's Tenth Army and to head for Rome. Citino notes that "slithering out of a trap by the skin of their teeth was just another day at the office for German commanders by 1944." In this Clark disobeyed direct order from General Harold Alexander, his superior. (In the British Army you are allowed to do this; in the US Army you are not.) What Citino doesn't tell the reader is that Clark's maneuver was slower and more costly than Alexander's alternative.
Citino tells us that Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, the German Oberbefehlshaber-Süd, was the "one powerful figure who actually did want to fight in Italy, who revelled in it, and who kept faith to the end". This is completely untrue; it was the Allies that decided to invade Italy, and Alexander, Clark and General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson all believed that the campaign could go somewhere, that if they were given the resources, they could drive through the vaunted Ljubljana Gap and into Hitler's homeland. (They didn't get them, and the consensus of military historians is that it never a practical option.)
What Kesselring did do was assess the situation, and come up with what most military historians agree was the best possible operational concept. Italy has a mountainous spine, and the many rivers and ravines run towards the sea, at right angles to an invader moving north, and form excellent defensive positions. Moreover, the narrowest part of the peninsula is south of Rome. Here, Kesselring held up the Allied armies, using a minimum of troops (thereby freeing others for use in another theatre of war.) He thought he could delay the Allies from reaching the northern Apennines (where Rommel wanted to make a stand) for six to nine months. He managed to make it twelve. The Germans then held them there for another six months.
Citino likes panzer generals he characterises as "hard charging" like Eberhard von Mackensen. He notes that Kesselring (an aviator) fired Mackensen as commander of Fourteenth Army and replaced him with General der Panzertruppe Joachim Lemelsen, "even though the latter’s pessimistic assessment of the operational situation had been correct". (p. 106) The official history says: "The countermeasures ordered by Mackensen had been tactically sound but by 1 June impossible of fulfillment. His blunder had been less in delaying to notify Kesselring of what had happened than in allowing the gap to develop in the first place." (Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, p. 190) Citino notes that the prevailing consensus of opinion among military historians is that Kesselring was a military genius (p. 107); but in Citino's eyes, Kesselring "was the first German army commander of all time who wilfully chose to fight a Stellungskrieg" (positional war). (The general principle here is called economy of force.)
There are annoying little bits as well. Citino says that "The disaster at Stalingrad still infected the army; no fewer than three of the divisions in Italy had met their demise in the Stalingrad Kessel and had been rebuilt, either from cadre and former enlisted personnel who had managed to escape encirclement, or from whole cloth." And I'm going: "well that would be the 44th, 71st, 76th, 94th and 305th Infantry Divisions. Oh, and the 3rd and 29th Panzergrenadier Divisions, and the 16th, and 24th Panzer Divisions... how many did we say again?" (Four more were divisions that had been destroyed in Tunisia. I have the entire OrBat of both sides committed to memory.)
Sometimes Citino seems to be trying to snow job us. He writes: "Kesselring, in particular, spends much of his memoir criticizing operational decisions on both sides (except his own, which he deems to be invariably correct)." (p. 105) So what does Kesselring actually say? "We had to pay for both these mistakes—I cannot acquit myself of a share in the blame." (The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 196)
Citino tells us that Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, the German Oberbefehlshaber-Süd, was the "one powerful figure who actually did want to fight in Italy, who revelled in it, and who kept faith to the end". This is completely untrue; it was the Allies that decided to invade Italy, and Alexander, Clark and General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson all believed that the campaign could go somewhere, that if they were given the resources, they could drive through the vaunted Ljubljana Gap and into Hitler's homeland. (They didn't get them, and the consensus of military historians is that it never a practical option.)
What Kesselring did do was assess the situation, and come up with what most military historians agree was the best possible operational concept. Italy has a mountainous spine, and the many rivers and ravines run towards the sea, at right angles to an invader moving north, and form excellent defensive positions. Moreover, the narrowest part of the peninsula is south of Rome. Here, Kesselring held up the Allied armies, using a minimum of troops (thereby freeing others for use in another theatre of war.) He thought he could delay the Allies from reaching the northern Apennines (where Rommel wanted to make a stand) for six to nine months. He managed to make it twelve. The Germans then held them there for another six months.
Citino likes panzer generals he characterises as "hard charging" like Eberhard von Mackensen. He notes that Kesselring (an aviator) fired Mackensen as commander of Fourteenth Army and replaced him with General der Panzertruppe Joachim Lemelsen, "even though the latter’s pessimistic assessment of the operational situation had been correct". (p. 106) The official history says: "The countermeasures ordered by Mackensen had been tactically sound but by 1 June impossible of fulfillment. His blunder had been less in delaying to notify Kesselring of what had happened than in allowing the gap to develop in the first place." (Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, p. 190) Citino notes that the prevailing consensus of opinion among military historians is that Kesselring was a military genius (p. 107); but in Citino's eyes, Kesselring "was the first German army commander of all time who wilfully chose to fight a Stellungskrieg" (positional war). (The general principle here is called economy of force.)
There are annoying little bits as well. Citino says that "The disaster at Stalingrad still infected the army; no fewer than three of the divisions in Italy had met their demise in the Stalingrad Kessel and had been rebuilt, either from cadre and former enlisted personnel who had managed to escape encirclement, or from whole cloth." And I'm going: "well that would be the 44th, 71st, 76th, 94th and 305th Infantry Divisions. Oh, and the 3rd and 29th Panzergrenadier Divisions, and the 16th, and 24th Panzer Divisions... how many did we say again?" (Four more were divisions that had been destroyed in Tunisia. I have the entire OrBat of both sides committed to memory.)
Sometimes Citino seems to be trying to snow job us. He writes: "Kesselring, in particular, spends much of his memoir criticizing operational decisions on both sides (except his own, which he deems to be invariably correct)." (p. 105) So what does Kesselring actually say? "We had to pay for both these mistakes—I cannot acquit myself of a share in the blame." (The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 196)
August 19, 2023
(parte 1)
Un libro che è di storia nel vero senso della parola: Citino oltre che essere uno studioso accademico è anche un incredibile narratore. L'anno '44 è raccontato attraverso dei mini-quadretti narrativi che racchiudono i vari avvenimenti (campagne, operazioni) della guerra. La sensazione che se ne ricava è un continuo senso di angoscia e di imminente morte: dello stato tedesco, del regine hitleriano, delle formazioni al fronte.
La tesi è che i tedeschi non avevano alcuna chance di vincere la guerra, forse dall'inizio - forse anche solo iniziarla li ha condannati. Ma cosa li ha condannati? La popolazione, soldati, ufficiali, politici - chi li ha condannati? Il mago, demone-incarnato Hitler: li ha rapiti, li ha convinti; questo tramanda la memorialistica post-bellica di quei generali che hanno sentito il bisogno di scaricare le proprie colpe e cercare di ripulirsi la coscienza.
Ma le cause del Nazismo erano ben più profonde: l'indagine storica del libro, oltre che mettere accento sulla natura pratica della guerra, riflette della connivenza dei quadri militari col regime. Come il corpo di ufficiali dalla tradizione militare più ricca e sofisticata del mondo (quella tedesco-prussiana) si sia piegato per allineamento ideologico e convenienza al regine più razzista e killer della storia moderna. Come questi uomini, che erano le mani di un Hitler che era la mente, abbiano portato avanti le sue idee e convinzioni sulle linee del fronte: senza quasi mai cedere, senza quasi mai opporsi - quando sapevano che stavano condannando alla morte le proprie truppe, il proprio popolo, lo stato a cui avevano giurato fedeltà più volte.
Il libro è tutto incentrato su questa dissonanza: la coscienza dei militari di avere perso la guerra, ma la mancanza della forza di volontà di ribellarsi al regime. Il libro li descrive come uomini moralmente piccoli, attaccati al loro status, alla loro tradizione del corpo degli ufficiali: incapaci di reagire, addormentati in una sorta di sonno da cui si risveglieranno dopo la guerra, disconoscendo le proprie responsabilità. Una dissociazione, si potrebbe dire in termini psicologici. Per quanto moralmente aborrenti per la loro fedeltà al Nazismo, questi sono stati uomini le cui vite narrano del dramma umano della auto-coscienza: risultano molto simpatetici per questo, risvegliano una strana empatia. Le loro storie fanno riflettere su cosa accada agli esseri umani quando avviene il "sonno della ragione" a tutto un popolo: quando la morale muore, e l'etica diviene solo un trascinarsi in avanti con la consapevolezza della propria condanna.
La tragedia vera era al fronte: gli uomini mandati al massacro nel tritacarne. Ma la seconda tragedia, quella morale, avvenne nelle posizioni di potere: di come l'ideologia possa possedere intere classi e strati sociali di uomini e perpetrarsi per inerzia ed inazione di chi potrebbe cambiare le cose. Tutto questo, questa tragedia umana, è meravigliosamente narrata e chiarificata da Citino.
Un libro che è di storia nel vero senso della parola: Citino oltre che essere uno studioso accademico è anche un incredibile narratore. L'anno '44 è raccontato attraverso dei mini-quadretti narrativi che racchiudono i vari avvenimenti (campagne, operazioni) della guerra. La sensazione che se ne ricava è un continuo senso di angoscia e di imminente morte: dello stato tedesco, del regine hitleriano, delle formazioni al fronte.
La tesi è che i tedeschi non avevano alcuna chance di vincere la guerra, forse dall'inizio - forse anche solo iniziarla li ha condannati. Ma cosa li ha condannati? La popolazione, soldati, ufficiali, politici - chi li ha condannati? Il mago, demone-incarnato Hitler: li ha rapiti, li ha convinti; questo tramanda la memorialistica post-bellica di quei generali che hanno sentito il bisogno di scaricare le proprie colpe e cercare di ripulirsi la coscienza.
Ma le cause del Nazismo erano ben più profonde: l'indagine storica del libro, oltre che mettere accento sulla natura pratica della guerra, riflette della connivenza dei quadri militari col regime. Come il corpo di ufficiali dalla tradizione militare più ricca e sofisticata del mondo (quella tedesco-prussiana) si sia piegato per allineamento ideologico e convenienza al regine più razzista e killer della storia moderna. Come questi uomini, che erano le mani di un Hitler che era la mente, abbiano portato avanti le sue idee e convinzioni sulle linee del fronte: senza quasi mai cedere, senza quasi mai opporsi - quando sapevano che stavano condannando alla morte le proprie truppe, il proprio popolo, lo stato a cui avevano giurato fedeltà più volte.
Il libro è tutto incentrato su questa dissonanza: la coscienza dei militari di avere perso la guerra, ma la mancanza della forza di volontà di ribellarsi al regime. Il libro li descrive come uomini moralmente piccoli, attaccati al loro status, alla loro tradizione del corpo degli ufficiali: incapaci di reagire, addormentati in una sorta di sonno da cui si risveglieranno dopo la guerra, disconoscendo le proprie responsabilità. Una dissociazione, si potrebbe dire in termini psicologici. Per quanto moralmente aborrenti per la loro fedeltà al Nazismo, questi sono stati uomini le cui vite narrano del dramma umano della auto-coscienza: risultano molto simpatetici per questo, risvegliano una strana empatia. Le loro storie fanno riflettere su cosa accada agli esseri umani quando avviene il "sonno della ragione" a tutto un popolo: quando la morale muore, e l'etica diviene solo un trascinarsi in avanti con la consapevolezza della propria condanna.
La tragedia vera era al fronte: gli uomini mandati al massacro nel tritacarne. Ma la seconda tragedia, quella morale, avvenne nelle posizioni di potere: di come l'ideologia possa possedere intere classi e strati sociali di uomini e perpetrarsi per inerzia ed inazione di chi potrebbe cambiare le cose. Tutto questo, questa tragedia umana, è meravigliosamente narrata e chiarificata da Citino.
May 20, 2024
The Wehrmacht's Last Stand is a summary of operations on the eastern, western, and Mediterranean fronts, mostly from the German point of view, during the last two years of the war. The book casts a pretty wide net: it is tasked with discussing a large amount of battle and campaign material, as well as high command actions, and it rarely penetrates below the divisional level.
Since the scope is so broad, I initially had a pretty poor impression of the work. It is a bit slow to start, the the author does not really let his style shine through until a bit later on. In fact, it feels initially like reading a very large Wikipedia article; there are rudimentary comments about the battles, there is little detail, and the reader goes on to the next.
However, upon further reading the book opens up a bit and Citino's style becomes more clear. It's obvious he has read huge amounts of WWII literature, and as such the book turns into a sort of "chat over a beer", especially if the reader is also familiar with some of the tropes and ideas of WWII history. Essentially, Citino acknowledges that the Germans were basically screwed top-down because they simply did not have the resources to fight the war at this point. Thus the information is presented with a bit of a tongue in cheek: yes here is how the two sides fought, but it doesn't really matter all that much when viewed in the bigger scope.
With this in mind the book is a bit of a unique and fun read, though it is somewhat in two minds as to its audience, a newer reader of history will appreciate the surface level narrative, but won't get some of the trope-y discussions. A more knowledgeable reader will appreciate the banter, but may be bored by the generic operational retelling. Overall, I'm glad I kept going in the book, as it is definitely not your average warbook.
Since the scope is so broad, I initially had a pretty poor impression of the work. It is a bit slow to start, the the author does not really let his style shine through until a bit later on. In fact, it feels initially like reading a very large Wikipedia article; there are rudimentary comments about the battles, there is little detail, and the reader goes on to the next.
However, upon further reading the book opens up a bit and Citino's style becomes more clear. It's obvious he has read huge amounts of WWII literature, and as such the book turns into a sort of "chat over a beer", especially if the reader is also familiar with some of the tropes and ideas of WWII history. Essentially, Citino acknowledges that the Germans were basically screwed top-down because they simply did not have the resources to fight the war at this point. Thus the information is presented with a bit of a tongue in cheek: yes here is how the two sides fought, but it doesn't really matter all that much when viewed in the bigger scope.
With this in mind the book is a bit of a unique and fun read, though it is somewhat in two minds as to its audience, a newer reader of history will appreciate the surface level narrative, but won't get some of the trope-y discussions. A more knowledgeable reader will appreciate the banter, but may be bored by the generic operational retelling. Overall, I'm glad I kept going in the book, as it is definitely not your average warbook.
July 13, 2019
This is the third and final book in the trilogy Robert Citino has written about the German Army in World War II (WWII). I gave it 5 stars because it provides very readable insights to the decision-making process and the decisions made by NAZI Germany during 1944 and 1945. Most WWII history that I have read has been written from the United States or United Kingdom perspective. It was quite enlightening to read about these same events from the German Army’s point of view. While history as written from the Western Allies perspective makes much of Allied errors and limitations, it often seems as if the Wehrmacht is portrayed a powerful force to be reckoned with throughout the war. A fighting force that just had too many enemies and not one dealing with internal problems. However, the view from the German side shows a force often dealing with vast material shortages, poor planning and failures of execution as well. So, as Paul Harvey would say, the “rest of the story” can be found in this trilogy of books about the Wehrmacht in World War II.
February 20, 2025
Citino examines why the Germans kept fighting. By 1943, most German officers knew it that the war was all but lost. By examing the war from the German perspective and with the German records, Citino analyzes the German Totenritt, or “death ride,” from January 1944—with simultaneous Allied offensives at Anzio and Ukraine—until May 1945, the collapse of the Wehrmacht in the field, and the Soviet storming of Berlin.
Why I started this book: I was craving a long detailed audio book.
Why I finished it: The battles of WWII in Europe are familiar to me, but Citino showed how the German actions flowed from the Prussian military culture and history. How being surrounded by that ethos, lead to aggression and a determination to fight on. And the belief/hope that agression could once again lead to a last minute change in fortune.
Why I started this book: I was craving a long detailed audio book.
Why I finished it: The battles of WWII in Europe are familiar to me, but Citino showed how the German actions flowed from the Prussian military culture and history. How being surrounded by that ethos, lead to aggression and a determination to fight on. And the belief/hope that agression could once again lead to a last minute change in fortune.
April 18, 2020
I read multiple WW2 books since I was young. As time goes by, the words used by certain historians became very stale and over glorifying of certain factions were just the hype of post WW2 era during the Cold War.
Therefore when I read Robert's book, it was a refreshing writing style. A certain clarity take in a no holds barred writing style that holds both Allied and German commanders to task over the Western Front. He peeled open the various myths that had grown after WW2 and revealed the actual facts. It is interesting to link up Prussian Art of War with German military decision making and operations in WW2.
Highly recommend to those who wants to have an unsullied read on German Army Command decisions and military actions from 1944 to 1945.
Therefore when I read Robert's book, it was a refreshing writing style. A certain clarity take in a no holds barred writing style that holds both Allied and German commanders to task over the Western Front. He peeled open the various myths that had grown after WW2 and revealed the actual facts. It is interesting to link up Prussian Art of War with German military decision making and operations in WW2.
Highly recommend to those who wants to have an unsullied read on German Army Command decisions and military actions from 1944 to 1945.
August 20, 2024
This is really just a 3.5 star book; Dr Citino is a good writer, but this book has way too many flaws for me.
There are way too few maps and those included are mostly useless. Similarly there is way more typos than I would expect, but that might be a Kindle issue.
His use of both German history and even words are overdone and takes away from the flow of the book.
Worse, this is just another retelling of World War Two in Europe with a focus on the German Army. I suspect the three volumes could have been shortened to a single book covering the war of movement on the Eastern Front. Instead, it’s just another slog. I’m glad I started at the end.
There are way too few maps and those included are mostly useless. Similarly there is way more typos than I would expect, but that might be a Kindle issue.
His use of both German history and even words are overdone and takes away from the flow of the book.
Worse, this is just another retelling of World War Two in Europe with a focus on the German Army. I suspect the three volumes could have been shortened to a single book covering the war of movement on the Eastern Front. Instead, it’s just another slog. I’m glad I started at the end.
March 9, 2024
Like the previous two books, a gold standard in how a master military historian can combine military, political, and social history into a book that persuasively argues and retains, at its heart, a core morality. Instead of sermonizing about "retribution" or offering glorious-- or salacious-- stories of a "last stand," instead we see how the German army, compromised to the core by its active participation in atrocity and commitment to literally the worst monster in human history completed its death ride.
May 17, 2025
Citino again proves himself a top class historian and one of the foremost scholars of the War; no wonder he is the Senior Historian of the National WW2 museum (definitely worth a visit). Operationally focused and makes a confusing era of the war easy to understand. Not the most innovative or groundbreaking, but a fantastic standard operational text. Ends in climax with the Battle of Berlin, but somehow manages to downplay the importance of the Bunker while ignoring the northern (Donitz) and southern (Kesselring) commands and the actual surrender of the Wehrmacht.
July 22, 2018
Not that much new here but very well written , especially the chapters on the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 ( which resulted in the destruction of an entire German army group in less than two weeks), which is still not nearly well covered enough by historians writing in English with a few exceptions like this author and David Glantz. More importantly, he gets to the crux of Wehrmacht motivations, morale and immorality.
September 20, 2019
Great book and excellent conclusion to the trilogy
Citino's book brings a conclusion to his trilogy on the Wehrmacht and it's a great way to finnish. Not only there are detailed and well explained accounts on the operations, but all of them are linked to the strategic picture of the war and in particular to the German way of understanding war.
Citino's book brings a conclusion to his trilogy on the Wehrmacht and it's a great way to finnish. Not only there are detailed and well explained accounts on the operations, but all of them are linked to the strategic picture of the war and in particular to the German way of understanding war.
January 26, 2019
This book is one I had to read for a class I took on WWII, but it was surprising how easily read it was. Citino doesn’t overpack the novel with dates and numbers as many history books do but instead discusses the actions and reactions of people. Really good good for those interested in WWII history
January 3, 2020
I wanted to like this book, but it was too repetitive and some of the points made were questionable. Could have used an editor, too.
June 29, 2020
Good in-depth read for those interested in military history, it also dispels some popular myths regarding the Wehrmacht during WW2.
December 15, 2021
Citino produces another masterpiece on why and how the germans lost the war
September 26, 2025
this is an amazing analytical look at the end of the Whermacht
October 7, 2025
Now I finally understand why Germany was always going to fight until the bitter end instead of negotiate from a strong, but ultimately hopeless position in 1943. Definitely well worth the read.
December 7, 2025
An excellent treatise into what made Nazi Germany fight on to the very bitter end.
It lists clearly and concisely the battles fought in the last year of the war and offers insightful conclusions.
I like to think I have a good knowledge of this period but Mr Citino delves deeper offering observations that are now glaringly obvious (the legacy of Fredrick the Great and Prussia, for example) but I had not even considered.
The book is written in less than text book standard, almost dumbing-down the the subject matter at times.
Initially this irritated me a LOT as I am used to serious history books having a gravitas that this lacked.
However I eventually warmed to (forgot about?) this informal style and began to really enjoy what I was reading.
I say 'reading' I actually listened to the audio book version, and therein lies my only criticism.
His reading was over all good BUT when the narrator read anything that was a reported conversation, written document, diary entry, army order or even a quote, he chose to do it English but with a terrible accent of the country from where the writer originated from.
So we had everyone in the German Army, up to Adolf himself, voiced by 'Wolfgang' from Rowan and Martin's laugh-in.
We had the Red Army to a man in a generic East European accent that frequently strayed into 'Borat' territory.
It was surprising, then amusing, then irritating, then VERY annoying.
I would rate the audio experience as less than a 2*.
I won't mark the book itself down for this however, and I stand by my 5* rating.
It lists clearly and concisely the battles fought in the last year of the war and offers insightful conclusions.
I like to think I have a good knowledge of this period but Mr Citino delves deeper offering observations that are now glaringly obvious (the legacy of Fredrick the Great and Prussia, for example) but I had not even considered.
The book is written in less than text book standard, almost dumbing-down the the subject matter at times.
Initially this irritated me a LOT as I am used to serious history books having a gravitas that this lacked.
However I eventually warmed to (forgot about?) this informal style and began to really enjoy what I was reading.
I say 'reading' I actually listened to the audio book version, and therein lies my only criticism.
His reading was over all good BUT when the narrator read anything that was a reported conversation, written document, diary entry, army order or even a quote, he chose to do it English but with a terrible accent of the country from where the writer originated from.
So we had everyone in the German Army, up to Adolf himself, voiced by 'Wolfgang' from Rowan and Martin's laugh-in.
We had the Red Army to a man in a generic East European accent that frequently strayed into 'Borat' territory.
It was surprising, then amusing, then irritating, then VERY annoying.
I would rate the audio experience as less than a 2*.
I won't mark the book itself down for this however, and I stand by my 5* rating.
Read
August 15, 2018If Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 examined Wehrmacht when it was bloodied but still strong(er than enemies) and Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 saw Wehrmacht suffering series of defeats but still trying to regain dominance and turn the tables then this book sees Wehrmacht clearly on the strategic defensive and fighting not to win but to..... not sure, go down fighting? This is in fact a big part of Citino's work, why did Germans keep fighting when war was clearly lost. Part was nature of regime, indoctrination and painting apocalyptic post-war picture, but that was more for rank and file. Officers mostly kept fighting because that was "German way of war". Fight till the end because there is no other way and keep risking it all because you might turn the tables.
In other ways book is what you should expect from Citino by now. Attack, war of movement, concentric attacks and aim for annihilation of enemy. Of course by 1944 power balance was so much in German disfavor that this was only applicable either locally or after enemy extended themselves so much their flanks/spearpoints became vulnerable. But Wehrmacht still tried..... Here is something worth noting. Citino's work is full of "just barely failed". Be it Caucasus campaign, Salerno, Anzio..... where Germans were so tantalizingly close to victory that it was a question of a regiment or battalion or few tanks...... Yet he then returns to "production was so much in favour of German enemies victory was not really in the cards. Together we can sum it as "few local victories would not turn the tide or give different outcome".
Overall a good conclusion to interesting series. In flood of WW2 themed books Citino offers an interesting perspective and another angle to look at Wehrmacht.
Highly recommended.
In other ways book is what you should expect from Citino by now. Attack, war of movement, concentric attacks and aim for annihilation of enemy. Of course by 1944 power balance was so much in German disfavor that this was only applicable either locally or after enemy extended themselves so much their flanks/spearpoints became vulnerable. But Wehrmacht still tried..... Here is something worth noting. Citino's work is full of "just barely failed". Be it Caucasus campaign, Salerno, Anzio..... where Germans were so tantalizingly close to victory that it was a question of a regiment or battalion or few tanks...... Yet he then returns to "production was so much in favour of German enemies victory was not really in the cards. Together we can sum it as "few local victories would not turn the tide or give different outcome".
Overall a good conclusion to interesting series. In flood of WW2 themed books Citino offers an interesting perspective and another angle to look at Wehrmacht.
Highly recommended.
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