Η Ευρώπη σε πόλεμο: Η έναρξη, οι συγκρούσεις, οι ηγέτες και το τέλος του φασισμού, 1939-1945

by Norman Davies, Σωτήρης Αγάπιος (Translator)

Ξεφεύγοντας από τη δυτικοκεντρική αντίληψη περί της διεξαγωγής του Β΄ Παγκόσμιου Πολέμου, ο Norman Davies επιχειρεί με το σημαντικό έργο του Η Ευρώπη σε πόλεμο μια τολμηρή προσέγγιση της πλέον πολύνεκρης σύγκρουσης στην παγκόσμια Ιστορία, με κύριο πλαίσιο τον αγώνα μεταξύ των δύο περισσότερο ολοκληρωτικών καθεστώτων του 20ού αιώνα: Του Ναζισμού και του Σταλινισμού. Με τρόπο που δε συγκαλύπτει και δε δικαιολογεί κανέναν από τους υπεύθυνους των μεγαλύτερων εγκλημάτων αυτής της ανθρωποσφαγής, ο συγγραφέας προχωρεί σε μια καινούργια θεώρηση των δεδομένων του Πολέμου.

Χωρίς να ανήκει στους σύγχρονους οπαδούς της αποδόμησης της ιστορίας ο συγγραφέας επιχειρεί να δώσει στο διεθνές κοινό τα απαραίτητα αντίδοτα, απέναντι στην κρατούσα μέχρι πρόσφατα άποψη ότι ο Β΄ Παγκόσμιος πόλεμος ήταν μια απλή, μονοδιάστατη σύγκρουση μεταξύ των ναζί και τα "γενναίων υπερασπιστών της Ελευθερίας και της Δικαιοσύνης". Και διατρανώνει, απέναντι κυρίως στο "δυτικό κοινό", ότι οποιοσδήποτε σκεπτόμενος πολίτης "δεν μπορεί να δεχτεί με εντιμότητα ότι και οι δυτικές μέθοδοι διεξαγωγής του πολέμου ήταν κάτι άλλο εκτός από ειδεχθείς".

Πέρα από την ανάλυση όλων των παραγόντων και των πεδίων που επηρέασαν τη διεξαγωγή του Β΄ Παγκόσμιου Πολέμου (με έμφαση κυρίως στο "ηθικό τοπίο"), το βιβλίο του Norman Davies εξετάζει τις επιπτώσεις του στο ανθρωπιστικό επίπεδο, τόσο για τις διάφορες κατηγορίες των στρατιωτικών, όσο και των άμαχων πολιτών.

Ένα έργο μέσα από το οποίο αποκτά κάποιος την αίσθηση του μεγαλείου αλλά και της φρίκης του Ανατολικού Μετώπου και μπορεί κατόπιν να σχηματίσει μια σφαιρικότερη άποψη για τις πραγματικές αναλογίες της συνεισφοράς των δυνάμεων που πολέμησαν εναντίον του Άξονα στην Ευρώπη. Η ελληνική έκδοση περιλαμβάνει χαρτογραφικό και φωτογραφικό υλικό, καθώς και ευρετήριο προσώπων και τοπωνυμίων.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, Military History, War, Military Fiction, European History

816 pages, Paperback

First published November 3, 2006

About the author

Ivor Norman Richard Davies FBA, FRHistS is a leading English historian of Welsh descent, noted for his publications on the history of Europe, Poland, and the United Kingdom. From 1971, Davies taught Polish history at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) of the University of London, where he was professor from 1985 to 1996. Currently, he is Supernumary Fellow at Wolfson College, Oxford. Throughout his career, Davies has lectured in many countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, China, Poland, and in most of the rest of Europe as well.

The work which established Davies' reputation in the English-speaking world was God's Playground (1981), a comprehensive overview of Polish history. In Poland, the book was published officially only after the fall of communism. In 2000, Davies' Polish publishers Znak published a collection of his essays and articles under the title Smok wawelski nad Tamizą ("The Wawel Dragon on the Thames"). It is not available in English.

In 1984, Davies published Heart of Europe, a briefer history of Poland. Interestingly, the chapters are arranged in reverse chronological order. In the 1990s, Davies published Europe: A History (1996) and The Isles: A History (1999), about Europe and the islands of Great Britain and Ireland, respectively. Each book is a narrative interlarded with numerous sidepanel discussions of microtopics. In 2002, at the suggestion of the city's mayor, Bogdan Zdrojewski, Davies and his former research assistant, Roger Moorhouse, co-wrote a history of Wrocław / Breslau, a Silesian city. Titled Microcosm: Portrait of a Central European City, the book was published simultaneously in English, Polish, German and Czech. Davies also writes essays and articles for the mass media. Among others, he has worked for the BBC as well as British and American magazines and newspapers, such as The Times, The New York Review of Books and The Independent. In Poland, his articles appeared in the liberal Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny. Davies' book Rising '44. The Battle for Warsaw describes the Warsaw Uprising. It was followed by Europe at War 1939-1945: No Simple Victory (2006). In 2008 Davies participated in the documentary film "The Soviet Story"

Some historians, most vocally Lucy Dawidowicz and Abraham Brumberg, object to Davies' historical treatment of the Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Poland. They accuse him of minimizing historic antisemitism, and of promoting a view that accounts of the Holocaust in international historiography largely overlook the suffering of non-Jewish Poles. Davies’s supporters contend that he gives due attention to the genocide and war crimes perpetrated by both Hitler and Stalin on Polish Jews and non-Jews. Davies himself argues that "Holocaust scholars need have no fears that rational comparisons might threaten that uniqueness. Quite the opposite." and that "...one needs to re-construct mentally the fuller picture in order to comprehend the true enormity of Poland’s wartime cataclysm, and then to say with absolute conviction ‘Never Again’." In 1986, Dawidowicz’s criticism of Davies’ historical treatment of the Holocaust was cited as a factor in a controversy at Stanford University in which Davies was denied a tenured faculty position for alleged "scientific flaws". Davies sued the university for breach of contract and defamation of character, but in 1989 the court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction in an academic matter.

Davies holds a number of honorary titles and memberships, including honorary doctorates from the universities of the Jagiellonian University (since 2003), Lublin, Gdańsk and Warsaw (since 2007), memberships in the Polish Academy of Learning (PAU) and the Academia Scientiarum et Artium Europaea, and fellowships of the British Academy and the Royal Historical Society. Davies received an honorary DLitt degree from his alma mater the University of Sussex. Davies is also an honorary

Reviews

[M. D. Hudson · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think I have had my fill of WWII revisionist history. Okay, already, the Soviets suffered more and fought more than all the other Allies put together. Davies “No Simple Victory” is all over that, and I found I learned a lot of stuff. And yet a day or two after reading it, I started getting cranky about it.

Well, first the good stuff. Davies is an Eastern European expert, and a pretty good marshaller of facts and figures. He uses a lot of easy-to-apprehend charts to keep the numbers (mostly dead people) in proportion. These numbers are appalling, but exactly how they are appalling is a good thing to know. Davies starts out asking basic questions about WWII (European/Mediterranean theatre only) that he thinks most US/UK readers will get wrong, even the WWII buffs. I must admit I was a bit surprised:

Which country suffered the most overall casualites? Which country suffered the most casualties as a proportion of its population? Ukraine and Belarus, respectively.

Here are European land battles arranged by deaths:

1. Operation Barbarossa
2. Stalingrad
3. Siege of Leningrad
4. Kiev
5. Operation Bagration
6. Kursk
7. Berlin
8. French Campaign (1940)
9. Operation Overlord (D-Day)
10. Budapest
11. Polish Campaign (1939)
12. Battle of the Bulge
13. Warsaw Rising
14. Operation Market Garden
15. Battle of El Alamein II

This rather surprised me (I thought everybody surrendered in the French Campaign of 1940!). I knew the Battle of Berlin was awful, but worse than D-Day? I thought the Nazis were exhausted at that point. Of course in the top 10, only D-Day and the French Campaign make the list from the Western Front. This is an interesting list. The book is full of useful things like it.

My complaint comes from the comparisons Davies makes and the conclusions he draws. There is no doubt that the Soviets were key in defeating the Nazis, but these claims that they did most of the work just does not quite ring true to me. In this case, it is because Davies considers only the European half of WWII, and half of anything is bound to be lopsided. Although he anticipates most of the arguments I will make below, he does not always convince me:

1. One of the luckiest things to happen to the Soviets was to have Marshal Zhukov in Siberia when the Japanese attacked from Manchuria in 1941 or thereabouts. Zhukov beat them soundly, thus ending any chance the Soviets would face a 2-front war. Zhukov was moved west, along with 30 or so divisions and this made a pretty big difference.

2. Because of item 1, I think it safe to say the USSR was the only Allied or Axis force that did NOT fight a two-front war (even the Nationalist Chinese spent half the time fighting Chinese communists). The Japanese fought in China-Burma-India and the Pacific (and Alaska). The Germans were in Italy, France, Africa, and the Eastern Front. The USA was everywhere, as was the UK. Hell, even the Italians and French were in Africa. That the Soviets were on one land front only – a big front to be sure – meant that they had one victory to focus on, and this is a huge logistical advantage if nothing else.

3. Allied air power is mostly dismissed by Davies. This is part of the revisionist dismissal of the strategic bombing campaign as having been a failure. It did fail to some extent (about everything does), and yes, I know about the rising German production figures after the bombing started. But German industry did not go on “total war” mode until very late in the game (c. 1943) and Albert Speer’s terrible but effective organization skills and the use of a vast slave labor pool offset the 8th Air Force. But what the US-UK air forces did was destroy the Luftwaffe. Although doing so later than they should of, they shut down German oil production. These are two huge contributions to the Soviet war efforts. Soviet air power confuses me – along with everything else, they built way more planes than the Germans, and yet the Germans seemed to dominate the skies of the Eastern Front until very late in the war (and only after the US-UK had pretty much wiped them out). Germans flew obsolete planes successfully on the Eastern Front (Stukas, ME-110s) years after they withdrew them from the West. Nazi aces ran up incredible kill scores (100s!). I don’t think, without the US-UK, the Soviets would have been able to gain air superiority, and without that, the Eastern Front may have come out somewhat different. Also, despite vague claims I have read, I don’t think Soviet planes were very good, even at the end of the war.

4. The Soviet Navy was inconsequential. They didn’t really need a Navy, and so the vast resources needed to maintain one went to ground and air forces. Davies largely ignores this, but the fact is, the Soviets couldn’t have done D-Day – at least not the way the UK-US did. No naval superiority, massed gunfire from the sea. I am not saying the Soviets couldn’t have done it – they just never had to. A Soviet D-Day would have been three times bigger than the real one, moving on mostly wooden boats, and would have sustained 10 times the number of casualties.

5. I still don’t understand to what extent the American Arsenal of Democracy contributed to the war. Davies dismisses it in regards to the Soviets since US materiel didn’t flow into the USSR until after Kursk and therefore didn’t have much to do with tides being turned.

I am indulging in armchair generalship rather than a review here (sorry). But Davies’ book, although very up front and clear about it, deals with only about half (arguably about a third) of what was a global war. And with the rest of the world out of the picture, the Soviet victory, as tremendous and significant as it was, is given too much credit. Also, the book has moments of sketchiness. Nothing major, but occasionally my confidence was shaken. In describing small arms of the combatants, Davies (p. 233) makes it sound as if the average Fritz and Ivan was armed with automatic assault rifles. Not so, especially for the Germans – the bolt-action rifle of 1890s technology was the main weapon of virtually all forces in World War II except for the USA. The G.I.’s had the M-1 Garand, the finest weapon of the war, this according to General Patton but Davies doesn’t mention it at all.

Still, I learned a lot from this book, and it covers a lot of statistical ground adroitly. This statistical information is nicely integrated into the text (and horrible to read – something trivial like the number of soldiers in the German and Soviet armies killed by their own side is staggering – killed by their own side! Executions for desertion, Soviet “punishment brigades” etc.). Davies also does a fine job pointing out that the ideological differences between fascism (on the political right) and Stalinist communism (on the left) is nil -just raw, ruthless power. The appallingly cynical and brutal treatment of Poland by virtually everybody in the war haunts everything. This muddies the good guys vs. bad guys certainties to a useful extent.

[Ed · Rating 5 out of 5]

For those who have read many books about the Eastern Front (Germany versus the Soviet Union), this book may have less surprises, but for those brought up on Saving Private Ryan, Hollywood WW2, most western histories of the war, and the Greatest Generation it may be a major eye opener. Davies clearly loves Poland (on which he has written the national accepted monumental history)and given its suffering, who can blame him. What he does bring into clear focus is the writing of history and the problems of proportionality and criminality.

By proportionality he means that the Second World War in Europe was 90% Germans versus Soviets and that it is time the US and Western Europe recognized this. Military deaths in Europe WW2: USSR 8.8 million (and probably another 19 million civilians), Germany 4.2 million (80% on the Eastern Front), Poland 300,000, UK 200,000 USA 150,000.

The other issue is criminality: there is not much to choose between Hitler and Stalin in mass murder of innocents, indeed Stalin was at it longer and killed more people. The notion of a good war dies at Davies's hands because he shows that the brunt of the dying was done in the East in war between two murderous tyrants. And the notion (Band of Brothers etc.) that democracies produce the best infantry doesn't stand up to examination: when on equal terms (with equal numbers and without superior Allied air power) the Germans almost always beat the US and UK infantry. And the Russians beat the Germans in offensive warfare without the conventional 3 to 1 superiority. By 1943 the Russians were fighting better than the Germans.

The book has so many interesting side lights as well as good balanced narrative of the unfolding of the war. My only complaint is that he lets Franco off lightly and doesn't turn the criminality lens in his direction, though to be fair, this is a peripheral issue. And Poland does lack for attention!

Adam Tooze's book Wages of Destruction would be a great supplement to this book and a useful corrective and addition if Davies were to write a new edition.

[Olethros · Rating 3 out of 5]

-Los libros pueden ser incómodos de leer por varias razones.-

Género. Ensayo.

Lo que nos cuenta. Con un subtítulo que debería preparar ya al lector, “¿Quién ganó realmente la Segunda Guerra Mundial?”, repaso al conflicto en Europa (mayoritariamente) desde diferentes ópticas, ángulos y temáticas con la intención de tratar de ofrecer visiones del mismo no demasiado trilladas para el gran público.

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...

[Justin Evans · Rating 4 out of 5]

So, this was published in 2007, but smells of the '90s, when people apparently were shocked to learn that Stalin and his cronies were actually pretty evil. It'll teach you a lot about the war in Europe, especially if you know little about it, particularly the importance of the Eastern Front and the Red Army. There's no narrative, but the format, especially for the more social history type bits, is great: a page or two on important themes, with references if you want to read more.

I would go to five stars, but for two bizarre flaws: first, considering how even-handed and 'objective' Davies tries to be, it's odd that the Poles can do no wrong, and, according to this book, are generally the most put-upon people in the world. They are mighty put-upon, no doubt, but Davies basically writes the hagiography of the country. I actually knew he'd do that, because he did it in his history of Europe as well.
More disturbing, for someone who is keen to stress the horrors of Soviet Russia, is his tendency to identify 'people who have read Marx with some sympathy' and Stalinists: for Davies, anyone who was a communist in the twentieth century just *was* a Stalinist. He ignores the importance and work of anti-Stalinist communists and socialists, (who spoke out against Nazism while the great 'democrats' were appeasing away, and to speak out against Stalinism itself).
In part, this is probably due to his insistence that the USSR and Nazi Germany be considered in the same light. Of course they should: they were both totalitarian states. But 'communism' is an economic system which is, in theory, compatible with all sorts of 'political' systems, no matter how slippery the distinction between political and economic might be (and of course they're pretty slippery). Fascism is a political system which, I suppose, is compatible with most economic systems. So while Stalinism, a political system, should be thought of along the lines of Fascism, also a political system, once you identify Stalinism with 'communism,' you're just mixing up two things which shouldn't be mixed.
Also, I love that the Kirkus Review's claim that Davies 'deconstructs' the foundations of World War II history. Can an author roll in his grave if he's still alive?

[Ushan · Rating 1 out of 5]

This is an overview of the European Theater of World War II from a Polonocentric perspective. Every page I looked at has a claim that made me go: WTF? Sławomir Rawicz was not a fraud? Typical American GIs were of Italian and Polish descent? The Soviet Union annexed 14 independent countries including Uzbekistan, and set them up as Soviet republics? Vlasov's movement had a million men? Most (as opposed to some) POWs liberated by the Red Army were sent to the GULag? Well over 10 million Ukrainians were killed in the 1930s? These are things that are false which I know are false; I am sure that there are more things in this book that are false which I don't know are false, which I don't want to remember, which is why I didn't want to finish this book.

[Peter · Rating 3 out of 5]

I find Norman Davies' history books both thought provoking and annoying.
He makes you reconsider what you think you know but he also writes as a vehicle for his opinions which can, unfortunately detract from the enjoyment of the former. One occasionally gets the impression of an axe being sharpened in between lines. To extend the well known football metaphor 'this is a book of several halves'.

Its' basic premise is that the Second World War in Europe was a conflict between three ideologies and two dictatorships; Stalinist Communism, Nazi-ism and Liberal democracy, and in turn, globally between various National imperialistic ambitions; Russian, Japanese, American and German.
Mr Davies comes to the convincing conclusion, supported by facts, that the war was won by the U.S.A financially and by the U.S.A and the Stalinist Soviet Union politically. Germany, Italy and Poland lost.
This is a deliberate attempt to give a fuller more realistic overview of the European theatre since everybody's account of the war is inevitably distorted, especially that of the victors.
Mr Davies unpacks these issues brilliantly, from the historians perspective, in the closing section of the penultimate chapter

To quote:

"The true tales...should prompt some troublesome reflections. Courage and virtue, it seems, were not the preserve of Allied fighters. People fighting heroically against Nazism were not necessarily decent. And warriors who fulfilled their patriotic duty without fear or reproach could be found on every side.This is not the moral framework that most Britons or Americans have been taught to believe in. But it is true. It is historical"

To some degree he succeeds.
In the first 3 chapters on Warfare and Politics he successfully dispels and demythologizes the western over simplification that the war was one of good versus evil i.e. The Allies versus Hitler. He shifts the Military emphasis from west to central eastern Europe and the conflict as of one between 'Two Monsters'; Hitler and Stalin, since the overwhelming majority of people who lost their lives were either killed by, or died fighting for, one of these two.
He also challenges accepted perceptions by claiming that World War II was actually a single prolonged episode in a larger, century long conflict that began in 1914 and ended with the fall of communism in 1989.
The political and military interpretations then are excellent, convincing and well written, often drawing on new, hitherto unavailable, sources that the breakdown of the Soviet Empire have yielded, and hence he is able to shift perspective, encompassing international relations between other states as well as national internal affairs when these are relevant. For example how many accounts of the war mention anything of Soviet/Japanese diplomacy and aggression or note the different degrees that internal affairs dictated how occupation was received or resisted?

However, the middle sections of the book, on soldiers and civilians seem to lose the thread and momentum and occasionally left me wondering exactly what point Mr Davies is trying to make. The whole book majors on Soviet/German conflict with poor old Poland caught in between and just hammers this home, on every aspect over and over again; The Soviets and the Germans were more numerous, bigger and better equipped, suffered more, fought more etc... etc... He aims at an unbiased position, giving honest appraisal to courage, skill and bravery of all sides equally yet in attempting to place the western involvement into a more sober perspective by the same method, the text often reads like a vehicle for Mr Davies' thinly veiled anti English and/or pro Marxist sentiments. Nothing wrong with either, apart from when you claim at the outset to be seeking a lack of bias!

For example here are two quotes that occur within 2 pages of each other: -

"Deception is as old as warfare, and it is usually a speciality of the weaker party. The British, therefore, were acutely aware of the powers of deception"

(pp 251)

"The Red Army's field intelligence...improved greatly as photographic reconnaissance gradually became feasible..the Soviets were the undisputed champions of maskirovka or 'deception'. Troop movements were made at night, dummy base camps were built, and phoney radio traffic filled the airwaves. Time and again, they spirited up huge reserves and whole tank armies from nowhere. They attacked at time s and places where they were least expected and they sometimes stood still whilst the whole world waited on attack."

(pp 252)

What conclusions is he leading me to draw from these statements:
that the British use of subterfuge was a sign of weakness whilst Soviet use of the same was a mark of their genius and greatness?

In the same section he criticises Western cemeteries for possessing an atmosphere that is, quote 'far removed from the realities of war'! Whilst Soviet cemeteries, first criticised for their overbearing Stalinist ostentation are then several pages later lauded for being more in keeping with the realities of war because of, guess what?, their ostentation and grandeur!
It seems then that at at times he confuses his fervour for Marxism or communism with his knowledge of Stalinism, getting a little verbose about the wrong things.
He gets excited about the development of Genocidal politics, Stalinist despotism and the Eastern front in equal measure but then brushes the Mediterranean arena, Normandy D-day and ensuing battles and the naval conflicts aside, as minimal or insignificant. The book might have more accurately been titled Germany and USSR at war.
The introduction and initial chapters then are engaging whilst bringing new information and fresh interpretations to bear whilst the middle section is a monotonal reiteration of a single opinion written to the sound of a grinding axe.

The inclusion of the chapter on the various literary and cinematic portrayals of wartime events is an interesting addition with an excellent self examination on historical texts, which includes, to the authors credit, an acknowledgement or apologetic of short comings and difficulties involved in writing a comprehensive, arch history, if not the impossibility of such a thing.


If you can cope with all that (All histories are written with some opinion, subjective bias or glaring omissions) then, overall, this amounts to a knowledgeable, well researched, concise and, occasionally, well written alternative history.

The Wars and European politics of the last century were a very involved, many faceted period of our history and no one volume could ever cover all sides. However, many of the world's conflicts both recent and current have their origins in the events described here and so, as a starting point or complimentary text this book will serve you well but I would highly recommend that it be read alongside at least one other authoritative text.

[Bob Schmitz · Rating 5 out of 5]

The most interesting book I have ever read on WWII. The author asks 5 questions in the beginning of the book: 1. Name the 5 biggest tank battles of the war in Europe, 2. Name the main ideologies contending in the War, 3. Where was the largest concentration camp. 4. Who lost the most civilians, 5. The sinking of which vessel lost the most # of lives.

The answers are in the book and will surprise most readers. The author explains that in the west WWII has been mistold for a variety of reasons. The Soviets were our allies and so we didn't print negative things about them during the war. After the war their archives were seal from western eyes and western audiences were primarily interested int he Western Front in Europe. With newly opened archives and facts and figures the author lays out a new story of the war.

For instance:
- Troops deployed in Europe in 1945: Britain 2MM, USA 3.5MM, Germany 6MM, USSR 12MM.
- Man-months in campaigns: Poland 2.6MM, Finland: 9MM, North Africa: 5MM, Italy 4.4MM, German-Soviet war: 406 MM.
- Military dead in Europe: USSR: 11MM, Ger. 3.5MM, Romania 519K, Yugoslavia: 300k, Italy 226k, UK 144k, US 143K, Hungary 136k.
- The eastern front had the 6 battles with the most loss of life. The biggest being Operation Barbarossa with 1.6MM dead, while Overlord was 9th with 132k.

You will learn that the troops that assualted Monte Casino were not American and British as has been portrayed in the past but mostly Polish under British command.

[Gintarė Lialienė · Rating 5 out of 5]

Platus, bet kartu ir labai koncentruotas žvilgsnis į Antrojo pasaulinio karo istoriją. Ši didžiausia XX amžiaus tragedia vaizduojama kaip dviejų monstriškų valstybių susidūrimas, atnešęs daugybę kančių, mirčių ir praradimų. Bene ryškiausias knygos akcentas - kančių Europoje šaltinis ne tik Vokietijos nacių ambicijos, bet ir sovietinės Rusijos žvėriškumai, deja, nepasibaigę su pasauliniu karu. Žmogui, išaugusiam sovietinio režimo pabaigoje, šių faktų akcentuoti nereikia, bet knyga orientuota į Vakarų skaitytoją, o ten, atrodo, suvokimas apie tai, kas buvo Sovietų Sąjunga kiek skiriasi nuo jos buvusių gyventojų. Nuo kitų knygų apie Antrąjį pasaulinį karą ši skiriasi tuo, kad aprašoma ne tik politika, mūšiai, laimėjimai ir pralaimėjimai, bet ir okupacijų padariniai įvairiems gyventojų sluoksniams, karo padariniai XX a. Europai, įvairių meno sričių raiškai karo metu ir įamžinant karo įvykius.

[Gill · Rating 5 out of 5]

Davies here makes the case for the centrality of the Eastern Front in WWII in Europe and thus for the Soviet Union being the victor with the US, UK, and others playing a minor role.

This ahistorical and gross exaggeration is a useful corrective to the similar distorted view in the West that the US and UK were the decisive players and that the Soviet Union would never have been able to stand up to the Germans without them.

There are no certainties in alternative history so we can't know how WWII might have turned out had anything been different. If the Soviets had collapsed would the West have defeated Hitler? We'll never know, however sure we may think we can guess.

That polemic aside, Davies does an excellent job of examining the war from many different perspectives -- different countries, military, economic, political, social, etc. As someone who has read many histories of WWII over a lifetime, that is both welcome and rare.

Davies is also accused of minimizing the Holocaust by looking at it in the context of other atrocities during the war. I think that is unfair to him. As I read his book, I don't see that at all. I see him showing how the Holocaust was the ultimate realization of historical forces that also expressed themselves in other ways during the same time period. I don't see that he equates them or minimizes some and exaggerates others.

Davies is a historian of Poland, not just WWII, and the relations between Poles and Jews over the centuries are complex and particularly after WWI, especially during the Nazi genocide. I think his critics are on his case more for his Polish perspective on Polish history than any statements in this book on WWII. He doesn't excuse Polish collaboration with the Germans nor does he demonize all Poles and all of Polish history because of it either.

I do have a bone to pick with Davies in his assertion that US forces were almost never a match for the Germans in equal numbers without air cover and only prevailed because of airpower. First, even if that were true, it simply means our generals were smarter than the Germans to develop that airpower which was decisive. It's not a weakness of an army to figure out a way to win and not to play the enemy's game. Second, it's just not true.

Patton's drive across France was not based on overwhelming numbers and his men outfought and outmaneuvered the Germans on most occasions without huge odds in their favor. Nor were the paratroops in Bastogne or troops in St. Vith protected from the air while they defeated the Germans who had a huge superiority in armor and infantry at the point of contact.

Davies would say that these were small battles compared with the battles in the East that involved much larger numbers of troops and tanks. So what? The US and UK armies went from Normandy to occupy Germany and accept their surrender and they did it far faster and more effectively than the Soviets. They suffered far fewer casualties for each one inflicted on the enemy than did the Soviets. The Soviet losses of millions were due more to their own ineptitude than to the skill of the Germans. The same Germans were not nearly as effective fighting us.



Using Davies' logic Fredricksburg would be a key battle of the Civil War because of the large casualties, even though it was strategically meaningless, while the taking of Forts Henry and Donelson which was one of the decisive events of the war would be unimportant because there were very few casualties. Nonsense.

Also, Davies being a historian specializing in Central and Eastern Europe is blind to the importance of naval power since the countries in that part of the world are quite inept at naval warfare. The German inability to invade Britain in the summer of 1940, to interfere in any meaningful way with the transport of American men and materiel to the UK and the Soviet Union, as well as their inability to prevent any of the Allied amphibious assaults -- Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Normandy, Southern France might well have had something to do with their losing the war.

So don't let Davies convince you that the Soviet Union saved the world in WWII all by itself. But do read his book to see what their part of the war was all about.

[Kate Sampsell · Rating 2 out of 5]

I question the validity of drawing meta-conclusions about good and evil when one's sample is intentionally incomplete. The Pacific cannot credibly be disconnected from the Atlantic when assessing which group did "more." In doing so, Davies sets up a very weak argument in assessing 3 ideologies. He includes the US as an equal source of ideology long before its ideologies became relevant to the war in Europe and thus commits the primary historical sin: presentism. The US emerges as the arsenal, the Red Army as the horde of cannon fodder, and Britain as the strategic aircraft carrier. All were ESSENTIAL.

Unsurprisingly, Churchill comes out as the hero for hating the Faustian bargain with Stalin, but Davies excuses this based on his argument that England's (as opposed to his repeated correction that the UK was at war, not just England) primary goal was mere survival. Canada and India were not merely trying to survive, e.g.

Deeply flawed, often unnecessarily snarky history, but like the Goldhagen thesis, worth reading for the references to AJP Taylor, Davies', thesis advisor. And, for Davies' knowledge of Poland.

The biggest flaw is the same as in all post-1989 histories: yes, Stalin was a monster and sheer numbers of murdered should not be compared. However, there is nothing in human history remotely like the Shoah. Others have attempted genocide, and others have killed more people, but not even Stalin committed murder via an industrial method and on an industrial scale against a single population selected because an immutable trait, it's genealogy.

Furthermore, socialism is an ideology that united the western anti-fascists. I remain unconvinced that, in 1939, Stalin was a more imminent threat that Hitler. Surprisingly, however, Davies' misses one salient point. In 1939, the UK declared war on Germany, then allied with the USSR, but not on the USSR. But in a way they did. The UK could wait and see what Stalin would do without exposing its navy to a second enemy. If the pact did not disintegrate, the UK and USSR would eventually come to blows. That it did was never in doubt; Hitler would never had remained Allied to a Slav and would never had given up access to Ukraine for Lebensraum. It was only ever a matter of time.

[Oleksiy Kononov · Rating 4 out of 5]

Davies's history of WWII in Europe will be a captivating reading for both western and eastern (ex-USSR and CEE) readers. The role of the Soviet Union in victory over the Nazis had indeed been underestimated in western historiography and pop-culture. On the other hand, I'd be interested to read more about the role of the Allies' supplies to the USSR. Even some Russian historians are starting to acknowledge the vital role of the Land Lease deliveries, especially in 1941-42. Unfortunately, Davies didn't dwell on that, and I think its one of the main caveats of the book. Besides, the author made some mistakes which spoiled my impression of the book. For example, at pp. 48, 135 of the 2006 Macmillan edition he writes that the USSR had been created on January 1, 1924. It's wrong, The Treaty on the Creation of the Soviet Union had been adopted two years earlier on December 30, 1922. Perhaps, the author meant the first Soviet Constitution adopted in 1924, yet again the date is wrong - the 1924 USSR Basic Law had been adopted on January 31, 1924.

[Dainius Jocas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Puiki knyga.

Antrasis Pasaulinis karas buvo siaubingas visomis prasmėmis. Jo vertinimas dar dabar yra net labai nevienareikšmis. Taip yra, nes kiekviena iš suinteresuotų pusių mano, kad jų indelis ir jų kančios kare buvo pačios reikšmingiausios. Visi tie nesutarimai, užduoda gausybę klausimų, kuriuos autorius ir stengiasi aptarti.

Kaip vienas iš Norman Davies principų rašant šią knygą tikrai turėjo būti proporcingumas. Reikšmingesni įvykiai tikrai aprašyti detaliau, negu ne tokie reikšmingi. Spėkit kodėl didžioji knygos dalis yra apie Rytų frontą?

Dar vienas dalykas, kuris tikrai krito į akis, tai autoriaus pastabos tam tikroms WWII interpretacijoms, kurios yra daugiau ar mažiau angažuotos ir todėl mažai reprezentuoja realybę, nes vienus svarbius dalykus tik pamini, nepatogius nutyli, etc. Tokie faktai, kaip kad žydai tarnavę vermachte tikrai verčia kilstelti antakius. Silpnesnių nervų žmogus po tokių naujienų gal jau ir numestų knygą į šalį kuriam laikui.

Mano galva, geriausiai WWII susumavo Stalinas: "Anglai parūpino laiko, amerikiečiai pinigų, rusai kraujo."

[Sheridan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mr. Davies has a refreshingly detached perspective of the war. He also has an empathy for those who suffered. There however are many irritations- his style is that of a bored lecturer, playing to a safe gallery with an eye on his career rather than the incisive independence required for a truly good historian. His main failing, a huge one, is that he does not put the war in context, the German genuine grievances, the duplicity of Churchill, the opportunism of business, the secret implementation of the Morgenthau plan, the use of prisoners of war in Britain, France, U.S. for ten years after the war, who was behind Pearl Harbour (logic would point the finger at the British). As I said- a safe book. But thank you for pointing out that credit for the breaking of the Enigma code goes to the Poles.
Good effort, Mr. Davies, but there is plenty of room for improvement.

[Chuck · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is a tedious book. The author claimed that it was a revistionist history of WW2, but anyone who's read much history of the war is already familiar with his main points. There's nothing particularly new or bold about them. Broadly speaking, he has two main points. The first is that it wasn't a war of the Allied good guys versus the Axis bad guys. The truth isn't as simple as that according to Davies, and as he points out, Stalin was every bit as bad as Hitler. His second point is that it was the Soviets who won the war in Europe. Contrary to popular opinion in the USA and Great Britain, their countries only acted as supporting players. As he points out, D-Day didn't even rank among the top ten battles in the War in Europe. As I said, anyone who has read much WW2 history would have come to these conclusions himself, but Davies belabors the point over and over again.

[Vikas Datta · Rating 5 out of 5]

No matter how much you might have read about the Second World War or believe you know about it, this book will be an absolute eye-opener. Provocative at times but cogently-argued throughout, Mr Davies has written a near-comprehensive encyclopaedia of the conflict organised thematically in all aspects imaginable - and accompanied with unrivalled insights into the mechanics and outcome of the conflict...

[PJ · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found this to be one of the most insightful books on the European Theatre of WWII. The book is well organized and really addresses topics that are not addressed in typical history classes. The book really paints a stark picture of the Russian contingent and how they were as barbaric as the Nazis before, during and after the war.

[Nayden Kostov · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of the most detailed book about WW2 I have ever read (and I have read a lot!) More importantly, it is very impartial and doesn't fall in the trap to side with someone and to demonise the other.
While very factual, its strength is that everything is put into context and bravely questions some dogmas.

[Christinabel · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ето че приключих книгата "Европа във война". Искам да отбележа, че парите които съм дала за тази книга, са най-добре похарчените пари в целия ми живот!

Приключвам тази книга с много смесени чувства...
В училище винаги са ни учили, че войната започва през 1941-а година и приключва през 1945-а. След тази книга разбирам, че не само в България (е) има/имало такава практика. Маските на много управници паднаха, паметниците на много хора трябва да бъдат разрушени заедно с техните безумни надписи. Уви, това няма да стане, но поне ще знам истината или поне частица от нея, защото това е една от малкото книги, в които истината за СССР и Сталин излиза наяве.
Абсурдно е да пиша по този въпрос при положение, че знам колко от познатите ми се интересуват... Но истината е че искам повече хора да знаят за тази книга. Тя буквално отваря очите на тези, които искат да знаят истината за Втората световна война. Може би няма да получат "цялата истина", но поне няма да мислят червената армия за спасители, а може би трябва да мислим за тях като за жертви на сталинизма?! Сложен въпрос...

ГУЛАГ е едно от нещата за които никога не бях чувала или чела. Ужасно е!
...
Хитлер се описва като психопат (какъвто е), но защо Сталин се описва като герой през WWS? Защо повечето филми наблягат върху "американската загуба", но никога върху чуждата? А може би не са само американците, може би всяка държава, която е участвала във войната набляга върху своите загуби?
...
"Един континент от 500 млн. души, засегнати от тотална война, представлява картина на огромно, неописуемо нещастие. И именно цивилните, които не се сражават, понасят главния удар от стреса и страданието."
...
"Има седем държави, които остават неутрални: Португалия, Испания, Ейре, Швейцария, Турция и Ватикана."
...
"Всички тези балкански страни (Унгария, Румъния, България...) наистина са заплашени от комунистически подривни действия и от съветска инвазия. И трябва сериозно да се замислим върху предположението, че тяхната позиция може да се опише по-скоро като антисъветска, отколкото като прогерманска."
...
"СССР окупира България през август 1944 г.
1991-а година е крайната дата на окупацията."
...
"Сферата на Оста:
В България получават нещо, което е много далеч от пълно сътрудничество. Уклончивите опити на България да защити малката си еврейска общност са увенчани поне с частичен успех."
...
"Щом някой влезе там (ГУЛАГ), той минава под арка, украсена с руски лозунг, като "Трудом домой" - "Завръщане у дома чрез труд" - или "Трудът е въпрос на чест и слава." Те изразяват точно същите цинични чувства като "Arbeit Macht Frei".

"Сталин се оказва прав, когато казва: "Англия осигурява времето, Америка осигурява парите, а Русия осигурява кръвта."

[Žydrūnas Jonušas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Krūvos faktų šviesoje, kuri kiek tik įmanoma objektyviai demonstruoja, kad šiame kare nebuvo teisiųjų. Kad laimėtojai tapo teisūs tik todėl, kad jie laimėtojai. Autorius nešlovina nacių, anaiptol. Jis tik rodo, kad reikia keisti sąjungininkų reputacijos supratimą, kuris nusistovėjo Vakarų pasaulyje (Rytų pasaulyje jis vis dar nepakeičiamas, deja).
Ši monografija pasirodė 2006m. Taigi per beveik 20m. nuo pirmo knygos leidimo tikėtis galima, kad bent kiek pasauliu ir istorija besidomintieji yra pakeitę savo supratimą šiomis temomis.
O visiems geriesiems žmonėms norėčiau priminti, kad Lietuvoje II-asis pasaulinis karas baigėsi 1993m. rugpjūčio 31d.
Rekomenduoju visiems. Nors tema sunki, nors pati knyga yra ~650psl. ir gal kažkiek gąsdina savo dydžiu, rekomenduoju visiems, kurie ne tik domisi šia nesena istorija, bet ir tuo, kas dedasi dabar pasaulyje. Knyga sudėlioja daug taškų dabartinio pasaulio suvokime.
10/10

Apie Antrąjį pasaulinį karą rašantys istorikai negali visą laiką ignoruoti katastrofiško Stalino reputacijos nuosmukio nuo tų gerų senų laikų, kai jis buvo laikomas geranorišku "dėdule Džo". Jau yra tvirtų įrodymų, kad jis per visą savo karjerą buvo tik paprastas masinis žudikas, o mintis, kad jo nusikaltimai ne tokie šlykštūs, nes kovojo teisiųjų pusėje, yra daugiau nei abejotina.

Ne mažiau paradoksalu ir tai, kad Osvencimą išlaisvino tie tarnai to režimo, kuris turėjo koncentracijos stovyklų dar didesnių už tą, kurią jie išvadavo. Kol nesuvoksime šio paradokso, tol iš tikrųjų neperprasime šios problemos esmės.

Vakarų šalių požiūrį į Sovietų Sąjungą dažnai iškreipdavo prisiminimai apie karo metų sąjungą. "Mes kovojom su nacizmu, - sako žmonės, - ir Sovietų Sąjunga kovojo su naciais nuožmiau už visus. Tad jei Hitleris buvo siaubūnas, tai Stalinas negali būti toks jau blogas, ar ne?" Tai stulbinančio masto nelogiška išvada. Režimus reikia vertinti pagal jų darbus. Vakarų šalių gyventojai turėtų atsitraukti nuo karo metų šališkumo ir paklausti savęs, ar ne du siaubūnai Rytų fronte kovojo vienas su kitu?

Stalinistinis teroras apėmė visas sovietinio gyvenimo sritis. Ir dabar, kai jau geriau žinomi tikri faktai, niekas negalėtų paneigti, kad niekšiškumu šis režimas nenusileido trečiojo Reicho metodams. Tik tiek, kad tęsėsi ilgiau ir neabejotinai pareikalavo daugiau žmonių aukų. Jo griaunamasis iracionalumas, kurį vadiname Blogiu, pasiekė visas įmanomas gelmes. Juk išžudęs visus savo varžovus - senuosius bolševikus - Stalinas nuo "socialinių priešų" ir politinių oponentų žudymo perėjo prie savo rėmėjų žudymo. 1936-1939 metais per "Didįjį terorą" Stalinas masiškai žudė dėl paties žudymo. Antrojo pasaulinio karo išvakarėse jis duodavo įsakymus NKVD žudyti pagal atsitiktinai nustatytas kvotas. Tūkstančių tūkstančiai visiškai nekaltų žmonių buvo sušaudyta, prieš tai verčiant juos įskųsti kitus, kurie tada irgi būdavo sušaudomi.

Pagrindinė priežastis, kodėl nacių įsiveržimas į Sovietų Sąjungą baigėsi nesėkme, buvo ta, kad vermachtas, kaip ir visa vokiečių tauta, tapo nacių mąstysenos įkaitu.

Iš vokiečių šaltinių žinoma, jog vermachto kulkosvaidininkai, susidūrę su priešo pėstininkų bangomis, šaudydavo tol, kol pro lavonų krūvas nieko nebematydavo ar kol jų kulkosvaidžių vamzdžiai perkaisdavo. Kyla pagunda daryti išvadą, kad kiekybinis pranašumas galėjo padėti Raudonajai Armijai išvengti pralaimėjimo, bet jis nieku gyvu nepaaiškina jos pergalių.

Vokietijoje per "Ilgųjų peilių naktį" 1934 metais Hitleris nužudė beveik šimtą savo partijos draugų norėdamas parodyti, kas čia viršininkas. Tačiau Stalino jis nepralenkė: šis per Didįjį terorą ir valymus Sovietų Sąjungoje nužudė apie 500 000 lojalių komunistų.

Kembridžo universiteto dėstytojas seras Džeimsas Batleris planavo išleisti didžiulę knygų seriją beveik iš šimto tomų. <...> Visa laimė, kad redaktoriams pagailo vargšų skaitytojų ir jiems šovė į galvą mintis išleisti visų tų knygų santrauką vienu tomu. Britai išleido Antrojo pasaulinio karo medicinos istoriją "Medical History" (dvidešimt penkis tomus) ir dvidešimt aštuonių tomų veikalą "UK Civil Series". Po galais, ir apie gi jie ten tiek daug prirašė? Kartais kyla pagunda daryti išvadą, kad kuo menkesnis buvo šalies indėlis kare, tuo daugiau ji apie jį prirašė.

[LG · Rating 5 out of 5]

Book Review Part 1 (before my trip to Poland)
I picked up No Simple Victory because I wanted to better understand Poland during and after WWII. I knew from reading reviews that Davies was pro-Poland and that didn't bother me. However, when someone is strongly pro or anti USA, I can read between the lines.
I am familiar with the debate and recognize the cultural double-speak. With Poland’s history, I know nothing. All I can do is occasionally say - wow, I wish I had someone to tell me whether or not there is a sign post here - which happened a few times to me while reading the book.

Davies presents Poland as having moments of stubbornness, heroism and at the same time a victim taken advantage of from all sides. For me, it was helpful to be reminded that Poland was abandoned to the Soviet Union after the war when they clearly indicated that was not their wish and how much that must have stung.

It was helpful to learn that the lone Polish cavalry on horseback against German tanks in 1939 was a convenient myth that both sides liked. The Germans believed it made the Polish seem wildly naive (read stupid) without military strength or skill. The Polish believed it made their soldiers appear wildly brave (read machismo or perhaps closer to chivalry) and willing to sacrifice all. It's a good example of how different groups interpreted a single event. I wanted more of these moments.

However, Davis is interested in telling a bigger picture. Davies provides lots of statistics about everything and then follows up by asking us to reflect on those statistics, particularly at the start of the book. How should a Ukraine Jew living in Moscow be counted? When people could be represented in more than category, how do we know if we are over or under counting? (Basically, not everyone counted as a Russian was Russian... I think that was the takeaway.)
The other thing I would say about this section - it overwhelmed me. (I listened to the book. So I don't know if there are tables that visually present the information making it easier to understand.) While in Poland, I visited the WWII museum in Gdansk, which had a graph that really helped me understand military casualties. Hopefully the book had graphs; it would be nice if the audiobook came with a PDF for supporting materials.

One of Davies' complaints is how fractured and therefore limited our understanding of the war is. Because we understand the war as a Western Front and an Eastern Front, we fail to grasp it as a whole. And those in the West are overly obsessed with the western part of the war. And because of post-war events, much of the Eastern story has been buried. However, by emphasizing the bigger picture with facts and statistics (instead of personal narratives), there were times that I found Davies argument hard to stay engaged with, particularly when I already agree with his thesis: WWII was more than simply good against evil and we degrade the events by limiting our understanding this way.

Book Review Part 2 (during my trip)
It took me going to Poland to let go of my expectations and appreciate the book on its terms. Before my visit I read exactly half the book; I considered skimming or flat out abandoning the book. While in Poland, I traveled from the Baltic Sea to the Tatra Mountains, visiting several WWII historical sites and museums. I began to understand the book as similar to the commentary museums provide if you get the headset. This made the abrupt transitions between topics- the Holocaust, work camps, gulags, various types of looting (food, homes, science, techonology, art), rape as war crime, Soviet purges of the 1930s, the significant change in gender roles and expectations, WWII's influence on literature, movies, poetry - less jarring. I thought about it as simply visiting the next wing of the museum. I'm glad that I stuck with the book. Davies saves his full assessment - the war is more complicated than any single remembrance so far. And as time passes, each nation will only make that remembrance more romanticized and politicized if historians don't actively attempt to unpack what happened.

Davis really rips on Postmodernism. He complains that Postmodernism has made historians into cowards, who are afraid to attempt an intellectually rigorous analysis of WWII that honors what happened and provides a coherent narrative that includes both the Eastern and Western Front. (That said, his critique of our statistics felt awfully Postmodern to me.) A part of me wanted to say: stop complaining, take the mantle and do it. And another part of me felt that Davis is providing a road map with the hope that others will continue to build beyond what he has presented.

For me, acknowledging our political frameworks go far in helping to understand the bigger picture. Maybe that's me agreeing that Postmodernism hasn't been helpful, but it's also not helpful to pretend there is a single all-knowing viewpoint based on the western male perspective that can wrap everything neatly up for us to digest. This is actually important. Davies ultimate goal is that we use facts to tell a truth that does not romanticize the war, under reports its atrocities, or is used as propaganda. Is that post-postmodernism?

My last observation - WWII reminds me of a family event that becomes distorted with everyone having a different version of events made even more confusing because not everyone shares the same facts. Following generations have all heard different versions and take different sides. Davies challenges historians to strive for the fullest and most honest remembrance possible.

[Arthur · Rating 5 out of 5]

A refreshing and thorough look at the war in Europe from a perspective that is oddly unique in that it both pays the Eastern front it's due respect and doesnt forgive the terrors of Stalin just because he was on the Allied side.

[Craig Fiebig · Rating 5 out of 5]

A singularly excellent work, Davies' book deserves close reading by everyone interested in the period. The author clearly strips the parochial blinders from prior efforts, many of which traded accuracy for popular or proscriptive, approved narratives. Most importantly, Davies focuses his scalpel to incisively resect patriotic fictions from history. He properly lays charges of incompetence and evil on the allies for the strategic murder known as "area bombing." There was and is no evidence to support the Bomber Command notion that flattening civilian population centers furthered the allied war aims. Of greater importance, with the current enchantment with communism / socialism, Davies displays the moral and ethical vacuousness of the initial Marxist failure the known as the USSR. Anyone infatuated with the notion of increasing the centrality and scope of government power would be well-served to read "No Simple Victory" along with "Gulag" and "The Black Book of Communism."

[Marcus · Rating 4 out of 5]

Let's clarify one thing right from the start - "No Simple Victory" is not a traditional book about history of Second World War. Rather, it is a study of historiography of this period and an analysis of the reasons why this period is perceived in such different and often very warped way by different people, depending on their nationality, ethnicity and political background. Furthermore, Davies claims that if the history of Second World War was reviewed objectively, then historians wouldn't be able to escape from some uncomfortable conclusions that would be very different than the "truths" accepted by modern societies. I will not bother to make a list of his conclusions, but it is safe to say that Mr. Davies presents some very controversial views that will most probably rise very strong emotions among the readers of this book. However, it is also important to observe that Davies presents his views systematically and logically, in a manner that is hard to dismiss without at least some serious afterthought.

"No Simple Victory" is one of those books that easily can end up being prized or condemned based solely on the extent of reader's agreement or disagreement with a specific subset of views presented by the author. It can be clearly seen in many reviews posted on the net - completely different, but very specific parts of the book are being picked apart by upset readers. What parts of "No Simple Victory" cause reader's outrage seem to be directly related to either their nationality or political views. Funnily enough, critique based mainly on those grounds is a perfect illustration of the fact that analysis presented in "No Simple Victory" is, at least to some extent, correct. Personally, even though I would love to get an opportunity to explain to Mr. Davies why he is definitely wrong about some specific topics, I also believe that people who base their critique solely on their personal pet peeves are completely missing the point of this book. In my opinion, the great value of "No Simple Victory" lies in the fact that it regards the biggest conflict of humanity in an unique way I am yet to encounter anywhere else. For that reason alone, I would recommend this book to anyone who's interested in its topic. But please, pick up this volume only if you are also capable to put away your prejudices and preconceptions for a little while.

[D-day · Rating 3 out of 5]

The two main points of Davies book are:
1) The crux of the European theatre in WW2 was on the Eastern Front, and the Western allies efforts were mainly a side show. This is a fair comment, although I think Davies somewhat overstates his case on how radical a position this is. It is true that most popular histories of the war published in Britain, the US (or for that matter Canada) focus on the Western Front. That is only natural. However any serious student of WW2 realises that the bulk of the fighting and casualties were in the East.
2) Although WW2 is often regarded here in North America as the 'last Good War' where it was unambiguous that 'Good' triumphed over 'Evil',as the titled of the book indicates it is not quite that simple. If we say that the outcome of (at least the European side of) WW2 was decided in the East, then it really is a matter of ' slightly less Evil' triumphing over 'slightly more Evil'. Davies makes a strong case that the symbol of the 'boot stomping on a human face' just changed from a Swastika to a Hammer and Sickle. That is the people of Central and Eastern Europe just switched from one set of tyrants to another. Again I think this is a fair point, although again maybe slightly overstated.
Anyways an interesting over view of the war even if its premises aren't as radical (at least in my opinion) as the author may think

[Jim Gallen · Rating 5 out of 5]

“No Simple Victory” is a critical examination of World War II in Europe by Norman Davies, an export on Polish and Eastern European involvement in that war. It presents a much different perspective than that usually encountered by American, Canadian or British readers. The points of the book are two-fold: first, that the bulk of the fighting occurred on the Eastern Front and secondly that the goodness of the “Good War” was soiled by reliance on the forces of a tyrannical Soviet Union to achieve victory.

Davies challenges things we thought we knew, such as that D-Day was not among the largest battles of the War, American, British and Canadian efforts were helpful, but not essential to defeat Germany and that Nazis did not have a monopoly on atrocities.

This book focuses heavily on the sordid record of the Soviet Union in its treatment of its own and conquered peoples, the depravity of Stalin and the naiveté and whitewashing propaganda with which Western leaders treated Soviet behavior. The hardship imposed by mass movements of people to conform to revised borders is given the attention that would be expected from a scholar of Polish history.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

This comprehensive book by a British historian breaks down much of what Americans "know" about the European theater of the Second World War. The volume reorients attention toward Eastern/Central Europe and explores the magnitude of the conflict between Nazi Germany and the USSR. Moreover, the book discusses how the alliance with the USSR tangled the US and UK up in complicated moral questions that largely have been swept away (to say nothing of other morally-fraught choices like the western bombing campaign. The only real negative is that the flow of the book varies in places -- sometimes too short and choppy, sometimes too long and detailed. That said, the chapter that summarizes the military history of the war is a great, concise summary that integrates the developments in both west and east.

[Jonny Andres · Rating 2 out of 5]

There is so much wrong with this account by Davies. It is amazing how soon this Eurocentric writer dismisses the significance of the US and the UK on defeating the Nazis. This is just one thing Davies gets completely wrong... And there are several more examples.
I already wasted my time reading this totally worthless diatribe. I'm not going to lose more of my life writing some long drawn out review of a book that just simply gets it won't.
Just know this...I did not like this book.

[Stephan Glienke · Rating 3 out of 5]

REZENSIONSAUSZUG
Je weiter das Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs zurückliegt, desto mehr scheint die Komplexität des Kriegsgeschehens aus dem Blick zu geraten. Jedes beteiligte Land pflegt eine eigene Version der Geschichte und rückt die eigene Rolle in den Vordergrund. Norman Davies wehrt sich gegen diese „Verengung des Blickwinkels“, in der sich die Erinnerung zunehmend bruchstückhaft in Fragmente von Einzelepisoden und Perspektiven auflöst. Er will die „unvereinbaren Perspektiven“ auf die Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs auflösen, um sie „miteinander zu versöhnen“.

Bis heute, so Davies, dominieren eine von der Westfront inspirierte „westliche Sichtweise“ und eine von der Ostfront inspirierte „sowjetische Sichtweise“. Auch sei eine „Abneigung westlicher Historiker“ zu beobachten, „dem Ruf der alliierten Koalition zu schaden“. So werde beispielsweise in der britischen Geschichtsschreibung vorzugsweise die Bedeutung des Battle of Britain, der Schlacht von El Alamein und der alliierten Landung in der Normandie betont, während der Fokus der USA vor allem auf dem Durchbruch der alliierten Bodenstreitkräfte in Frankreich, der deutschen Ardennen-Offensive und dem Holocaust liege. Der östliche Kriegsschauplatz, so Davies, werde dabei vernachlässigt.
Tatsächlich ist der von Davies erhobene Vorwurf einer in der westlichen Historiografie herrschenden Dominanz des westeuropäischen Kriegsschauplatzes nicht nur irreführend, sondern schlichtweg unzutreffend. (Vgl. z.B. David M. Glantz: When Titans Clashed. How the Red Army stopped Hitler, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence 1995 oder Richard Overy: Russlands Krieg 1941-1945. Rowohlt Verlag, 2. Aufl. Hamburg 2011,dt. Erstauflage 2003.)

Auch ist weder das von Davies gewählte Thema, noch der gewählte Ansatz neu. Durchaus verdienstvoll erscheint die konsequente und ausführliche Art und Weise der Herangehensweise. Die hier aufgeworfenen Fragen und der kritische Blick des Autors auf unterschiedliche Rezeptionsgeschichten sind dazu geeignet, die aktuelle Debatte zu befruchten. So ist durchaus diskutabel, ob der Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs auf das Jahr 1939 mit dem deutschen Überfall auf Polen und damit dem Kriegsbeginn in Europa, auf 1941 mit dem Kriegseintritt der USA bzw. dem deutschen Angriff auf die Sowjetunion oder gar auf das Jahr 1937 mit dem japanischen Angriff auf China angesetzt werden sollte.

Leider finden sich in dem sehr ambitionierten historischen Rundumblick von Davies (der sich im Übrigen ebenfalls auf den europäischen Kriegsschauplatz konzentriert), die zahlreichen historischen Ungenauigkeiten und Fehler. Weder wurde im Hafen von Mars-el-Kébir die gesamte französische Flotte versenkt, noch lautete der Name des Nürnberger Chefanklägers gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher Lord Geoffrey Lawrence. Tatsächlich vertrat der US-Amerikaner Robert H. Jackson die Anklage. Ähnliche Fehler ziehen sich durch den gesamten Text. Dies ist um so bedauerlicher, als sich durchaus die Gelegenheit ergeben hätte, die bereits im Rahmen der breiten Rezeption der englischen Ausgabe aufgedeckten Fehler in der deutschen Übersetzung zu korrigieren.

Mit Unbehagen nimmt man zudem die Ansicht von Davies zur Kenntnis, der Holocaust sei im Gesamtkontext getöteter Zivilisten im Zweiten Weltkrieg betrachtet, „nicht außergewöhnlich, was das Ausmaß und das Leid betrifft“ (S. 489).

Rezension auf Zett-und-Zett - Zeitgeschichte und Zeitgeschehen
Vollständige Rezension von Stephan Glienke in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft (ZfG), H. 4/2010, S. 377-379.

[Σταύρος Παυλίδης · Rating 5 out of 5]

Εν'τάξει,το βιβλίο είναι πολύ καλό.Εξετάζει διάφορες στιγμές του Β'Π.Π. με μια άλλη,φρέσκια ματιά και αυτό είναι πολύ ενδιαφέρον.Αυτό που με προβλημάτισε είναι η παραδοχή του συγγραφέα πως οι συνάδελφοι του ιστορικοί μας ξεγέλασαν κάπως για το ρόλο της ΕΣΣΔ κατά τη διάρκεια του πολέμου.Κατ'αρχάς τονίζει τον τεράστιο ρόλο που έπαιξε η ΕΣΣΔ για να φτάσουν στη νίκη οι σύμμαχοι.Όμως φέρνει και στο φως τα φρικτά εγκλήματα του σταλινικού καθεστώτος και λέει πως οι σύμμαχοι και οι ιστορικοί που κατέγραψαν τα γεγονότα,απέκρυψαν τα εγκλήματα αυτά μιας και η ΕΣΣΔ ανήκε στο στρατόπεδο τους!Μάλιστα μας λέει πως σε πολλές στιγμές ιστορικές η ΕΣΣΔ ήταν σκοτεινότερη και πιο απάνθρωπη δύναμη απο τους ναζί!Μπορεί να έχει δίκιο,μπορεί και όχι.Εμείς όμως που διαβάζουμε τι έγινε τότε,πως να δώσουμε βάση σε γραφτά που μπορεί να μην είναι αληθινά αλλά επηρρεασμένα απο πολιτικά συμφέροντα;Τώρα που η πολιτική κατάσταση
άλλαξε και ο εχθρός των δυτικών είναι η Ρωσία,πως μπορούμε να ξέρουμε πως και αυτά που μας περιγράφει το παρόν βιβλίο είναι πέρα για πέρα αληθινά;

[Alexandros Gerakopoulos · Rating 4 out of 5]

Πολύ καλό και αναλυτικό έργο σχετικά με τα γεγονότα του Β' Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου. Ο Norman Davies κρατά μία όσο το δυνατόν πιο αντικειμενική στάση απέναντι στα γεγονότα, και προσπαθεί να επιστήσει την προσοχή σχετικά με τη διαδεδομένη άποψη περί "καλών" Συμμάχικών δυνάμεων και "κακών" δυνάμεων του Άξονα. Υπάρχουν επιμέρους αναλύσεις γεγονότων και σκοπιμοτήτων, καθώς και αρκετές στατιστικές μελέτες που καταλήγουν σε διάφορα συμπεράσματα. Παρότι στα σημεία όπου αναφέρονται πολλά αριθμητικά δεδομένα ο αναγνώστης ίσως κουραστεί, στο σύνολό του το έργο αυτό αποζημιώνει όποιον επιχειρήσει να το διαβάσει. Πολύ εύστοχη και η παραπομπή σε περαιτέρω βιβλιογραφία, αλλά και οπτικοακουστικό υλικό για όποιον το επιθυμεί.