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On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle
On Tactics is intended to be the remedy to the chaotic and thus far unformed realm of tactical theory and to answer questions like the one above. Part One of the book will establish a tactical system meant to replace the Principles of War checklist. First, the contextual role of tactics with regards to strategy and war will be established. This will necessarily lean on major strategic theories in order to illuminate the role of tactics. This section will be formed around the Physical, Mental, and Moral planes of battlefield interaction used by theorists such as J.F.C Fuller and John Boyd. Each plane will then be examined in turn, and many of the classic Principles of War will be discussed along with some new ones. It will present some standard methods that tacticians can use to gain an advantage on the battlefield using historical examples that illustrate each concept. These “tactical tenants” include maneuver, mass, firepower, tempo, surprise, deception, confusion, shock, and the role of the moral aspects of combat. Finally, Part One will circle back around by discussing the role of tactical victory- once achieved- in contributed to a strategy. Part One is short by design. It is intended to be both compelling and easily mastered for junior non-commissioned officers and company grade officers, while still rich enough to be interesting to both specialist and non-specialist academics. It is a book meant not just for bookshelves but also for ruck sacks and cargo pockets.
Part Two will build on Part One by exploring concepts with which the tactician must be familiar with such as the culminating point of victory, mission tactics and decentralized command and control, offensive and defensive operations, and the initiative. Part Three will conclude the book examining implications of the presented tactical systems to a variety of other issues in strategic studies.
256 pages, Kindle Edition
First published May 15, 2017
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Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews
June 4, 2020
This book is bad. It is filled with inaccurate information, and to be candid, bad ideas.
-The author disregards, and then dismisses the operational level of war. He talks of the operational art, but insists there is nothing between the tactical and the strategic levels. While true 2500 years ago, this is not true today. It's intellectually lazy at best, dishonest at worst.
-The author misrepresents doctrine in multiple parts of the book. At one point the author suggests that the joint principles are of little use to the tactician. I don't buy that statement.
-Reading this book, it is clear that the author does not understand the historic or current concepts of the Center of Gravity. Linking to his dismissal of an operational level of war, he does not mention mention or discuss operational COGs, but insists on tactical COGs. It becomes clear in his writing that he had never seen plans where the strategic or operational COGs shift dependent upon what phase one side is in, something that is common in most plans. Moreover, the author misrepresents doctrine by asserting that our doctrine insists that the COG is "the enemy's fighting force." While this is used as an example, doctrine does not specify what the COG is, planners do so in the operational design phase of planning.
The author asserts CALL was created in response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. CALL stood up in 1985.
-The author disregards, and then dismisses the operational level of war. He talks of the operational art, but insists there is nothing between the tactical and the strategic levels. While true 2500 years ago, this is not true today. It's intellectually lazy at best, dishonest at worst.
-The author misrepresents doctrine in multiple parts of the book. At one point the author suggests that the joint principles are of little use to the tactician. I don't buy that statement.
-Reading this book, it is clear that the author does not understand the historic or current concepts of the Center of Gravity. Linking to his dismissal of an operational level of war, he does not mention mention or discuss operational COGs, but insists on tactical COGs. It becomes clear in his writing that he had never seen plans where the strategic or operational COGs shift dependent upon what phase one side is in, something that is common in most plans. Moreover, the author misrepresents doctrine by asserting that our doctrine insists that the COG is "the enemy's fighting force." While this is used as an example, doctrine does not specify what the COG is, planners do so in the operational design phase of planning.
The author asserts CALL was created in response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. CALL stood up in 1985.
September 28, 2018
Friedman, a former artillery captain in the US Marine Corps, notes that there are many books about strategy, but few about tactics, yet it is tactics that convert strategy into reality. Even where tactics have been examined, they have been characterised by a range of principles that have varied wildly over time and between authors. In an attempt to resolve this gap in the literature, and in an attempt to provide something of use to junior officers and senior NCOs, Friedman has produced his own list of nine 'tenets'.
In many ways, this works well, with Friedman offering a short chapter on each 'tenet'. He suggests that the list was generated purely by taking all the various lists and identifying the common themes. Were that the case, this would actually not amount to a 'theory of victory in battle', as there would be no theory behind the selection of tenets, just statistics. In reality, however, it is clear that Friedman does have a theory, drawn from J.F.C. Fuller's division of physical, mental and moral. This makes a great deal of sense, but Friedman's explanations become increasingly vague as he goes further down this list, leaving the reader with only limited practical guidance.
Friedman then hedges his bets by providing a supplementary list of four 'concepts'. Although he argues these are different from his tenets, they can feel a little as though he is seeking to extend his list to thirteen. The book concludes with a series of appendices, which venture into wider territory, including an extended polemic against the current 'faulty' understanding of the concept of the 'centre of gravity' by the US Army.
In general, the book is well written, concise and clear. There are, perhaps, rather too many historical examples, which break up the theoretical sections of the text. For the non-US reader, too many of these are drawn from the American Civil War or other conflicts that have involved American forces but few others. In addition, a large proportion of the examples drawn from situations with which this reviewer is familiar contained errors.
Nonetheless, an interesting read, and hopefully of some value in provoking thought about the nature of tactics. Well worth reading, despite its weaknesses.
In many ways, this works well, with Friedman offering a short chapter on each 'tenet'. He suggests that the list was generated purely by taking all the various lists and identifying the common themes. Were that the case, this would actually not amount to a 'theory of victory in battle', as there would be no theory behind the selection of tenets, just statistics. In reality, however, it is clear that Friedman does have a theory, drawn from J.F.C. Fuller's division of physical, mental and moral. This makes a great deal of sense, but Friedman's explanations become increasingly vague as he goes further down this list, leaving the reader with only limited practical guidance.
Friedman then hedges his bets by providing a supplementary list of four 'concepts'. Although he argues these are different from his tenets, they can feel a little as though he is seeking to extend his list to thirteen. The book concludes with a series of appendices, which venture into wider territory, including an extended polemic against the current 'faulty' understanding of the concept of the 'centre of gravity' by the US Army.
In general, the book is well written, concise and clear. There are, perhaps, rather too many historical examples, which break up the theoretical sections of the text. For the non-US reader, too many of these are drawn from the American Civil War or other conflicts that have involved American forces but few others. In addition, a large proportion of the examples drawn from situations with which this reviewer is familiar contained errors.
Nonetheless, an interesting read, and hopefully of some value in provoking thought about the nature of tactics. Well worth reading, despite its weaknesses.
June 18, 2020
In a recent book review, I noted that too many who write and talk about international politics don't really understand how military's operate and how they translate action into effect. But it is also *hard* to learn about that.
Much of how armed forces operate is either tacit knowledge - only making sense for those involved or classified given its value. Simply reading military history as found in your local bookstore will only help indirectly, and may easily confuse given the beloved heroic soldier tales. While there is a burgeoning literature on strategy, books on the concepts behind tactics are rare. Enter B.A Friedman's outstanding book 'On Tactics'
This is a clearly written and engaging introduction to creating tactical effect. Friedman examines 9 tenets, which must be understood and applied - often in combination and always in context - such as Mass, Firepower, Deception, Surprise, Moral Cohesion and Tempo.
The second half of the book is a series of essays on related issues, from the distinction between offence and defence, notions of the centre of gravity and comparing conventional and guerrilla conflict. Throughout the language is straight forward and sharp. It wasn't entirely clear why nearly half the written words of this book are put into various appendixes, but this is a minor quibble.
I first purchased the book because of one of Friedman's tenets - Tempo. While the US military and many writing about new technology in war, are besotted by the idea of Speed, Friedman rightly argues that tempo is far more important - the ability to modulate pace relative to context, rather than just mashing the accelerator.
This is a book I've long wanted to read to help those of us outside the military start to understand how conflict actually occurs. It's far from the last word, but it's the type and style of writing about the modern military we as a society need and contains more good sense than you'll find in 90% of what sits under the 'Military' shelf at your local bookstore.
Much of how armed forces operate is either tacit knowledge - only making sense for those involved or classified given its value. Simply reading military history as found in your local bookstore will only help indirectly, and may easily confuse given the beloved heroic soldier tales. While there is a burgeoning literature on strategy, books on the concepts behind tactics are rare. Enter B.A Friedman's outstanding book 'On Tactics'
This is a clearly written and engaging introduction to creating tactical effect. Friedman examines 9 tenets, which must be understood and applied - often in combination and always in context - such as Mass, Firepower, Deception, Surprise, Moral Cohesion and Tempo.
The second half of the book is a series of essays on related issues, from the distinction between offence and defence, notions of the centre of gravity and comparing conventional and guerrilla conflict. Throughout the language is straight forward and sharp. It wasn't entirely clear why nearly half the written words of this book are put into various appendixes, but this is a minor quibble.
I first purchased the book because of one of Friedman's tenets - Tempo. While the US military and many writing about new technology in war, are besotted by the idea of Speed, Friedman rightly argues that tempo is far more important - the ability to modulate pace relative to context, rather than just mashing the accelerator.
This is a book I've long wanted to read to help those of us outside the military start to understand how conflict actually occurs. It's far from the last word, but it's the type and style of writing about the modern military we as a society need and contains more good sense than you'll find in 90% of what sits under the 'Military' shelf at your local bookstore.
July 29, 2026
4.5 SG
March 25, 2022
B. A. Friedman's On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle attempts to create a framework for the employment of tactics in combat. He starts with a several lists of principles and distills them down to nine common tenets, which he discusses at some length. The author provides plenty of historical references to support his ideas. He then shifts focus to tactical concepts, to include command and control, linking tactics with strategy and a number of other important ideas. He includes a decent appendix, which comprises roughly a quarter of the book. The appendix addresses critical aspects that are so important that I suggest they should be part of the main body.
This is a thought provoking, engaging and well-written book. The author carefully explains how he picked the nine principles that he covers and offers a solid conclusion along with recommendations. He recognizes that his views may not be correct, but he offers a starting point for additional thought and discussion.
I recommend this book for U.S. soldiers and Marines from corporal up. Additionally, civilian leaders and policy makers who have any involvement with national strategy will benefit from On Tactics.
This is a thought provoking, engaging and well-written book. The author carefully explains how he picked the nine principles that he covers and offers a solid conclusion along with recommendations. He recognizes that his views may not be correct, but he offers a starting point for additional thought and discussion.
I recommend this book for U.S. soldiers and Marines from corporal up. Additionally, civilian leaders and policy makers who have any involvement with national strategy will benefit from On Tactics.
March 18, 2018
An attempt at a descriptive theory of tactics, Friedman writes a clear set of principles to guide tactical actions. Extremely well researched and an easy read, it flows like a think-tank paper. The jewel here is the tactical approach. Most published principles are warfare generic and not specific to the tactical environment. This book provides the tactician with tenants to evaluate and compare past activities. The ease and clarity provided allow for deeper examination of battles and engagements.
Someone once said, "All theories are wrong; some are useful." Friedman certainly gives us something useful.
Someone once said, "All theories are wrong; some are useful." Friedman certainly gives us something useful.
November 9, 2023
I read this book as a former U.S. Marine Sergeant, no longer active but nonetheless interested in tactics, strategy and the bridge between the two.
My overall assessment would be that this is a good read for small unit leaders interested in learning more about how the machine functions and why they do what they do.
In my opinion the comparison of Center of Gravity to astrophysics was apt, however, a little drawn out and over complicated for the audience that I believe this book best suits.
Overall, good read.
My overall assessment would be that this is a good read for small unit leaders interested in learning more about how the machine functions and why they do what they do.
In my opinion the comparison of Center of Gravity to astrophysics was apt, however, a little drawn out and over complicated for the audience that I believe this book best suits.
Overall, good read.
June 24, 2024
Skulle lest denne for lenge siden, men samtidig glad å være i stand å se _noen_ sammenhenger.
Forblir ydmyk over at det er mye jeg ikke vet
Forblir ydmyk over at det er mye jeg ikke vet
May 20, 2025
War is considered by many a very dry subject and there are few who would treat it as just another domain of knowledge. People usually dislike reading about war because they dislike the violence accompanying it, but of course this is not very reasonable since for example, I hate reptiles a lot -- I legitimately think God made reptiles either by mistake or simply to spite me -- but I would love to learn more about reptiles, because it's just science. Same goes for war of course.
I have for some time come to the conclusion that politicians should absolutely know about war. If they actually know about it, they would of course see the whole thing in more reasonable terms, and this should lead to less ill-advised rhetoric (unless human nature...) and more reasonable decision making in general. However, the reality is that politicians often lack proper historical knowledge, which means they haven't even given themselves the chance to absorb some knowledge about this subject through pure osmosis either. Then there is the whole democracy deal, which is supposed to make us all politicians by proxy, so a logical extension of this first idea means that people in general should have some knowledge of war too, simply to be able to make reasonable decisions about a subject which affects the life of citizens more than most events when it happens.
Of course this advocacy is only part of the equation, because admittedly this book is about a very specific thing in war: tactics. The other part is simple curiosity. It is nice to know things, both for the ego, and one hopes, for the world.
I have for some time come to the conclusion that politicians should absolutely know about war. If they actually know about it, they would of course see the whole thing in more reasonable terms, and this should lead to less ill-advised rhetoric (unless human nature...) and more reasonable decision making in general. However, the reality is that politicians often lack proper historical knowledge, which means they haven't even given themselves the chance to absorb some knowledge about this subject through pure osmosis either. Then there is the whole democracy deal, which is supposed to make us all politicians by proxy, so a logical extension of this first idea means that people in general should have some knowledge of war too, simply to be able to make reasonable decisions about a subject which affects the life of citizens more than most events when it happens.
Of course this advocacy is only part of the equation, because admittedly this book is about a very specific thing in war: tactics. The other part is simple curiosity. It is nice to know things, both for the ego, and one hopes, for the world.
April 10, 2025
Some reviewers have raised insightful criticisms of this book. Having read the book and their criticisms, I think there is more good than bad in this book, and therefore it is worth reading. I also agree with the author's choice to separate tenets and concepts; maneuver and tempo are certainly categorically distinct from command & control and geography. The number of US civil war examples and the presumed familiarity with them was irritating, but there were many examples from diverse periods of history; the examples did a good job of substantiating the theory. A review from War on the Rocks, posted on the back of the book, sums it up well: "useful and accessible to the military novice and non-expert."
April 25, 2022
Quick and interesting read. There could have been a bit more substance and some of the material in the Appendix coud/should have been in the main body of the text. Regarding the mental aspects of tactics, I felt that deception and surprise could be merged, as could confusion and shock.
The book would have benefited from a further round of revisisions. For example, Thucydides most certainly did not lead the Athenians to victory over Sparta at Sphacteria. He just wrote about it. While such errors can be irritating, I don't think they damage the core message of the book and I will be reading the author's next one, On Operations.
The book would have benefited from a further round of revisisions. For example, Thucydides most certainly did not lead the Athenians to victory over Sparta at Sphacteria. He just wrote about it. While such errors can be irritating, I don't think they damage the core message of the book and I will be reading the author's next one, On Operations.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
November 14, 2026
I found the material and presentation of the book to be useful, although I'll reduce overall marks for editing and format. There were repetitions that were unnecessary, the structure of the book didn't require six appendices, the work could use a revision to both update the conditions of applying the last decade of material and the current paradigm's complexity as much as tailoring a more poetic version to ease the stilted prose structure and redundant nature of both explanations and case studies. Overall, I enjoyed this book, although probably not as much as his other work, "On Operations," but I would recommend both for reading.
February 18, 2023
Although my role in the military is to master the art of supporting the logistics requirements of operational units, I got a lot from a better understanding of tactics.
Throughout this book, it struck me how intertwined logistics support is in all of this. Many of Friedman's tenets of tactics relate directly (mass, maneuver, tempo) and the rest indirectly (deception, surprise, and confusion).
I also appreciated his appendix on centers of gravity. This abstract term is crucial to carrying out an effective strategy and yet often misunderstood or poorly communicated across the force.
Throughout this book, it struck me how intertwined logistics support is in all of this. Many of Friedman's tenets of tactics relate directly (mass, maneuver, tempo) and the rest indirectly (deception, surprise, and confusion).
I also appreciated his appendix on centers of gravity. This abstract term is crucial to carrying out an effective strategy and yet often misunderstood or poorly communicated across the force.
May 28, 2025
For me, a fan and avid reader of military history, this was an interesting read. I don't claim to have understood a great deal of the theory behind the author's as I found it hard to understand that tactics have really never been distilled and codified into a series of "rules". I can see the difficulty in doing so when tactics are the "sharp end" of the spear where situations are fluid and always changing.
May 6, 2018
A great primer for the young officer, NCO, aspiring junior enlisted, and civilians. Presents a working and easy to understand theory of elements which can yield tactical successes and how they fit into the operational and strategic narrative of war. A perfect companion piece for Clausewitz's timeless On War.
January 11, 2020
As others have said, a good read for leaders at the tactical level. His discussion on strategy and tactics gives a good intro for moving into deeper discussions on the topic. I appreciated the use of recognizable historical examples to illustrate his concepts of discussion. Given its length, a definite reading list book for junior leaders.
July 14, 2026
Anyone who criticizes consultants and finance bros for making a living spouting nonsensical phrases (ritual chants) in service of arcane constructs almost entirely removed from material reality clearly hasn't met the sort of people producing these works
January 29, 2018
Foundational. The best taxonomy of tactics ever presented. I wish it had a more developed theory of battle dynamics a la Du Picq but this book did not need one to succeed.
August 1, 2021
Not bad
July 7, 2022
A good effort by a young officer. Incomplete in thoughts and concepts, I look forward to reading a revised second edition.
July 20, 2018
This book is bad. It is filled with inaccurate information, and to be candid, bad ideas.
-The author disregards, and then dismisses the operational level of war. He talks of the operational art, but insists there is nothing between the tactical and the strategic levels. While true 2500 years ago, this is not true today.
-The author misrepresents doctrine in multiple parts of the book. At one point the author suggests that the joint principles are of little use to the tactician. I don't buy that statement.
-Reading this book, it is clear that the author does not understand the historic or current concepts of the Center of Gravity. Linking to his dismissal of an operational level of war, he does not mention mention or discuss operational COGs, but insists on tactical COGs. It becomes clear in his writing that he had never seen plans where the strategic or operational COGs shift dependent upon what phase one side is in, something that is common in most plans. Moreover, the author misrepresents doctrine by asserting that our doctrine insists that the COG is "the enemy's fighting force." While this is used as an example, doctrine does not specify what the COG is, planners do so in the operational design phase of planning.
The author asserts CALL was created in response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. CALL stood up in 1985.
-The author disregards, and then dismisses the operational level of war. He talks of the operational art, but insists there is nothing between the tactical and the strategic levels. While true 2500 years ago, this is not true today.
-The author misrepresents doctrine in multiple parts of the book. At one point the author suggests that the joint principles are of little use to the tactician. I don't buy that statement.
-Reading this book, it is clear that the author does not understand the historic or current concepts of the Center of Gravity. Linking to his dismissal of an operational level of war, he does not mention mention or discuss operational COGs, but insists on tactical COGs. It becomes clear in his writing that he had never seen plans where the strategic or operational COGs shift dependent upon what phase one side is in, something that is common in most plans. Moreover, the author misrepresents doctrine by asserting that our doctrine insists that the COG is "the enemy's fighting force." While this is used as an example, doctrine does not specify what the COG is, planners do so in the operational design phase of planning.
The author asserts CALL was created in response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. CALL stood up in 1985.
July 17, 2018
A book I read slow in an effort to dissect the authors ideas. It was full of great information of use in our efforts to apply tactics as the book gives a great detailed of the history and application of tactics in the way strategy is written about. Tactics is rarely written in a way that that gives us guiding tried and true principles that help us understand WHY we chooses the tactical methods and techniques we do. I very refreshing look into tactics. A-much need book in my view!
January 29, 2018
Foundational. The best taxonomy of tactics ever presented. I wish it had a more developed theory of battle dynamics a la Du Picq but this book did not need one to succeed.
June 13, 2021
Well worth a read. Provides succinct summaries and definitions of what works on the battlefield backed by examples.
Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews