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Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy
Shivshankar Menon gives an insider's account of the negotiations, discussions and assessments that went into the making of five pivotal choices in India's recent history. These include the decision not to use overt military force against Pakistan after 26/11; the civil nuclear deal with the United States; the border agreement with China; the response to the last months of Sri Lanka's brutal civil war; and the thinking that underlay India's No First Use nuclear policy.Drawing on his long and distinguished career as a diplomat holding critical positions in India's external affairs ministry and in the prime minister's office, Menon considers each situation against the backdrop of India's evolving definition of her place in the changing global landscape. He brings out the history, politics and principles involved, while examining and dissecting the reasons for the outcome.Analytical, lucid and illuminating, Choices is an unmatched insight into the intellectual heft of foreign policy decision-making by one of India's most formidable diplomatic practitioners who was actively engaged in these five defining moments.
175 pages, Kindle Edition
First published November 1, 2016
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 93 reviews
February 15, 2025
#Binge Reviewing all my past Reads:
[Read in 2018]
The former NSA and Foreign Secretary of India Shivshankar Menon, offers a fascinating insider’s viewpoint on key foreign policy decisions in this book. The book examines five major strategic choices India has made, including the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal, India's response to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, and the boundary consultations with China. Menon presents these cases with a composed assortment of historical background, diplomatic nuance, and individual understanding. He does not just narrate events but examines the strategic thought processes behind them, providing readers with an uncommon, theatrical and exceptional foretaste into the convolutions and intricacies of Indian diplomacy. His writing is articulate and very very fetching, making complicated geopolitical matters easy to get to, to a wide-ranging audience.While the book offers appreciated insights, it primarily reflects Menon’s perspectives, leaving room for substitute interpretations. Nevertheless, Choices is a must-read for students of international relations, policymakers, and anyone interested in India's evolving role on the global stage.
[Read in 2018]
The former NSA and Foreign Secretary of India Shivshankar Menon, offers a fascinating insider’s viewpoint on key foreign policy decisions in this book. The book examines five major strategic choices India has made, including the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal, India's response to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, and the boundary consultations with China. Menon presents these cases with a composed assortment of historical background, diplomatic nuance, and individual understanding. He does not just narrate events but examines the strategic thought processes behind them, providing readers with an uncommon, theatrical and exceptional foretaste into the convolutions and intricacies of Indian diplomacy. His writing is articulate and very very fetching, making complicated geopolitical matters easy to get to, to a wide-ranging audience.While the book offers appreciated insights, it primarily reflects Menon’s perspectives, leaving room for substitute interpretations. Nevertheless, Choices is a must-read for students of international relations, policymakers, and anyone interested in India's evolving role on the global stage.
August 19, 2018
Choices -‘Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy’ authored by former Foreign Secretary and subsequently NSA Shivshankar Menon is a simple and lucid analysis of the challenges that faced Indian foreign policy, the particular circumstances the decision makers found themselves in, the choices which were subsequently made and the wide-ranging ramifications of these decisions. Particularly, the author with strong theoretical underpinnings, elucidates and analyses five significant foreign policy situations and/or decisions that were taken by India under different political establishments and how they affected a significant shift in our policy orientation while safeguarding and sometimes strengthening the core principles at the same time.
All these situations were encountered during times that were difficult and challenging in various ways. They often involved complex intricacies of international diplomacy intertwined with an interplay of domestic political compulsions. Along with dissecting these particular situations, the thrust is on emphasising the strategic goals while minimising the tactical advantages that India could have gained through the exercising of alternative choices. Without doubt, the most difficult situation out of these was the decision to refrain from exercising overt force against Pakistan for 26/11 attacks. As he argues succinctly, India kept its strategic and long term goals in mind as a declaration of war would have played into the hands of our neighbour and internationalised the conflict. However, he emphasises that in a future situation of external aggression, the response may be different.
The best thing about this book is that along with the ‘what’ and ‘when’ of these circumstances, the ‘why’ and more importantly, the ‘how’ has been delved into in detail and with clarity. The web of diplomatic negotiations has been illuminated with a clear understanding, particularly in the international negotiations that followed the Indo-US Nuclear Deal in 2005 and culminated with the waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008. Further, the role of domestic political compulsions determining our foreign policy choices has been examined, for example how the foreign policy has become politicised since the Nuclear Deal. Further, he reiterates constantly throughout the book that foreign policy decision making is not a black and white conception of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ but a huge gray area where we often have to make mini-max decisions that minimise the damage and maximise the benefit to our interests. ‘There are seldom clearly right or wrong answers or evident successes at the time the decisions are made and implemented.’
In a passing reference, the author has pointed out the capacity concerns facing India’s diplomatic cadre and cited examples to show when facing NSG waiver, ‘it took a colossal and considerable disruption of our normal work for us..’ Thus there is a need to strengthen our ‘diplomatic machine’ to focus on more such issues at the same time. In my knowledge, steps have been taken to correct this problem and in the near future, we will be able to improve upon the current situation through better cadre management and improved training practices.
This book, as it could be predicted given the high credentials of the former foreign policy practitioner, is not a gung-ho nationalist account of India’s foreign policy choices. It is nonetheless a patriotic account of these situations and choices with the overarching goal of strengthening India’s position in the global order through the almost unique Indian foreign policy style of ‘boldness in conception and cautious in implementation’ and the same time fiercely safeguarding our strategic autonomy. To be neither a ‘responsible power’ nor a US-style superpower but to be, as Indira Gandhi said, a ‘different power’, his dictum to the foreign policy establishment is the reiteration of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘’twenty-four character strategy : “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; to be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”
All these situations were encountered during times that were difficult and challenging in various ways. They often involved complex intricacies of international diplomacy intertwined with an interplay of domestic political compulsions. Along with dissecting these particular situations, the thrust is on emphasising the strategic goals while minimising the tactical advantages that India could have gained through the exercising of alternative choices. Without doubt, the most difficult situation out of these was the decision to refrain from exercising overt force against Pakistan for 26/11 attacks. As he argues succinctly, India kept its strategic and long term goals in mind as a declaration of war would have played into the hands of our neighbour and internationalised the conflict. However, he emphasises that in a future situation of external aggression, the response may be different.
The best thing about this book is that along with the ‘what’ and ‘when’ of these circumstances, the ‘why’ and more importantly, the ‘how’ has been delved into in detail and with clarity. The web of diplomatic negotiations has been illuminated with a clear understanding, particularly in the international negotiations that followed the Indo-US Nuclear Deal in 2005 and culminated with the waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008. Further, the role of domestic political compulsions determining our foreign policy choices has been examined, for example how the foreign policy has become politicised since the Nuclear Deal. Further, he reiterates constantly throughout the book that foreign policy decision making is not a black and white conception of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ but a huge gray area where we often have to make mini-max decisions that minimise the damage and maximise the benefit to our interests. ‘There are seldom clearly right or wrong answers or evident successes at the time the decisions are made and implemented.’
In a passing reference, the author has pointed out the capacity concerns facing India’s diplomatic cadre and cited examples to show when facing NSG waiver, ‘it took a colossal and considerable disruption of our normal work for us..’ Thus there is a need to strengthen our ‘diplomatic machine’ to focus on more such issues at the same time. In my knowledge, steps have been taken to correct this problem and in the near future, we will be able to improve upon the current situation through better cadre management and improved training practices.
This book, as it could be predicted given the high credentials of the former foreign policy practitioner, is not a gung-ho nationalist account of India’s foreign policy choices. It is nonetheless a patriotic account of these situations and choices with the overarching goal of strengthening India’s position in the global order through the almost unique Indian foreign policy style of ‘boldness in conception and cautious in implementation’ and the same time fiercely safeguarding our strategic autonomy. To be neither a ‘responsible power’ nor a US-style superpower but to be, as Indira Gandhi said, a ‘different power’, his dictum to the foreign policy establishment is the reiteration of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘’twenty-four character strategy : “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; to be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”
March 9, 2022
It is an excellent analysis of 5 momentous foreign policy choices of India. Written by the former Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, one can understand the circumstances and reasons behind India's important decisions straight from the horse's mouth. It is definitely a must-read for anyone interested in contemporary Indian foreign policy.
January 2, 2017
Choices is a compact and a fast paced book riding on the back of the knowledge and experience of the author in the External Affairs Ministry. It is not a Natwar Singh memoir but more of Shashi Tharoor memoirs plus story. There is more story rather than behind the scenes discussions which was expected of the author. However the story build up in the five instances mentioned is good.
Book starts the tale with five instances wherein the Indian Diplomacy has been questions and the author discusses the after effects of those choices and what these choices mean today. These choices related with four of our biggest stakeholders - China, Pakistan, USA and Sri Lanka and the forth is of our nuclear Doctrine. The story part behind the CHina Boundary agreement, Srilakan Civil War and the 123 Agreement are also public knowledge. IN between analysis is good including when he tells of recent Chinese agressions and what they mean from a Diplomats perspective.
However the Civil Nuclear Agreement and the Sri Lankan story look more of history textbook read out. Credit for the Manmohan Singh for 123 Agreement is duly acknowledged but it would have been great if some behind the scene discussions which the author might have been party could have been added- explaining character and characteristics of the people involved. The Mumbai Incident chapter was a fad. I bet they might have done a game theory decision tree analysis which could have been added. The chapter just says it was great as diplomats to not attack Pakistan. World was sympathetic with us and we were able to invite investments against which the attack was targeted.
Needless to say India is still reeling under our behaviour at that time. But being a diplomat I give him due credit for being the best judge that us public. I can only question him .
I would probably read this book for the China chapter and the nuclear doctrine. The scope ont he foreign policy front was immense but the book does not meets the mark .
Book starts the tale with five instances wherein the Indian Diplomacy has been questions and the author discusses the after effects of those choices and what these choices mean today. These choices related with four of our biggest stakeholders - China, Pakistan, USA and Sri Lanka and the forth is of our nuclear Doctrine. The story part behind the CHina Boundary agreement, Srilakan Civil War and the 123 Agreement are also public knowledge. IN between analysis is good including when he tells of recent Chinese agressions and what they mean from a Diplomats perspective.
However the Civil Nuclear Agreement and the Sri Lankan story look more of history textbook read out. Credit for the Manmohan Singh for 123 Agreement is duly acknowledged but it would have been great if some behind the scene discussions which the author might have been party could have been added- explaining character and characteristics of the people involved. The Mumbai Incident chapter was a fad. I bet they might have done a game theory decision tree analysis which could have been added. The chapter just says it was great as diplomats to not attack Pakistan. World was sympathetic with us and we were able to invite investments against which the attack was targeted.
Needless to say India is still reeling under our behaviour at that time. But being a diplomat I give him due credit for being the best judge that us public. I can only question him .
I would probably read this book for the China chapter and the nuclear doctrine. The scope ont he foreign policy front was immense but the book does not meets the mark .
February 10, 2021
Shivshankar Menon, retired IFS officer and NSA, wrote this book to describe the constrained environment in which Indian diplomats have to make choice of the course of action. He picks up five most important such cases :
1. Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA), 1993 with China at a time when 1962 war wounds were still not healed, India was opening up and Kashmir militancy was peaking. He reasons that it was transformative, but also disincentivized the solution to boundary problem
2. Civil Nuclear Initiative, 2008 with USA less than 10 years after 1998 Op Shakti and resulting US sanctions. He mentions how foreign policy got politicized for the first time, but improved Indo-US relations, which led to Chinese aggression
3. Aftermath of 26/11 attacks with Pakistan. He believes that it was an intentional provocation by Pak Army to derail the Singh-Zardari peace process. He also lists how the restraint benefitted India to focus on 2008 GFC, but that this option will not be available in future. This became true in Uri and Balakot Surgical strikes, where such overt attacks on Pak were not protested by international community
4. LTTE case with Srilanka. He gives details of why and how Indian stance shifted from support to oppose to side-lined view over 26 years. He expresses surprise, as this is the only case in world where extra violence resuced intensity and number of probable death losses
5. India NFU Policy and its actions as a "responsible nuclear power". He lays out the calculus of nuclear neighbourhood of India - NWS China supporting NNWS Pakistan. He also explains why Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) had to be mixed with massive retaliation on first strike, and not proportionate retaliation. Finally, the seeming ambivalence of India as a de facto NWS & its disarmament stance.
From his experience, he lays out a chart of India's "cultural strategy" and that it should focus on move from soft power to hard power.
1. Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA), 1993 with China at a time when 1962 war wounds were still not healed, India was opening up and Kashmir militancy was peaking. He reasons that it was transformative, but also disincentivized the solution to boundary problem
2. Civil Nuclear Initiative, 2008 with USA less than 10 years after 1998 Op Shakti and resulting US sanctions. He mentions how foreign policy got politicized for the first time, but improved Indo-US relations, which led to Chinese aggression
3. Aftermath of 26/11 attacks with Pakistan. He believes that it was an intentional provocation by Pak Army to derail the Singh-Zardari peace process. He also lists how the restraint benefitted India to focus on 2008 GFC, but that this option will not be available in future. This became true in Uri and Balakot Surgical strikes, where such overt attacks on Pak were not protested by international community
4. LTTE case with Srilanka. He gives details of why and how Indian stance shifted from support to oppose to side-lined view over 26 years. He expresses surprise, as this is the only case in world where extra violence resuced intensity and number of probable death losses
5. India NFU Policy and its actions as a "responsible nuclear power". He lays out the calculus of nuclear neighbourhood of India - NWS China supporting NNWS Pakistan. He also explains why Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) had to be mixed with massive retaliation on first strike, and not proportionate retaliation. Finally, the seeming ambivalence of India as a de facto NWS & its disarmament stance.
From his experience, he lays out a chart of India's "cultural strategy" and that it should focus on move from soft power to hard power.
February 27, 2021
Suppose you're the Prime Minister of India, or a diplomat. You have to take decisions regarding Indian Foreign Policy. Which factors will you consider?
First, obviously competitive politics. Second, electoral obligations. Third, India's strategic interests. Fourth, interests of allies. And the list goes on.
The point is: to decide foreign policy is a complicated and complex task. The author, a former top diplomat, explains that, albeit differently, in this book.
This six-chaptered book discusses about the critical decisions--Peace with China, 26/11 attacks, The 123 Agreement, The LTTE, and 'No First Use' policy wrt nukes--taken where we have had 'choices'. Thus, the title. The last chapter talks about the futuristic decisions of New Delhi in international matters
Factual and objective, the book is mostly a documentation. If a reader is layperson, this book is a good start. Otherwise, it may be boring for geopolitics buffs.
First, obviously competitive politics. Second, electoral obligations. Third, India's strategic interests. Fourth, interests of allies. And the list goes on.
The point is: to decide foreign policy is a complicated and complex task. The author, a former top diplomat, explains that, albeit differently, in this book.
This six-chaptered book discusses about the critical decisions--Peace with China, 26/11 attacks, The 123 Agreement, The LTTE, and 'No First Use' policy wrt nukes--taken where we have had 'choices'. Thus, the title. The last chapter talks about the futuristic decisions of New Delhi in international matters
Factual and objective, the book is mostly a documentation. If a reader is layperson, this book is a good start. Otherwise, it may be boring for geopolitics buffs.
May 24, 2021
'Choices' is an average book for the readers. The book summarizes some of the most challenging issues faced by India. There is a candid exploration of our relations with China, Pakistan, and Srilanka. Yet, the book somehow revolves around our strategic tie with the USA. The book is really successful in showcasing our dilemma behind nuclear security and the long conflicts that can't be solved. The book doesn't do justice to the non-state actors and the deep state within Pakistan while exploring the 26/11 scenario in diplomacy. Yet, this book clearly shows diplomacy of the nations is purely based on self-interest and there are rarely clear solutions between right and wrong.
July 3, 2022
Just finished reading Choices: Inside the making of India’s Foreign Policy by Shivshankar Menon
Shivshankar Menon served as national security adviser to the Prime Minister of India between 2010 and 2014. He was also a former member of India’s Atomic Energy Commission. As a career diplomat, he served as India’s envoy to China, Sri Lanka, Israel, and Pakistan.
In this book, he critically analyzed five crucial episodes in India’s foreign policy that were essentially challenging amidst the changing global environment after the break up of the USSR. The five instances explained were:
1. The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China (1993)
2. Indo-US Nuclear Deal (2008)
3. The Mumbai Attack (2008)
4. Elimination of LTTE (2009)
5. No First Use Policy (1998)
My favorite chapter from the book was the narration of India’s policy towards the Sri Lankan Civil War, explained through a lucid historical account. As an ambassador himself to Sri Lanka, Shivshankar Menon argued that the choice made by Rajiv Gandhi to send the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka was a strategic faux pas. The peace settlement mediated by Norway and the entire chain of events leading to the civil war and India’s choices in balancing its strategic interests with the internal crisis was well discussed in this book.
India’s civil nuclear initiative with the United States was a watershed moment in the Indo-US relationship. In the chapter titled “Natural Partners,” Shivshankar Menon made a coherent analysis of the positives and negatives of the deal signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with George Bush in middle of domestic political resistance from the Left. To get rid of the prevailing Western sanctions, to ensure nuclear imports bypassing the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s (NSG) restrictions, and to overcome the shortage of domestic Uranium, Singh’s bold initiative despite risking the fall of his government at the center will always remain as one of the remarkable choices made by India.
Can ‘No First Use Policy’ be an effective deterrence policy for India? Shivshankar Menon argues that as a developing country ‘no first use policy’ can be the best strategy to focus on domestic development rather than aiming to win the nuclear arms race in short term at a tremendous economic cost. But he also seems suggestive of the fact that, with changing times, India should consider an effective triad system (land, water, and air) to safeguard its missiles for retaliation after the first strike.
Overall, it is a fascinating account of five cases from an insider who had maintained extreme modesty and objectivity throughout his writing without chest-thumping or exaggerating the realism followed in policy making.
Shivshankar Menon served as national security adviser to the Prime Minister of India between 2010 and 2014. He was also a former member of India’s Atomic Energy Commission. As a career diplomat, he served as India’s envoy to China, Sri Lanka, Israel, and Pakistan.
In this book, he critically analyzed five crucial episodes in India’s foreign policy that were essentially challenging amidst the changing global environment after the break up of the USSR. The five instances explained were:
1. The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China (1993)
2. Indo-US Nuclear Deal (2008)
3. The Mumbai Attack (2008)
4. Elimination of LTTE (2009)
5. No First Use Policy (1998)
My favorite chapter from the book was the narration of India’s policy towards the Sri Lankan Civil War, explained through a lucid historical account. As an ambassador himself to Sri Lanka, Shivshankar Menon argued that the choice made by Rajiv Gandhi to send the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka was a strategic faux pas. The peace settlement mediated by Norway and the entire chain of events leading to the civil war and India’s choices in balancing its strategic interests with the internal crisis was well discussed in this book.
India’s civil nuclear initiative with the United States was a watershed moment in the Indo-US relationship. In the chapter titled “Natural Partners,” Shivshankar Menon made a coherent analysis of the positives and negatives of the deal signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with George Bush in middle of domestic political resistance from the Left. To get rid of the prevailing Western sanctions, to ensure nuclear imports bypassing the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s (NSG) restrictions, and to overcome the shortage of domestic Uranium, Singh’s bold initiative despite risking the fall of his government at the center will always remain as one of the remarkable choices made by India.
Can ‘No First Use Policy’ be an effective deterrence policy for India? Shivshankar Menon argues that as a developing country ‘no first use policy’ can be the best strategy to focus on domestic development rather than aiming to win the nuclear arms race in short term at a tremendous economic cost. But he also seems suggestive of the fact that, with changing times, India should consider an effective triad system (land, water, and air) to safeguard its missiles for retaliation after the first strike.
Overall, it is a fascinating account of five cases from an insider who had maintained extreme modesty and objectivity throughout his writing without chest-thumping or exaggerating the realism followed in policy making.
December 24, 2017
I had many reasons to pick this title by former Indian foreign secretary Mr.Shivshankar Menon. And I am glad that it fulfilled almost all of them.
There seems to be a deliberate attempt to keep the book focused and easy-to-read so that an average reader like myself with limited foreign policy 'vocabulary' can understand the process and the logic behind five important 'choices', the author was involved in. The five ''choices'' discussed are, the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China, the Civil Nuclear Agreement with the US, the events that unfolded after Mumbai 26/11, Srilankan Civil War and the elimination of LTTE and finally India's No-First-Use Nuclear doctrine.
The author gives you the insight into the elusive world and behind the scenes look at what it takes to formulate a foreign policy. It is after reading this, that I now understand that even the policy making exercise in a democratic country like India happen through consensus building and that it is definitely not a one-man show. Another eye opener was the central role played by the Prime Minister, on defining the broad contours of the country's foreign policy, within which the stakeholders operate. As the author explained India has been fortunate enough, to have Prime Ministers right from Jawarhlala Nehru till Dr. Manmohan Singh, who has deftly responded to demanding circumstances.
The former foreign secretary has defined Indian foreign policy 'Tactically restraint but Strategically bold'. And it does reflect in choices that the country made during Srilankan civil war and Mumbai 26/11 terrorist attack. But I was not totally convinced by the arguments that the author gave regarding the restraint that India showed during this two crisis. Particularly regarding the 26/11 terrorist attack; the author does make a concession that the future governments might not have the option of restraint that was shown by the then administration.The author did not elaborate much on the 1987 Indian involvement in Srilanka that lead to the loss of estimated 1400 Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel.
The much-discussed part of this book that has given more clarity to India's nuclear doctrine forms the penultimate chapter of the book. The author gives a detailed account of the evolution of No-First-Use Policy and why India went nuclear in the first place.
All in all, this is a great book and must read for anyone who would like to get to know why India has made certain 'choices' and how it is trying to adjust to the realities of an emerging multipolar world.
There seems to be a deliberate attempt to keep the book focused and easy-to-read so that an average reader like myself with limited foreign policy 'vocabulary' can understand the process and the logic behind five important 'choices', the author was involved in. The five ''choices'' discussed are, the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China, the Civil Nuclear Agreement with the US, the events that unfolded after Mumbai 26/11, Srilankan Civil War and the elimination of LTTE and finally India's No-First-Use Nuclear doctrine.
The author gives you the insight into the elusive world and behind the scenes look at what it takes to formulate a foreign policy. It is after reading this, that I now understand that even the policy making exercise in a democratic country like India happen through consensus building and that it is definitely not a one-man show. Another eye opener was the central role played by the Prime Minister, on defining the broad contours of the country's foreign policy, within which the stakeholders operate. As the author explained India has been fortunate enough, to have Prime Ministers right from Jawarhlala Nehru till Dr. Manmohan Singh, who has deftly responded to demanding circumstances.
The former foreign secretary has defined Indian foreign policy 'Tactically restraint but Strategically bold'. And it does reflect in choices that the country made during Srilankan civil war and Mumbai 26/11 terrorist attack. But I was not totally convinced by the arguments that the author gave regarding the restraint that India showed during this two crisis. Particularly regarding the 26/11 terrorist attack; the author does make a concession that the future governments might not have the option of restraint that was shown by the then administration.The author did not elaborate much on the 1987 Indian involvement in Srilanka that lead to the loss of estimated 1400 Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel.
The much-discussed part of this book that has given more clarity to India's nuclear doctrine forms the penultimate chapter of the book. The author gives a detailed account of the evolution of No-First-Use Policy and why India went nuclear in the first place.
All in all, this is a great book and must read for anyone who would like to get to know why India has made certain 'choices' and how it is trying to adjust to the realities of an emerging multipolar world.
November 16, 2016
Shivshankar Menon's book is an extremely enlightening (and short) examination of Indian foreign policy and strategic thinking, as told through a handful of recent case studies (the Pakistani attack on Mumbai in 2008, the end of Sri Lankan civil war, the US-India civil nuclear agreement). At times tedious, at times poetic and rather philosophical, Dr. Menon renders his account as a practitioner in the highest capacity of Indian foreign policy in a remarkably humble and insightful tone. A must read for India IR and FP nerds, and for US policymakers trying to make sense of India's unique "strategic culture".
November 7, 2018
A good read. Perhaps the best book on India's foreign policy as far as beginners are concerned. Written in simple and lucid style, the book covers those aspects in the recent past where former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon was directly or indirectly involved. In the book, Menon analyses the "choices" that were available to India at the time and how the present and the future are shaped by the "choices" that were made back then. Overall, a very good book, especially if you are a beginner.
July 5, 2020
The author who has been part of Indian foreign service has, in brief, shared his experience in this book where he emphasizes the importance of choice making and how the choice of national leader can change the course of foreign policy. This book has been divided into 5 chapter where each chapter covers major happening in terms of foreign relations which include Border Agreement with China, Nuclear deal with the USA, Aftermath of the civil war in Sri Lanka, relations with Pakistan after the attack of 26/11 and reasons why India arsenal has nuclear weapons.
In the current time when we are almost at war with China over land disputes, the border agreement of 1993 becomes really important. This agreement was entered on September 7, 1993, and it contains various provisions which should be adhered to by both the sides. In the meantime, conditions of both countries have changed and trade between both the countries have increased to multiple times which requires peace and harmony among the two countries to ensure that business flourishes. With time, policymakers have also realised that the situation on both eastern and western borders are drastically different. In the present time, diplomacy should take the front seat and should ensure that all the agreements relating to border issues adhere too and friendly relation between the countries should be established. The author very beautifully presents that India-China relations exhibit a complex interplay in political, economic, security and other realms.
We recognise it or not but actions of USA administration have been really impactful in the policies which our country has adopted subsequently. One such step has been India-USA nuclear deal which further strengthened the relationship between the two countries. This came in the backdrop of the International peace process which India was trying to establish with its neighbouring countries like Pakistan and China. In these circumstances, the USA was to be a natural ally as it had the capacity to be a spoiler in each of the cases.
After years of sanction by the USA, it was realised by both the countries that time has come when they should align again where our former PM, Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared the USA as a natural ally. This bilateral relation was important in the backdrop of many events happening simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific area. The seed of this nuclear deal was sown by the NDA government which gave the fruits in 2008, there were a lot of complications in this agreement but finally, it was concluded and also, our diplomats played a decisive role in addressing the concerns of stakeholder’s countries and various groups related to Nuclear Energy.
The author has also covered Attack of 26/11 where Pakistan was deeply involved and Sri Lankan civil war where it seems difficult to come to the conclusion that whether we were able to achieve our objective or not.
In his chapter on nuclear weapons author has explained that since the time of cold war, nuclear arsenal has been strengthened by the leading countries to give a message of deterrence to its rivals. Following the same line, India has also experimented the nuclear test and became a nuclear possessing country. After adopting no first use policy, it has been India’s argument that we will not use a nuclear weapon as an aggressor but this will be used only for retaliation. This policy has been criticised by the aggressive people of this nation but purpose with which whole nuclear arsenal was built by India was to send message to its neighbouring country that India does possess nuclear weapons and will use it when required.
This book is a must-read for someone who wants to know the perspective of a man who has been into foreign policymaking for more than four decades.
In the current time when we are almost at war with China over land disputes, the border agreement of 1993 becomes really important. This agreement was entered on September 7, 1993, and it contains various provisions which should be adhered to by both the sides. In the meantime, conditions of both countries have changed and trade between both the countries have increased to multiple times which requires peace and harmony among the two countries to ensure that business flourishes. With time, policymakers have also realised that the situation on both eastern and western borders are drastically different. In the present time, diplomacy should take the front seat and should ensure that all the agreements relating to border issues adhere too and friendly relation between the countries should be established. The author very beautifully presents that India-China relations exhibit a complex interplay in political, economic, security and other realms.
We recognise it or not but actions of USA administration have been really impactful in the policies which our country has adopted subsequently. One such step has been India-USA nuclear deal which further strengthened the relationship between the two countries. This came in the backdrop of the International peace process which India was trying to establish with its neighbouring countries like Pakistan and China. In these circumstances, the USA was to be a natural ally as it had the capacity to be a spoiler in each of the cases.
After years of sanction by the USA, it was realised by both the countries that time has come when they should align again where our former PM, Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared the USA as a natural ally. This bilateral relation was important in the backdrop of many events happening simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific area. The seed of this nuclear deal was sown by the NDA government which gave the fruits in 2008, there were a lot of complications in this agreement but finally, it was concluded and also, our diplomats played a decisive role in addressing the concerns of stakeholder’s countries and various groups related to Nuclear Energy.
The author has also covered Attack of 26/11 where Pakistan was deeply involved and Sri Lankan civil war where it seems difficult to come to the conclusion that whether we were able to achieve our objective or not.
In his chapter on nuclear weapons author has explained that since the time of cold war, nuclear arsenal has been strengthened by the leading countries to give a message of deterrence to its rivals. Following the same line, India has also experimented the nuclear test and became a nuclear possessing country. After adopting no first use policy, it has been India’s argument that we will not use a nuclear weapon as an aggressor but this will be used only for retaliation. This policy has been criticised by the aggressive people of this nation but purpose with which whole nuclear arsenal was built by India was to send message to its neighbouring country that India does possess nuclear weapons and will use it when required.
This book is a must-read for someone who wants to know the perspective of a man who has been into foreign policymaking for more than four decades.
April 10, 2019
Tl.Dr :
An absolute feast for Foreign Policy aficionados to devour. A gripping account of India’s recent foreign policy choices and the rationale for the same.
Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, is an exemplary book written by one of the most revered diplomats, Mr. Shivashankar Menon, who retired as the Foreign Secretary of India. It is an invaluable book that shines light into the esoteric art of Foreign Policy decision making and about the ‘Choices’ made during the pursuit of the Nation’s objectives. It is a riveting read regarding five scenarios in which Mr. Menon was involved, at various levels of engagement and wherein, he could assist the government of the day in making key choices, given the situation and means at hand. Honest and rational in his writing, he lists down the reasons why the said choices were made. The scenarios were the following:
The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement: The negotiation for a boundary settlement with regards to China.
The Civilian Nuclear Deal with USA
India’s restraint after the 24/11 attacks against war with Pakistan.
Sri Lankan Civil War and the tough policy choices that India had to make.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine and the basis behind the same.
In each instance, the author maintains a logical flow starting with a background and the various stakeholders involved, the policy choices that India had, the dilemmas, the final action, the consequences and a final word on how the events would have played out if the said choice was not implemented.
For a foreign policy nerd like myself, the detailed account of how policy decisions are crystallized in the PMO and the South Block, was delightfully enlightening. The points which the author made on the disproportionate influence wielded by the PM and ironically, about the nature of consensus building before formalizing policy (as opposed to a one man show as commonly perceived) was heartening to read. It also shines a beacon on the incredible contributions of our much-maligned past PMs from Mr. Nehru to Mr. Singh who set us on the path to becoming a major power. The author delves into the keystone of Indian Foreign Policy philosophy which is ‘Boldness in policy conception, caution in implementation’ and the riddle that is the Indian Strategic Autonomy.
Lucidly written, thoughtfully conceived, pragmatically portrayed- this book is a brilliant addition to the annals of Indian foreign policy literature.
An absolute feast for Foreign Policy aficionados to devour. A gripping account of India’s recent foreign policy choices and the rationale for the same.
Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, is an exemplary book written by one of the most revered diplomats, Mr. Shivashankar Menon, who retired as the Foreign Secretary of India. It is an invaluable book that shines light into the esoteric art of Foreign Policy decision making and about the ‘Choices’ made during the pursuit of the Nation’s objectives. It is a riveting read regarding five scenarios in which Mr. Menon was involved, at various levels of engagement and wherein, he could assist the government of the day in making key choices, given the situation and means at hand. Honest and rational in his writing, he lists down the reasons why the said choices were made. The scenarios were the following:
The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement: The negotiation for a boundary settlement with regards to China.
The Civilian Nuclear Deal with USA
India’s restraint after the 24/11 attacks against war with Pakistan.
Sri Lankan Civil War and the tough policy choices that India had to make.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine and the basis behind the same.
In each instance, the author maintains a logical flow starting with a background and the various stakeholders involved, the policy choices that India had, the dilemmas, the final action, the consequences and a final word on how the events would have played out if the said choice was not implemented.
For a foreign policy nerd like myself, the detailed account of how policy decisions are crystallized in the PMO and the South Block, was delightfully enlightening. The points which the author made on the disproportionate influence wielded by the PM and ironically, about the nature of consensus building before formalizing policy (as opposed to a one man show as commonly perceived) was heartening to read. It also shines a beacon on the incredible contributions of our much-maligned past PMs from Mr. Nehru to Mr. Singh who set us on the path to becoming a major power. The author delves into the keystone of Indian Foreign Policy philosophy which is ‘Boldness in policy conception, caution in implementation’ and the riddle that is the Indian Strategic Autonomy.
Lucidly written, thoughtfully conceived, pragmatically portrayed- this book is a brilliant addition to the annals of Indian foreign policy literature.
April 26, 2017
As an Indian citizen, often I wonder whether successive Indian Governments from Nehru to Modi have a strategic foreign policy to engage with the world at large, secure our interests from adverse neighbours around and do more. Post independence for many decades India championed Non-Alignment. As (then) a poor country, it would've been logical for it to place itself under the security umbrella of either of the superpower - the Soviet Union and the United States of America, and benefit from the relationship. Instead, by staying mostly equidistant, subscribing to (in my view) an ill-fated socialistic ideology it lost opportunities when our neighbours gained economically and militarily during the period. Being the largest democracy in the world, it will be expected that major foreign policies undertaken by Government of India would be debated extensively in parliament and put before the people and voted on. Instead, foreign policy decisions are taken by the executive covertly and often apologetically.
Let us look at few examples of these, taken post-liberation (1991):
1. For the generation which fought and got freedom from the imperial Britain, China was a friend, a fellow victim, which they truly believed, they even taught their kids the slogan of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers). For them, it was a body blow when China attacked in 1962 and decimated the young republics defences. In India for next 30 years, China was a thorn of concern. India didn't have the military or economic might to revenge the Chinese and claim back every lost inch as Parliament had vowed during the way, nor was it ready to reconcile to reality and patch up for the larger good. Yet in 1993, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao announced the signing of Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement with China, which effectively recognised the prevailing Line of Actual Control (LAC) which in many portions were not even defined and vowing not to use force to settle the boundary.
2.During the Parliament elections of 2009, when Sri Lanka was waging the final phase of a 25-year war with LTTE (Tamil Tigers), it was discussed on stage only in the state of Tamil Nadu, never becoming a national issue. During the war, the 60 million Tamils in India were worried about the safety of 2.2 million Tamils of Sri Lanka, yet Indian Government conspicuously stay away on the issue.
3.This was also the period when the wounds were fresh from the 26/11 Mumbai attack waged by LeT with the backing of Pakistan Army & ISI. The attack damaging the pride and prestige of Indian Armed forces and its political leadership dramatically, yet the opposition got no visible gain at the polling booths. Immediately after the attack, India didn't try to go after the actors of the crime in Pakistan by using its superior military might as many around the world expected it would.
4.India's Nuclear tests in 1974 and in 1998 was a show of strength by respective Governments nationalist agenda, aimed at a domestic audience than for any visible international gains. For twenty-five years after acquiring Nuclear capabilities India remained silent. Yet it never signed to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, opting to retain its rights for further development. Then in 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Initiative. Later in 2007, India agreed to the standards of NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement (which limits conventional weapons exports), and the Australia Group (which regulates trade in dual-use chemicals) and to international nuclear safeguards. It is unclear what it gained for its impeccable record on non-proliferation compared with Pakistan & China.
To understand what went through the minds of policy makers of India while making the above four choices & more, you should read this book "Choices" - Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy by Shivshankar Menon. A veteran diplomat, Shivshankar was India's foreign secretary from 2006 to 2009, served as India's envoy to Israel, Sri Lanka, China & Pakistan and lastly as National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister of India from 2010 to 2014. Though there was nothing unknown told in its pages, the book serves as a guide on why India behaves the way it does on the world stage. The author puts forward the reasoning behind India's actions and inactions.
In the fifth chapter, he goes into detail to explain Why India Pledges No First Use of Nuclear Weapons. He puts a good argument on why this became the official position of India. What could be seen by many to be counter-initiative proved advantageous to India in its efforts to manage the threat from Pakistan - a fellow NWS (Nuclear Weapons State) which operates with different motivations & acts through non-state actors. Pakistan is the only NSW which has put it's nuclear arsenal under the control of its army and is fast turning its nuclear weapons for tactical advantage and military usage, here the author shares his worry of a rogue Pakistan Air Force pilot deciding to take the law into his own hands armed with deployable nuclear weapons. Shivshankar Menon feels the Pakistan Army learned wrong lessons from Kargil war, which was that Pakistan's nuclear shield permits it to undertake terrorist attacks on India without fear of retaliation. He feels this may well have figured in the Pakistan Army's calculations behind the audacious Mumbai attack of November 26, 2008.
The book gives you glimpses of the operational style of individual Prime Ministers of India. For example in 1992 during the negotiations with Chinese on the border agreement, PM Rao had asked the author to keep the opposition leaders constantly informed, that's when Shivshankar Menon was asked by A.B.Vajpayee who was the opposition leader "Do you think this is good for India?"
One clue Shivshankar leaves for the reader to figure out how India will react in future is:
The policy decisions discussed were strategically bold but tactically cautions. There are some who argue that there is a "unique Indian strategic culture of restraint". ..This caution in practice may owe to systemic factors: since foreign policy decision making is so centralised in the prime minister, and the Ministry of External Affairs lacks capability in India, no single actor or hierarchy in India is sufficiently empowered or has the time to ensure that policy is implemented satisfactorily. The corollary to the central role of the prime minister in decision making is the weak institutionalisation of foreign policy implementation in India. India has serious capacity issues in the implementation of foreign policy and lacks the institutional depth to see policy through.
Most of the book has been about the retelling of what happened, but the book has served its purpose in my view with the above paragraph. This and many other insights makes the book a must-read for any student or actor handling India's foreign policies.
Reading the book, you understand why the following quote is very true when it comes to foreign policies:
Men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted all the other alternatives - Abba Eban
Originally posted in my blog at http://venkatarangan.com/blog/2017/04...
Let us look at few examples of these, taken post-liberation (1991):
1. For the generation which fought and got freedom from the imperial Britain, China was a friend, a fellow victim, which they truly believed, they even taught their kids the slogan of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers). For them, it was a body blow when China attacked in 1962 and decimated the young republics defences. In India for next 30 years, China was a thorn of concern. India didn't have the military or economic might to revenge the Chinese and claim back every lost inch as Parliament had vowed during the way, nor was it ready to reconcile to reality and patch up for the larger good. Yet in 1993, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao announced the signing of Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement with China, which effectively recognised the prevailing Line of Actual Control (LAC) which in many portions were not even defined and vowing not to use force to settle the boundary.
2.During the Parliament elections of 2009, when Sri Lanka was waging the final phase of a 25-year war with LTTE (Tamil Tigers), it was discussed on stage only in the state of Tamil Nadu, never becoming a national issue. During the war, the 60 million Tamils in India were worried about the safety of 2.2 million Tamils of Sri Lanka, yet Indian Government conspicuously stay away on the issue.
3.This was also the period when the wounds were fresh from the 26/11 Mumbai attack waged by LeT with the backing of Pakistan Army & ISI. The attack damaging the pride and prestige of Indian Armed forces and its political leadership dramatically, yet the opposition got no visible gain at the polling booths. Immediately after the attack, India didn't try to go after the actors of the crime in Pakistan by using its superior military might as many around the world expected it would.
4.India's Nuclear tests in 1974 and in 1998 was a show of strength by respective Governments nationalist agenda, aimed at a domestic audience than for any visible international gains. For twenty-five years after acquiring Nuclear capabilities India remained silent. Yet it never signed to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, opting to retain its rights for further development. Then in 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Initiative. Later in 2007, India agreed to the standards of NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement (which limits conventional weapons exports), and the Australia Group (which regulates trade in dual-use chemicals) and to international nuclear safeguards. It is unclear what it gained for its impeccable record on non-proliferation compared with Pakistan & China.
To understand what went through the minds of policy makers of India while making the above four choices & more, you should read this book "Choices" - Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy by Shivshankar Menon. A veteran diplomat, Shivshankar was India's foreign secretary from 2006 to 2009, served as India's envoy to Israel, Sri Lanka, China & Pakistan and lastly as National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister of India from 2010 to 2014. Though there was nothing unknown told in its pages, the book serves as a guide on why India behaves the way it does on the world stage. The author puts forward the reasoning behind India's actions and inactions.
In the fifth chapter, he goes into detail to explain Why India Pledges No First Use of Nuclear Weapons. He puts a good argument on why this became the official position of India. What could be seen by many to be counter-initiative proved advantageous to India in its efforts to manage the threat from Pakistan - a fellow NWS (Nuclear Weapons State) which operates with different motivations & acts through non-state actors. Pakistan is the only NSW which has put it's nuclear arsenal under the control of its army and is fast turning its nuclear weapons for tactical advantage and military usage, here the author shares his worry of a rogue Pakistan Air Force pilot deciding to take the law into his own hands armed with deployable nuclear weapons. Shivshankar Menon feels the Pakistan Army learned wrong lessons from Kargil war, which was that Pakistan's nuclear shield permits it to undertake terrorist attacks on India without fear of retaliation. He feels this may well have figured in the Pakistan Army's calculations behind the audacious Mumbai attack of November 26, 2008.
The book gives you glimpses of the operational style of individual Prime Ministers of India. For example in 1992 during the negotiations with Chinese on the border agreement, PM Rao had asked the author to keep the opposition leaders constantly informed, that's when Shivshankar Menon was asked by A.B.Vajpayee who was the opposition leader "Do you think this is good for India?"
One clue Shivshankar leaves for the reader to figure out how India will react in future is:
The policy decisions discussed were strategically bold but tactically cautions. There are some who argue that there is a "unique Indian strategic culture of restraint". ..This caution in practice may owe to systemic factors: since foreign policy decision making is so centralised in the prime minister, and the Ministry of External Affairs lacks capability in India, no single actor or hierarchy in India is sufficiently empowered or has the time to ensure that policy is implemented satisfactorily. The corollary to the central role of the prime minister in decision making is the weak institutionalisation of foreign policy implementation in India. India has serious capacity issues in the implementation of foreign policy and lacks the institutional depth to see policy through.
Most of the book has been about the retelling of what happened, but the book has served its purpose in my view with the above paragraph. This and many other insights makes the book a must-read for any student or actor handling India's foreign policies.
Reading the book, you understand why the following quote is very true when it comes to foreign policies:
Men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted all the other alternatives - Abba Eban
Originally posted in my blog at http://venkatarangan.com/blog/2017/04...
February 25, 2017
True Wonderer
"There is some self-interest behind every friendship. There is no friendship without self-interests. This is a bitter truth." ~Chanakya. This is perhaps more true for Diplomacy than for anything else. One of the best things about this book other than its core theme was it's author, there is no one better to tell you about the Choices India made in her most diplomatically charged phase, than the diplomat who helped her make them.
Mr.Menon had been personally involved in all the 4 issues discussed in this book(China in the 1990s, USA in 2006, Pakistan & 26/11, Sri Lanka & LTTE in 2009) and has many years of experience driving the foreign policy of India.Hence this book was a delight and an immediate priority for me to read, to know from the people directly responsible the What and Whys is really refreshing. Though he has been quite evasive on the "How" part, the intricate details of the negotiations or the MOM that i had hoped this might contain are absent. Nevertheless the book though lacking in detailed blow by blow of the various issues, gives you the reasoning and thought process behind the various actions taken by the Indian government working within the constraints of that time period.
One of the most important things this book made me realize is how underappreciated some of the very critical events are, for example P.V. Narasima Rao (9th Prime Minister of India) & his border peace and tranquility agreement with China. The 1990's was a very critical time for India, our economy was at its lowest point and we were in an unprecedented danger of being bankrupt (Courtesy of the 'License Raj' that had been practiced in the country till than) ,so naturally the immediate priority was the economy and its liberalization, but to achieve this having stability with our immediate neighbors was a necessary prerequisite. More so with China, having been defeated in the 1962 war, India was acutely aware of the scale of disaster that could ensue if the Chinese decided to press their advantage once again. Settling the border issue or in the lack of a favorable settlement, agreeing on a peaceful process for its resolution was paramount. Adding to that China,being the victor, would be very difficult to negotiate with specially resisting any kind of concessions(not every country could be as magnanimous (or foolish) in victory as we were after 1971 during the Shimla agreement), and to top it all off convincing the current political heads of the country to shake hands with a previous foe would have been quite a challenge. Yet,the deal was done. And its importance barely noticed,the mind boggles.
Lao Tzu said "A leader is best when people barely know he exists, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled they will say: we did it ourselves". This quote is quite apt for the "Accidental" Prime Minister Manmohan Singh & his civil nuclear agreement with the USA in 2006. Like every Indian i have my own misgivings about Mr. Singh and his tenure but the 123 agreement is one of the master strokes that has to be attributed to his dogged persistence. Convincing a country like the USA which scuttled a previous agreement for nuclear fuel supply, imposed sanctions on India after the "Pokharan" nuclear test in 1974, to a civil nuclear agreement, making it alter its own laws and giving a 'Clean' exemption from the very restrictions by the NSG that were a direct result of India's nuclear program in the first place would have been a daunting task. But yet again the deal was done,it is quite interesting to know how,and Mr.Menon as our faithful guide do not disappoint. Yet, i felt that he was way too soft on Mr.Singh, which is understandable as he was his National Security Adviser at the time.But still, not taking a strong military action against Pakistan after 26/11, and just posturing on the border and using diplomacy, still, to this day, doesn't sit well with me, maybe because as a citizen having these kinds of opinions is easy as opposed to being the one taking the decisions, but explaining away as to why we didn't use something like Israel's strong covert response to the situation "because we are different" and "that approach would only lead to temporary peace and not solve the main issue" is ludicrous. Mr.Menon himself admits that he suggested a strong and clear response, which he says we are fortunate the PM didn't go for, i mean 'War' was maybe not the ideal answer but we could have taken the scum who planed 26/11 out, morality be damned. But again, a country's foreign political machinery is too complicated a thing to be always in perfect working order. He warns the situation is different now and the restraint of the past is now just that 'Past'.
The Lankan civil war and our involvement in it is once again, i felt, was downplayed quite a bit in the book, India made a number of blunders regarding the LTTE, and i agree with Mr.Menon that perhaps due to our meddling and trying to broker peace we prolonged Sri Lankans suffering. Though, i feel a complete disarmament of the rebels should have been a prerequisite condition before any kind of negotiation. But it is always easy to judge history. The assassination of PM Rajiv Gandhi, is perhaps the result of said blunders and the cause which finally lead to the war's bloody conclusion.
The last 2 chapters of the book are perhaps my favorite, India's nuclear policy and a 'final word' about the intricacies of decision making, diplomacy and negotiation and their broad contemplation on the country's psyche and its unique personality were very well crafted. Here in the last chapters you really get to see the diplomat in Mr.Menon in all his glory. The book overall is well thought and well presented, the author talks about things he knows and has a first had experience in, adding credibility to his statements and thoughts. The fact that these agreements and issues were in a volatile time, as Mr.Menon notes where one could maneuver, concede and negotiate successfully ,as opposed to now where the world order is much more cemented and diplomats don't have the leeway that they previously enjoyed is what makes the book and his own experience so important. I have always had a keen interest in nations and their behaviors towards each other. To any such enthusiast and or history buff this book is a treat, perhaps we would not agree on all the points that Mr.Menon makes but that is not the purpose of this book. He lays down his views and experiences, and as Confucius said "Study the past if you would define the future". There are indeed lessons here, and lessons worth reading.
"There is some self-interest behind every friendship. There is no friendship without self-interests. This is a bitter truth." ~Chanakya. This is perhaps more true for Diplomacy than for anything else. One of the best things about this book other than its core theme was it's author, there is no one better to tell you about the Choices India made in her most diplomatically charged phase, than the diplomat who helped her make them.
Mr.Menon had been personally involved in all the 4 issues discussed in this book(China in the 1990s, USA in 2006, Pakistan & 26/11, Sri Lanka & LTTE in 2009) and has many years of experience driving the foreign policy of India.Hence this book was a delight and an immediate priority for me to read, to know from the people directly responsible the What and Whys is really refreshing. Though he has been quite evasive on the "How" part, the intricate details of the negotiations or the MOM that i had hoped this might contain are absent. Nevertheless the book though lacking in detailed blow by blow of the various issues, gives you the reasoning and thought process behind the various actions taken by the Indian government working within the constraints of that time period.
One of the most important things this book made me realize is how underappreciated some of the very critical events are, for example P.V. Narasima Rao (9th Prime Minister of India) & his border peace and tranquility agreement with China. The 1990's was a very critical time for India, our economy was at its lowest point and we were in an unprecedented danger of being bankrupt (Courtesy of the 'License Raj' that had been practiced in the country till than) ,so naturally the immediate priority was the economy and its liberalization, but to achieve this having stability with our immediate neighbors was a necessary prerequisite. More so with China, having been defeated in the 1962 war, India was acutely aware of the scale of disaster that could ensue if the Chinese decided to press their advantage once again. Settling the border issue or in the lack of a favorable settlement, agreeing on a peaceful process for its resolution was paramount. Adding to that China,being the victor, would be very difficult to negotiate with specially resisting any kind of concessions(not every country could be as magnanimous (or foolish) in victory as we were after 1971 during the Shimla agreement), and to top it all off convincing the current political heads of the country to shake hands with a previous foe would have been quite a challenge. Yet,the deal was done. And its importance barely noticed,the mind boggles.
Lao Tzu said "A leader is best when people barely know he exists, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled they will say: we did it ourselves". This quote is quite apt for the "Accidental" Prime Minister Manmohan Singh & his civil nuclear agreement with the USA in 2006. Like every Indian i have my own misgivings about Mr. Singh and his tenure but the 123 agreement is one of the master strokes that has to be attributed to his dogged persistence. Convincing a country like the USA which scuttled a previous agreement for nuclear fuel supply, imposed sanctions on India after the "Pokharan" nuclear test in 1974, to a civil nuclear agreement, making it alter its own laws and giving a 'Clean' exemption from the very restrictions by the NSG that were a direct result of India's nuclear program in the first place would have been a daunting task. But yet again the deal was done,it is quite interesting to know how,and Mr.Menon as our faithful guide do not disappoint. Yet, i felt that he was way too soft on Mr.Singh, which is understandable as he was his National Security Adviser at the time.But still, not taking a strong military action against Pakistan after 26/11, and just posturing on the border and using diplomacy, still, to this day, doesn't sit well with me, maybe because as a citizen having these kinds of opinions is easy as opposed to being the one taking the decisions, but explaining away as to why we didn't use something like Israel's strong covert response to the situation "because we are different" and "that approach would only lead to temporary peace and not solve the main issue" is ludicrous. Mr.Menon himself admits that he suggested a strong and clear response, which he says we are fortunate the PM didn't go for, i mean 'War' was maybe not the ideal answer but we could have taken the scum who planed 26/11 out, morality be damned. But again, a country's foreign political machinery is too complicated a thing to be always in perfect working order. He warns the situation is different now and the restraint of the past is now just that 'Past'.
The Lankan civil war and our involvement in it is once again, i felt, was downplayed quite a bit in the book, India made a number of blunders regarding the LTTE, and i agree with Mr.Menon that perhaps due to our meddling and trying to broker peace we prolonged Sri Lankans suffering. Though, i feel a complete disarmament of the rebels should have been a prerequisite condition before any kind of negotiation. But it is always easy to judge history. The assassination of PM Rajiv Gandhi, is perhaps the result of said blunders and the cause which finally lead to the war's bloody conclusion.
The last 2 chapters of the book are perhaps my favorite, India's nuclear policy and a 'final word' about the intricacies of decision making, diplomacy and negotiation and their broad contemplation on the country's psyche and its unique personality were very well crafted. Here in the last chapters you really get to see the diplomat in Mr.Menon in all his glory. The book overall is well thought and well presented, the author talks about things he knows and has a first had experience in, adding credibility to his statements and thoughts. The fact that these agreements and issues were in a volatile time, as Mr.Menon notes where one could maneuver, concede and negotiate successfully ,as opposed to now where the world order is much more cemented and diplomats don't have the leeway that they previously enjoyed is what makes the book and his own experience so important. I have always had a keen interest in nations and their behaviors towards each other. To any such enthusiast and or history buff this book is a treat, perhaps we would not agree on all the points that Mr.Menon makes but that is not the purpose of this book. He lays down his views and experiences, and as Confucius said "Study the past if you would define the future". There are indeed lessons here, and lessons worth reading.
October 22, 2025
Shivshankar Menon’s "Choices" is a concise and brilliant analytical work, providing an unparalleled look at the strategic rationale behind some of India’s most consequential national security decisions. These are the choices that truly define contemporary Indian statecraft, including the no military action against Pakistan after the 26/11 attacks, the foundational No First Use (NFU) nuclear policy (initiated under Vajpayee) and the complex diplomatic handling of the LTTE and the final phase of the Sri Lankan Civil War.
The book is structured around five pivotal policy decisions he shaped as Foreign Secretary and NSA: the 1993 Border Peace with China, the 2008 Indo-US Nuclear Deal, the decision for strategic restraint after 26/11, the 2009 Sri Lanka Civil War response and the NFU doctrine.
Menon offers a masterclass in high-level statecraft, justifying choices made under pressure. However, the book's narrative lens is distinctly favorable to the Congress leadership (Narsimha Rao and Manmohan Singh). While balanced on the NFU, the work primarily champions the UPA era’s strategic approach. Essential reading for understanding modern Indian diplomacy, provided you read it with a critical eye toward the political perspective.
The book is structured around five pivotal policy decisions he shaped as Foreign Secretary and NSA: the 1993 Border Peace with China, the 2008 Indo-US Nuclear Deal, the decision for strategic restraint after 26/11, the 2009 Sri Lanka Civil War response and the NFU doctrine.
Menon offers a masterclass in high-level statecraft, justifying choices made under pressure. However, the book's narrative lens is distinctly favorable to the Congress leadership (Narsimha Rao and Manmohan Singh). While balanced on the NFU, the work primarily champions the UPA era’s strategic approach. Essential reading for understanding modern Indian diplomacy, provided you read it with a critical eye toward the political perspective.
September 20, 2020
Foreign policy for any country is incredibly complicated by a number of factors - both internal and external. It is even more true for India due to its strategic location and its decision to tread with caution yet show strategic boldness, furthering its interests one step at a time.
The author describes five of India's arguably most strategic choices in its independent history and analyses the alternatives along with their rationale.
Much of the era speaks about a UPA led government interspersed with brief NDA governments - supposedly ideological ends of a spectrum. But the strategic goals and approach when it comes to external affairs has been largely coherent across governments.
The author also stresses the important fact that there is no way of predicting such situations arising in future and even if they do the response might be different due to inherent complexity of factors involved.
Overall gives a decent insight into why simply going to war isn't even remotely an option in situations involving national security as some people believe or why it is not simply a matter of taking sides on the international stage without consequences.
The author describes five of India's arguably most strategic choices in its independent history and analyses the alternatives along with their rationale.
Much of the era speaks about a UPA led government interspersed with brief NDA governments - supposedly ideological ends of a spectrum. But the strategic goals and approach when it comes to external affairs has been largely coherent across governments.
The author also stresses the important fact that there is no way of predicting such situations arising in future and even if they do the response might be different due to inherent complexity of factors involved.
Overall gives a decent insight into why simply going to war isn't even remotely an option in situations involving national security as some people believe or why it is not simply a matter of taking sides on the international stage without consequences.
August 5, 2018
A take on India's foreign policy making process by an insider, this book lets you down due to the generality of the discussion. The choices are presented in the form of 5 case studies and apart from the US nuclear deal, rest of the 4 are just clippings from a newspaper. Also, the writer writes not for a layman but for someone who is already well versed with the basic terminologies of the subjects under discussion. This filters the reading population to a very narrow band. Overall an average book, hence the 3 stars.
March 4, 2020
The book gives one useful insights into the considerations that go into framing a foreign policy decision and arriving at it. It concentrates mostly on decisions taken in the last 2 decades and their implications on India now and in the future. It also discusses on the lessons Indian diplomats have learnt over the process and their shortcomings and way forward.
Though it was an interesting read and offered some new insights, it felt more repetitive in its ideas towards the end.
Though it was an interesting read and offered some new insights, it felt more repetitive in its ideas towards the end.
February 14, 2020
A must-read. Could have been more interesting...
May 27, 2020
Choices: Inside the making of India's foreign policy is a brief but amazing book that talks in greater depth about India's Foreign affairs. It is not a pedantic analysis of how our foreign policy evolved, rather it is a case study of four landmark decisions by the Indian government that vividly portrays the strategically bold, yet tactically conservative nature of our external affairs.
The author is at his objective best when he talks about India - US Civil nuclear agreement and India's No First Use policy. He highlights an important fact on why the Nuclear deal is more than just Nuclear commerce. The deal elevated Indo - US relations to a new level and had that initiative failed to pick up, we would not have got the title of De facto Nuclear Weapons State. India's international status is now almost equal to the P5 countries. The author also explains why the No first Use policy is the aptest Nuclear doctrine and with Pakistan enhancing its Tactical Warfare capabilities to counter India's Cold Start Doctrine, the author urges the policymakers to be ready with a game plan for multiple worst-case scenarios. ( Imagine terrorists and extremists in Pakistan, taking control over their Nuclear program. In such a situation, it would be a nightmare for our government. Our Nuclear doctrine remains mute on this issue because it does not talk about Retaliation on Non-State Actors)
In the section, where he discusses the Sri Lankan civil war, there is a subtle political message hidden. India voted against Srilanka in a UNHRC resolution over war crimes during 2012. It abstained from doing so in 2014. The UPA government had done that considering its political ambitions in the south. DMK, a political party in the south, threatened to collapse the UPA government if it did not vote against the Sri Lankan Government in the resolution. Following that, we saw Rajapakse's Sri Lanka, drift steadily towards China.
The author remarks that DMK and ADMK were very understanding about the ground realities of Sri Lanka and that they had to make populist statements only to appease the people, but otherwise, they were very supportive of the central government on its stance over LTTE. I urge the readers to exercise caution and have a balanced reading on this issue.
So much for a small book? Because it is a Good Read!
The author is at his objective best when he talks about India - US Civil nuclear agreement and India's No First Use policy. He highlights an important fact on why the Nuclear deal is more than just Nuclear commerce. The deal elevated Indo - US relations to a new level and had that initiative failed to pick up, we would not have got the title of De facto Nuclear Weapons State. India's international status is now almost equal to the P5 countries. The author also explains why the No first Use policy is the aptest Nuclear doctrine and with Pakistan enhancing its Tactical Warfare capabilities to counter India's Cold Start Doctrine, the author urges the policymakers to be ready with a game plan for multiple worst-case scenarios. ( Imagine terrorists and extremists in Pakistan, taking control over their Nuclear program. In such a situation, it would be a nightmare for our government. Our Nuclear doctrine remains mute on this issue because it does not talk about Retaliation on Non-State Actors)
In the section, where he discusses the Sri Lankan civil war, there is a subtle political message hidden. India voted against Srilanka in a UNHRC resolution over war crimes during 2012. It abstained from doing so in 2014. The UPA government had done that considering its political ambitions in the south. DMK, a political party in the south, threatened to collapse the UPA government if it did not vote against the Sri Lankan Government in the resolution. Following that, we saw Rajapakse's Sri Lanka, drift steadily towards China.
The author remarks that DMK and ADMK were very understanding about the ground realities of Sri Lanka and that they had to make populist statements only to appease the people, but otherwise, they were very supportive of the central government on its stance over LTTE. I urge the readers to exercise caution and have a balanced reading on this issue.
So much for a small book? Because it is a Good Read!
June 16, 2020
A practitioners view of some of India's key foreign policies. The number of variables that the govt has to consider including possible repercussions before making a stand is horrifying. Politics is really a dirty game of power with rare win-win scenarios. Because of India's unique location and fraught relationships with it's neighbours, it has no option but to be cautious and pragmatic in it's decisions.
I think,for me, the most enlightening one was about the war in Sri Lanka. I have a close friend and many acquaintances here in Sydney who are Tamil Sri lankans so it felt good to understand more about the war that overturned their life. The author gives a good overview on how the war broke out to India's peace keeping efforts to how LTTE was crushed and also sentiments of the tamils in India. Of course, no Indian can forget the shock on hearing how our former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber and the images in the newspaper the next day.
Other policies covered are:
- Border agreement with China (lead by former prime minister P.V. Narasimha Rao)
- Nuclear agreement with the US (lead by former prime minister Manmohan Singh)
- Mumbai attack & the decision not to retaliate with military force
- India becoming a Nuclear Weapons State and pledging to no first use of nuclear weapons
Something new I learned is that India's foreign policy decisions were all taken under the leadership of our prime ministers. Looks like India was lucky to have a long line of leaders who was capable of steering India in the right direction. It remains to be seen how the current govt with Narendra Modi fares in this area. Prime minister Modi has certainly made many friends overseas with his visits and invitations to visit India but it's not clear (to me) how much of an impact this and made in building allies and inviting foreign sponsorship.
I think,for me, the most enlightening one was about the war in Sri Lanka. I have a close friend and many acquaintances here in Sydney who are Tamil Sri lankans so it felt good to understand more about the war that overturned their life. The author gives a good overview on how the war broke out to India's peace keeping efforts to how LTTE was crushed and also sentiments of the tamils in India. Of course, no Indian can forget the shock on hearing how our former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber and the images in the newspaper the next day.
Other policies covered are:
- Border agreement with China (lead by former prime minister P.V. Narasimha Rao)
- Nuclear agreement with the US (lead by former prime minister Manmohan Singh)
- Mumbai attack & the decision not to retaliate with military force
- India becoming a Nuclear Weapons State and pledging to no first use of nuclear weapons
Something new I learned is that India's foreign policy decisions were all taken under the leadership of our prime ministers. Looks like India was lucky to have a long line of leaders who was capable of steering India in the right direction. It remains to be seen how the current govt with Narendra Modi fares in this area. Prime minister Modi has certainly made many friends overseas with his visits and invitations to visit India but it's not clear (to me) how much of an impact this and made in building allies and inviting foreign sponsorship.
April 11, 2021
Author Shiv Shankar Menon is a distinguished Indian diplomat who has served both as Foreign Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs between 2006-2009 and later as National Security Adviser of India to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh between 2010-2014. Prior to that, he was posted as Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan and Sri Lanka and ambassador to China and Israel.
The book is essentially a distillation of the author's years of experiences and insights that he gained while serving in the ministry of external affairs. Being a diplomat, he was able to witness and participate, at close quarters, in the formulation of Indian foreign policy wherein crucial pacts, agreements, and strategic priorities was deliberated upon. It is fascinating to see how the events leading to those decisions unfold and how they lay bare the deep geopolitical intricacies and challenges that the government had to weigh up before making the 'Choices'.
Notes:
---------------------------
1. In the first chapter the author discusses the implications of a significant diplomatic milestone: The border Peace and Tranquility Agreement signed in 1993 between India and China during PM Narasimha Rao's visit to Beijing. It was a significant move in the light of two big events that had happened in the last 4 years: The fall of the Soviet Union; followed by the opening up of the Indian economy in 1991. Much of the Indo-China border (the majority being under the Mcmahon Line) was fixed under various agreements reached by the British with Chinese and Tibetan governments in the early 1900s. However, after the British leaving India, China ceased to acknowledge their existence and started claiming those areas that were now part of independent India. The confrontations reached their peak resulting in the 1962 war where India lost part of its eastern territory to China. The author also argues that the relationship between India and China can not fall into a simple binary. There are larger political, economic, and security actors at play. While competition vs cooperation marks the short-term view on the relations, the development of strong ideological predispositions to nationalistic rhetoric post-2012 on both sides, according to him, may not auger well in the long term.
2. The civil nuclear initiatives between India and the US are the focus of the second chapter. The author describes in interesting detail the tortuous process by which the Indian government under the leadership of PM Manmohan Singh and Foreign minister Pranab Mukharjee was able to successfully secure the NSG approval and then entered into historic '123 agreement' with the US in July 2008 without binding to NPT clauses. In the light of the hardening of Indo-china relations on the boundary settlement and the mounting threat of increasing Chinese and Pakistani cooperation on nuclear and defense technology, this event was a watershed in the strategic alignment of Indo-US interests and a new chapter in civil nuclear cooperation.
3. On Nov 26, 2008, Mumbai, has been the target of deadly terrorist attacks of '93 blasts and July 2006 train bombings in the past had once again fallen prey to vicious acts of sabotage by Pakistan ISI. A commando-style attack unleashed by ten Pakistani terrorists from Lashkar-e-taiba caught the city off-guard. US sided with India to proclaim clearly ISI hand while the Pakistan army shamefully denied any involvement. In chapter three, the author dissects the policy dilemma of 'restraint vs retaliation' that the Indian government faced within the aftermath of the attacks and reveals the deliberations in his capacity as foreign secretary that went behind the reasons why it chose the former over the latter.
4. Chapter four on the Srilankan Civil War was particularly a riveting read. The Srilankan government had been embroiled in a bitter 3 decades-long civil war that was fueled by the conflict between Majority Sinhalese and Minority Tamils. It had its roots going as far back as the year 1948 when the country after getting its independence passed the controversial Ceylon citizenship act that discriminated against the Tamils. Later governments' more tendentious policies such as acts imposing Sinhala as an official language of the country, deliberated attempt to discourage Tamils to get into civil services, granting special benefits/preferences to Sinhalese, state-sponsored colonization of Tamil populations added to further estrangement and discontent amongst Tamils. This led to the emergence of a plethora of militant groups that later consolidated to only a few; major being LTTE.
5. India was itself grappling with the rise of Tamil separatism in southern India. Political parties and the general public in Tamilnadu increasingly identified with the Srilankan Tamil cause and millions felt outraged as they witnessed the injustice meted out to their brethren in Srilanka. India had an urgent need to act and meditate in order to find a peaceful solution to the problem that would ensure its own long-term stability. The author describes in interesting detail the choices India had in 1987, the Indian government's intervention (unsuccessful) to enforce ceasefire by sending Indian peacekeeping forces, and the bitterness that ensued in the wake of the tragic assassination of Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. He also delves into dilemmas of statecrafts as he takes us through the developments of late 2000 where the Indian government had to tread a delicate balancing act with the Rajapaksha government which was determined to ruthlessly end the civil war by eliminating LTTE that had grown more powerful and lethal.
6. In the final chapter, he delves into the implications of India's no-first-use doctrine and assured retaliation in the context of Nuclear weapons from the long strategic viewpoint and justifies how it has served well so far in the context of geopolitical dealings with Pakistan, China, and the US. He argues that the decision to adopt this doctrine is a carefully deliberated one with a view to deter the use of nuclear weapons in the heavily nuclearized neighborhood.
Finally, the author argues that the function of the domestic political process plays an important role in foreign policy decisions. In this multi-party system, negotiating with internal actors and quickly move forward on a crucial policy decision is a feat in itself and clever political maneuvering is a skill that comes in handy.
The book is essentially a distillation of the author's years of experiences and insights that he gained while serving in the ministry of external affairs. Being a diplomat, he was able to witness and participate, at close quarters, in the formulation of Indian foreign policy wherein crucial pacts, agreements, and strategic priorities was deliberated upon. It is fascinating to see how the events leading to those decisions unfold and how they lay bare the deep geopolitical intricacies and challenges that the government had to weigh up before making the 'Choices'.
Notes:
---------------------------
1. In the first chapter the author discusses the implications of a significant diplomatic milestone: The border Peace and Tranquility Agreement signed in 1993 between India and China during PM Narasimha Rao's visit to Beijing. It was a significant move in the light of two big events that had happened in the last 4 years: The fall of the Soviet Union; followed by the opening up of the Indian economy in 1991. Much of the Indo-China border (the majority being under the Mcmahon Line) was fixed under various agreements reached by the British with Chinese and Tibetan governments in the early 1900s. However, after the British leaving India, China ceased to acknowledge their existence and started claiming those areas that were now part of independent India. The confrontations reached their peak resulting in the 1962 war where India lost part of its eastern territory to China. The author also argues that the relationship between India and China can not fall into a simple binary. There are larger political, economic, and security actors at play. While competition vs cooperation marks the short-term view on the relations, the development of strong ideological predispositions to nationalistic rhetoric post-2012 on both sides, according to him, may not auger well in the long term.
2. The civil nuclear initiatives between India and the US are the focus of the second chapter. The author describes in interesting detail the tortuous process by which the Indian government under the leadership of PM Manmohan Singh and Foreign minister Pranab Mukharjee was able to successfully secure the NSG approval and then entered into historic '123 agreement' with the US in July 2008 without binding to NPT clauses. In the light of the hardening of Indo-china relations on the boundary settlement and the mounting threat of increasing Chinese and Pakistani cooperation on nuclear and defense technology, this event was a watershed in the strategic alignment of Indo-US interests and a new chapter in civil nuclear cooperation.
3. On Nov 26, 2008, Mumbai, has been the target of deadly terrorist attacks of '93 blasts and July 2006 train bombings in the past had once again fallen prey to vicious acts of sabotage by Pakistan ISI. A commando-style attack unleashed by ten Pakistani terrorists from Lashkar-e-taiba caught the city off-guard. US sided with India to proclaim clearly ISI hand while the Pakistan army shamefully denied any involvement. In chapter three, the author dissects the policy dilemma of 'restraint vs retaliation' that the Indian government faced within the aftermath of the attacks and reveals the deliberations in his capacity as foreign secretary that went behind the reasons why it chose the former over the latter.
4. Chapter four on the Srilankan Civil War was particularly a riveting read. The Srilankan government had been embroiled in a bitter 3 decades-long civil war that was fueled by the conflict between Majority Sinhalese and Minority Tamils. It had its roots going as far back as the year 1948 when the country after getting its independence passed the controversial Ceylon citizenship act that discriminated against the Tamils. Later governments' more tendentious policies such as acts imposing Sinhala as an official language of the country, deliberated attempt to discourage Tamils to get into civil services, granting special benefits/preferences to Sinhalese, state-sponsored colonization of Tamil populations added to further estrangement and discontent amongst Tamils. This led to the emergence of a plethora of militant groups that later consolidated to only a few; major being LTTE.
5. India was itself grappling with the rise of Tamil separatism in southern India. Political parties and the general public in Tamilnadu increasingly identified with the Srilankan Tamil cause and millions felt outraged as they witnessed the injustice meted out to their brethren in Srilanka. India had an urgent need to act and meditate in order to find a peaceful solution to the problem that would ensure its own long-term stability. The author describes in interesting detail the choices India had in 1987, the Indian government's intervention (unsuccessful) to enforce ceasefire by sending Indian peacekeeping forces, and the bitterness that ensued in the wake of the tragic assassination of Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. He also delves into dilemmas of statecrafts as he takes us through the developments of late 2000 where the Indian government had to tread a delicate balancing act with the Rajapaksha government which was determined to ruthlessly end the civil war by eliminating LTTE that had grown more powerful and lethal.
6. In the final chapter, he delves into the implications of India's no-first-use doctrine and assured retaliation in the context of Nuclear weapons from the long strategic viewpoint and justifies how it has served well so far in the context of geopolitical dealings with Pakistan, China, and the US. He argues that the decision to adopt this doctrine is a carefully deliberated one with a view to deter the use of nuclear weapons in the heavily nuclearized neighborhood.
Finally, the author argues that the function of the domestic political process plays an important role in foreign policy decisions. In this multi-party system, negotiating with internal actors and quickly move forward on a crucial policy decision is a feat in itself and clever political maneuvering is a skill that comes in handy.
January 11, 2024
Context. There is always context. It's easy to make judgements when we only see the results and decisions. But it makes it less and less objective as we get to know the context behind things and put ourselves in the shoes of the decision maker. Choices by Shivshankar Menon explores exactly that as he shows us the ins and outs of the Indian foreign policy making with his career as a diplomat and his experience in vital chokepoints of the Indian foreign policy. Using lucid language, he also greatly increases the prestige of the foreign services and emphasises on the role they play in India's relationship with its fellow states and presenting her image with the decisions she makes. All in all, in under 200 pages, Menon talks of the highlights with China, Pakistan, USA, Sri Lanka and the Indian policy of no first use. As we've all heard, the history shapes the future - and having the first hand view of a diplomat directly involved in these relationships and events will help us immensely to create a stable global image with the sky being the limit.
April 5, 2018
Great crash course in the major events for India's Foreign Policy post 1971. The personal touch and optimism of the author comes through. It showcases the unique India culture towards its external policy.
It was a fun read, and as it is well written can be covered in a realtively short amount of time.
It was a fun read, and as it is well written can be covered in a realtively short amount of time.
August 31, 2018
"Choices - Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy" had so much that could have gone in its favor. Shivshankar Menon, its author, is a career diplomat. He was one of the Top 5 people who managed India's foreign policy and internal security for 10 years (between 2004 and 2014). He just could have got so many things right in a book with such impacting title. But then, there is a difference between an author and diplomat. As an author, Mr Shivshankar Menon disappoints us immensely in this book.
Given the title and the background of the author, you would expect such a book to cover one or more of the following areas:
- Importance of foreign policy, how it is practiced in other countries, how it is done in India
- Specific instances where foreign policy decisions influenced the outcomes of historical events
- Author's deep understanding of India, foreign policy
- Author's narration of various policy choices and decisions
- Author's involvement and influence on the policy decisions
But Mr Menon gives us a wafer thin narrative. The book itself talks about 5 specific chapters in India's foreign policy - China oriented policies, Nuclear treaty with the US, 26/11 Mumbai attacks, Sri Lanka conflict and India's nuclear weapon policy. Now, on paper, these look strong areas to convey a lot of details. Unfortunately, we get very little facts in all these narratives, except for the Sri Lanka conflict.
And where the book gets boring is the personal (mostly subjective) views of Mr Menon. He goes into monologues very often with very little facts. He gives us some dots and then starts his own narrative to connect those dots. It gets repetitive and you lose interest in those long sentences that go nowhere. Word "Choices" gets inserted into some of the pages, rather forcefully, as it to justify the title of the book.
In short, this is a hugely disappointing book. It does not provide you with exhaustive references to historical events, actors, actions and outcomes. All you get is pages and pages of monologues from author. I'm not sure if there are other better books out there on India's foreign policy. But "Choices" by Mr Shivshankar Menon is definitely NOT one of them.
Given the title and the background of the author, you would expect such a book to cover one or more of the following areas:
- Importance of foreign policy, how it is practiced in other countries, how it is done in India
- Specific instances where foreign policy decisions influenced the outcomes of historical events
- Author's deep understanding of India, foreign policy
- Author's narration of various policy choices and decisions
- Author's involvement and influence on the policy decisions
But Mr Menon gives us a wafer thin narrative. The book itself talks about 5 specific chapters in India's foreign policy - China oriented policies, Nuclear treaty with the US, 26/11 Mumbai attacks, Sri Lanka conflict and India's nuclear weapon policy. Now, on paper, these look strong areas to convey a lot of details. Unfortunately, we get very little facts in all these narratives, except for the Sri Lanka conflict.
And where the book gets boring is the personal (mostly subjective) views of Mr Menon. He goes into monologues very often with very little facts. He gives us some dots and then starts his own narrative to connect those dots. It gets repetitive and you lose interest in those long sentences that go nowhere. Word "Choices" gets inserted into some of the pages, rather forcefully, as it to justify the title of the book.
In short, this is a hugely disappointing book. It does not provide you with exhaustive references to historical events, actors, actions and outcomes. All you get is pages and pages of monologues from author. I'm not sure if there are other better books out there on India's foreign policy. But "Choices" by Mr Shivshankar Menon is definitely NOT one of them.
March 19, 2017
Choices is a sober analysis of Indian Foreign policy. The book ruminates on five key choices Indian foreign policy made- No first use of Nuclear policy, Restraint in face of 26/11 attacks, Limited involvement in the last phase of Sri Lanka- LTTE conflict, Civil Nuclear Agreement with the USA, and Boundary negotiations with China.
Through this five choices, the book aims to go deep into drivers of Indian foreign policy. Those looking for some grand theoretical framework will be disappointed. The book concludes that these choices were less a product of some grand theory, and more a result of conjectures, personalities and resources available at those times.
India's world view is incoherent because it is shaped by many mutually contradictory elements. The history of colonisation induces thrust on sovereignty, the experience of UN over Kashmir issue in 1947-48 makes it suspicious of great power politics at multilateral forums, the desperate need of domestic development overrides charming idealism at multilateral forums and finally it being in phase of national consolidation keeps it from taking first principle stands of issues of separatist movements, human rights and so on.
Menon makes no bones about admitting to the fact of incoherence in Indian foreign policy. As an insider, as someone who had skin in the game, he knows that real world offers little chance of high idealism based on first principles. Diplomacy is much more about judgement. The judgements which have to factor in histories, presents and futures; judgements which need to be strategically acute and tactically workable; judgements which are rooted in reality of capabilities.
'Choices' offers us a fascinating story of such judgements.
Through this five choices, the book aims to go deep into drivers of Indian foreign policy. Those looking for some grand theoretical framework will be disappointed. The book concludes that these choices were less a product of some grand theory, and more a result of conjectures, personalities and resources available at those times.
India's world view is incoherent because it is shaped by many mutually contradictory elements. The history of colonisation induces thrust on sovereignty, the experience of UN over Kashmir issue in 1947-48 makes it suspicious of great power politics at multilateral forums, the desperate need of domestic development overrides charming idealism at multilateral forums and finally it being in phase of national consolidation keeps it from taking first principle stands of issues of separatist movements, human rights and so on.
Menon makes no bones about admitting to the fact of incoherence in Indian foreign policy. As an insider, as someone who had skin in the game, he knows that real world offers little chance of high idealism based on first principles. Diplomacy is much more about judgement. The judgements which have to factor in histories, presents and futures; judgements which need to be strategically acute and tactically workable; judgements which are rooted in reality of capabilities.
'Choices' offers us a fascinating story of such judgements.
August 22, 2017
Insight by the Inside Man. A must read for the students and scholars of conflict resolution, foreign policy, political science, and international relations.
"Initiative and risk taking must be strategic, not tactical, at India's present level of power, to avoid the fate of powers in history whose rise was thwarted. History is replete with examples of rising powers that prematurely thought their time had come, that mistook influence and weight for real power. Their rise, like that of Wilhelmine Germany or militarist Japan, was cut short prematurely."
"At the risk of disappointing those who call on India to be a "responsible" power - meaning they want us to do what they wish - and at the risk of disappointing Indians who like to dream of India as an old-fashioned superpower, I would only say, as Indira Gandhi once said, "India will be a different power" and will continue to walk its own path in the world. That is the only responsible way for us."
"Defining the Indian way in foreign policy is difficult, just as it is hard to put into words what makes a person Indian, since we base our nationhood not on religion, ethnicity, language, or any of the standard nineteenth-century criteria but on an idea of India. However, hard to define, the world knows an Indian, an Indian diplomat, and Indian foreign policy, it is marked by a combination of boldness in conception and caution in implementation, by the dominant and determining role of the prime minister, by a didactic negotiating style, by a fundamentally realistic approach masked by normative rhetoric, by comfort in a plural and diverse world or multiverse, and, most consistently, by a consciousness of India's destiny as a great power."
"Initiative and risk taking must be strategic, not tactical, at India's present level of power, to avoid the fate of powers in history whose rise was thwarted. History is replete with examples of rising powers that prematurely thought their time had come, that mistook influence and weight for real power. Their rise, like that of Wilhelmine Germany or militarist Japan, was cut short prematurely."
"At the risk of disappointing those who call on India to be a "responsible" power - meaning they want us to do what they wish - and at the risk of disappointing Indians who like to dream of India as an old-fashioned superpower, I would only say, as Indira Gandhi once said, "India will be a different power" and will continue to walk its own path in the world. That is the only responsible way for us."
"Defining the Indian way in foreign policy is difficult, just as it is hard to put into words what makes a person Indian, since we base our nationhood not on religion, ethnicity, language, or any of the standard nineteenth-century criteria but on an idea of India. However, hard to define, the world knows an Indian, an Indian diplomat, and Indian foreign policy, it is marked by a combination of boldness in conception and caution in implementation, by the dominant and determining role of the prime minister, by a didactic negotiating style, by a fundamentally realistic approach masked by normative rhetoric, by comfort in a plural and diverse world or multiverse, and, most consistently, by a consciousness of India's destiny as a great power."
June 24, 2017
I have only just started studying geopolitics and foreign policy. And since this was only my second book after Shebonti Ray Dadwal's Geopolitics of Gas (IDSA), my review might seem a little too appreciative of the author as I haven't read the contrarian views.
Now coming to the book, I loved the structure in which it was presented. It was rich in knowledge and guided the reader well through the build ups which led to certain important decisions.
The chapters discussed all those issues which I have been pondering upon over the years. I too wondered why we never attacked after 26/11 and after reading the book I am now convinced that it was for the best. Having an elaborate light shed on these issues were a source of significant joy and knowledge for me.
Now, coming to the eyebrows raised part, I felt that the author was a little too critical of the new government. Even though he didn't put it explicitly, it was quite evident from the writing. What confused me was that the book mentions that the new government does not have an established foreign policy yet, I want someone to explain me why author would say that.
I can see India building on its existing relationship with USA, while at the same time keeping Russia happy. While relationship with China is uncertain, the trade with it has also been good. India's growth potential and increasing trade is perhaps it's leverage against its neighbors. So is not the foreign policy implied here?
Again, I am not trying to criticize the author, the question I ask is to satisfy my own curiosity.
Now coming to the book, I loved the structure in which it was presented. It was rich in knowledge and guided the reader well through the build ups which led to certain important decisions.
The chapters discussed all those issues which I have been pondering upon over the years. I too wondered why we never attacked after 26/11 and after reading the book I am now convinced that it was for the best. Having an elaborate light shed on these issues were a source of significant joy and knowledge for me.
Now, coming to the eyebrows raised part, I felt that the author was a little too critical of the new government. Even though he didn't put it explicitly, it was quite evident from the writing. What confused me was that the book mentions that the new government does not have an established foreign policy yet, I want someone to explain me why author would say that.
I can see India building on its existing relationship with USA, while at the same time keeping Russia happy. While relationship with China is uncertain, the trade with it has also been good. India's growth potential and increasing trade is perhaps it's leverage against its neighbors. So is not the foreign policy implied here?
Again, I am not trying to criticize the author, the question I ask is to satisfy my own curiosity.
September 28, 2017
A comprehensive account of India's foreign policy outlook post the cold war by an acclaimed diplomat, the book talks about an Indian way of policymaking because of the unique geo-strategic challenges the country faces. The author reflects on five key engagements he was involved in as a key policymaker - border dispute with China, civil nuclear deal with the United States, policy outlook towards Pakistan in the wake of 26/11 attacks, India's role during Sri Lankan Civil War and dealing with LTTE, and lastly India's position on Nuclear Weapons.
In each of the chapter, Menon discusses the possible choices, roadblocks and the learnings from each of the decisions taken at that point of time. He clearly illustrates how diplomacy and policymaking is a combination of art & science with a hazy distinction between right or wrong. In all of the situations, Menon clearly illustrates how the strategic policymaking is influenced by culture and politics of a nation, but why a nation should not ever let them become deterministic factors. He captures India's way of policymaking beautifully, "If there is an Indian way in foreign policy, it is marked by a combination of boldness in conception and caution in implementation, by the dominant and determining role of the prime minister, by a didactic negotiating style.....and by a consciousness of India's destiny as a great power."
Overall, a wonderful read for anyone with interest in the evolution of Indian foreign policymaking over the previous decades!
In each of the chapter, Menon discusses the possible choices, roadblocks and the learnings from each of the decisions taken at that point of time. He clearly illustrates how diplomacy and policymaking is a combination of art & science with a hazy distinction between right or wrong. In all of the situations, Menon clearly illustrates how the strategic policymaking is influenced by culture and politics of a nation, but why a nation should not ever let them become deterministic factors. He captures India's way of policymaking beautifully, "If there is an Indian way in foreign policy, it is marked by a combination of boldness in conception and caution in implementation, by the dominant and determining role of the prime minister, by a didactic negotiating style.....and by a consciousness of India's destiny as a great power."
Overall, a wonderful read for anyone with interest in the evolution of Indian foreign policymaking over the previous decades!
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