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Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the false assessment of Saddam Hussein's weapons arsenal were terrible reminders that good information is essential to national security. These failures convinced the American public that their intelligence system was broken and prompted a radical reorganization of agencies and personnel, but as Richard K. Betts argues in this book, critics and politicians have severely underestimated the obstacles to true reform.
One of the nation's foremost political scientists, Betts draws on three decades of work within the U.S. intelligence community to illuminate the paradoxes and problems that frustrate the intelligence process. Unlike America's efforts to improve its defenses against natural disasters, strengthening its strategic assessment capabilities means outwitting crafty enemies who operate beyond U.S. borders. It also requires looking within to the organizational and political dynamics of collecting information and determining its implications for policy.
Combining academic research with personal experience, Betts outlines strategies for better intelligence gathering and assessment. He describes how fixing one malfunction can create another; in what ways expertise can be both a vital tool and a source of error and misjudgment; the pitfalls of always striving for accuracy in intelligence, which in some cases can render it worthless; the danger, though unavoidable, of "politicizing" intelligence; and the issue of secrecy—when it is excessive, when it is insufficient, and how limiting privacy can in fact protect civil liberties.
Betts argues that when it comes to intelligence, citizens and politicians should focus less on consistent solutions and more on achieving a delicate balance between conflicting requirements. He also emphasizes the substantial success of the intelligence community, despite its well-publicized blunders, and highlights elements of the intelligence process that need preservation and protection. Many reformers are quick to respond to scandals and failures without detailed, historical knowledge of how the system works. Grounding his arguments in extensive theory and policy analysis, Betts takes a comprehensive and realistic look at how knowledge and power can work together to face the intelligence challenges of the twenty-first century.
One of the nation's foremost political scientists, Betts draws on three decades of work within the U.S. intelligence community to illuminate the paradoxes and problems that frustrate the intelligence process. Unlike America's efforts to improve its defenses against natural disasters, strengthening its strategic assessment capabilities means outwitting crafty enemies who operate beyond U.S. borders. It also requires looking within to the organizational and political dynamics of collecting information and determining its implications for policy.
Combining academic research with personal experience, Betts outlines strategies for better intelligence gathering and assessment. He describes how fixing one malfunction can create another; in what ways expertise can be both a vital tool and a source of error and misjudgment; the pitfalls of always striving for accuracy in intelligence, which in some cases can render it worthless; the danger, though unavoidable, of "politicizing" intelligence; and the issue of secrecy—when it is excessive, when it is insufficient, and how limiting privacy can in fact protect civil liberties.
Betts argues that when it comes to intelligence, citizens and politicians should focus less on consistent solutions and more on achieving a delicate balance between conflicting requirements. He also emphasizes the substantial success of the intelligence community, despite its well-publicized blunders, and highlights elements of the intelligence process that need preservation and protection. Many reformers are quick to respond to scandals and failures without detailed, historical knowledge of how the system works. Grounding his arguments in extensive theory and policy analysis, Betts takes a comprehensive and realistic look at how knowledge and power can work together to face the intelligence challenges of the twenty-first century.
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First published December 31, 2006
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
October 21, 2019
One of my new favorites. For most, the subtleties and nuances will likely get glanced over, but this author did a great job capturing the frustrations that those in the intelligence production enterprise have when constant blame of “intelligence failures” falls on them, especially by those leaders who are so steeped in their biases that they either reject specific reporting of warnings and risk, or make assumptions contrary to evidence, which the producers to waste time and resources to chase such assumptions until they become “assessments” out of thin air.
Fair, yes, to blame failures on lack of reporting, missed details, not connecting dots, etc, but just as guilty, if not more, is both clear direction with authorities to collect and report in sensitive arenas so as to gain access and placement at the point of friction, and foregone conclusions by leaders and policymakers before they have even delved into analysis.
An interesting treatise on attempting to stop blaming one aspect of the problem, and putting a mirror in the face of those constantly laying the blame.
Fair, yes, to blame failures on lack of reporting, missed details, not connecting dots, etc, but just as guilty, if not more, is both clear direction with authorities to collect and report in sensitive arenas so as to gain access and placement at the point of friction, and foregone conclusions by leaders and policymakers before they have even delved into analysis.
An interesting treatise on attempting to stop blaming one aspect of the problem, and putting a mirror in the face of those constantly laying the blame.
November 15, 2021
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Betts was born and raised in Eaton, Pennsylvania graduating from Newton High School in 1965. He went on to attend and graduate from Harvard University earning a bachelor's, master's, and eventually doctorate in government in 1965, 1971 and 1975 respectively.
His dissertation, under the direction of Samuel P. Huntington was on the role of military advice in decisions to resort to force, which later became his first book, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.
His dissertation was awarded the Sumner Prize, for best dissertation in international relations. While a student at Harvard, Betts served as a teaching fellow from 1971 to 1975 and a lecturer for the 1975–1976 academic year. He served as a professional staff member on the Church Committee.
In 1976 Betts joined the Brookings Institution where he served as a research associate and later in 1981 a senior fellow until 1990. While at Brookings, Betts was a professional lecture at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Harvard, and Columbia University.
Additionally, he was a staff member on the National Security Council in 1977 and on the foreign policy staff of Walter Mondale presidential campaign in 1984.
In 1990, Betts joined the faculty at Columbia University. There, he led the international security policy program at the School of International and Public Affairs, became the director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies.
A staple of the faculty, Betts taught the introductory course war, peace, and strategy for over 25 years, a requirement for all international relations students at the university.
Betts has been an occasional consultant to the National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency.
Betts was born and raised in Eaton, Pennsylvania graduating from Newton High School in 1965. He went on to attend and graduate from Harvard University earning a bachelor's, master's, and eventually doctorate in government in 1965, 1971 and 1975 respectively.
His dissertation, under the direction of Samuel P. Huntington was on the role of military advice in decisions to resort to force, which later became his first book, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.
His dissertation was awarded the Sumner Prize, for best dissertation in international relations. While a student at Harvard, Betts served as a teaching fellow from 1971 to 1975 and a lecturer for the 1975–1976 academic year. He served as a professional staff member on the Church Committee.
In 1976 Betts joined the Brookings Institution where he served as a research associate and later in 1981 a senior fellow until 1990. While at Brookings, Betts was a professional lecture at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Harvard, and Columbia University.
Additionally, he was a staff member on the National Security Council in 1977 and on the foreign policy staff of Walter Mondale presidential campaign in 1984.
In 1990, Betts joined the faculty at Columbia University. There, he led the international security policy program at the School of International and Public Affairs, became the director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies.
A staple of the faculty, Betts taught the introductory course war, peace, and strategy for over 25 years, a requirement for all international relations students at the university.
Betts has been an occasional consultant to the National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency.
September 28, 2011
Hello, dissertation.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews