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Topyekun Harp
Paperback. 14,00 / 21,00 cm. In Turkish. 152 p. Topyekün Harp, toplumlarin sahip olduklari bütün maddi ve manevi kaynaklari seferber ederek savas halinde olmalarini tanimlar. Topyekün Harp'in kavram olarak ortaya çikisi 1789 Fransiz Ihtilali'ne dayansa da kavramin askeri, siyasi ve akademik alanlarda genis yanki uyandirmasi ünlü Alman generali Erich von Ludendorff'un Ikinci Dünya Savasi'nin hemen öncesinde yazmis oldugu bu kitap sayesinde gerçeklesmistir.Ludendorff'un Topyekün Harp'e dair dünya genelinde ses getiren görüslerini içeren bu eser Topyekün Harp'in esaslarindan tatbikine kadar konuyla ilgili her ayrinti hakkinda doyurucu bilgi sunmaktadir. Bununla beraber, etkileri bugün dahi belli oranda devam eden ve öncesindeki dünyayi neredeyse ortadan kaldiran Ikinci Dünya Savasi'nin toplum, ordu ve iktisat alanlarindaki dönüstürücü mantigini bir generalin gözünden anlatmaktadir.
152 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1988
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104 people want to read
About the author
Erich Ludendorff
120 books8 followersGerman general.
Ludendorff was active during the first world war, where he was the victor of the battles of Liege & Tannenberg.
In August 1916 he was appointed Quartermaster general which made him joint head with Paul von Hindenburg. Ludendorff was the chief engineer behind the management of Germany's effort in World War I until his resignation in October 1918.
After the war, Ludendorff became a prominent nationalist leader, and a promoter of the stab-in-the-back theory and convinced that the German Army had been betrayed by Marxists and Republicans in the Versailles Treaty.
He took part in the Coup d'etait of 1922 and of Hitler's Putsch of 1923.
Ludendorff was active during the first world war, where he was the victor of the battles of Liege & Tannenberg.
In August 1916 he was appointed Quartermaster general which made him joint head with Paul von Hindenburg. Ludendorff was the chief engineer behind the management of Germany's effort in World War I until his resignation in October 1918.
After the war, Ludendorff became a prominent nationalist leader, and a promoter of the stab-in-the-back theory and convinced that the German Army had been betrayed by Marxists and Republicans in the Versailles Treaty.
He took part in the Coup d'etait of 1922 and of Hitler's Putsch of 1923.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 26, 2019
Erich Ludendorff is one of the more overlooked persons in Nazi history. Had he been standing on the right side of history, we could rightly call him "maligned". Ludendorff was a legend among the Nazis, a major proponent of deism, anticlericalism, militarism and the Dolchstoßlegende, leader of the Freikorps, and one of the masterminds of the Hitlerputsch. Later, him and Hitler fell out of favor, and he openly positioned himself against the Nazis, considering them to be milquetoast. No, he didn't land in a concentration camp for it. They pretty much let him be, and on his death, they even afforded him a crazy expensive funeral. That should tell you something about how big of a deal he was.
Ludendorff was a man with an ego and a military rank, and he let everyone know about the latter. He refused to shake hands with Hitler based on their difference in rank, that is the level of ego we are talking about. Der Totale Krieg reads that way, too: Ludendorffs favorite example of how to successfully wage war is himself. He considers himself the man who did everything right, who totally would've won the First World War if only those pesky social democrats and Catholics and Jews didn't sabotage him at every turn. His military record, as far as I could discern, consists of the Tannenberg Battle, and of taking supreme command over the later stages of that little war he lost. In other words, one success and a million good intentions. This is not the work of a Gustav Adolphus or a Jan Zizka, but of a general who would have become a military legend if only the world had given him a chance.
I have talked so much about Ludendorff himself because he is the major selling point of this book. Had it been written by anybody else, chances are no one would care very much. But I know books should be judged on their own merits nevertheless, so that is what I will do.
Der Totale Krieg outlines Ludendorffs theory of the total war. Ludendorff turns Clausewitz on his head by proposing that war, instead of being the continuation of policy by other means, holds primacy over politics. In Ludendorffs vision, the generals are in charge of the nation, and the politicians only have to make sure that the war machinery is running smoothly. Ludendorff demands nothing less than military dictatorship, not as a temporary measure, but as a permanency. Franco and Pinochet, two of the most famous military dictators, voluntarily relinquished power, but Ludendorff wouldn't have any of that. He is more militaristic than the military dictators of the 20th century.
Ludendorff loves war. He revels in it. Personally, I think he was one of the victors of the war: It gave him importance, an audience and perhaps a higher rank than he could've dreamed of. He was not one of the victims of the famine, I am not sure he even skipped meals. I doubt the high command would literally starve itself. He also wasn't one of the grunts suffering in the trenches. He never has been, for all I know. Had he been, he would still be deluded, talking, as he does, about war in quasi-religious terms, as the clash of races fighting for their very survival. He calls it holy and exalted, and sneers at the very idea of a limited war. How can you limit yourself, he asks, when the very survival of the race is at stake? Nevermind that there have been plenty of limited wars throughout history. They were even the rule, not the exception, from the early Middle Ages onward, up until the Thirty Years War, and then again until the French Revolution. That Ludendorff doesn't take this into account outs him as someone with as little empathy as historical knowledge.
Interwoven with his theory of total war is his spiritualism. It is uncommitted, insubstantial and relativistic. Spirituality is about "Gotterkenntnis", which means something like cognisance of god, or grasping or understanding him. Every race has its own unique "Gotterkenntnis", Ludendorff informs us, which is an elegant way to do away with catholicism (as a principle) and rationality at the same time. Spirituality is all about the warm feeling in your tummy when you think really hard about god with your buddies, who have to be of the same race or else you cannot communicate about these things. Not that you can communicate it anyway, because there's no holy book, no tradition (germanic paganism being deader than dead and Christianity being too semitic to be cool), and not even metaphysical claims open to philosophical inquiry. It's just so much New Age woo, not worthy of the name religion. I purposely did not capitalize god because in Ludendorffs deism, that is just an empty word.
All this, the primacy of military matters over politics, the empty spirituality, the racialism, combines to create a most peculiar form of complacency. Let the generals wage war unhindered, and remove all those Jews and Christians and Freemasons (the "discontent ones", as Ludendorff repeatedly, and repeatedly, calls them) who threaten racial homogeneity, then the rest of the problems of society will take care of themselves, somehow. The people will happily stand united against all outer enemies, one people acting as one (doing what after the war?), looking at lower-case god (must be boring after a while), paying racial scientists to inform them that yes, they are capital-G Germans. That no price is too much to ask for to ensure the survival of the race implies that as long as the race is alive, all is well. There is no motor to be kept alive to ensure a worthy existence besides our racial spirit. The Good Life is in our blood, not in any cultural achievements to preserve, not in a religion to observe.
The latter half of the book is mostly military trivia. Ludendorff meticulously describes the weapons of war of his time and their usage, which might be of some interest to a gun nut interested in the technical details, but for me, it was all too out of place. This is not supposed to be a technical manual, Ludendorff was purporting to talk about the nature of war per se, and then what should we care about pure historical contingencies, facts that will be obsolete to any general within decades?
As a military theoretician, Ludendorff is not worth very much. Not only is he afraid of saying anything too abstract for his simple audience (not that he doesn't dwell on abstractions anyway, he just does it in a primitive manner), he also doesn't even make a worthwhile effort to transcend his time and circumstances. He doesn't take account of the more limited nature of warfare in the past, or its more decentralized structure at certain times, like during the First Crusade, which was also a quite voluntary endeavor, yet highly successful. He doesn't take paradigm changes into account, like Jan Zizkas tactics that made cavalry charges worthless. War, like any kind of fighting, is not just about playing the game better than everyone else, but sometimes also about refusing to play the same game as everyone else. The one-sided battle at the Thermopylae was possible because the Greeks refused to fight the Persian armies on Xerxes' terms. There is a place for trading blows until someone gives out, there is a place for enduring and persevering, and there is a place for barely trying. Ludendorff, meanwhile, still assumed that it is battles that decide the war. That is often the case, but by no means always.
If you're interested in military theory, I recommend The Conduct Of War and War Before Civilization, as well as some historical research spanning the epochs.
Ludendorff was a man with an ego and a military rank, and he let everyone know about the latter. He refused to shake hands with Hitler based on their difference in rank, that is the level of ego we are talking about. Der Totale Krieg reads that way, too: Ludendorffs favorite example of how to successfully wage war is himself. He considers himself the man who did everything right, who totally would've won the First World War if only those pesky social democrats and Catholics and Jews didn't sabotage him at every turn. His military record, as far as I could discern, consists of the Tannenberg Battle, and of taking supreme command over the later stages of that little war he lost. In other words, one success and a million good intentions. This is not the work of a Gustav Adolphus or a Jan Zizka, but of a general who would have become a military legend if only the world had given him a chance.
I have talked so much about Ludendorff himself because he is the major selling point of this book. Had it been written by anybody else, chances are no one would care very much. But I know books should be judged on their own merits nevertheless, so that is what I will do.
Der Totale Krieg outlines Ludendorffs theory of the total war. Ludendorff turns Clausewitz on his head by proposing that war, instead of being the continuation of policy by other means, holds primacy over politics. In Ludendorffs vision, the generals are in charge of the nation, and the politicians only have to make sure that the war machinery is running smoothly. Ludendorff demands nothing less than military dictatorship, not as a temporary measure, but as a permanency. Franco and Pinochet, two of the most famous military dictators, voluntarily relinquished power, but Ludendorff wouldn't have any of that. He is more militaristic than the military dictators of the 20th century.
Ludendorff loves war. He revels in it. Personally, I think he was one of the victors of the war: It gave him importance, an audience and perhaps a higher rank than he could've dreamed of. He was not one of the victims of the famine, I am not sure he even skipped meals. I doubt the high command would literally starve itself. He also wasn't one of the grunts suffering in the trenches. He never has been, for all I know. Had he been, he would still be deluded, talking, as he does, about war in quasi-religious terms, as the clash of races fighting for their very survival. He calls it holy and exalted, and sneers at the very idea of a limited war. How can you limit yourself, he asks, when the very survival of the race is at stake? Nevermind that there have been plenty of limited wars throughout history. They were even the rule, not the exception, from the early Middle Ages onward, up until the Thirty Years War, and then again until the French Revolution. That Ludendorff doesn't take this into account outs him as someone with as little empathy as historical knowledge.
Interwoven with his theory of total war is his spiritualism. It is uncommitted, insubstantial and relativistic. Spirituality is about "Gotterkenntnis", which means something like cognisance of god, or grasping or understanding him. Every race has its own unique "Gotterkenntnis", Ludendorff informs us, which is an elegant way to do away with catholicism (as a principle) and rationality at the same time. Spirituality is all about the warm feeling in your tummy when you think really hard about god with your buddies, who have to be of the same race or else you cannot communicate about these things. Not that you can communicate it anyway, because there's no holy book, no tradition (germanic paganism being deader than dead and Christianity being too semitic to be cool), and not even metaphysical claims open to philosophical inquiry. It's just so much New Age woo, not worthy of the name religion. I purposely did not capitalize god because in Ludendorffs deism, that is just an empty word.
All this, the primacy of military matters over politics, the empty spirituality, the racialism, combines to create a most peculiar form of complacency. Let the generals wage war unhindered, and remove all those Jews and Christians and Freemasons (the "discontent ones", as Ludendorff repeatedly, and repeatedly, calls them) who threaten racial homogeneity, then the rest of the problems of society will take care of themselves, somehow. The people will happily stand united against all outer enemies, one people acting as one (doing what after the war?), looking at lower-case god (must be boring after a while), paying racial scientists to inform them that yes, they are capital-G Germans. That no price is too much to ask for to ensure the survival of the race implies that as long as the race is alive, all is well. There is no motor to be kept alive to ensure a worthy existence besides our racial spirit. The Good Life is in our blood, not in any cultural achievements to preserve, not in a religion to observe.
The latter half of the book is mostly military trivia. Ludendorff meticulously describes the weapons of war of his time and their usage, which might be of some interest to a gun nut interested in the technical details, but for me, it was all too out of place. This is not supposed to be a technical manual, Ludendorff was purporting to talk about the nature of war per se, and then what should we care about pure historical contingencies, facts that will be obsolete to any general within decades?
As a military theoretician, Ludendorff is not worth very much. Not only is he afraid of saying anything too abstract for his simple audience (not that he doesn't dwell on abstractions anyway, he just does it in a primitive manner), he also doesn't even make a worthwhile effort to transcend his time and circumstances. He doesn't take account of the more limited nature of warfare in the past, or its more decentralized structure at certain times, like during the First Crusade, which was also a quite voluntary endeavor, yet highly successful. He doesn't take paradigm changes into account, like Jan Zizkas tactics that made cavalry charges worthless. War, like any kind of fighting, is not just about playing the game better than everyone else, but sometimes also about refusing to play the same game as everyone else. The one-sided battle at the Thermopylae was possible because the Greeks refused to fight the Persian armies on Xerxes' terms. There is a place for trading blows until someone gives out, there is a place for enduring and persevering, and there is a place for barely trying. Ludendorff, meanwhile, still assumed that it is battles that decide the war. That is often the case, but by no means always.
If you're interested in military theory, I recommend The Conduct Of War and War Before Civilization, as well as some historical research spanning the epochs.
Read
February 3, 2018Historical document interesting for
- Ludendorff's militaristic turning of Clausewitz upside down
- Ludendorff's apparent keen military mind (accurately predicting WW II-style warfare despite his experiences with WW I) and complete lack of understanding of war as a means, not an end
- Ludendorff's wacky spiritual ideas of "national gnosis" instead of Christianity as well as his murky ideas of Jews and the Catholic church controlling the "global capitalists" including the Russian communists
- Ludendorff's militaristic turning of Clausewitz upside down
- Ludendorff's apparent keen military mind (accurately predicting WW II-style warfare despite his experiences with WW I) and complete lack of understanding of war as a means, not an end
- Ludendorff's wacky spiritual ideas of "national gnosis" instead of Christianity as well as his murky ideas of Jews and the Catholic church controlling the "global capitalists" including the Russian communists
August 19, 2024
"Christian doctrine is a foreign doctrine that is in the deepest contradiction with our racial heritage, kills it, takes away the racially specific spiritual cohesion of the nation, and renders it defenseless, which I will explain in more detail shortly. Only the Jewish nation has, according to Christian doctrine, the right to live according to its race and its nature. Recognizing this grave fact is the result of serious reflection on how it was possible for the Jewish nation and the Roman Church to take away from the German people in its struggle for life in the World War."
In contrast to previous theories of war, general Ludendorff presented a radical new framework. The entire nation with its education and economy should be oriented towards crushing a rival nation. So that every action of every citizen plays a role in providing the most moral support and resources to the army in the battlefield. Although a strong believer in social darwinism, he also worshipped the pagan gods of the vikings like odin,siegfried and thor. He saw in their ideology a war culture which was messing in christianity. Where dying in the battlefield is much preferred over dying of natural causes so the valkeries will take you to valhalla. After retirement upon the end of the first world war he became a teacher and mentor of Adolf. His ideas also being influential with heidegger. That a citizens death is also a natural resource that should not be wasted but used in the battlefield. Ideas which were 13 centuries earlier being used by the muslims in their rapid expansion and militarism and which are still relevant today as we see in Gaza. The fiercest warriors are the ones who prefer to die in the battlefield than of old age.
In contrast to previous theories of war, general Ludendorff presented a radical new framework. The entire nation with its education and economy should be oriented towards crushing a rival nation. So that every action of every citizen plays a role in providing the most moral support and resources to the army in the battlefield. Although a strong believer in social darwinism, he also worshipped the pagan gods of the vikings like odin,siegfried and thor. He saw in their ideology a war culture which was messing in christianity. Where dying in the battlefield is much preferred over dying of natural causes so the valkeries will take you to valhalla. After retirement upon the end of the first world war he became a teacher and mentor of Adolf. His ideas also being influential with heidegger. That a citizens death is also a natural resource that should not be wasted but used in the battlefield. Ideas which were 13 centuries earlier being used by the muslims in their rapid expansion and militarism and which are still relevant today as we see in Gaza. The fiercest warriors are the ones who prefer to die in the battlefield than of old age.
May 12, 2019
O ağır Alman üslubunun karmaşıklığına takılmadığınız sürece hem bir savaş stratejisi hakkında okumuş hem de II.DS öncesi asker kökenli bir Alman'ın görüşlerini okumuş olursunuz.
April 12, 2020
Teorik olarak dopdolu bir kitap. Ancak 2 bölümün Türkçeleştirilmesi yorucu olmuş.
January 11, 2020
Clearly the Nazi juice got to his head...
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews