When Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, the United States and NATO were losing the Cold War. The USSR had superiority in conventional weapons and manpower in Europe, and had embarked on a massive program to gain naval preeminence. But Reagan already had a plan to end the Cold War without armed conflict.
Reagan led a bipartisan Congress to restore American command of the seas by building the navy back to six hundred major ships and fifteen aircraft carriers. He adopted a bold new strategy to deploy the growing fleet to northern waters around the periphery of the Soviet Union and demonstrate that the NATO fleet could sink Soviet submarines, defeat Soviet bomber and missile forces, and strike aggressively deep into the Soviet homeland if the USSR attacked NATO in Central Europe. New technology in radars, sensors, and electronic warfare made ghosts of American submarines and surface fleets. The United States proved that it could effectively operate carriers and aircraft in the ice and storms of Arctic waters, which no other navy had attempted. The Soviets, suffocated by this naval strategy, were forced to bankrupt their economy trying to keep pace. Shortly thereafter the Berlin Wall fell, and the USSR disbanded.
In Oceans Ventured, John Lehman reveals for the first time the untold story of the naval operations that played a major role in winning the Cold War.
John Francis Lehman Jr. is a former secretary of the US Navy (1981–1987) during the Reagan administration in which he promoted the creation of a 600-ship navy.
My desire to read this book was sparked by several overwhelmingly positive reviews in defense outlets After reading the book itself, my suspicion that defense publications should employ actual literary critics was confirmed. This book, a memoir of sorts from a former SECNAV, fails to live up to its great promise. It is both poorly written and not nearly as fulfilling as it could have been. If it had been written in bullet points it would not have been much different to read. Paragraphs follow in sequence with little transition or cohesion. The events described are written in such a staccato manner that I'm amazed this book made it past an editor. Naval exercise follows exercise with no description of plans, analysis, or review in between. Lehman seems to believe that it is these naval exercises that are the most exciting aspects of his book. In this he is extremely mistaken. Military exercises do not exist in a vacuum. They follow changes in both national strategic thought and operational modes of warfare. The exercises themselves are less interesting than the decisions that guided those exercises. The Navy's choice to reorient their forces to the north Atlantic with offensive battle doctrines was a lightening bolt to the Soviet navy, but not enough is written about the political and military choices that brought this strategic shift to the forefront of naval doctrine. Lehman had a unique opportunity to describe the decision-making, planning, and review process for changes in both doctrine and procurement policy. His book almost totally misses the opportunity.
This is unfortunate. The 1980s are a rich environment. The shift in defense policy writ large and naval policy especially forced the USSR to operate in ways that it was both militarily and economically unable to sustain. The shift in naval doctrine from the Carter administration to the Reagan and Bush administrations was titanic. The service became less rick averse, and began to train as it would have fought: in hazardous environments at consistently high readiness states. The growth in the number of warships and in manpower allowed for armadas not seen since the Second World War. As developments in propulsion, armaments, construction, and early-warning spread throughout the fleet, her sailors became more confident in not only holding back the larger Soviet fleet, but in also defeating them before they reached critical areas and then counterattacking. The financial strain of keeping up with American shipbuilding was instrumental in the rapid deterioration in Soviet state finances during the decade. This deterioration was vital in the final implosion of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. These events could have easily filled a 300-page book, but Lehman's is not the landmark work it both could have been and should have been. We must continue to wait for the work of nonfiction that matches Tom Clancy's fictional examinations of this era with such mastery.
Enlightening narrative in maritime thinking of the 1980s, but naturally one-sided. Also, organization throughout is repetitive and difficult to follow at times. Still worth the read.
A good book, providing a first-hand account of the implementation of the Maritime Strategy by one of its prime architects and main initiators, SecNav John Lehman. Rather than presenting the narrative as a story about the strategy and its various effects, Secretary Lehman uses detailed outlines of the series of large scale Naval Exercises conducted by the USN as the primary focus. From this we get a deeper view into the Maritime Strategy’s implementation and the Naval Leaders who put actions to words. Along the way there are plenty of side stories on the various technologies introduced in conjunction with the Maritime Strategy, the tactics developed to make it effective, the expanded operational scope of the USN to implement the Strategy, and the various levels of reaction by the Soviets, both military and diplomatic, to counter the effort. Though obviously remaining loyal to the President who authorized the expanded use of Naval Power in the last stage of the Cold War, Lehman presents a very bipartisan story, understanding the rationale for the various figures involved and showing how he maneuvered to maintain focus on his prime goal of successfully carrying out his published strategy. His Naval Aviation background is obvious in the way he presents the exercises, but the main points of the total Naval effort do come through (though sometimes you have to wade through a very Carrier-esque storyline to get there). A great book for those wanting to know more about the nuts-and-bolts of the Maritime Strategy and it’s indications for the future.
After serving in the military in the 70's and 80's, Lehman's book provided an insight into the bigger picture that we rarely saw at the enlisted level. He covers Northern Wedding '86 in which I participated and it was quite fascinating to read the background stories that led up to one of the largest exercises in history. There were times when it was difficult to follow timelines as more than once they blended together and I was confused as to which year he was speaking about. Overall it's a good book and I recommend it for anyone interested in naval or Marine Corps history, foreign policy, or leadership.
As a Naval Officer, I am charged with leading multiple generations of personnel, from baby boomer to millennial. My charge comes with the expectation that my leadership decisions do not repeat the mistakes of the past while implementing the lessons learned for future Naval progress. History, without the proper context, is merely words on paper or pictures on a wall. This book eloquently explains the Cold War through the lens of the Navy. As a person that “hates” history class, in the academic sense, this book helped me developed a better appreciation for our Naval history and what our future Navy force may look like. A great read for any young junior officer or Navalist.
The background story is compelling. The current relevance is undisputed. The author had a uniquely favorable position to influence, experience and recount the strategy and the ensuing events. The ambition is a Tom Clancy style real life-thriller from the last years of the Cold War.
So far so good.
Bit the author is no Tom Clancy and among the multiple people being so profusely thanked in the book apparently no none had the guts to tell the author that he is no Tom Clancy. The disappointing result is repetitious, unstructured, superficial, bombastic, narrow jumble that frustrates the reader wanting to study and learn about the crucial period of the Soviet-US confrontation.
I never expect much from books written by former politicians, but this book is even weaker than normal. It is, in large part, a self-congratulation. Of course, all that went well was the Reagan administration's earned success; everything that went wrong, including severe weather, was the responsibility of the Carter administration. The book is blown up by repetitions and the addition of useless technical data but adding nothing new on the political backgrounds that wasn't known already before. It is a pity that the two authors could have brought some interesting insight into the thinking of the Reagan administration.
To be honest, this is a very self-congratulatory book about the Department of the Navy's role at the end of the Cold War, written by the former head of it. There are some insightful elements, but for true scholarship, you'll need to look elsewhere. It does give you an idea of the Navy's view of itself, and the placement and schema of its current leadership, who would have been junior officers at that time. I could have done without Lehman 's digs at the other services in the book.
Great book. If you want to understand America's Navy in the Cold war, this book is a must read. I've read two others like this. The first, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation. The second, Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation. These three books tell a comprehensive story, but Oceans Ventured was the last written and able to tell a better story using the retrospectives made in the first two.
Pretty above average professional reading book, more like a textbook than a novel - very strategy oriented from a fascinating Former SECNAV author. Best part to me was the in depth discussion of how the Soviet Union actually fell, which is sadly missing from most history classes in today’s high schools. Recommend it to Seagoing professionals and Cold War buffs, and anyone (like me) that feels that their Cold War era knowledge is unfortunately lacking depth and breadth.
I was disappointed in this. It reads like an endless catalog of mission names and which ships participated. It also seems to jump around a lot in time; it's not in a chronological sequence. It seemed like a really slapdash effort with little to no character. Just "there was this exercise on this date and these ships participated" over and over. Not recommended.
An interesting read covering most of my early years on active duty in the Navy and why it was so important for America what we were doing was truly in it's best interests. I enjoyed the read and thought it was well worth the time investment.
Reliving some of my own history as I read this. Lehman needs to do some editing, some repetitiveness. Strong case for rebuilding our Navy to meet resurgent Russia, expansionist China and Iran.
It was mildly interesting from a historical perspective and fascinating from a lived experience perspective. Secretary Lehman has some stories and this seems like only the beginning of them.
A useful contribution by a former Secretary of the Navy that sheds light on a particularly significant era in both Cold War naval history and in the evolution of U.S. maritime strategy.