The China Mission: George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945-1947

by Daniel Kurtz-Phelan

A nuanced history of the doomed diplomatic mission that turned the tides of the Chinese Civil War.

Following the phenomenal success of General George C. Marshall’s leadership of the American army during World War II, he was the standout candidate for a vital international mission: brokering a coalition government between China’s warring Nationalists and Communists. Marshall went overseas as a U.S. “special representative” and began enacting miraculous change. Under Marshall’s guiding hand, China’s embattled political factions agreed to a ceasefire and settled on the principles of a democratic government. But over the next ten months, Marshall’s mission soured: the agreements he brokered fractured and civil war came to China after all.

This fascinating narrative history portrays the incredible beginnings and ultimate failure of Marshall’s high-stakes mission, with a remarkable cast of characters featuring a heroes’ gallery of American diplomats―Truman, Eisenhower, MacArthur, and many others. In spellbinding, pinpoint detail, The China Mission chronicles an unforgettable misstep in American diplomacy that changed the course of global politics forevermore.

Genres: History, China, Nonfiction, Asia, Biography, American History, World War II

476 pages, Hardcover

First published April 10, 2018

Reviews

[Joseph · Rating 2 out of 5]

The author, a former speech writer for Hillary Clinton and likely part of the entourage Hillary brought to the State Department and later her campaign, has an undergraduate degree centering on political science and history. He is an able writer who is an excellent wordsmith and has a smooth easy to follow style. The book comes with a long set of notes and a semi extensive bibliography. In terms of sheer numbers the notes and sources fill 88 pages. But, too many of these notes and too much of the bibliography is from less than substantial sources, several of which are more notable for revisionist views of history than for serious academic chops. But, perhaps more significant are the omissions. Not found in the works cited are John Gittings landmark study, “The Role of the Chinese Army,” which speaks to the development, leadership, training and discipline of the People’s Liberation Army or James Sheridan’s “China in Disintegration.” Similarly two of the foremost biographers of Mao: Jerome Chen and Frederic Wakeman are missing from the bibliography. That by itself is not necessarily a problem or even a surprise since Kurtz-Phelan has no academic background and minimal experience in East Asia.

More concerning; however, is the way, the author takes bits and pieces from the works he cites without providing full context. Thus when he speaks to the murder of Chinese communist officials and sympathizers in Shanghai by the KMT and thugs recruited for the slaughter he fails to mention that Mao’s wife, Yáng Kāihuì, (probably the only woman Mao ever really loved) was executed by a KMT warlord He Jian. Mao later told an American that he mourned Yáng Kāihuì for the rest of his life. That certainly would have colored Mao’s relationship with Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. It is this sort of detail and its impact that Kurtz-Phelan routinely misses.

There are other opportunities for analysis that the author glosses over. For example early on he recounts an incident with Winston Churchill. As Kurtz-Phelan recounts Marshall says to Churchill “Not one American soldier is going to die on that goddamned beach.” (A reference to the upcoming invasion of Normandy.) The author does not understand why Marshall said that. Marshall said it because of the needless death he saw in the Meuse Argonne, the deadliest battle in American history which saw 26,277 American doughboys killed and another 95,786 wounded. My dad’s oldest brother was killed in the Meuse Argonne which can probably best be described as a “cluster—ck.” The fighting that Marshall took part in in the American War in the Philippines in the early 1900s was also extremely brutal with atrocities on both sides. It is obvious that Kurtz-Phelan never served in the military and has has little background or feel for what military service is like. If he had, he would have understood Marshall’s remark.

Finally, some of the research is just plain shoddy. Colonel Dave Barrett headed the Dixie Mission from March 1942 to November 1944. Barrett was a skilled Chinese linguist with long experience in China. Barrett was despised by Ambassador Hurley (Hurley was pretty much a flaming idiot) and replaced by Col Ivan Yeaton who had nowhere near the background Barrett had, but who was much more deferential to the loose cannon Hurley. Had Kurtz-Phelan understood this his remarks about the Dixie mission would have been less convoluted.

Another example of Kurtz-Phelan playing a bit fast and loose with facts occurs when he states “... when Yenan requested Soviet Weapons, Moscow instead sent tens of thousands of guns, airplanes, and tanks, along with advisors and pilots ... “ That is well and good, but the Soviets withdrew all those personnel in 1940. What impact that had on Marshall’s mission is questionable. The way the author writes about Soviet support it would be all too easy to assume the Soviets where still supporting Chiang Kai-shek when Marshall arrived in China. Making this false assumption abets the revisionist history Kurtz-Phelan puts forth.

Kurtz-Phelan and Norton obviously pulled some strings to get some good reviews written. As the editor of Foreign Affairs and a protege of Hillary’s there certainly were strings to be pulled. The book will probably be a best seller.

I am rating it a two in spite of the shoddy research ... i am doing that because it made me consult several books I have on hand and it lead me to review some of the work I did in Asian Studies. That, for me, was a good exercise.

[Marks54 · Rating 4 out of 5]

I heard about this book right when I was finishing Ben Steill’s excellent book on the Marshall and it seemed like it would be a good complement. These are books about two different but important cases of immediate post-WW2 diplomacy led by the same larger than life leader but taking place in different parts of the world and leading to very different outcomes that continue to influence the world today. Sounded like a good pairing to me.

Kurtz-Phelan’s book on Marshall’s mission to China to avert a civil war between the Communists and Nationalists is a sharp and well documented story about a mission that seemed to start well but then went off the rails and ultimately failed. Spoiler alert ...

The book focuses on personalities with central attention to Marshall. That is a great strength of the book to me, since Marshall is without question one of the towering Americans of the century. I say this even as I am deeply skeptical of “great man” approaches to history or leadership. The pivotal importance of key individuals is most often clear after the fact (and then with the aid of promotional efforts) and frequently tied to positive outcomes. Capable analysis unfailingly finds such stories of great actors to obscure the truth that management and leadership are team sports that also depend heavily on background conditions.

In his mission to China, one wonders how much success was ever possible, given the colossal egos involved and the long history of violence and betrayal in relations between the Communists and Nationalists. There were some world class operators working the stage here (Zhou, Mao, Chiang), and Marshall no doubt suspected that he was being used. Then there is the matter of the scale of what was being negotiated - the governance of 400 million Chinese over a land area the size of the US. Given this and a decade of world war, how amenable was this situation to personal diplomacy? It is amazing that any progress was made in 1946.

Marshall comes across as principled, smart, supremely confident, and a team player. Some of the more insightful parts of the book relate to the recollections of the subordinates who worked with him. An interesting aspect of Marshall is that he was not a subscriber to the cult of personality approach to management and kept more in the background as he directed the war and post-war periods. This includes not producing any significant memoirs, unlike nearly everyone else her worked with during the war, at the wartime conferences, or in the post-war period. His strategic posture is also interesting. He clearly thought in global terms but worried much more about implementation and getting plans to work. Marshall preferred to let others produce strategic documents and was instrumental in setting up the policy planning staff at the State Department that George Kennan led. In this sense, he was a modern leader/manager in that he knew the importance organization, information, and good process to the success of modern warfare and diplomacy.

The story of the China mission is sad and even tragic, in that Marshall seems to have known its long odds for success and yet jumped in when asked to serve his country and Truman. The comparison with the Marshall Plan for Europe is instructive about what conditions need to be present for diplomacy to have lasting positive effects. At a time when a grand summit is at hand between two longtime adversaries on an Asian peninsula and that summit is planned by a novice president with little experience in government, military, or diplomacy, this book is a cautionary tale of how hard it is to make things work under highly capable and well respected leadership. What could happen if the conditions supporting such a summit were less well founded?

[Charles · Rating 5 out of 5]

U.S. Discovers the Limits of its Post-War Power

This is a wonderful, insightful book about a period in U.S.-Chinese relations that has received little attention recently — but which in the U.S. resulted in character assassination and myth about “what might have been” until Nixon “opened China” in 1972.

The U.S. emerged from World War II as far and away the most powerful nation in the world. But as described in Daniel Kurtz-Phelan’s book about George Marshall’s 1946 mission to China, this leadership had its limitations. Not the least of these was a war-weary American electorate who wished to reduce the number of soldiers stationed overseas. Americans were unenthusiastic about using taxpayer funds to support the regimes of other nations, especially those that were weak, lacked popular indigenous support, and were of marginal economic importance to the U.S.

In this regard, China in 1946 was a curtain-raiser to the American experience in Vietnam.

America was at the peak of its power and so was the reputation of General George Marshall, who was seen by many as the architect of victory in World War II. One day after his retirement as Army Chief of Staff, Marshall received a call from President Harry Truman asking him to go to sort out the problem of China, consisting primarily of Soviet occupation of Manchuria and the impending civil war between the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists under Mao Zedong.

American hopes were high. “With God’s help, we will lift Shanghai up until it’s just like Kansas City,” said one U.S. Senator.

Indeed, at first Marshall’s reputation was such that all sides held him in awe and seemed eager to take direction. In short order, he appeared to get Communist agreement to move to democracy, to reject civil war, and to become part of the government under Chiang. The Nationalists had an army three times the size of Mao’s, and was equipped with modern military equipment provided by the U.S. Stalin kept Mao at arm’s length, was skeptical about Communism in China, and told Mao that he had to behave.

The author portrays a number of the principals vividly. That includes Marshall, of course, but Zhou Enlai is an impressive actor representing Mao at high level talks to try to hammer out agreement on a unified government. Initially, Zhou seemed dazzled by Marshall, although it’s unclear whether this was a true sentiment or a tactical ploy. Another fascinating character is Madam Chiang, the Wellesley-educated bridge between the Chinese and American cultures, who hosted the Marshalls throughout their China posting and developed a close relationship with General Marshall’s wife Katherine.

But the Nationalist government was spending virtually all its budget on the military, and Chiang — despite Marshall’s efforts — failed to address corruption and the extreme poverty of a populace which had suffered terribly under Japanese occupation and war. Marshall thought neither side could destroy the other, but together they could destroy China.

Marshall’s approach was always practical. Although he wanted to guarantee China’s unity, secure Chiang’s leadership, and encourage enough reform and compromise to avert a civil war, he recognized that at the end of the day it was up to Chiang and his advisors to take the lead to achieve these goals.

Marshall disliked half measures (as the U.S. pursued in Vietnam) but he also recognized the limits of American power even at a time when America seemed so preeminent. He knew that Americans were eager to shift to a peacetime economy and to move beyond the consumer austerity of the war years. The Soviet threat to Europe was beginning to loom large (and would soon command economic aid in the form of the Marshall Plan as well as a major U.S. military commitment). Marshall was known, the author notes, to be able to separate the vital from the secondary, and then differentiate between goals that were vital and achievable and those that may have been vital but were futile. China fell into the second category.

Kurtz-Phelan closes with the attacks on Marshall, by Joseph McCarthy and others, for “losing China.” Having read the story of Marshall’s efforts, which were honorable, diligent, and realistic, one is persuaded that such charges were grossly unfair. The U.S. didn’t lose China as it was never ours to lose.

[Micah · Rating 5 out of 5]

I learned so much from this comprehensive narrative of George Marshall's heroic efforts to stem the tide of an all but certain war in post-WWII China. Amid the growing tension in Washington over the spread of Soviet influence in Europe and Asia and an infant U.S. foreign policy after World War II broke America's isolationist streak, Gen. George Marshall stood in the gap to try and diplomatically bring peace to the 400 million people of China, torn between the idealistic fervor of the Communists under Mao Zedong and the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. This book documents the unfolding of events over the long 13 months that Marshall was in China trying to broker a peace between the two warring sides, with the future of East Asia at stake. Marshall seemed to be a man of great conviction, unwavering in his desire for peace, and having to delicately navigate the complex continental politics of China, all while receiving criticism from both Democrats and Republicans back in the U.S. I greatly admire the author's commitment to conveying the common struggles faced by all the parties involved: the impoverished people in the war-torn Chinese countryside, the power-hungry, zealous Mao and Chiang, the schizophrenic politicians of Washington, the ever-changing U.S. public and its opinions on foreign policy, and the beleaguered yet indefatigable George Marshall. Great read!

[Harry Jordan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very helpful in understanding present day Chinese relations with U.S.

All students of Chinese politics will benefit by reading this well told story of General Marshall’s work after WW II.

[JS · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book! The subject matter could have become tedious and boring, but the author did a great job of writing this history as a compelling narrative. The story of the founding of the PRC from the side of the west is fascinating and the author knocked it out of the park. Highly recommend

[Patricia · Rating 4 out of 5]

So many reviewers have summarized the book's story, and have raised some of the larger issues (does history make men or men make history?) let me leave the metaphorical forest and share some of the 'trees' I found interesting or gave pause to thought (i.e. notes I made):

P. 69 - Unfortunately Kurtz-Phelan identifies Charlie Soong's eldest daughter (Ai-Ling) as Sun Yat Sen's wife; no, she was married to the banker H. H. Kung; it was his 2nd eldest daughter (Ching-Ling) who was married to Sun Yat Sen. The key player in this book though is the youngest daughter, Mei-Ling, who was Chiang Kai-shek's third wife. But making such a simple factual error early on, made me a cautious reader, who had a bookmark stuck in the 'Notes' section in the back (which replaced the more common use of quotation marks and footnotes, which disturbed some readers) to keep checking the sources. That said, the ones I checked, 'checked out' and the Bibliography is excellent, so it was a little disconcerting to find such a simple mistake in a work that clearly reflects considerable research.

I also found it odd when Kurtz-Phelan referred to Mao's leadership in connection with "After the heroic hardships of the Long March and the first years of refuge in Yenan.... (p. 78). We now know that many of those 'heroic hardships' were after-the-fact myth-making, making me worry that the author had bought the propaganda. Anyone who has read about the Long March, when Mao was basically carried in a sedan chair for long sections when not riding a horse (see Mao: The Unknown Story), would have raised an eyebrow.

The author's access to government sources, however, gave him the advantage of including some fascinating little details I'd never seen before and loved, such as the Secret Service's names for the key players: Zhou Enlai's code name was "Mainbocher, after a French-American line of haute couture; Mao was Moby, after the white whale" (p. 79). Madame Chiang's "U.S. military code names included both Zeus and Snow White" (p. 68). Likewise, his relationship with John Mellbye gave him access to his letters where I learned of Mellbye's and Lillian Hellman's relationship, which explained Mellbye's sudden fall of grace later in his career, another story I hadn't seen before.

There were several references (p. 220 & 292) to Marshall being perceived as Chiang Kai-shek's "smoke screen"--a phrase I think I could find useful in the future personally.

My most common bookmarks were, however, opinions and judgments attributed to Marshall himself, who was clearly (to use a Chinese term) 'a superior man': such as his warnings about not getting "sucked in along an unpredictable path of intervention and escalation" (p. 344); or when warning Chiang's corrupt 'militarists', "The army is draining 80 to 90 percent of the budget and if you think the U.S. taxpayer is going to step into the vacuum this creates, you can go to hell", p. 306); or the advice he gave to a new appointee, "avoid trivia" (p. 338). And of course, the entire speech he gave on June 5, 1947 in Cambridge, Massachusetts (my home town) that launched the Marshall Plan.

And the paragraph (that in the early months of 2020, ahead of a U.S. election, as I write this review) that stopped me dead: "For all the sense of China as some exotic other ... Was the divide between Nationalists and Communists really so different from the divide between Republicans and Democrats? (If Democrats and Republicans had independent armies ... would [they] be at war as well"?) (p. 326).

[Adam Balshan · Rating 2 out of 5]

2.5 stars [History]
(W: 2.79, U: 2.57, T: 2.47)
Exact rating: 2.61

This account of George Marshall's diplomatic mission to China was decently paced and of good lexical stock. The dynamism was lacking, and so were explanations about the broader themes or environments of its setting. In short, Kurtz-Phelan did very well with the day-to-day and micro details, but poorly with the macro.

The author wrote very little about Marshall's time at the Virginia Military Institute. Marshall's shining character traits formed in that spartan environment would have born weightily upon the author's continual emphasis on the personalities involved in the mission (Marhall's, Chiang's, and Zhou's).

Several minor and one major element moved the Truth rating around from its general 2.5:
3 - A nuanced overview of American involvement in China, 1900-1943. Entailed both the noble and base. Described the baseness of Woodrow Wilson, which was accurate.

3.5 - Even took a dig at Soviet ideological hypocrisy in greedily scooping up booty in its retreat from China that the Chinese Communists could have used.

2.25 - It was unclear what the author meant in Ch. 5 about the realization of power by rural masses to be contrary to Marxist orthodoxy. The Proletariat is exactly that.

1.5 - The treatment of General Wedemeyer seemed to be 100% negative. Wedemeyer was a fellow military man, and at one point was in line for the ambassador position after Marshall left.

2 - A rightful condemnation of McCarthyism. But its description flowered after Marshall left China, whetting our appetite, only to leave a loose end as the book terminated shortly thereafter.

The major element:
2.38 - Most of the narrative seemed to ignore Marxist-Maoist doctrine and temperament. It was like we were presented a whitewashed Mao, unlike what we know him to be from every accurate historical portrayal of the autocrat [1.5]. This was mitigated to a [2] by a late-book admission that the Communists (as well as the Nationalists) only ever negotiated in the first place to reverse ground situations or seek for advantage. Conversely, the author portrays well the increasing concern about Communism in Washington, inducing even the eminent figure of General Wedemeyer to engage in some double-talking [2.75]. This early treatment also made the loose end of McCarthyism more anticlimactic.

Takeaway
Probably not worth the read unless you are strongly interested in post-WWII diplomacy, Chinese history, Chiang Kai Shek, or Communist history.

[J.K. George · Rating 3 out of 5]

Another book club selection.

Crammed full of info, with a full-bore dive into General Marshall's assignment (at the bequest of President Truman) to try and bring the two antagonists, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, into some sort of more or less representative government with the Chinese Communists as a minority party with restraining capabilities along with the majority party (and controller of a merged military) the Chinese Nationalists. The book is so full of excruciating back-and-forth moves to gain superiority and move around Marshall's good intentions, "good" according to American ideals of fairness, that I tired of the detail. But I persevered on, page by page, until the end came with the collapse of the Nationalists, as the result of years of the elite creaming off the control of land, wealth, and depending on the US to protect them from the USSR which was pressing in from the north and supporting the Communists, albeit with sometimes surprisingly light touches.

The book consists of 363 pages of text, 75 pages of incredible notes, 12 pages of sources, and finally 15 pages of an index. Whew! This work is a splendid example of scholarship and detail, but requires the reader to slog over and over through the ins and outs of the intrigues of both sides. They move inexorably towards the ending we know to have occurred when Chiang's offensive was overextended, the people ready for land and corruption reform (according to Mao) and the whole thing collapsed in late 1949 with Chiang's forces forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan, where that arm of the government in exile exists today under the protective shield of the US. How long this will continue - one wonders. That Taiwan includes the bulk of the world's most advanced semiconductor manufacturing capability underscores the question and dilemma.

This quote from the book struck me as apropos to today: "It is an ugly sight to watch a country increasingly being forced into one extreme or another - it makes any form of (liberal democracy) seem hopeless."

Also this conclusion, in retrospect: "It would not have been possible for the United States to prevent a Communist victory in China by military force, covert options, or diplomatic initiatives."

The author concludes with this: "History's lessons are never clean or simple." Reading this book makes that point extremely clear.

JKG

[Michael Ting · Rating 5 out of 5]

Riveting & forceful insight of General Marshall’s role in mediating peace between 2 belligerents (Mao’s CCP & Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang) through the joint efforts of the committee for 3.

It breaks down and indicts the different parties errors which led to the failure for negotiations which preceded the CCP invasion of Manchuria and caused the communist takeover of China.

Several factors are identified which contributed to the failure such as amongst others:
1. the lack of a desire for peace;
2. regional domination;
2. complete eradication of the opposing party;
4. intransigence;
5. weakness from Marshall &
6. a leak from the state department to Chiang Kai Shek on Truman’s order for committed support for the nationalists despite all circumstances.

Readers will get to see how both parties took General Marshall on a wild goose chase, pressing advantages in moments of success then return to the negotiation table as momentum starts to change.

One cannot feel somewhat angry at the ineffectiveness of General Marshall’s actions and how a different outcome could have been achieved if he had pursued a maximalist position or if he was just a harder negotiator. However, I also felt sympathetic and admiration towards the general who pursued relentlessly day & night devising solutions whilst remaining steadfast in the midst of obstacles and questions about his judgment ability and integrity.

Anyhow those are just my 2 cents, it is up for the reader to opine and infer for themselves as they read this detailed account by Kurtz-Phelan.

[Nathan Thomas · Rating 4 out of 5]

An important investigation into George C. Marshall’s attempt to solve what has remained one of the most contentious issues in global politics. After the end of the Second World War, Marshall was given the task to save China from the chaos that threatened to consume it as Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong battled over competing visions of China. For just a moment it seemed that the former Chief of Staff, or as Churchill called him, “Organizer of Victory,” could do it. However, even Marshall could not, and the author, Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, provides a deeply revealing account how Marshall and the United States ultimately failed to reconcile these two visions.

The book is an insightful investigation of an oft neglected part of Marshall’s career which also provides greater insight into the forces that shaped China and the modern world after WWII. It will remain a regularly referenced book as I seek greater understanding into China, the limits of diplomacy, and the career and a failure of one of the United States’ greatest statesmen.

As Marshall noted, and many others have realized, "Conducting war is a relatively simple profession [...] To make peace seems to be a more complicated matter."

[Piker7977 · Rating 3 out of 5]

The China Mission is a biography of George Marshall during the years when he was tasked with settling tensions in China during the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. While there is plenty of information about the frictions between the Nationalists and the Communists, this book mostly examines how a great leader like Marshall used everything in his diplomatic and leadership toolkit to try and salvage an agreement amidst deteriorating circumstances in a particular moment. These few years illustrated how diplomacy is not only tested, but can be impossible regardless of who is leading the charge.

But, this is not the only legacy of George Marshall nor the United States. The greatest statesmen, leaders, and countries are not marked by their successes alone. The world and its history are much more nuanced for those types of narratives.

[Dennis Hogan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Finished The China Mission: George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945-1947 by Daniel Kurtz-Phelan. After retiring as Army Chief of Staff, President Truman asked this unassuming, brilliant loyal soldier to mediate a settlement between the Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and the Chinese Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-Shek to avoid a civil war. This well written book illuminates the causes of the China we know today and more importantly, supplies the context for the fear of Communists at the same time America was in a rush to demobilize troops at the end of WW2. There are lessons not learned by America that have some parallel with Iraq, Vietnam and Afghanistan. One sad personal learning, Joe McCarthy decimated the State Department’s Asia experts in the Communist witch hunt which came back to haunt us when formulating plans for Vietnam and Southeast Asia. George Marshall is a legendary figure in US history even if his mission was unsuccessful.

[Brian Thorson · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was not previously familiar with Marshall’s role in defining the US-China relationship. The amount of autonomy he was given to negotiate with all parties and determine what aid was received was surprising; certainly different than today. I’m not sure anyone else would have done better, but the outcome certainly wasn’t favorable.

The way the author weaved the personal story of Marshall into a detailed historical account made the book an enjoyable read.

[Dennis Murphy · Rating 5 out of 5]

The China Mission: George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945-1947 by Daniel Kurtz-Phelan is one of the more revealing books I've read explaining the road to the second phase of the Chinese civil war. Marshall comes across as a great man trying to accomplish a great task, but one ultimately doomed from the start. I was surprised by just how willing Kurtz-Phelan portrays the early communists in their desire to shift to political struggle. Chiang's Icarus-like drive to reunify the country by military means was less surprising, given how hostilities were ended in the first Communist-Nationalist war. Chiang's entire modus operandi was one of massaging Marshall into eventually coming around to his point of view. It had little, if nothing, to do with seriously compromising with communists. The communists, for their part, knew Chiang better than Marshall, as while they were just as guilty for eventually killing off negotiations, they seemed to know exactly how to respond in certain situations. For Marshall's major failing, it was the belief that factions were driving the decision-making process, and that ultimately compromise and unity could be possible - and indeed was desirable.

Its no wonder why he thought that. Chiang said as much, as did Zhou - and Zhou believed it for a time. He wasn't adaptable enough, nor did he really understand the environment that he was walking into. He understood Chiang's military risks just fine, but there was more to it than that. A man cannot win a war, nor can he cajole two parties set on conflict - especially when he's being scapegoated in the same way for both. There are a couple of ways things might have gone differently, but they would have required a radically different set of assumptions going in or after the first few months. Perhaps if Marshall made a midnight trip to Yan'an, or shifted some permanent staff there? Who knows, but otherwise this just seemed like squandering talent, and perhaps hastening the death of an American giant.

Still, its well worth the read.

90/100

[Kevin Y · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an amazing episode in history and certainly obscured by flow of events since Marshall's attempt at reconciling the problems plaguing China at the end of World War II. The author writes a very telling narrative and I don't think a simple review would do the book justice. All I can say is read this book if you are a student of history.

I will end with a quote from the author:
[To Marshall, failure could not be separated from the broader record; reckoning with limits, "trying to keep to the things we could do" and focusing on those battles that could be won, was essential to overall success. Neither his story nor his country's was as straightforwardly triumphant as mythology would come to hold. ... To him, hindsight was not 20/20; it obscured as much as it clarified.]

[Benjamin Schauer · Rating 4 out of 5]

There is so much I didn’t learn in school! I’m aware of the basics behind the rise of Mao’s China, but I was amazed at the sheer amount of events that happened in the final days of Chiang’s republic (and how involved the US was in them).

Not being very aware of all the events, I did find myself rewinding on several occasions, and I had to pull up information online for areas that I must’ve totally spaced out on. That said, it seemed to be a very balanced and well put together account of General Marshall’s time with the two warring factions of mainland China. I found that it was fascinating subject matter, and I am currently working through a biography on Mao Zedong to supplement this new knowledge.

[Liam · Rating 5 out of 5]

"'With God's help,' said a U.S. senator, 'we will lift Shanghai up and up, ever up, until it is just like Kansas City.'" (22)

"Once, on a flight, the officer heading the Dixie Mission asked Zhou whether the Communists viewed the Soviet Union or the United States as a better model of democracy. Zhou answered that the Soviet Union was the greatest democracy in the world. But, he added reassuringly, Soviet democracy was a long way off in China. American democracy would be just fine in the meantime." (81)

[Peter · Rating 3 out of 5]

Another quick holiday read of good old General Marshall, the hero of WWII and post-war Europe, trying to craft a compromise between two diametrically opposed Chinese sides. It was a mission that was doomed from the start, but he gave it his best shot. The blasé conceit of Chiang Kai-shek, and the patient guile of Mao both come through well. I felt myself thinking, “Forget it George, its Chinatown”.

[Gordon E. Castanza · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book should be better known as a romance. It certainly isn't history. The scholarship is non-existent. The author makes thousands of quotations without documentation and no citations.

[Steven · Rating 5 out of 5]

great insight into the widely unknown mission of GEN Marshall to China and his thoughts on trying to prevent a war that was inevitable. This history set the stage to where the world is now.

[Jimmy · Rating 5 out of 5]

For those who know their history of the United States from the 1940s-1950s, George Marshall is one of the most iconic and popular American who was the General overseeing the entire military during World War Two, a Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State who have done all his duty for the sake of duty even though he wanted to retire. Yet most Americans might not remember a forgotten chapter in his life after World War Two in which he went to China to try to resolve the tension between the Nationalist government and the Communists. This book tells that important chapter in his life.
The book doesn’t jump into the the 1940s diplomatic mission right away. It begin by giving us the biography of America’s most famous general and statesman. But this biography is also relevant and I didn’t know that Marshall was in China as a young American soldier before he became a famous general. Concerning the actual diplomatic mission the author narrated the events well. Readers gets a window into the working neogotiating process of the Committee of Three” represented by Nationalist Zhang Qun, George C. Marshall and Communist representative Zhou Enlai. An interesting part of this discourse is the attempt of Marshall to integrate both the Communist and Nationalist army right away; yet this wasn’t going to be able to accomplished given the vast divide and suspicion between the two camps. Sadly though as the story unfold you see more and more of the deceptiveness of the Communists and sadly the United States turning against the Chinese president Chiang Kai-shek. There’s a point where Marhall uses the American analogy of their own Civil War yet this was turn on its own head. The tale is told as one of tragedy. The author reflects on the legacy of the China mission and also point out the limitations the United States have and one that we should even remember today with our foreign policy. I agree with the author.
One point I got from the book was that the Chinese communists look better afar than the Chinese nationalists’ flaws up-close. You see the deception put up by the Communists and advantageous maneuvering whether by Chairman Mao or Zhou Enlai. Negotiations were stalled, agreements were broken and while it is true that both sides did this one can’t help but to think of the inevitable of China turning into a Communist state and just how dark things will be for the people in China.

[Randall Harrison · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kurtz-Phelan has written an interesting, authoritative and exhaustively-researched tale of this little-known chapter in American diplomacy. It serves as both a case study in personal diplomacy, and a sympathetic and respectful portrait of an American giant in the latter stages of his career.

Ike and MacArthur got the lion's share of the ink in WWII; however, most believe Marshall was the ultimate source of Allied success. This book paints him as the towering figure in post-war US foreign policy; his ultimate legacy is equal to, if not greater than, either of the generals we falsely learned won the war for us.

Marshall was largely unsuccessful in China; Kurtz-Phelan does a good job of identifying and deconstructing the sources of that failure over the course of the book and especially in the epilogue. However, the author makes the argument it would have been impossible for anybody, including a giant ike Marshall, to wring a binding agreement out of the two parties, led by venal, duplicitous and narcissistic men. Chaing and Mao each believed his cause -through their leadership- was providentially-chosen to conquer, control and govern China. Ironically neither man truly ended up governing it, despite controlling it for a long period of time.

Although it technically ended in failure, Marshall's mission to China identified and predicted many of the Cold War problems that Chaing's defeat at the hands of Chinese communists eventually created.

Oh for the days of statesmen like Marshall! The politically-appointed men and women populating the upper reaches of the diplomatic establishment in DC today are mere shadows of the greatness demonstrated by Marshall. The recent "summit" with North Korea demonstrates the chasm between the old and the new clearly.

Ultimately this is a story of lost opportunity. Despite Marshall's best efforts, he was not able to bring peace to China. In deconstructing his failure, albeit in a sympathetic way, the author has given historians, and readers like myself, new perspective to understand the history of this important time and how it affects America and the world today.

Strongly recommend this book for anybody with an interest in post-WW II history in Asia and the beginnings of the People's Republic in 1949.

[Scott Martin · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book attempts to provide insight into an aspect of early Cold War History that doesn't always get a lot of attention. While much of the immediate post-war American focus was on Europe and the USSR, the post-war situation in China was no less volatile, especially as the country ended World War II, only to roll right into a Civil War. The Nationalist and Communist factions both fought each other for control of the country. Most expected and wanted the Nationalist to win. Even the USSR was making its initial arrangements to work with the Nationalist government in the event of their expected victory. Yet, neither side was on the clear path to victory. A long, brutal civil war figured to drag on, unless someone could broker a peace deal.

Enter George C. Marshall, recently the former Chief of Staff of the US Military. His determination, intellect and gift for leadership made him a prime candidate to try to bring about peace. Even both the Nationalists and Communists thought him the man for the job. Unfortunately, even Marshall couldn't bridge the gap, as both the Nationalists and Communists tried to use Marshall to press their advantages, ignoring advice that might have actually brought about a settlement. At one point, the Nationalists could have made a deal and perhaps maintained their advantage, but they refused, and the Communists didn't encourage him. Eventually, Marshall left China to its fate, where the Communists pulled off the military victory. Given all that followed (the accusations of the "loss of China", the Korean War, the Red Scare, McCarthy, etc)...it is not surprising that the negotiations got buried in the wave of events that followed. Given that Marshall achieved great success as the Secretary of State who gave name to the plan that help trigger the rebuild of Europe, his failure in China is sometimes glossed over. Still, it is important to learn and understand that part of history, as it would come to have such impacts today.

The reader does a good job with the material, and it doesn't bog down in too much minutia and academic detail. There is a good deal of historical backstory, but it doesn't overwhelm the primary narrative. For a student of history or politics, this book is worth the time to read/listen.

[Kathy · Rating 5 out of 5]

it was so amazing, I need more time to consider how I could possibly review it. It may have sent me back down the black hole of "modern" Chinese history. It once again astounded me at how deceptive and duplicious politics and "peace" are. Peace is hell, indeed. I know very little about Eisenhower and this book does not inspire me to learn much more. Chou En Lai has fascinated me for a long time and it was good to read so much about him. I had already read Tuchman's book on Stilwell so I read this entire book with a deep sense of depression. And I've read a number of Mao biographies and this book gave me a look at another facet of China, Stalin, and the "early days" of international (and national) communism. Years ago, I did read a fair bit of Kennan and it's easy to see the seeds of the Domino Theory. I also know very little about Truman, and that needs to be corrected. Imho, when Roosevelt died, Truman was left holding the bag.

With the current ongoing problems of dealing with Ukraine and Russia, and with Zelensky needing US support, I couldn't help but see the partial parallels with Chiang and his endless desire for US support. History is most certainly not repeating, but there are fragments that want to rhyme. Maybe there really is nothing new under the sun.

A few upbeat passages: when Mao remarked that Marshall went to Kulin so he could walk in the moonlight with Mrs Marshall, it made Marshall smile because that was precisely what he did. And good for him.

Also early in the book it was said that Marshall devoured cheap novels. It reminded me of the bit in War and Peace where General Kutuzov relaxed by reading French novels.

I msut say, this book has the most positive depiction of Madame Chiang that I have ever seen.

In these days with the various generals who were in the Trump administration and have written books, I'm grateful to read about General Marshall, who declined to write his own journal or memoirs (and for what I consider sound reasons). I'm tremendously grateful to the author who did a ton of research (and has provided me a great bibliography/future reading list).

I will no doubt edit this review...probably more than once.
Grateful to have read this. Thank you, Gen. Marshall, for all that you did.

[Nick Frazier · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read on loan from a friend. The book covers General of the Army (GA) George Marshall's time in China following World War 2 in an attempt to mediate between the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Communists of Mao ZeDong and Zhou Enlai.

GA G.C. Marshall was a mere hours into his retirement when President Truman called upon him to return to national service as a mediator for the two major Chinese camps. Widely considered one of the most respected and famous men in America in 1945, Marshall's assignment was considered the best chance for success; however, success was not to be. During each negotiated ceasefire, both sides continued to jockey for position - both territorial and political. Ultimately, the mission failed and Marshall suffered public attacks from all sides to include Communists, Nationalists, and the U.S. politicians as each side hoped to use the break down in talks for their own ends.

A fascinating piece of modern U.S.-Chinese history that provides insight with primary documents from Marshall, Zhou, Chiang, Soong MeiLing (Madame Chiang) and others.

The ultimate goal of the Marshall mission was to avert another major war; however, ~1 year mission occurred with several other major international events - most notably, the U.S.-Soviet schism following World War 2 as the once-previous allies start carving out parts of the world.

The end of the book provides an interesting look into the "Who Lost China?" chapter of U.S. Cold War history. "Who Lost China?" is a famous j'accuse from the late -1940s when post-World War 2 U.S. suddenly decided to orient against an international communist effort to re-order part of the world. The Soviet Union detonated a nuclear weapon. China went red. And U.S. foreign policy began to coalesce around an anti-communist narrative (with Kennan's Mr. X telegram serving as a touchstone). Within domestic politics, "Who Lost China?" became a cudgel to swing to against political opponents. It foreshadowed the House Un-American Activities of McCarthyism.

Following the China mission, Marshall assumed two cabinet positions in the Truman Administration - Secretary of State and then Secretary of Defense.

[Jody Ferguson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well researched and well-written account of the attempt by Harry Truman to bring peace to China in the years after WWII. Unable to comfortably repatriate large numbers of US troops who occupied large swathes of northeastern China at the war's end, Truman dispatched America's foremost soldier George C. Marshall to try to bring the warring sides together. Marshall, who had recently led the United States to its greatest triumph over Germany and Japan, had retired from the Army on a Friday in late 1945, only to receive a phone call Monday morning from the president, asking him to become a diplomat with the toughest of missions. Marshall, the most respected man in America--and perhaps the entire world--was given a Herculean task. He left the United States in December 1945 for China, hoping to return in 2-3 months. He stayed for thirteen months, returning home only once during this time in the summer of 1946 to bring his wife back with him to China. They remained until early 1947. Kurtz-Phelan eloquently describes the back and forth between the two sides and Marshall's role, first as diplomat and then as reluctant arm-twister. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Nationalist Party, was the face of China during the Second World War. His American-educated wife Soong Mei-ling, was the voice for China to the American people. As effective as they were at diplomacy and image-making, they could never bring to heel the corrupt politicians and generals who led the Nationalists down the path of dissolution. Meanwhile, Communist leader Mao Zedong had his own golden tongue: shadow foreign minister Zhou Enlai, who would become the counterpart 25 years later to Henry Kissenger during normalization talks. Marshall became close to both Zhou and Chiang, but he could never get them to see the larger picture. Chiang was convinced the communists would never give up their arms. Mao and Zhou knew that to give up their arms risked destruction at the hands of Chiang's American-supplied army. Ultimately, the mission failed and the accusations of "Who lost China?" reverberated across the American political spectrum for years to come.

[Albert · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an incredible account of the lesser known post-WWII diplomatic project of George Marshall and a prelude to the Marshall Plan: the mission to bring about the unification of China. In many ways, Marshall's China mission may have been doomed to fail from the start, though this book details how the enmity between the Communists and the Nationalists in China got progressively worse, overshadowing any initial hope of reconciliation and coexistence of the two parties' leaders under Marshall's guidance.

I found the explanations of the political shifts and motivations of each party easy to follow and understandable. The reader is treated to insightful looks into the mind of George Marshall the diplomat as he tries to get both sides to see the other's point of view.

Multiple personal perspectives are presented through the internal thoughts of key individuals through their letters. The diary entries of the overconfident Chiang Kai-Shek revealing the Generalissimo's internal debate and thoughts of Marshall's directives were some of my favorite parts of the book. There are also lovely anecdotes of Marshall's relationship with his wife Katherine, as well as the couple's genuine friendship with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang.

This short, pivotal history and the resulting "loss" of China had massive implications on US-China relations and China as we know it today, and was a large role in Marshall's ensuing approach to increased US-Soviet tensions leading to the Cold War. This book did a wonderful job of telling that history with a proper mix of blow-by-blow accounts and well-explained political reasoning.

[Nemo · Rating 5 out of 5]

I expected to get some new insights/details after I read China 1945. But this book is a bit below my expectation mainly because 1) the author was too repetitive in writing here and there (and these repeat paras are not interesting details of history, but just his generalized comments on and on about CCP, Gemo and Marshall). 2) even though this book is focused on Marshall, it failed in providing a lot of vivid details about his experience/life in Chongqing and Nanjing. As a comparision, China 1945 covered Stilwell, Hurley, Marshall in all, and still managed to tell a lot of fun stories about every side (and also having a more convincing views on CCP in particular).

That said, the author did do his research and this book is a decent one. I probably will give it a 5star if I have not read China 1945. The take away from the book is not really clear. The author doesnt like speculations on alternative history, so he seems to view the failure of Marshall Mission a destiny in the context of the world situation. But I would like to think what-ifs: 1) what if US provided full ground support to Chiang in 1945 and beat the CCP to half death and then proposed a coalition government? 2) what if US set up a friendly relationship with CCP in 1945 and hence make China an ally in Aisa? Or 3) what if Japan didnt invade China in 1937 and hence Chiang terminated CCP in a final strike? There is always an alternative for China to become a demoracy like Taiwan today.

[Eurydicegirlgmail.Com · Rating 5 out of 5]

Germane to Hong Kong re restraint & limitations of power

informed, mature history which incorporates the tragedian element universal in human affairs.

This wise & wearisome tale records the extraordinary efforts our country made to aid the birth of a functioning humane state in Asia. Marshall was the best we could offer, a highly honorable, shrewd & superbly capable man summoned by his president to intervene in post war China. Alas, foresight, fair intent and America’s generous resources were grist for the mill of coldly calculating power seekers and vested power holders.

Nothing we could do could to halt the collision or shelter the population, the hundreds of millions of lives sacrificed as collateral damage by socialist, communists and opportunists .

The mission: an attempt to interpose US peacemaking into another country’s long brewing civil war. The final chapter is brilliant, and worth plowing through the somber slog of Marshall’s tenacious struggle against the triumph of extremist politics over endemic embedded corrupt power holder.

Particularly laud the authors use of Chiang Ki Shek personal diary
A far more nuanced, and accurate portrayal emerges.