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El gran miedo: Una nueva interpretación del terror en la revolución rusa
La historiografía sobre el gran terror de los años treinta en la Unión Soviética se ha dividido entre quienes han responsabilizado principalmente a Stalin y quienes han buscado líneas de continuidad respecto de una actuación típica del ejercicio del poder en Rusia y/o han hecho recaer las culpas sobre la sociedad en general y la cúpula bolchevique en particular. El profesor James Harris, discípulo directo de autores comprometidos con la segunda interpretación como Arch Getty o Sheila Fitzpatrick, se sitúa en la corriente de responsabilidad compartida. Dentro de ella, sin embargo, da un paso más allá y a través de documentación original otorga un nuevo sentido a la expresión «el gran miedo», convirtiéndolo en un concepto bidireccional. Es decir, a la de nición clásica como eufemismo de la gran purga incorpora el terror real que la cúpula bolchevique tenía —a veces fundadamente, a veces sin base alguna— a ser derrocados, saboteados y/o asesinados.
641 pages, Kindle Edition
First published April 25, 2016
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James Harris
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
August 13, 2018
Somtimes the way to hell is paved of good intentions, this is the case of russian revolution.
In this revolution is set out the moral dilema of if the purpose justify the means.
This book about the stalinist terror is framed in the last subject.
The Great Fear by James Harris is for me a excelent work in history, with a great work in documentation,study and syntesis,is a book of great historic rigor and very objective in its analysis.
The book gives other historic perspective of the great fear (different of that of the book The Great Terror by Conquest).
In brief the message that one get of the book is that the great fear is not the fruit of a bunch of evil psichopats mass murderers, otherwise a conjuction of factors that have carried ,as the author says ,to a perfect storm.
Fundamentally this factors were:
The great apprehension of the comunist party of the Soviet Unión to a invasión war of the industrial powers in a agressively militarist context ( Germany,Japan).
The paranoic personality and fanatism of Stalin, and his decisión of to defend the soviet system at any price human or material.
The feedback of this paranoia by othe fanatic and paranoic, head of the state security Ehzov.
The untrue information obtained under torture by the NKVD funcionaries ,and that biased by Ehzov were given to Stalin.
The underground fight of different factions in the party (Troskists,Bujarinists ,Zinovievites) and out of the party with spys,Whites,Mencheviques and Social Revolutionaries.
The fake information made by Heydrich about the army threat of a coup, that give way to the execution of mariscal Tujachevsky and a great purge in the red army.
Given that the direction of the regime received biased information about the great danger that the revolution were overturned, and as they dont want another fail as in the earlier revolutions (they didnt want another 18 Brumario) they launched a campaign of vigilance and delation that changed the Soviet Unión in a mad house that put the sistema on the edge.
The spirit of the moral and material failure of the construction of the socialism (comunism) in a alone country is reflected in the textual following paragraphs of the autor:
"Everyone could do their best,keep their own corrupt practices quiet,and legitimately think the real roblems lay just beyond their horizon.at the same time the ,the top regional and ministerial officials protected themselves by building tight leadership cliques that managed the flow of information to the organization that monitored the plan fulfilment.When things were wrong in their organization,they were then in a position to identify a scapegoat or scapegoats.These were sacked or arrested,depending on the seriousnes of the problema,labelled as incompetent,or as wreckers or class alien and pressented as the cause of the fulfilment problems."
"His pressuriced plans(Stalins),his demands for 100 percent fulfilment whithout excuses,and his calls for vigilance had created a recalcitrant,secretive and corrupt bureaucracy.Few officials could claim to embodyStalins ideal of "Bolshevik Leadership" because it demanded the imposible.Who was not an oportunist,if an oportunistwas defined as one who atempted to shield himself from the regimes imposible demands?. Who was not a Leftish (Troskist/Zinovievite) if a Leftish was defined as one who lacked faith in the construction of Socialism?. Who was not a Rightist if a Rightist was defined as as one who attemted to slow the socialist construction?.The apparat was full of officials who could be described as doublé-dealers,praising central policy in public,but tryng to escape its nearly imposible demands in less public settings.
The pressure to find enemies was extremely dangerous because it threatened to tear the party and state apparatus apart in a spiral of denunciations and counter-denunciations"
As a anecdote, a indirect victim of the grat fear was Andre Nin, a troskist líder of the POUM(partido obrero de unificación marxista) that in Barcelona fighted against the PCE(partido comunista de España) a stalinist party ,in the fight were killed a thousand people , the POUM defeated and Andre Nin purged(murdered).Orwell, that was on the side of the POUM was disenchanted with the republic and described this facts in his famous book Homenage to Catalonia.And aside as a hard critic to the stalinist system and great purges he wrote 1984 and Animal Farm.
A very recomended book for understand the deep historic causes of the stalinist great fear and the failure of the building the socialism in the Soviet Unión.
In this revolution is set out the moral dilema of if the purpose justify the means.
This book about the stalinist terror is framed in the last subject.
The Great Fear by James Harris is for me a excelent work in history, with a great work in documentation,study and syntesis,is a book of great historic rigor and very objective in its analysis.
The book gives other historic perspective of the great fear (different of that of the book The Great Terror by Conquest).
In brief the message that one get of the book is that the great fear is not the fruit of a bunch of evil psichopats mass murderers, otherwise a conjuction of factors that have carried ,as the author says ,to a perfect storm.
Fundamentally this factors were:
The great apprehension of the comunist party of the Soviet Unión to a invasión war of the industrial powers in a agressively militarist context ( Germany,Japan).
The paranoic personality and fanatism of Stalin, and his decisión of to defend the soviet system at any price human or material.
The feedback of this paranoia by othe fanatic and paranoic, head of the state security Ehzov.
The untrue information obtained under torture by the NKVD funcionaries ,and that biased by Ehzov were given to Stalin.
The underground fight of different factions in the party (Troskists,Bujarinists ,Zinovievites) and out of the party with spys,Whites,Mencheviques and Social Revolutionaries.
The fake information made by Heydrich about the army threat of a coup, that give way to the execution of mariscal Tujachevsky and a great purge in the red army.
Given that the direction of the regime received biased information about the great danger that the revolution were overturned, and as they dont want another fail as in the earlier revolutions (they didnt want another 18 Brumario) they launched a campaign of vigilance and delation that changed the Soviet Unión in a mad house that put the sistema on the edge.
The spirit of the moral and material failure of the construction of the socialism (comunism) in a alone country is reflected in the textual following paragraphs of the autor:
"Everyone could do their best,keep their own corrupt practices quiet,and legitimately think the real roblems lay just beyond their horizon.at the same time the ,the top regional and ministerial officials protected themselves by building tight leadership cliques that managed the flow of information to the organization that monitored the plan fulfilment.When things were wrong in their organization,they were then in a position to identify a scapegoat or scapegoats.These were sacked or arrested,depending on the seriousnes of the problema,labelled as incompetent,or as wreckers or class alien and pressented as the cause of the fulfilment problems."
"His pressuriced plans(Stalins),his demands for 100 percent fulfilment whithout excuses,and his calls for vigilance had created a recalcitrant,secretive and corrupt bureaucracy.Few officials could claim to embodyStalins ideal of "Bolshevik Leadership" because it demanded the imposible.Who was not an oportunist,if an oportunistwas defined as one who atempted to shield himself from the regimes imposible demands?. Who was not a Leftish (Troskist/Zinovievite) if a Leftish was defined as one who lacked faith in the construction of Socialism?. Who was not a Rightist if a Rightist was defined as as one who attemted to slow the socialist construction?.The apparat was full of officials who could be described as doublé-dealers,praising central policy in public,but tryng to escape its nearly imposible demands in less public settings.
The pressure to find enemies was extremely dangerous because it threatened to tear the party and state apparatus apart in a spiral of denunciations and counter-denunciations"
As a anecdote, a indirect victim of the grat fear was Andre Nin, a troskist líder of the POUM(partido obrero de unificación marxista) that in Barcelona fighted against the PCE(partido comunista de España) a stalinist party ,in the fight were killed a thousand people , the POUM defeated and Andre Nin purged(murdered).Orwell, that was on the side of the POUM was disenchanted with the republic and described this facts in his famous book Homenage to Catalonia.And aside as a hard critic to the stalinist system and great purges he wrote 1984 and Animal Farm.
A very recomended book for understand the deep historic causes of the stalinist great fear and the failure of the building the socialism in the Soviet Unión.
Read
August 17, 2016Excellent book. Reading the book, and the new evidence that it discloses regarding the actions taken by Stalin and others, is very thought-provoking. Among the many questions worthy of consideration that the book can raise in the mind of the reader are the following:
1. Changed perception.
A. Should the public perception of Stalin be changed to any significant degree by the additional evidence that has come to light following the opening of the Soviet archives?
B. Or has the historical image of Stalin become so embedded in the minds of the public that such image has not, and will not, be changed to any significant degree by any new evidence obtained as a result of the opening of the Soviet archives?
C. If, and to what extent, has the public's perception of Stalin been changed by new evidence that has come to light following the opening of the Soviet archives?
D. Is there any significant additional new evidence that is expected to be uncovered from now on going forward that is likely to result in any future changes in the public's perception of what Stalin did and why he did it?
2. Misunderstanding.
A. Is it true that "Stalin's great terror… is… among the most misunderstood moments in the history of the 20th century"?
B. If so, why is that? Is it because that misunderstanding of that terror is caused by, or compatible with, or contributes to satisfaction of the political, emotional, or other needs of those who misunderstand those actions and that time period?
3. Emotional or rational responses.
A. If, and to what extent, were the actions taken by Stalin that constitute what is considered to be "the terror" motivated or driven by (X) the emotional responses of Stalin, and/or (Y) rational analysis by Stalin?
B. If, and to what extent, is the conclusion that there was no substance or material evidence supporting the claims against a majority of the victims of state repression that they were participating in counterrevolutionary conspiracies based upon exculpatory evidence that came to light after the time of terror, and not before?
4. Justification for seeking power.
When it is said that the terror represents "the culmination of Stalin's struggle for total power", what criteria should be used to determine how much power it would be reasonable for a head of state to seek to use in the management of the government, when the government is perceived to be threatened internally, and by other nations, to the same extent that the Soviet Union was threatened?
5. Intelligence gathering.
How does the extent to which Stalin used "the apparatus of intelligence gathering to keep a careful watch" on domestic and international individuals and groups compare to what was done, and is done, by other governments that perceive significant internal and external threats to the present and future existence of their nations?
6. Evaluating decisions using information not available to the decision-maker.
Should history judge the decisions made by a head of state based upon either (X) what the head of state knew at the time that decisions were made and actions taken, or (Y) what comes to light at a subsequent date?
7. Relationship of reaction to the degree that state is at risk.
A. Did the other nations that Stalin viewed as a threat to the Soviet Union then, or thereafter, they themselves overreact to what they perceived as risks threatening them and, if so, how did their overreaction compared to the alleged Stalin overreaction?
B. Was it logical, or foreseeable, that Stalin, and the Soviet Union as a whole, would feel more insecure, and act accordingly, than other nations, when faced with such foreign and domestic threats perceived, given the prior history of foreign invasion of Russia and the Soviet Union?
8. Considering the circumstances.
A. Was Stalin’s perception correct that the Soviet Union was at one point during the rule of Stalin was so economically and militarily “… behind the advanced countries” that it was reasonable for Stalin to conclude under the circumstances that unless the Soviet Union eliminated that deficiency with some promptness that certain foreign countries would “crush” the Soviet Union”?
B. How does the nature and extent of the brutality attributed to Stalin compare to the nature and extent of the brutality attributed to those who were opposing Stalin?
C. In justifying actions to be taken in the furtherance of what they perceived to be their national interests, was Stalin any more or less likely to believe that “the end justified the means” than the leaders of Stalin’s perceived domestic or foreign opposition?
D. If, and to what extent, was the information that was provided to Stalin by his intelligence services, upon which he based his decisions, “flawed” in comparison with flaws in the information provided to the foreign enemies of the Soviet Union by their intelligence services?
E. If, and to what extent, did the ability of Stalin to gather information, and carry out the decisions and actions he preferred, depend upon the good faith and cooperation of other individuals, who were not totally within the control of Stalin and who themselves from time to time had their own personal objectives, ambitions, and views that conflicted with those of Stalin?
9. Selfish motives of others.
If, and to what extent, were some of the claims ultimately shown to have wrongfully been brought against innocent people in the Soviet Union initiated not by Stalin, but instead by other individuals in the Soviet Union who asserted such claims against such innocent people to “eliminate” such innocent people for opportunistic personal or competitive reasons or to deflect blame?
I suspect that a consideration of these questions in light of the newly disclosed evidence may cause the reader to have a deeper understanding and more comprehensive assessment of Stalin, and his times, than was previously possible. A very worthwhile read.
1. Changed perception.
A. Should the public perception of Stalin be changed to any significant degree by the additional evidence that has come to light following the opening of the Soviet archives?
B. Or has the historical image of Stalin become so embedded in the minds of the public that such image has not, and will not, be changed to any significant degree by any new evidence obtained as a result of the opening of the Soviet archives?
C. If, and to what extent, has the public's perception of Stalin been changed by new evidence that has come to light following the opening of the Soviet archives?
D. Is there any significant additional new evidence that is expected to be uncovered from now on going forward that is likely to result in any future changes in the public's perception of what Stalin did and why he did it?
2. Misunderstanding.
A. Is it true that "Stalin's great terror… is… among the most misunderstood moments in the history of the 20th century"?
B. If so, why is that? Is it because that misunderstanding of that terror is caused by, or compatible with, or contributes to satisfaction of the political, emotional, or other needs of those who misunderstand those actions and that time period?
3. Emotional or rational responses.
A. If, and to what extent, were the actions taken by Stalin that constitute what is considered to be "the terror" motivated or driven by (X) the emotional responses of Stalin, and/or (Y) rational analysis by Stalin?
B. If, and to what extent, is the conclusion that there was no substance or material evidence supporting the claims against a majority of the victims of state repression that they were participating in counterrevolutionary conspiracies based upon exculpatory evidence that came to light after the time of terror, and not before?
4. Justification for seeking power.
When it is said that the terror represents "the culmination of Stalin's struggle for total power", what criteria should be used to determine how much power it would be reasonable for a head of state to seek to use in the management of the government, when the government is perceived to be threatened internally, and by other nations, to the same extent that the Soviet Union was threatened?
5. Intelligence gathering.
How does the extent to which Stalin used "the apparatus of intelligence gathering to keep a careful watch" on domestic and international individuals and groups compare to what was done, and is done, by other governments that perceive significant internal and external threats to the present and future existence of their nations?
6. Evaluating decisions using information not available to the decision-maker.
Should history judge the decisions made by a head of state based upon either (X) what the head of state knew at the time that decisions were made and actions taken, or (Y) what comes to light at a subsequent date?
7. Relationship of reaction to the degree that state is at risk.
A. Did the other nations that Stalin viewed as a threat to the Soviet Union then, or thereafter, they themselves overreact to what they perceived as risks threatening them and, if so, how did their overreaction compared to the alleged Stalin overreaction?
B. Was it logical, or foreseeable, that Stalin, and the Soviet Union as a whole, would feel more insecure, and act accordingly, than other nations, when faced with such foreign and domestic threats perceived, given the prior history of foreign invasion of Russia and the Soviet Union?
8. Considering the circumstances.
A. Was Stalin’s perception correct that the Soviet Union was at one point during the rule of Stalin was so economically and militarily “… behind the advanced countries” that it was reasonable for Stalin to conclude under the circumstances that unless the Soviet Union eliminated that deficiency with some promptness that certain foreign countries would “crush” the Soviet Union”?
B. How does the nature and extent of the brutality attributed to Stalin compare to the nature and extent of the brutality attributed to those who were opposing Stalin?
C. In justifying actions to be taken in the furtherance of what they perceived to be their national interests, was Stalin any more or less likely to believe that “the end justified the means” than the leaders of Stalin’s perceived domestic or foreign opposition?
D. If, and to what extent, was the information that was provided to Stalin by his intelligence services, upon which he based his decisions, “flawed” in comparison with flaws in the information provided to the foreign enemies of the Soviet Union by their intelligence services?
E. If, and to what extent, did the ability of Stalin to gather information, and carry out the decisions and actions he preferred, depend upon the good faith and cooperation of other individuals, who were not totally within the control of Stalin and who themselves from time to time had their own personal objectives, ambitions, and views that conflicted with those of Stalin?
9. Selfish motives of others.
If, and to what extent, were some of the claims ultimately shown to have wrongfully been brought against innocent people in the Soviet Union initiated not by Stalin, but instead by other individuals in the Soviet Union who asserted such claims against such innocent people to “eliminate” such innocent people for opportunistic personal or competitive reasons or to deflect blame?
I suspect that a consideration of these questions in light of the newly disclosed evidence may cause the reader to have a deeper understanding and more comprehensive assessment of Stalin, and his times, than was previously possible. A very worthwhile read.
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March 29, 2017Description from Pushkin House: Today we turn our **Pushkin House Recommends** spotlight on THE GREAT FEAR: Stalin's Terror of the 1930s by James Harris (Oxford University Press). This title presents a new and original explanation of the Stalin's Terror as a destructive force in terms of human life and the state that provoked the events. It also uncovers new evidence from the Russian archives and is the first English-language monograph to be written on the Terror in 20 years.
June 1, 2022
An absorbing and compulsively readable account of the events leading up to Stalin's purges during the Great Terror. Harris argues compellingly that the reason behind Stalin's purges was not that he was a sadistic dictator obsessed with consolidating his own power, but rather he had become convinced that there were plots and conspiracies against him and his regime. Some of this information was true, but most was exaggerated. Most of all, during the first Five Year Plan, the economic goals were so unreachable that local officials inflated numbers and blamed their failure to meet quotas on sabotage of workers and counterrevolutionaries. When Stalin had his police look into the industrial records more carefully, all of this corruption was revealed, and so his worst fears of a conspiracy against him were seemingly confirmed. This all led to the crackdowns and repression of the Great Terror.
Harris situates Stalin within the tradition of Russian rulers who had a history of betrayals and regime changes. He argues that he was right to suspect plots against him, but that the information gathered from his police was unreliable and was subject to further corruption from political officials jockeying for position beneath him. This seems like a more reasonable explanation than that Stalin was a singularly evil individual.
Harris situates Stalin within the tradition of Russian rulers who had a history of betrayals and regime changes. He argues that he was right to suspect plots against him, but that the information gathered from his police was unreliable and was subject to further corruption from political officials jockeying for position beneath him. This seems like a more reasonable explanation than that Stalin was a singularly evil individual.
November 28, 2016
Read in two sessions--couldn't really put it down. Adds a nuanced view to suggest why Stalin may have engaged in such horrific violence in the 1930s. And it all has to do, interestingly, with how information was gathered and used, from the bottom up and top down.
August 9, 2020
The book itself operates as an interesting counterpoint to the intrigue and deception which many state was inherent in the trials- yet seems to be operating upon faulty intelligence. One of the many errors I found through my read was in relation to V.P Olberg. Harris insists that the discovery of olberg to Stalin was a huge blow as he truly was a supporter of the Trotskyites- yet in an innumerable amount of sources including the documents of the CIA- Olberg is a known NKVD agent, a plant who attempted to gain access to Trotsky. Harris blatantly ignores important memoirs which detail the feelings of the people, the elite, and shaky evidence under the guise of "facts." For a paper which attempts to really dethrone the concept of a maniacal Stalin, the over-reliance on summation and lack of any introspective depth makes reading only useful for analysis of the events. If you planned to take this out for research upon the actual terror, this is a useful book for a light counterbalancing. Take much of what is said with a grain of salt- it is incredibly biased to the extent of ignorance.
January 13, 2018
Un descubrimiento interesante
March 5, 2019
This book documents the history of Stalin's Great Terror.
Fascinating in a terrible way.
Fascinating in a terrible way.
April 27, 2025
easy to read, not much new information, concise argument, accurate analysis, insightful info on stalin
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews