Hümanizm Üzerine

by Martin Heidegger, Yusuf Örnek (Translator)

"İnsanın özünü sürdürmesiyle ilgili en yüce hümanist belirlemeler bile, insanın asıl onurunun tecrübesini edinemezler. Bu nedenle 'Varlık ve Zaman'daki Düşünme, hümanizmin karşısındadır. Fakat bu karşıtlık, bu Düşünmenin, kendini insanca olanın karşısına koyduğu ve insanca olmayana evet dediği, gayri insaniliği savunduğu ve insan onurunu alçalttığı anlamına gelmez. Hümanizme karşı düşünülmektedir, çünkü hümanizm insanın humanitas'ını yeterince yüceltmemektedir."
(Tanıtım Bülteninden)

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Psychology, German Literature, Classics

112 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1946

About the author

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was a German philosopher whose work is perhaps most readily associated with phenomenology and existentialism, although his thinking should be identified as part of such philosophical movements only with extreme care and qualification. His ideas have exerted a seminal influence on the development of contemporary European philosophy. They have also had an impact far beyond philosophy, for example in architectural theory (see e.g., Sharr 2007), literary criticism (see e.g., Ziarek 1989), theology (see e.g., Caputo 1993), psychotherapy (see e.g., Binswanger 1943/1964, Guignon 1993) and cognitive science (see e.g., Dreyfus 1992, 2008; Wheeler 2005; Kiverstein and Wheeler forthcoming).

Reviews

[Xander · Rating 2 out of 5]

In this rather long-winded and incomprehensible letter, Martin Heidegger defends himself against accusations of being a promoter of irrationalism, nihilism and in-humanism. Heidegger's philosophy is aimed at Being, and uses human beings - as the only type of beings that occupy themselves with the question of Being - as the starting point to a fundamental ontology - a science of being in general.

For Heidegger, human existence is existence in an everyday world, comprised of networks of things and their interrelational references. We, as beings, interacti with this world and this influences how things appear to us and how we appear to ourselves. Heidegger rejects logic and science as fields which are occupied solely with the world of being as already constituted by us - he wants to penetrate to a deeper layer of being.

It is easy to see how such a view warrants accusations of irrationalism (the rejection of logic especially), nihilism (the rejection of any existential foundations, like God of humanity), and humanism (the rejection of individuality and the dissolving of human beings into abstract modes of Being in general).

Sartre, who took Heidegger's analysis of human existence and ran with it, developed the view that Heidegger's perspective on human existence leads to the fundamental claim that (human) existence precedes essence, i.e. we decide the meaning of our lives.

Heidegger (rightly, in my opinion) points out how his analysis of human existence was never meant as a fundamental ontological theory, it was merely the starting to point to find the path to the question of Being in general. Heidegger's discoveries about human existence were merely methodical, so Sartre is not allowed to take these (preliminary) conclusions as facts about human existence in general.

But how does Heidegger refute the accusations of nihilism, irrationalism and inhumanism? First, Nothing means - for Heidegger - 'no thing'. So when he claims Being is Nothing he means Being is not a thing itself, but something apart from things (beings). So Nothing should not be taken to mean the absence of Being - this rejecting the accusation of nihilism.

Second, the phenomenological method, although rejecting science and logic as sciences of the factual world, is not irrational in a Nietzschean sense. It does not mean: anything goes! It is a descriptive method which charts things as they appear to us and which subsequently have to be interpreted in a more pure and fundamental sense. For example, Heidegger's treatment of time as an intuitive phenomenon, as a fundamental structure of Being for human beings, is not irrational; it merely states time first appear to us through our everyday experience and in this form is the origin of more scientific conceptions of time (as e.g. in astronomy or physics). He does not rejects those conceptions of time, he merely claims tey originate from our intuitive notion of existential temporality.

Third, Heidegger claims his quest to search for the question of Being, buried under the rubble of millennia of deluded philosophical traditions, is the most important question for human beings. Humanism as usually conceptualized, with its notions of humanity, goodness, etc., is deeply rooted in metaphysics, which in and of itself is a delusion. Metaphysics is dead - all of metaphysics is occupied with the question of why there is something (beings) rather than nothing (non-beings). But this question is rooted in beings, not in Being. The real question is: What does it mean to Be? So humanism, as a metaphysical offshoot is delusional. But Heidegger does not simply reject humanism and goes on, he tries to prove how his quest is rather the highest, most loftiest, and most important goal for human beings, and in this sense is more humanistic than ordinary humanism.

On the surface, Heidegger is able to defend himself superbly, yet here is a dark undercurrent running through this work. Written in 1947, in the French-occupied part of post-World War Germany, the accusations against Heidegger for rejecting human beings and occupying himself solely with abstract aims and ambitions strike a more sensitive chord. In the early 1930's Heidegger had joined the Nazi Party and was, as head of a university department, responsible for implementing Nazi laws (e.g. the expulsion of Jews from universities - illustratingly, he sent his own former teacher Edmund Husserl home). After being disappointed in the obstinacy of the Nazi regime to implementing his philosophy into party doctrines, he went to work out a new philosophy - a grim view of the destruction of the Occident and the need for a new Leader, a Führer, viewing Hitler as the culmination of history in the making. He viewed himself as a modern-day Plato - who once traveled to Syracuse to turn a despot into a philosopher-king, and failing miserably - and his ambition was to educate the Führer into a philosopher-king. Of course, this is not what happened, and disappointed, Heidegger retreated into country life and taught some courses during the war.

I am hesitant to draw any direct lines from Heidegger's philosophy to his nazism (which was even deeper and darker than he would admit during his life), but the man had some serious flaws in his thinking. He seems obsessed with Ancient Greece as the model of doing philosophy and living life; he seems to reject the modern way of life with its freedoms and cosmopolitanism ('americanism') and long for a simple rural life of times past; he sees in Western history a decline and a need for salvation; and finally, he looks at intellectual developments and their technical products as degenerating man and destroying the essence of what it means to be a human being. The picture that emerges when reading Heidegger is a frustrated man, who feels alienated by the place and time he lives in, and who singlehandedly wants to restore order and truth. It is this way of thinking, rigid and reactionary, which is fully in line with the key ideologues of the Nazi movement - who viewed the middle-class liberalism and the americanisation of Germany as a decline that had to be halted - at any costs.

There is a lesson to be learned here, which is twofold. Heidegger's thinking is hugely interesting in itself and even fascinating, yet his gloomy outlook houses a danger for anyone who treads these same intellectual paths. We moderns are not rid of these tendencies and I think Heidegger can serve as a warning and a cure.

[Nathan "N.R." Gaddis]

“By way of contrast, Sartre expresses the basic tenet of existentialism in this way: Existence precedes essence. In this statement he is taking existentia and essentia according to their metaphysical meaning, which from Plato’s time on has said that essentia precedes existentia. Sartre reverses this statement. But the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement. With it he stays with metaphysics in oblivion of the truth of being. For even if philosophy wishes to determine the relation of essentia and existentia in the sense it had in medieval controversies, in Leibniz’s sense, or in some other way, it still remains to ask first of all from what destiny of being this differentiation in being as esse essentiae and esse existentiae come to appear to thinking. [....] Sartre’s key proposition about the priority of existentia over essentia does, however, justify using the name ‘existentialism‘ as an appropriate title for a philosophy of this sort. But the basic tenet of ‘existentialism‘ has nothing at all in common with the statement from Being and Time -- apart from the fact that in Being and Time no statement about the relation of essentia and existentia can yet be expressed, since there it is still a question of preparing something precursory.” (p250r, link below)




Earlier:
_______________________
Existentialism is a Humanism is making its rounds on goodreads. As it deserves. I got my toe wet first in the Sartrean dark waters. But it is written from the ground of an (inevitable) misunderstanding of Heidegger's fundamental concepts. Instead of reading all of Being and Time in order to gain that correction, one can read his Letter on Humanism which functions as a kind of response to Sartrean existentialism. (And if you have it on hand, Derrida's "The Ends of Man" in Margins of Philosophy).

The Letter is available on-line ; merely 38 or 60 pages ::

Frank A. Capuzzi's translation from Pathmarks (photostat) :: http://pacificinstitute.org/pdf/Lette...
Miles Groth (unauthorized translation) :: http://wagner.edu/psychology/files/20...

Also, but if you really don't like Heidegger and refuse to ever read him for whatever reason ;; please, as you read Sartre, also look back to the Existenzphilosohie of Karl Jaspers.

[Matt T · Rating 5 out of 5]

There is a well-worn caricature of Heidegger’s philosophy. It is deliberately obfuscating, riddled with Black Forest mysticism, peppered with reflections on the classical etymological roots of current terms. That Heidegger remains a crypto-fascist thinker who gives himself away in his praise of farming, in his search for an authentic homeland which may lie beyond Germany’s linguistic borders, is today's received wisdom. He is a philosopher who leverages folk wisdom against philosophy, and draws out the philosophical import of common speech, via Latin and Greek, as if all that mattered were to bring truth into that storehouse of Being that is language, by mining the ‘unthought’. But, as my exasperated philosophy teacher once asked, ‘how do you know when you are thinking the unthought?’

While both the style and matter of Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ confirms these aspersions, there is an undeniable philosophical originality and depth at work in these pages which is simply breathtaking. For a thorough detailed reading of the ‘Letter on Humanism’ in the context of humanist existentialism more broadly, I recommend Daniel Chernilo’s ‘Debating Humanism’ (2017), an open access publication on Cambridge University Press. Chernilo builds on Karl Löwith’s prescient analysis, and makes a strong case for the continuities between Heidegger’s late philosophical position and a fundamentally authoritarian political outlook, very much in accord with his early support for the Nazis. Chernilo’s argument turns on the fact that in the ‘Letter on Humanism', Heidegger implicitly places the blame for the catastrophe of the Second World War on a rationalist utilitarian mindset, as expressed through crude thoughtless notions of value, which humanist metaphysics allegedly maintains. In contrast, the type of ‘higher’ humanism Heidegger espouses in the ‘Letter…’ is supposedly above biological reductionism and base anthropological generalisations about what all human-beings share, and, in its rejection of instrumental reason, is constitutively ‘irrational’. For Chernilo, this leaves the door open for that great thinker of Being, also known as the philosopher-king, who is rare, wise and aims to keep a paternal eye over the peasantry. We might add, following Pierre Bourdieu (1989), that while Heidegger’s ‘Letter…’ betrays its authoritarianism in the very form of its purpose—an attempt to secure how people must read ‘Being and Time’, there are repeated powerful invocations of an ‘authentic’ organic wisdom which appears in an anti-intellectual guise, and, with its semblance of humility towards those that really work and think, along with its credence for those who hold onto conservative religious beliefs, might also be said to be populist in tone.

Despite all this, and however brutally insensitive they may appear after the event of the holocaust, it is difficult to deny the sincerity of Heidegger’s beliefs. How can someone possessed by such philosophical acumen be a proponent of such cruel indifference? In my view, the ‘Letter on Humanism’ raises two further problems for those who are sympathetic to the thought of Marx, and these are matters of fundamental concern. The first is the question of what constitutes emancipated non-alienated labour, and the second is how can progress towards a more emancipated state be measured?

Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ often surprises readers in its explicit endorsement of Marx, and this is aside from the obvious and likely deliberate irony that Heidegger is using Marx to repell Sartre’s attempt to draw his thought leftwards in his lecture, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ (1946). For Heidegger, ‘the Marxist view of history is superior to that of other historical accounts’, (259), and because Sartre fails to recognise ‘the essential importance of the historical in being, neither phenomenology nor existentialism enters that dimension within which a productive dialogue with Marxism first becomes possible.’ (259) Why does an apparently conservative thinker place such a high value on Marx’s view of history? It is difficult to pin down, but the answer lies in Marx’s inversion of the dialectic in Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’ (1807), where ‘the self-establishing process of unconditional production, which is the objectification of the actual through the human being [is] experienced as subjectivity.’ (259). In Heidegger’s view, rather than proposing a metaphysical ideal production experiencing itself through human consciousness, Marx has the benefit of making conscious reflection a product of the actual labour process, which is in turn in an ‘always already’ antagonistic relationship to alienating technology, something which Heidegger will develop further in his notion of enframement in his ‘Question Concerning Technology’. (1954)

A harder question to answer is where exactly Marx and Heidegger can be said to part ways? The conventional response would be to claim that while Marx hypostasizes labour-power into a metaphysical entity privileging rational purposive physical action, Heidegger would have us pondering the vagaries of Being somewhere out in the fields. Indeed, perhaps Heidegger’s best rejoinder to ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ is his critique of Sartre’s de facto consequentialism: ‘Thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it is applied. Thinking acts insofar as it thinks.’ (239) Yet, what kind of ‘thinking’ is it that Heidegger proposes? It is a thinking which is first of all stripped from utilitarian concerns. It is not confined to obvious biological limits or physiological determinations. Nor should it be in the service of reinforcing some metaphysical ideal. Even placing God as humanity’s ‘highest value’ belies a crude ‘degradation of God’s essence’ (265). Whatever thinking is, it is a kind of unconditioned act which affirms humanity’s most important role: to be the shepherd of Being. Who or what precisely does humanity ‘shepherd’? The shepherd brings to light all that exists through historical reflection as expressed through our language. Who else contemplates the sky? No-one else can do it. The fact that these expressions involve the materiality of actual language in the form of tools and texts will be developed by Bernard Stiegler in his series ‘Technics and Time’ (1994). Privilege technics over the human that brought them into Being and you have the philosophy of Nick Land.

Arguably, what is less considered in contemporary ‘fully-automated’ post work leftist positions today, is Marx’s conception of the possibility of non-alienated labour upon which the whole critique of capitalism hinges. Capital is not just unjust because of its exploitation of worker’s labour-power through the profits made by the owners of the means of production, as unfortunate as this may be. Such a critique would remain largely moral. While it is correct that workers are literally alienated from the products of their labour insofar as they do not own them, for Marx, the more fundamental problem with capitalist societies is the process of real subsumption which renders all work alienating. Through increasing social inequality and making all work practices more concerned with maximising profits, human species-being is said to be alienated. Even those rare few who believe they have fulfilling jobs, insofar as they subjectively experience contentment, are by virtue of the fact that their labour is more or less unwittingly contributing to the total alienation of the species, still alienated.

If such a process could ever be reversed, what would non-alienated labour look like? For Marx, no doubt fearing a misinterpretation and reification of a limited set of activities, there are precious few indications. What we can say is that really free labour, aside from being freed from the wage relation, would not be simply relaxed, limited, and confined to a four-day week; rather, free non alienated labour might best be figured in the work of a composer of music: something serious, engaging, thoughtful, that works as an end-in-itself, and utilises all that is best in human-beings: 'Really free labor, the composing [of music] for example, is at the same time damned serious and demands the greatest effort.' (Marx, 1861)

The idea that a day will come where we’re all serious composers is perhaps no more ludicrous than the idea that we’ll all settle around the Black Forest and live as subsistence farmers thoughtfully warming ourselves by the stove come eventide. But just as Heidegger proposes that in each historical epoch certain aspects of Being come to light at the same time as others are obscured, so Marx never sees a complete end to our alienation through work which is constitutive of human species-being and against which humanity is in permanent dialectical revolt. Both Marx and Heidegger reject utopian projects, and, arguably neither communism nor fascism were long imagined as achievable end-states. Whether it’s the farmer who furrows poetry into the soil or the worker who makes industrial music, what we’re left with are figures of qualified hope, and, for now, the best approximations we have for the unthinkable.

[Francisca · Rating 3 out of 5]

“El lenguaje es el lenguaje del ser, como las nubes son las nubes del cielo”. !!!

[Oskar Knutsen Brennhagen · Rating 5 out of 5]

I Brev om Humanismen tematiserer Heidegger den opprinnelige enheten mellom Væren og tenkning; den evige begynnelsen (eller begynnelsens evighet) som muliggjør tenkningen av Værens sannhet. For å tenke Værens sannhet og erfare tenkningens vesen i sin renhet må vi ifølge Heidegger gi slipp på beregnende tenkning og enhver teknisk forståelse av språket. Språkets vesen finnes ikke som «informasjonsbærende tegn», men som «Værens hus», og som Værens hus er språket noe helt annet enn det vi vanligvis mener med «språk».

Da Descartes «fant opp» moderne filosofi, og med det det moderne subjektet som noe adskilt fra den utstrakte virkeligheten, kuttet han også det opprinnelige båndet mellom tenkningen og Væren. Beregnende tenkning ble dominerende, og tenkningen kan sies å ha mistet sin levende kraft i det subjektet foldet seg selv inn i seg selv; for alltid lukket ute fra «tingen i seg selv». Virkeligheten som død og utstrakt masse ble forstått som totaliteten av det værende, og metafysikkens fullendelse i Gestell nærmet seg med stormskritt.

All metafysisk tenkning lider ifølge Heidegger av den samme feilen; den har glemt å tenke den ontologiske forskjellen mellom Væren og det værende. I søken etter virkelighetens grunnleggende bestanddeler, om det er snakk om atomer, kvarker, eller vann (Thales), har den metafysiske tradisjonen glemt Værens absolutte nærhet. Denne pågående øvelsen i metafysisk avstand begynte med grekerne, og den moderne teknovitenskapelige avdekningen av det værende som Gestell – forstått som en konsentrasjon og samling av tilgjengelighet og posisjonering – er slik Heidegger ser det metafysikkens fullendelse.

Den beregnende tenkningen som forsøker å be-gripe det værende gjennom å kontrollere det som er mister muligheten til å tenke Værens mening. Metafysikken postulerer det værende som totaliteten av alt som er, og er dermed ikke i stand til å stille spørsmålet om Værens mening; Værens mening er ikke å finne i det værende, men i Værens lysning. Værensglemselen anfør metafysikken blir slikt forstått kilden til vår tids nihilisme. Fordi Værens mening ikke finnes i det værende, men i spørsmålet om Væren, og siden metafysikken reduserer Væren til det værende, er det klart at denne reduksjonen ender i det moderne subjektets følelse av tomhet og meningsløshet.

I sin Værensglemsel har det moderne subjektet følgelig også glemt sitt sanne vesen, og dermed sin menneskelige verdighet. Metafysikken søker «objektiv sannhet» gjennom å modellere det værende, og har slik fjernet menneskets vesen fra regnestykket; idealet om «objektivitet» er et ideal om en verden uten mennesker. Vi tror altså på en metafysikk som gjør oss selv ubetydelige og overflødige. Er det rart vi lever i en meningskrise? Heidegger skriver: «Metafysikken stenger seg ute fra det enkle faktum at mennesket bare er vesentlig i sitt vesen når det blir tiltalt av Væren. Bare ut fra kravet i denne tiltalen har det funnet det som huser dets vesen» (16).

Som vi kan se her hevder Heidegger at menneskets vesen ligger i å bli tiltalt av Væren, og at kravet denne tiltalen stiller er det som gir menneskets vesen «et hus». Det betyr at så lenge vi ikke hører Værens tiltale og dets krav er vi hjemløse. Meningskrisen beror nettopp på dette faktum; det moderne subjektet flakker omkring i hjemløshetens uro.

Å bli lydhør for Værens tiltale innebærer å gi slipp på det værende, å gi slipp på ønske om kontroll, å gi slipp på manipulering. Det handler om å la væren være for på den måten å hvile i den navnløse stillheten. «... hvis mennesket enda en gang skal finne nærheten til Væren, da må det først lære å eksistere i det navnløse ... Bare slik kan ordet få tilbake sitt kostbare vesen og mennesket igjen gis et husvære der det bor i Værens sannhet» (11).

At språkets vesen er Værens hus kan ikke forstås som at språkets proporsjonale form «huser Væren», nei, det er mer som at Væren er språk i det den taler til vårt vesen. I denne tiltalen finner vi vårt vesens sannhet som ek-statisk stående ut i Værens lysning. Heidegger skriver: «Å stå i Værens lysning kaller jeg menneskets ek-sistens» (16) ... «Ek-sistens betyr innholdsmessig å stå ut i Værens sannhet» ... «Ek-sistens gir bestemmelsen av det mennesket er i sannhetens tilskikkelse» (19).

Ved å gi opp den beregnende tenkningens behov om kontroll; ved å gi slipp på det værende og å la væren være, oppstår muligheten for å høre Værens tiltale, og ut ifra dets krav finne vårt hjem i Værens lysning. Ved å bli lydhøre for Værens tiltale kan vi finne veien ut av subjektets tomme grunnlag i seg selv, og dermed oppdage vårt vesen som ek-statisk stående ut i ek-sistens som Værens sannhet. Forståelsen av vårt vesen som ek-statisk stående ut i Værens sannhet peker mot vår oppgave som voktere av Værens sannhet. Poiesiens levende tenkning – forstått som tenkning i og fra Værens sannhet – er noe helt annet enn teknikkens beregnende tenking, og de som dikter og tenker i poiesisk ånd må sammen med Heidegger forstås som vokterne av Værens hus:

«Språket er Værens hus. I dens husvære bor mennesket. De som tenker og dikter, er denne boligens voktere. Deres vakthold er fullbyrdelsen av Værens åpenbarhet, i den grad de bringer den til orde gjennom sin tale og bevarer den i språket ... All virksomhet har sitt utgangspunkt i Væren og sprer seg til det værende. Tenkningen etterkommer på sin side Værens krav om å utsi Værens sannhet. Tenkningen fullbyrder innrømmelsen av denne fordring. Å tenke er å være engasjert av Væren for Væren.» (5-6)

[Ana · Rating 3 out of 5]

2.5 estrelas, arredondadas para cima.

Este livro consiste numa carta escrita por Heidegger a Jean Beaufret, em resposta a uma outra carta por este endereçada ao autor em 1946 e contendo, entre outras questões, a pergunta principal “De que maneira dar novamente à palavra humanismo, um sentido?”

A filosofia não é, de todo, o meu género preferido, e vi-me, literalmente grega, para entender uma ínfima parte destas 124 páginas. E digo literalmente, porque se não bastasse o tema já de si bastante hermético, Heidegger ainda se dá ao luxo de semear o texto de palavras escritas em carateres gregos! Valeu-me a matemática, que usa bastantes símbolos gregos e me ajudaram a ler em voz alta algumas palavras. E depois valeram-me as origens gregas de algumas palavras portuguesas, que me permitiram entender outras tantas.

Foi uma leitura muito exigente, a maior parte do tempo exasperante, mas senti-me satisfeita por ter conseguido levá-la até ao fim, embora não sinta ter ficado totalmente esclarecida acerca do humanismo...

“A filosofia é perseguida pelo temor de perder em prestígio e importância se não for ciência. O não ser ciência é considerado uma deficiência (…)” - Se quisesse ser mazinha diria que concordo plenamente, mas a verdade é que o uso da lógica em filosofia, por exemplo, a aproxima bastante das ciências.

“Ela (a palavra humanismo) perdeu o sentido, pela convicção de que a essência do humanismo é de carácter metafísico e isto significa, agora, que a Metafísica não só não coloca a questão da verdade do ser, mas a obstrui, na medida em que a Metafísica persiste no esquecimento do ser.”

[Brent · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really great. Here Heidegger is responding to Sartre’s lecture “Existentialism is a Humanism.” Heidegger published this Briefe in 1947 shortly after the conclusion of WWII.

There is a candidness here in Heidegger where he seems to be speaking in plainer language so as to distinguish himself as clearly as possible to his French compatriots as to the differences between his philosophy of Being and Sartre’s existentialism. Also irony, sarcasm, and some asshole moments yet shine through. Heidegger chiding his readers for not understanding his position on a/theism debate is hilarious when he refers to italic text of a footnote of a previous work of his! “Why then are there particular words in the note italicized and not just random ones?” (230)

The fundamental thesis of the letter is to clarify terms such as Being, existence, essence, and humanism. For Sartre, existence precedes essence. This is an inversion of Plato/Aristotle and all of Christian theology hitherto. For Heidegger, this is still a metaphysical assertion. He wants to move beyond metaphysics which he attempts to do with his concept of Being, Dasein, and ek-sistence. For him, Sartre is still using existence (existentia) and essence (essentia) like in scholastic theology. The former actuality (actus) and the latter potentiality (potentia). Sartre’s existentialism is a humanism because it raises up mankind as absolute lord over the earth and over all beings. This is the absolute Cartesian objectification of the world. Indeed, Sartre proclaims that it’s on Descartes and his Cogito Ergo Sum that his existentialism is founded. The human subject and the ego cogito is the foundation for Sartre’s existentialism. Because of this, human beings have a unique responsibility to all other human beings. He tries to avoid making this a prescription and thereby founding a new Kantian categorical imperative.

Heidegger decries Cartesian dualism and honestly believed that because of Descartes most of the problems of metaphysics were precipitated. He seems at pains to make it clear how utterly distinct his philosophy is from Sartre, notwithstanding the usage of similar terms. Indeed, Heidegger at one point laments the frailty of language and he confesses that he was in some respects forced to make due with the especial vocabulary that metaphysics had bequeathed to him, even though he ends up redefining the majority of these terms. Nevertheless, he wants to get rid of the word humanism. For him, Sartre’s humanism doesn’t do the homo humanum enough justice. He asserts that adding “ratio” to mankind and making him far superior to the animal kingdom still keeps mankind in the realm of animalitas. But he rejects this, and states that human beings are unique because we are not beings among other beings if spread out by distance i.e man, plants, beasts, God, etc. This way of thinking sets man as homo animalis. Rather, Being is the Being of beings and as such, man is positioned in a relation to Being. It is our responsibility to think the thinking that thinks of the truth about Being.

Language is one of the principle ways that man relates to Being. Language is not derived rather it is given over from Being to man. Being calls man into this relationship which is man’s thinking. Language is the house of Being wherein man dwells. In this house thinking the lighting of Being sets us in a relationship to Being that is fitting. But language is elusive and precisely what enables us to dwell in nearness to Being also casts a wide gulf between us and Being. Language becomes a tool that in service of communication “along routes where objectification branches out and disregards all limits” (197). Language becomes a techne that seeks to enframe and acquire power and as such does not service thinking of the truth of Being. Rather it thinks the oblivion of Being. This is the paradox of language. Thinking, also, for Heidegger allows us to ask the truth of Being. Thinking is the thinking of Being. It is both a thinking about Being and the thinking that comes from Being. Being comes to man in thinking. The written word, contemplative meditation allow us to draw near to Being.

For Heidegger, mankind is different than animals not because he has reason. As if he is another being among beings but contains an additive. Rather, man is different from other beings because he exists ek-sistingly in Being. That is, he stands out ecstatically in the lighting of Being. Heidegger states that ek-sistence is the ground of the possibility of reason (ratio). Man thus is thrown by Being into the world which is his Dasein (being-in-the-world) and thereupon stands out (eksists) in Being. Man’s ek-sistence is the counter-throw (Gegenwurf) to his thrownness (Gewurfenheit).

There is so much more I can say. He quotes Hölderlin and Heraclitus; discusses Hegel, Marx, Schelling, Nietzsche, Goethe.

I loved his concept of homelessness as man in our present age who does not think the truth of Being but only the oblivion of Being. There he is a wanderer with no home, he is a tourist not a pilgrim (Byung-chul Han). This is the mode of the present age of the history of Being which is the history of metaphysics. For Heidegger, it must be historical. He tips his hat to Hegel here. Heidegger also leaves open whether God exists or not. He states we must first think the truth of Being. Only then can we open up new avenues in which one can think thoughts of ontology, the spheres of the holy, the divine and thereby God or gods. He doesn’t think this is indifference but rather prudence.

The end discussion of the Nicht and Nein as the negativity of the negative is great and is really just Schelling and earlier German idealists. Thinking must find its way back to Being but not by climbing ever higher platonic hierarchical spheres, but rather Being shall come (adventus) to man, as mankind must descend evermore. In his lowly estate, there Being IS. Heidegger ends the letter by stating we need less philosophy and “more attentiveness to thinking” which is simple, and unassuming. The “farmer, slow of step, draw[ing] through the field.” Thus man is the simple shepherd of Being, called by Being to stand in the openness of Being. It is this sphere which is more primordial and essential and thus eliminates the problems with the language constructs of subject/object and theory/praxis. Here man can dwell in Being. This is beyond both ethics and metaphysics.

I would love to write more but I’ll spare the pen. I shall most likely return to this in the future for references and in academic study. Just wonderful. Highly recommend.

-b

[Marcelo · Rating 4 out of 5]

la arrogancia de decirle a heidegger "4 estrellas: está bien pero podrías haberla estructurado mejor y podrías ser menos fascista muak"

[Lauren Collins · Rating 3 out of 5]

metaphysics does not address Being! what does that mean??

[Dan · Rating 5 out of 5]

The main point of this letter is the dismissal of Sartre's existentialism and opposition to humanism. In the first case, Sartre's statement that “Existence precedes essence” is nothing more to Heidegger than a reversal of the old metaphysical statement that “essentia precedes existentia” and the reversal of a metaphysical statement is still a metaphysical statement. In the second case, Heidegger opposes humanism because it does not set the humanitas of man high enough. According to the destiny of Being, man is the shepherd of Being and needs to guard the truth of Being. In this ek-sisting we need to find the meaning of existentialism and humanism, and not in some metaphysical concepts.

Interestingly, Heidegger takes the side of Marx (Hegel and Nietzsche) over Sartre on issues like historicism and alienation/homelessness. Marx's and Nietzsche's absolute and inverted metaphysics belong to the history of the truth of Being; but not Sartre's metaphysics.

In line with his critique of Nietzsche, “will to power” and “valuing”; Heidegger repeats his objection against any such valuing as ignorant of its consequences – to him any valuing process is nothing more than a subjectivizing process of turning beings into simple objects and consequently does not let beings be. To proclaim God as the highest value is a degradation of God and the highest blasphemy. This is the process of nihilism that in the end will destroy the metaphysical world and this is how man is killing God for some time now.

Here Heidegger also defend his ontology as not endorsing any atheism or theism. Moreover, as opposed to any metaphysics, he claims that his thinking opens the possibility for understanding of “holy” and “essence of divinity”; and thus of God. If we want to experience and understand any god in today's world, I guess we need to take his word for it and follow him on this path.

To overcome metaphysics/philosophy, we do not need to climb even higher and higher in this frenzy for more and more general concepts, but to climb down to the nearness of the nearest and to return to simplicity. It is easy and safe to keep moving up, but very difficult and dangerous in descending. This is a remainder that Heidegger was more sympathetic and closer to the Black Forest's peasants than to any philosopher or scientist.

How about that Heraclitus passage when the thinker sits by the stove while warming himself and proclaims to the puzzled philosophers that “for here too the gods are present”? I guess that is the best way to experience the gods – by warming yourself by a stove and by going back to the simple and daily human experiences and practices that are still in touch with the gods, and not by studying theology or in churches.

How dull is the standard translation of Heraclitus' saying that “A men's character is his daimon” when compared with Heidegger's: “The (familiar) abode is for man the open region for the presencing of god (the unfamiliar one)”...

In this letter, Heidegger raises the issue of a possible ethic that goes with his ontology. It seems to me that he dismisses it since the true of Being will eventually make any conduct obvious and that the distinction between theoretical and practical with come to pass with a thinking that lets Being be.

As someone who's project is overturning the entire philosophy tradition, Heidegger was always an arrogant dick - and rightly so. I was surprised to find him explaining, clarifying, and even defending himself in this “letter” addressed directly to a specific person and indirectly to the French philosophical community at that time. Maybe the recent defeat of Germany and his new situation induced him to respond with this letter and be a little more obliging and agreeable then otherwise.

[Amaury A. Reyes-Torres · Rating 3 out of 5]

Reading Heidegger in english is difficult. However, this letter reflects the main essence of his work in Being and Time and shows how Sartre misinterpreted the work. As usual, Heidegger makes clear the essence and the need of thinking, beyond mere philosophy and action. Something that actualy calls my atention is the approach towards Being and the man (person), which reveals a shift in the approach undertake in Being and Time. This is just me: a impression that I have by reading the text. I found confussing and necessary all the play he does with words and to change the meanings or adapting them to what he wanted to say. Some people say that this Heidegger is not the Heidegger from Being and Time: this is is different. In fact you can tell this disconformity with the modern world and his nostalgia for more simple times. Nevetheless, this is a letter that must be read after you read Being and Time and What is Metaphysics...I recommend this fantastic, despite the rating.

[T · Rating 2 out of 5]

"Because we are speaking against ‘logic’ people believe we are demanding that the rigour of
thinking be renounced and in its place the arbitrariness of drives and feelings be installed and thus
that ‘irrationalism’ be proclaimed as true. For what is more ‘logical’ than that whoever speaks
against the logical is defending the alogical?... For what is more “logical” than that whoever roundly denies what is truly in being puts himself on the side of nonbeing and thus professes the pure nothing at the meaning of reality?."

Heidegger switches from lucid and interesting writing on 'being' which flies in the face of everything the analytic tradition holds dearly, but then goes on long digressions which leave me totally dumbfounded, and have me questioning what relation the words have to the text Heidegger is responding to (Sartre's Existentialism and Humanism), or the ideas Heidegger is advancing.

[una filósofa viciosa · Rating 5 out of 5]

"El lenguaje es la casa del ser. En su morada habita el hombre. Los pensadores y poetas son los guardianes de esa morada. Su guarda consiste en llevar a cabo la manifestación del ser".

[Humphrey J]

(Rating may be subject to change as I go over the Letter in the future— for now it's an impressive (if baffling & repetitive) text.)

[Shulamith Farhi · Rating 3 out of 5]

An important moment in the exposition of Heidegger's thought, this letter poses itself against existentialist humanism, which it suggests is merely the latest form of the metaphysical forgetting of the problem of Being. Much of the letter is PR - Heidegger is trying to rehabilitate himself after the Nazi misadventure, and accordingly insists that the theme of the homeland cannot be reduced to its nationalistic signification, and must instead be seen as a primordial renewal given by the history of Being. For Heidegger, stepping out of one's element is the end of thinking; it is difficult not to see this as a continuation of the earlier insistence on being "rooted in the soil." Only diehard disciples will be convinced by Heidegger's rhetorical contortions.

Since Heidegger is brilliant, there are, as always, moments that transcend the numerous shortcomings addressed above. Perhaps most important is Heidegger's sketch of a post-metaphysical thought which "brings the unspoken word of being to language." This thought must above all be humble and fit to its world, and Heidegger gives three criteria to this end: "rigor of meditation, carefulness in saying, frugality with words." This will allow us to break the habit of overestimating philosophy; thinking is "on the descent to the poverty of its provisional essence."

[Searchingthemeaningoflife Greece · Rating 5 out of 5]

[...]Ὁ ἄνθρωπος δέν εἶναι ὁ κύριος τῶν ὅντων. Ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ὁ ποιμήν του Εἶναι. Μέ τοῦτο τό «λιγότερο» ὁ ἄνθρωπος δέν χάνει τίποτα· ἀντίθετα κερδίζει, καθόσον φθάνει στήν ἀλήθεια του Εἶναι. Κερδίζει την οὐσιώδη ἔνδεια τοῦ ποιμένος, τοῦ ὁποίου ἡ ἀξιοπρέπεια συνίσταται στο να καλεῖται ἀπό τό Εἶναι αὐτό τούτο για να ἀναλάβει τη διαφύλαξη τῆς ἀλήθειας του [ενν. του Εἶναι]. [...]

[...]Αν όμως μέ ἀνθρωπισμό ἐννοοῦμε γενικά την προσπάθεια νά γίνει ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐλεύθερος γιά τήν ἀνθρωπιά του καί νά βρεῖ ἐκεῖ τήν ἀξιοπρέπειά του, τότε ὁ ἀνθρωπισμός διαφοροποιείται κάθε φορά ανάλογα μέ τήν ἀντίληψη που έχει γιά τήν «ἐλευθερία» καί τή «φύση» τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Ομοίως διαφέρουν καί οἱ δρόμοι γιά τήν πραγμάτωσή του.[...]

[moi, k.y.a.]

kitap Varlık ve Zaman’a göndermelerle dolu. başlığı sebebiyle okunacaklara eklemiştim, hata olmuş. sonra tekrar okunacak kitaplar arasına girdi.

[David Val Campillo]

Me ha gustado mucho la verdad, no todo porque siento que patina en cosas pero en general, de lo que he entendido, esta tremen
El mundo se mira a si mismo a través de si

[Sam · Rating 5 out of 5]

In Existentialism is a Humanism, Jean-Paul Sartre defines existentialism through the claim that “existence precedes essence.” In the same work, he identifies Martin Heidegger as an existentialist. But is Heidegger truly one? In his Letter on Humanism, Heidegger directly responds to Sartre, questioning both the meaning of existentialism and the very idea of humanism itself.

First, we should briefly define what Sartre means by “existence precedes essence.” This credo expresses the idea that human beings are not born with a fixed nature or purpose; rather, we first exist and then define ourselves through our actions and choices. In this sense, choice plays a central role in Sartre’s existentialism. However, this emphasis on human freedom also presupposes a subject–object relationship, in which the subject stands apart from and relates to objects in the world. This relation implies a certain hierarchy or power dynamic, where the subject manipulates or defines objects according to its own purposes. In doing so, it fails to let things simply be what they are and instead objectifies them.

For Heidegger, this is not what Being truly means. Heidegger distinguishes Being—with a capital “B”—as that which underlies and makes possible all beings. It cannot be grasped as an object but can only be approached through our lived experience among beings themselves. This is what they call a phenomenological approach, in which Being is understood not as something created or as a creator, but as that which grounds both. Heidegger articulates this idea in Letter on Humanism as follows:

“Man is rather ‘thrown’ from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are. Man does not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history and nature come forward into the clearing of Being, come to presence and depart. The advent of beings lies in the destiny of Being. But for man it is ever a question of finding what is fitting in his essence that corresponds to such destiny; for in accord with this destiny man as ek-sisting has to guard the truth of Being. Man is the shepherd of Being.”

For Heidegger, human beings are thus the shepherds of Being. In other words, we do not stand as absolute sovereigns over Being—as Sartre’s existentialism suggests—but instead dwell within and care for it. Our role is essentially passive or receptive: we are “thrown” into the “truth of Being,” and through our ek-sistence—a term that signifies a standing out into the openness of Being—we are called to guard this truth. In doing so, beings “appear in the light of Being” as what they truly are. The “truth of Being,” then, is not something we create or define through our choices, but something we must attune ourselves to and preserve; the “truth of Being” is surrendering to Being itself.

Later in the Letter, Heidegger reinforces this rejection of the subject–object framework:

“Of course, the essential worth of man does not consist in his being the substance of beings, as the ‘Subject’ among them, so that as the tyrant of Being he may deign to release the beingness of beings into an all too loudly bruited ‘objectivity.’”

He precedes this with a crucial clarification:

“To that extent the thinking in Being and Time is against humanism. But this opposition does not mean that such thinking aligns itself against the humane and advocates the inhuman, that it promotes the inhumane and deprecates the dignity of man. Humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of man high enough.”

Thus, Heidegger’s critique of Sartre’s existential humanism is not a rejection of humanity but a call to think the human more deeply. Sartre’s conception, grounded in self-definition and choice, remains trapped within metaphysics and fails to account for the “truth of Being.” In reducing humanity to self-determination, it overlooks our more originary relation to Being itself.

To illustrate this difference, I like to give an example, imagine walking through a forest, surrounded by trees glistening with droplets of thawed frost as sunlight filters softly through an opening in the canopy. In such a moment, one does not think, “This scene is the result of my choices,” or “What choice will I make next to shape my being?” Instead, one simply experiences and takes delight in what it is to be. This moment of attunement reveals a way of existing that is not grounded in self-determination, but in openness to the presence of Being itself.

For this reason, Heidegger rejects Sartre’s principle that “existence precedes essence.” As he notes, “…the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement.” In other words, simply inverting the traditional Greek claim that essence precedes existence does not escape metaphysics—it only turns it on its head. Heidegger does not accuse Sartre of being wholly mistaken, but rather of remaining within the metaphysical framework that forgets the deeper question of Being. As he writes, Sartre “stays with metaphysics in oblivion of the truth of Being”. In this sense, Sartre’s existentialism exemplifies what Heidegger calls ‘Seinsvergessenheit’—the forgetfulness of Being.

I agree with Heidegger’s critique of Sartre: Being is not about objectifying reality but about the blissful wonder of experiencing it. To claim, as Sartre does, that our being consists solely in the freedom to make choices is, in my view, a reduction of the mystery and richness that surround us. As illustrated in the example of the forest, we do not naturally encounter the world as a collection of objects to be manipulated, but as a living, unfolding presence—a gift that calls for appreciation rather than control. To reduce this experience to mere subject–object relations, as Heidegger suggests, is indeed “deprecating”: it diminishes both the world and our place within it.

The tree adorned with droplets of thawed frost is not merely an object—it is a being, a quiet miracle. Just as one can analyze a piece of music through theory without ever capturing the feeling of hearing it, so too can one describe the world conceptually without truly dwelling within it. For this reason, I share Heidegger’s belief that we must let beings be, allowing them to reveal themselves rather than reducing them to objects of thought or use.

Finally, I would like to close with a passage from Jacques Ellul’s The Technological Society, which poignantly captures how our perception of reality has shifted over time:

“In our day, we are unable to envisage comfort except as part of the technical order of things. Comfort for us means bathrooms, easy chairs, foam-rubber mattresses, air conditioning, washing machines, and so forth. The chief concern is to avoid effort and promote rest and physical euphoria. For us, comfort is closely associated with the material life; it manifests itself in the perfection of personal goods and machines. According to Giedion, the men of the Middle Ages also were concerned with comfort, but for them comfort had an entirely different form and content. It represented a feeling of moral and aesthetic order. Space was the primary element in comfort. Man sought open spaces, large rooms, the possibility of moving about, of seeing beyond his nose, of not constantly colliding with other people. These preoccupations are altogether foreign to us. Moreover, comfort consisted of a certain arrangement of space. In the Middle Ages, a room could be completely “finished,” even though it might contain no furniture. […] The goal was not convenience, but rather a certain atmosphere.”

I’m aware that Heidegger was responding to a rather popular and simplified account of Sartre’s existentialism. So my agreement with him here is not meant as a dismissal of Sartre, but as an acknowledgment of how Heidegger’s reply turns that exchange into a deeper, if densely stylized, piece of Schwarzwald mysticism—an elegant doorway into his own philosophy.

[stolencenturies ⭑.ᐟ · Rating 4 out of 5]

4.5 ⭐

Diría que este libro me gustó bastante y me gustaría leer más sobre este pensamiento y sobre Heidegger, aunque no termine de entenderlo del todo pero quedé con una sensación de satisfacción al leerlo, investigaré más sobre esto jajaja

[Vicente Garrido · Rating 3 out of 5]

Me leí este libro bajo el efecto notable de la cafeína en mi cuerpo... Todos los humanismos desde el romano dan por entendida la esencia del humano, pero cuál es la esencia del humano? acaso es posible pensar esa esencia prescindiendo de una metafísica? qué es la metafísica? que es la? que es? que? q? ?

[Vany · Rating 4 out of 5]

20 años más tarde de que publicara su obra titulada " Se y tiempo" y después de de los terribles suceso históricos que vivió Alemania Heidedgger se pregunta o mejor dicho un filosofo francés le pregunta como se puede definir ahora el humanismo. Bajo está pregunta se escribe este ensayo que continua los pensamientos de la obra antes mencionada, pero introduce nuevas formas de acercamiento a la verdad del ser. El hombre aquí no se encuentra arrojado al mundo, sino que debe permanecer expectante al cuidado del ser. Introduciendo el concepto de ex-sistencia y abre la posibilidad de relacionar al Dasein con el cuidado, la espera a que el ser se des-oculte para poder conocer su verdad vinculada a lo histórico, el lenguaje y la cultura.

[Lídia]

I can't rate it because I didn't understand a thing...

[A YOGAM · Rating 3 out of 5]

Die schockierende Abrechnung
Moment mal, die zentrale Erkenntnis ist also, dass das größte Problem der Menschheit darin besteht, dass wir den Menschen in den Mittelpunkt stellen? Klingt, als würde man einem Fünfjährigen erklären, dass sein Lieblingsspielzeug – er selbst – eigentlich die Wurzel allen Übels ist. Heidegger schwingt hier die ganz große Keule: Die ganze metaphysische Tradition, von der Renaissance bis zu Sartre, ist Mumpitz (Quatsch, Unsinn), weil sie das Sein verfehlt. Offenbar waren all diese Denker einfach zu sehr damit beschäftigt, menschlich zu sein, um sich mal wirklich um das Sein zu kümmern. Das ist so, als würde man die Erfindung des Rades kritisieren, weil sie nicht genug die Rad-heit gewürdigt hat. Und das alles hat dann auch noch zu den politischen Katastrophen geführt? Ich hatte ja den Eindruck, Technisierung und Weltkriege wären ernste Probleme, aber jetzt weiß ich: Es ist die mangelnde Wertschätzung des Seins! Und beiläufig entsteht der Eindruck, dass diese Abrechnung nicht nur ein philosophischer Rundumschlag ist, sondern auch eine elegante Möglichkeit, sich von jeder politischen Verantwortung „seinsgeschichtlich“ freizusprechen.
Die schwer fassbare "Kehre"
Der Brief gilt als Schlüssel zur sogenannten "Kehre" in Heideggers Denken, in der das Sein plötzlich wichtiger wird als wir selbst. Er trennt das "Sein" vom "Seienden" – eine Unterscheidung, die klingt wie der Versuch, den Unterschied zwischen einem Kuchen und der Kuchen-Essenz zu erklären, die man aber leider nicht essen kann. Das Denken soll jetzt "Wahrnis des Seins" sein. Ich stelle mir das bildlich vor: Man sitzt tief im Wald, denkt nicht über die Steuererklärung nach und plötzlich – zack! – spürt man die Wahrnis des Seins. Und das soll uns jetzt retten. Kein Wunder, dass die ganze Sache sofort eine riesige Debatte ausgelöst hat. Sartre, der dachte, er sei frei und selbstbestimmt, muss nun einsehen, dass er nur ein Subjekt ist, das es nicht auf die Prioritätenliste des Seins geschafft hat. Existenz geht der Essenz voraus? Pustekuchen! Das Sein geht allem voraus, selbst der Philosophie des Mannes, der diesen Satz formuliert hat! Die Ironie dabei: Sartre hatte bereits alles getan, um den Menschen zu „de-zentrieren“, aber Heidegger wirft ihm dennoch vor, viel zu sehr am Menschen zu hängen – es ist, als würde man jemandem, der schon im eiskalten Wasser schwimmt, vorwerfen, er würde das Schwimmbad zu sehr mögen.
Die unentrinnbare Wirkung
Dieser Brief hat also die gesamte französische Nachkriegsphilosophie inspiriert. Offenbar waren Derrida, Foucault und Co. so verwirrt von Heideggers Abneigung gegen den Humanismus, dass sie sich dachten: "Okay, wir kapieren das nicht, aber es klingt wichtig – machen wir eben Poststrukturalismus draus!" Das Ergebnis: Eine ganze Generation von Philosophen, die mit viel Aufwand erklären, warum das, was wir dachten, was der Mensch ist, eigentlich gar nicht der Mensch ist. Und dann Gadamers hermeneutische Erkenntnis: "Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins." Verstehe. Also ist das philosophische Problem nicht die Abwesenheit des Seins, sondern dass es einfach in einem Haus aus Vokabeln wohnt, dessen Schlüssel Heidegger exklusiv besitzt. Bis heute wird diskutiert, ob das Ganze nun ein genialer Wurf oder nur eine philosophische Ausflucht vor der politischen Verantwortung war. Ein grandioser Text, der uns lehrt: Wenn du ein Problem hast, sprich nicht über das Problem, sondern über die Seins-Geschichtlichkeit des Problems! Und falls jemand fragt, was das konkret lösen soll – nun, nichts, aber es klingt wenigstens nach metaphysischer Dringlichkeit.

[Ioana]

A question without an answer isn't a question

Funny how this guy pivots on mysticism in order to educate us on the servitude of philosophy to its own established meaning.
After zoning out every two phrases or so and re-reading them ad nauseam, I kinda chuckled when he wrote 'Soon after Being and Time appeared a young friend asked me, "When
are you going to write an ethics?'.
How is not Eckart better (and more laid back), when he writes Therefore you must truly sojourn and dwell in your essence, in your ground, and the God shall mix you with his simple essence without the medium of any image. No image represents and signifies itself: it stands for that of which is it the image.. Would we prefer: . Language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of being. Instead, language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings. Beings themselves appear as actualities in the interaction of cause and effect. We encounter beings as actualities in a calculative businesslike way, but also scientifically and by way of philosophy, with explanations and proofs. Even the assurance that something is inexplicable belongs to these explanations and proofs. With such statements pure believe that we confront the mystery. As if it were already decided that the truth of being lets itself at all be established in causes and explanatory grounds or, what comes to the same, in their incomprehensibility.?

Were you to meet Heidegger in some 'if this guy were alive' setting, what color the straight jacket for him? :)

[Albert Martínez i Cuadras · Rating 3 out of 5]

Heidegger escriu una carta responent a Jean Beaufret el 1946, que publicarà un any després. En aquesta carta es veu perfectament l’enllaç entre el primer Heidegger (el de “L’Ésser i el Temps”) i el segon, el de la famosa “Kehre”. La preocupació per abordar la pregunta per l’ésser en tota la seva profunditat i abandonar definitivament el terreny de que ell anomena “l’ens” és profunda: per Heidegger, fins que la filosofia (o el pensament en general) no faci aquest gir, ens haurem d’acontentar amb la metafísica i la ciència.

En aquesta carta hi apareixen, de manera merament programàtica, les principals qüestions del segon Heidegger: l’ésser humà com el “pastor de l’ésser”, la profunda relació entre el llenguatge i l’ésser, la metàfora de la clariana de l’ésser, l’íntima connexió entre la filosofia que es pren seriosament la pregunta per l’ésser i la poesia…

Malgrat tot, es nota que aquest text no està escrit per ser publicat com una obra independent, sinó com un mer comentari o referència a altres obres de l’autor. El mateix Heidgger dona per fet que el seu interlocutor no només ha llegit “L’Ésser i el Temps”, sinó que a més a més el coneix amb profunditat (segur que era el cas de Beaufret). Aquest és un text revelador si es coneix l’autor, però intranscendent i fins i tot incomprensible si es pretén prendre com una mena de “manifest heideggerià” (com, d’altra banda, s’ha intentat fer en nombroses ocasions).

[Bradley · Rating 4 out of 5]

This read more like a work of mysticism than philsophy. He keeps evading definition by Sartre, telling us that categorizing things, subjectivising or objectivising them does damage to being. That thinking must be its own end not for the sake of something. He alludes to the power and place of poetry and silence. He tells us a little, also, about how nothing is part of being. The text is fairly opaque, and at times it seems like he's basically saying "you just don't understand, Sartre", but I think at some fundamental level he is trying to preserve the mystery of being, by keeping it beyond the systematizing and objectifying trends that had become a part of the then and even now "humanisms." Read as a response to Sartre it makes some sense, on its own its a tricky read at best, and deserves time and attention.

[Jonatan Almirón · Rating 4 out of 5]

(sobre la existencia arrojada del dasein) El descenso, sobre todo cuando el hombre se ha estrellado ascendiendo a la subjetividad, es más difícil y peligroso que el ascenso. El descenso conduce a la pobreza de la ex-sistencia del homo humanus. En la ex-sistencia se abandona el ámbito del homo animalis de la metafísica.

(...) Si el hombre quiere volver a encontrarse alguna vez en la vecindad del ser, tiene que aprender previamente a existir prescindiendo de nombres. (...) Antes de hablar, el hombre debe dejarse interpelar de nuevo por el ser, con el peligro que, bajo este reclamo, él tenga poco o raras veces algo que decir. Sólo así se le vuelve a regalar a la palabra el valor precioso de su esencia y al hombre la morada donde habitar en la verdad del ser.

[Pavlogreen]

En esta obrita Heidegger expone algunos puntos cruciales de su filosofía, muy útiles tanto para comprender mejor su gran obra, Ser y tiempo, como para acercarse a ella de manera crítica, pues en esta Carta sobre el humanismo el alemán demuestra su capacidad reflexiva y autocrítica a la par que original. No es un libro fácil de entender, pero su escasa longitud se presta a la revisión y la relectura (tarea que me gustaría emprender en algún momento). Eso no quita que sus ideas estén medianamente claras para quien tenga un mínimo conocimiento previo de su pensamiento. Con ese pequeño bagaje, la experiencia de leerlo, si bien correosa, es satisfactoria y estimulante.

[Julio The Fox · Rating 5 out of 5]

This sneaky and beautifully written attack on Jean-Paul Sartre and his essay, "Existentialism is a Humanism" is the best introduction to the monumental thought of Martin Heidegger. The master demonstrates why a man-centered approach to the problems of the world is bound to lead to the triumph of technology. War, pollution, loss of privacy, political crises and sundry will only grow worse if we put humanity at the height of our thought. Better to think of humans as one part of a larger Being, and value all forms of life, protecting them from the intrusion of the machine. (Yes, Heidegger is very Zen.) Step back, earthlings, and let Marty do the talking.