This is a tour de force from James Holland, and is exactly what I have come to expect from him: a thoroughly researched, compellingly written narrative history. A theme that runs through all of his books is the conviction that the way the Western Allies approached the war was essentially the right one, and was most likely to ensure their victory - but this is no one-sided hagiography. Holland's analysis is sharp, and he is unsparing in his criticism of Allied command, strategy or tactics where he feels it is justified. Another feature of his writing is his establishment of a cast of characters, whom he tends to follow and quote from throughout the book (and even across multiple books). This serves to humanise the events he is writing about, and is ultimately what keeps me interested in the subject of the Second World War - these are extraordinary events, but are being lived and experienced by ordinary people like you or I.
As he sets the scene in the first few chapters and introduces us to the USAAF, I was struck by the attitude and self-belief that suffused the young men who flew and crewed the bombers - they grown up in an increasingly technological society, and one that was growing in confidence as it emerged from the Great Depression. Additionally, the USA had the time and resources to invest in its young pilots, who typically joined their squadrons with several hundred hours of flying experience. All of this was both a product of and a contributor to the Allied strategy of 'steel not flesh'. Nevertheless, by 1943, all three of the main protagonists in the bomber campaign over Western Europe (the US, Britain and Germany) had encountered significant challenges in their attempt to decisively deploy air power in that theatre. The US had rapidly expanded their bomber force and was implementing its pre-war doctrine of daylight bombing. This was (theoretically) more accurate and utilised a strategy of heavy bombers that were heavily armed and armoured, and deployed in large formations to be self-defending. The compromise was that the American four-engine heavy bombers could carry only a modest payload compared to their British counterparts, who could drop five times the weight of ordinance using the same number of aircraft. For the British, the compromise for having a much greater bomb carrying capacity was that the British Lancasters and Halifaxes were much more vulnerable to enemy fire. British Bomber Command had also rapidly expanded since the start of the war, and focused on night bombing using a "bomber stream" strategy where aircraft operated independently but all followed the same predefined route to the target. Sir Arthur Harris, the uncompromising head of Bomber Command, insisted that his forces carry out a programme of area bombing against German cities to (in theory) fatally cripple German war industry and remove their ability to continue the war. While distasteful to modern sensibilities, thanks to improved technology and tactics (such as the Pathfinder Force), this approach to bombing was scarcely more indiscriminate than the daylight bombing pursued by the Americans. It was also militarily justifiable in the effort to hamper key war industries, particularly aircraft production. All in all, it is difficult to see how bombing could have been more accurate with contemporary technology, albeit that the American marketing of this was much more successful than Harris's bullish and cold blooded ruthlessness - but in both cases, Allied bomber forces were incurring significant casualties for relatively limited returns, with no conceivable end to the bombing campaign in sight. For the Germans, the main challenge was a perpetual shortage of everything: training, fuel, and modern aircraft. As Holland comments, "Germany simply could not compete with the industrial output, technological advances and vast global reach of the Allies, nor with the immense reserves of manpower and burgeoning war industry of the Soviet Union. By the autumn of 1943, Germany was short of just about everything, but especially of manpower, food and oil, the three requirements needed above anything else for a long attritional war."
As I mentioned above, the Allied bomber campaign was a striking example of the 'steel not flesh' approach to fighting the war. Holland points out that the Combined Bomber Command heavy bomber force put fewer men in the front line than a single infantry division, but with a destructive power many times as great. However, for those who were on the front line and who made up the crews, the casualty rates were horrifying. By the middle of 1943, the casualties among bomber crews had reached crisis point, and the US 8th Air Force commanders in particular were beginning to doubt their ability to sustain the offensive with continued mass bombing over Germany. Inflicting these casualties was the Luftwaffe, perpetually in disarray but still a formidable fighting force. By 1943, the Luftwaffe's main strength lay in fighters. This contradicted Hitler's insistence that they remain on the offensive (this would have required a significant heavy bomber force), but aligned perfectly with the air defence system that had been established, similar to Dowding's system during the Battle of Britain. Consisting of radar, observers, massed flak, and day and night fighters, German air defences couldn't stop the raids against German cities and industry but did have the ability to reliably interdict Allied bombers and inflict significant casualties. It had become clear that bombers were not capable of self-defence, and Holland notes that, "to wrest back the initiative from the Luftwaffe, they needed many more and better fighter aircraft than those of the enemy, flown by pilots with greater skill and experience and employing superior tactics, and, perhaps most important of all, with greater range. But in the dark days and nights of the autumn of 1943, bringing these six criteria together still seemed a long way off." A further challenge that the Allies' air commanders faced in 1943 was the emerging consensus that the Combined Bomber Offensive alone was not going to end the war. A cross-channel invasion was needed, and was committed to for May 1944. To allow this invasion to succeed, the Allies needed to secure air superiority over Western Europe, which in turn meant defeating the Luftwaffe fighter force in the air. Again, the Allied Bomber forces could not achieve this objective without a long-range escort fighter, something they did not have in 1943.
These two challenges, bringing the casualty rates under control and substantially degrading the Luftwaffe fighter forces ahead of OVERLORD, appeared to be an insurmountable problem - until the P-51 Mustang entered the fray. Holland argues that the P-51 is, perhaps, the most important aircraft ever built, and certainly the most significant aircraft of the war. It is undoubtedly a case of fortuitous timing in design, development and production, and the only tragedy is that the potential of this remarkable aircraft was not recognised sooner.
During Operation Pointblank, the USAAF had sought to defeat the Luftwaffe by crippling their means of production - aircraft manufacturing and assembly, ball bearing plants, and the like. This had resulted in the bombing raids deep into Germany which had led to the crippling casualties noted above, and had notably failed to fatally weaken the Luftwaffe. Now, in February 1944, the Allies were ready to launch Operation Argument - otherwise known as Big Week. This was a more focused and concentrated operation, involving both the 8th Air Force and RAF Bomber Command, which meant that bombing of key targets could take place both day and night, exhausting and overwhelming German air defences. The long-range fighter escort provided by the P-51 meant that, as well as bombing targets on the ground, the German fighters could be taken on and defeated in the air. Holland explains that, "Doolittle's and Kepner's new fighter tactics were bearing fruit and, with more long-range Mustangs on their way, the time was right for a much more concentrated and sustained assault on the German Air Force. No longer would bombers simply head to a target, drop their bombs and return; the bomber formations would also be used as bait to entice the German fighters into combat with the Allies' own increasingly large fighter force. Strategic air power had always been about bombers. Now, six months after the first deep-penetration bombing raids, that belief had been cast aside, because it had become widely agreed that even more important than the bombers were the fighters. Fighters piloted by men of superior skill and training. Fighter aircraft that had greater speed and agility than those of the enemy, and in greater numbers. Fighters that had greater endurance too, so that they could maraud deep into Germany, hammering the beleaguered enemy in the air and on the ground and destroying the enemy fighter force."
The results of Big Week were devastating, as Holland continues, "it was not so much the damage to the aircraft factories that really set the Luftwaffe back but more the catastrophic losses to their existing fighter defence. Nonetheless, the damage caused on the ground through the week's bombing had been considerable. In all, some 70 per cent of the aircraft factory buildings targeted were destroyed...The Americans had proved, conclusively, the value of bombing by day, but, more importantly, had demonstrated the ascendancy of the American fighter, and in this clash of arms the real weight of the victory should be judged. During Big Week, the Americans lost just 28 fighters, the Germans lost over 500: a ratio of 18:1...The most marked impact of Big Week was unquestionably, however, the Luftwaffe's loss of aircraft and particularly pilots."
Holland concludes, surely correctly, that Big Week is an essential part of the D-Day story, and one that deserves to be better known: "If Big Week is taken as one single battle, then it was the largest of the war, yet today it is largely forgotten, as is the importance of the epic clashes that took place in the air during the autumn of 1943 and early months of 1944. For both sides, this was a pivotal moment in the air war and that third week of February was the point at which the Allied plans for D-Day were saved. By April, the skies over western Europe were largely clear and the Allies had the all-important air superiority they so needed. It deserves to be better known and to be woven more clearly into the D-Day narrative, rather than consigned to the general history of the war in the air, which in turn is so often viewed in isolation rather than in its more important wider context." This is an excellent piece of narrative history and fills in a large gap in my knowledge and understanding of the war in the West. Highly recommended!