1917: Lenin, Wilson, and the Birth of the New World Disorder

by Arthur Herman

In 1917, Arthur Herman examines one crucial year and the two figures at its center who would set the course of modern world history: Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin. Though they were men of very different backgrounds and experiences, Herman reveals how Wilson and Lenin were very much alike. Both rose to supreme power, one through a democratic election; the other through violent revolution. Both transformed their countries by the policies they implemented, and the crucial decisions they made. Woodrow Wilson, a champion of democracy, capitalism, and the international order, steered America's involvement in World War I. Lenin, a communist revolutionary and advocate for the proletariat, lead the Bolsheviks' overthrow of Russia's earlier democratic revolution that toppled the Czar, and the establishment of a totalitarian Soviet Union.Men of opposing ideals and actions, each was idolized by millions-and vilified and feared by millions more. Though they would never meet, these two world leaders came to see in the other the evils of the world each sought to eradicate. In so doing, both would unleash the forces that still dominate our world, and that continue to shape its future from nationalism and Communism to today's maps of the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern Europe. In this incisive, fast-paced history, Herman brilliantly explores the birth of a potent rivalry between two men who rewrote the rules of geopolitics-and the moment, one hundred years ago, when our contemporary world began.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, Russia, Biography, American History, World War I

501 pages, Kindle Edition

First published November 28, 2017

About the author

Arthur L. Herman (born 1956) is an American popular historian, currently serving as a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. He generally employs the Great Man perspective in his work, which is 19th Century historical methodology attributing human events and their outcomes to the singular efforts of great men that has been refined and qualified by such modern thinkers as Sidney Hook.

Reviews

[Leah · Rating 2 out of 5]

Save me from the exceptional...

In 1917, the USA finally entered World War I after years of pusillanimous dithering, and Russia threw its revolution after years of poverty and imperialist wars. In this book, Herman looks at the two men who led those events, Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin, and suggests that out of their respective philosophies of power grew the 20th century and all of its horrors.

Normally, when reviewing a major history book, I find that even though I might not like the style or may feel the author hasn’t entirely convinced me with his or her arguments, I still feel at the end that I have gained enough from reading it to have made it worthwhile. Sadly, this is the exception. I have thoroughly enjoyed each of Arthur Herman’s books which I’ve read to date. He is often biased, but usually openly, so that I feel the reader can allow for his bias in forming her own judgements. Here, however, his bias seeps into every analysis he makes and it seems as if he’s perhaps not even aware of it. American capitalism is good, Russian communism is bad. Wilson is an idealist, Lenin is a cynic. America is a shining beacon on the hill, the USSR is a blot on the escutcheon of history. I realise these are standard viewpoints on the other side of the Atlantic, and some parts of them would be accepted over here too, though perhaps less so after the last couple of years. But a history book with this level of bias teaches nothing, except perhaps that history should never be written by those with a dogmatic belief in the superiority of one particular nation or form of government.

It’s not that Herman is uncritical of Wilson and America – in fact, sometimes he’s almost sneeringly contemptuous of Wilson. It’s more in the language he uses. Some of his statements are simplistic and unnuanced in the extreme, and his facts are carefully selected to support his basic argument that both Wilson and Lenin were more interested in forcing their worldview on the rest of the world than in acting in their own nations’ self-interest. He speaks of “American exceptionalism” with a straight face, clearly believing the propaganda which has done so much damage in convincing so many Americans (but not many other people) that they are somehow intrinsically superior to other races, nations, etc. And yet this is exactly the kind of propaganda he condemns in his despised USSR. His conclusion, broadly summarised, is that everything bad in the 20th century comes from Russia, while America could have done better in the world, but did pretty well. An arguable stance, and I’d have appreciated an argument about it rather than it being presented as if it were an indisputable statement of fact.

Please don’t think I’m an apologist for the extreme communism of the USSR, nor the horrors carried out in its name. But nor am I an apologist for the extreme capitalism of the USA, complete with its own murky history of horrors. Unfortunately Mr Herman is, and appears to believe that America must stay engaged with the world to save it by exporting its form of capitalism to the rest of us. Personally, I think the world needs to be saved from all nations who think they have the right to force their views on other people and from all extremists who believe they are “exceptional” in any way. I find it difficult to recommend this one – the overwhelming weight of bias prevents it from adding any real insight into the subject.

PS Yes, I’m aware my own biases show here, but I’m not writing a history book. Nor am I advocating that the world should submit to the intrinsic superiority of Scotland.

www.fictionfanblog.wordpress.com

[Carol Storm · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fascinating history that covers an enormous amount of ground from bread riots in Czarist Russia to Woodrow Wilson's political infighting with Teddy Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. The author's ultra-conservative viewpoint makes it slow-going at times, however. Dozens of references to "brutal" Lenin and "bloody" Trotsky, but Wilson's tacit support for lynching, murder and racial terror in the Jim Crow south is barely mentioned.

Victor Davis Hanson gave this book a fawning blurb, and that's never a good sign!

[Tony · Rating 3 out of 5]

In 1917, the author argues that the momentous events of that year--especially those instigated by Wilson and Lenin--laid the foundation for what he terms the "modern world disorder." At times, he makes a compelling case. For instance, it is hard to dispute Herman's positions that Wilson's earlier entry into WW I, his failure to better defend the 14 points at the Versailles treaty negotiations, and his failure to help Kerensky's government each had dire future consequences. Some of the author's other assertions are less persuasive. Take his claim that WW I was the first war fought for ideology. The US and British Civil Wars, the European wars between Catholics and Protestants, and even the Crusades seem to disprove this. Nevertheless, on balance, this is a worthwhile book that provides interesting perspectives on some of the 20th century's most pivotal events.

[Devogenes · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's hard even giving this book 3 stars after that mess of a conclusion. Jesus Christ — we're told that Lenin invented terrorism (seriously), that ISIS are basically communists, and the U.S needs to act now to prevent China from plunging the world into another epochal catastrophe... It's pretty bad. Maybe skip the conclusion on this one. I did like it though, and so in accordance with Goodread's rating system, 3 stars it is.


I did like much of this book, the author's often cartoonishly American exceptionalist bias notwithstanding. The comparisson of Wilson and Lenin is certainly interesting, though it's difficult for me to buy the argument that they were as similar either in their worldview or in their historical impact as the main thrust of this book would have you believe. That they were both paralyzed by strokes and influenced by Hegel is pretty neat though.

Apparently this author is known for championing the 'great man' theory of history. It certainly comes through in this book (again: he literally credits Lenin with inventing terrorism). Which is maybe why this book is more interesting as a piece of biography than it is as history. You won't find any credible analysis as to what caused the Russian revolution or the First World War. Nor is his analysis of the post-war period particularly enlightening.

The scariest thing Herman can imagine is the U.S losing its position as global hegemonic superpower. The United States is credited with maintaining the system that has kept "Europe out of war" for seventy years, while every war in Asia since 1919 is blamed squarely on communists. No mention of Iraq. Or, say, Chile. Or Guatamala. Vietnam was Lenin's fault and had nothing to do with France. I suppose it's not surprising that Herman so obviously adores Teddy Roosevelt.

The author comes across as entirely ignorant of leftist political philosophy and revolutionary history in general (the French Revolution and the Jacobins were much like the Russian and the Bolsheviks than passing commentary herein suggests). But the book is interesting as a side-by-side portrayal of two prominent political figures during a hugely important moment.

[Erin · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.75 Stars!

"The international unites the human race."

"Marx had seen his mission as that of cosigning Europe's bourgeois and its preferred economic system, capitalism to the ash heap of history."

At first look Lenin and Wilson don't appear to have anything in common. One was the rather middle of the road, highly racist president of the United States. The other was a revolutionary leader of the Russian revolution who's plan was to topple capitalism. Through this book we learn that the two men had similar outsized egos and felt that they had been destined to change the world. Woodrow Wilson was according to a Google search I did, the president who changed how the world viewed the United States. It was under his reign that the United States became a super power and would eventually become the leader of the free world. History has not been kind to Wilson but he did change the presidency. Wilson's worldview is the still the worldview that the U.S has til this day, that of the peacemaker for the world. Today's hes probably most remembered for trying to start a League of Nations.

Vladimir Lenin is most remembered for being the leader of the Bolsheviks and overturn the Russian government. Lenin was a Socialist who hoped to overthrow capitalism and return power to the people. He wasn't perfect and the Central Committee definitely conducted some brutality. But I still think Socialism is preferable to capitalism.

While I don't agree with the authors political opinions, I still think this was overall a pretty good read. The author thinks that capitalism is amazing and that the United States should be the leader of the world and that the world should just submit. I don't agree but I still found lots of things in this book to enjoy and learn more about in the future. I don't have to agree with the author of a text to get something important out of it.

"Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world by a handful of advanced countries. "

I would recommend this book, to my fellow History lovers.

[Don · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wilson and Lenin are major historic figures, normally not associated with each other. However, they were contemporaries and played key roles in changing the futures of their country at the same time. They even both had strokes and died around the same time.

The author does a great job of putting the reader at the center of events focusing on the year 1917.

Obviously Lenin was a terrible thing to happen to Russia, but the decisions made by Wilson were also tragic in the scheme of things for the future of Europe. Had neither man played the roles they did, many of the mistakes of the 20th century may have been avoided.

[Daniel Sladek · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book covers a fascinating period of history. I enjoyed the book, but found it off-putting that the author occasionally couldn't restrain his opinions. He sometimes seeks to make tenuous extrapolations from the period in question to current affairs. For example, suggesting that Russian society lags far behind the West, or that many contemporary problems arise from the fact that France still thinks of itself as a great power. He offers no substantiation for these assertions, and they are not germane to the discussion. Also, the narrative the author presents is not always easy to follow.

[Nathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fascinating look at the roles Wilson and Lenin (and others) played during and after The Great War.
A few non-exhaustive notes from the book:
- If Wilson had listened to Lodge regarding the League of Nations, instead of fighting him to the end, it can be argued that there would have been no Hitler or Mussolini or WWII, possibly, not even a Great Depression.
- Wilson's racism affected his policies toward China and Japan, both before and after the Paris Peace Conference, in ways that would sow the seeds of trouble long after.
- Wilson thought that the doctrine of separation of powers was anti-constitutional and that it prevented the government from addressing the most pressing issues of the day. He therefore thought that SOP shouldn't apply to the modern age. (Ch. 3)
- Wilson thought that in the end, the federal government could do no harm. (Ch. 3)
- Lenin thought that socialism excluded any possibility of a belief in a divine being. He wrote, "Every religious idea, every idea of God, even flirting with the idea of God, is unutterable vileness. Millions of sins, filthy deeds, acts of violence and physical contagions, are far less dangerous than the subtle, spiritual idea of God." To Lenin, the idea of God posed a competition with socialism. Thus for Lenin, one of the most important tasks of his revolutionary regime would be to wipe out any trace of organized religion or religious belief before it distracted people with a different kind of salvation (namely, the salvation of God). (Ch. 3)
- Lenin sought for chaos and destruction. He constantly preached ruin, catastrophe, and the ills of capitalism so that he could hold up salvation through revolution and the transition of all state power into the hands of the revolutionary class (read, Bolsheviks). (Ch. 8)
- When Wilson learned that tons of foodstuffs were waiting at the Vladivostok port to be shipped to Russia's starving cities, he immediately sent a mission of American engineers and railroad technicians to figure out how to get the supplies moving across the crumbling railway. (Ch. 8)
- Levels of "Germaniphobia" ran high in America in WWI. Heartbreaking examples of lynching paralleled other forms of reactions, such as when sauerkraut became "liberty cabbage" and hamburger became "liberty steak" on restaurant menus. Some even sought to exclude German composers' music (e.g. Bach) from concerts. A speech by Wilson on Flag Day 1918 compounded the belief that Germany was filling America's neighborhoods with spies. Unfortunately, no German-related group was more persecuted than the Mennonites, a pacifist sect. 130 were eventually court-martialed and sentenced to 10-30 years at Leavenworth. (Ch. 10)
- Lenin sought to push for a civil war in Russia, even when Trotsky made a motion to delay it until the Bolsheviks were the majority in the government. At this point, the other members of the central committee no longer had the willpower to resist the overbearing Lenin. (Ch. 11)
- The Bolsheviks used many tools to discredit and wage war against those they saw as the "enemies of the people." Those suspected of sabotage, speculation, or opportunism were targeted, including high-ranking functionaries in banks, railways, the treasury, and the post and telegraph offices. The MRC became a bureaucratic apparatus for state security across Russia, or "komissars." These komissars were implanted into the military, government agencies, and even neighborhood communities to enforce political loyalty to the Bolshevik regime. (Ch. 12)
- The Bolsheviks made sure that everyone occupying the highest ranks of authority also held the highest offices inside the Bolshevik Party. (Ch. 12)
- In Nov. 1917, Russia had the biggest democratic vote in history (more than voted in the American 1916 presidential election) and the results were devastating against the Bolsheviks. But Lenin's finger was still on the proverbial trigger and he used several tactics to delay or inhibit the results. He had the Cadet Party (the most conservative party) outlawed as "enemies of the people." At the same time, the Cadet Party's two newspapers were stormed by Bolshevik mobs and shut down. Lenin had their leaders arrested as "leaders of civil war against the revolution." Lenin's message was clear: no one would stand in the way of his vision of revolution in Russia. (Ch. 12)
- Karl Marx's favorite quote was "Everything that exists deserves to be destroyed," and Lenin sought to carry that out against the old Russian system. But he also saw rebellion and civil war would help to further his cause by causing chaos and massacres and smash the existing capitalist functions in Russia. Thus he could consolidate Bolshevik power. (Ch. 12)
- Wilson excluded any Republicans from the Paris Peace Conference. (Ch. 14)
- The Japanese were a huge shot in the arm to the Allies. They gave loans, provided military support in Siberia, and sent destroyers to help deal with the Austro-Geman submarine threat thousands of miles from Japan. (Ch. 14)
- Wilson's failure to support Japan's highest aspirations during the Peace Conference would lead to bombs being dropped on Pearl Harbor (see the entire discussion about this in Ch. 14).
- The Treaty included Germany having to agree to sole guilt for the War and to major financial reparations. (Ch. 14)
- The civil war in Russia that Lenin had invited left more than 1 million dead, at least 1/2 million from the Red Terror alone. Social order had broken down throughout the country, and famine was ubiquitous. But Lenin was satisfied because his power was now unquestioned. (Ch. 14)
- Lenin was ruthlessly honest when he said in 1919, "We recognize neither freedom nor equality nor labor democracy if they are opposed to the interests of the emancipation of labor from the oppression of capital." He'd later state that "revolutionary violence [was] necessary against the faltering and unrestrained elements of the toiling masses themselves." (Ch. 14)
- Wilson saw the traditional balance of power between nation-states as a formula for protecting tyrannical and unjust political systems, and as the chief source of conflict among nations, with WWI as the example. Another view, that of Henry Cabot Lodge and Teddy Roosevelt, saw that balance of power between nation-states as a preservation that preserved peace among nations. Their view was that when one of those nation-states sought to overthrow that balance (i.e. Germany in 1914 and later in 1939) that wars broke out and violence and injustice spread across the landscape. This is why Lodge and Roosevelt supported going to war with the Allies almost at once because they saw a German-dominated Europe as one that was hazardous to America's interests, much more so than a balance of power existed in Europe. (Ch. 15)

[Jim · Rating 5 out of 5]

An important book for anyone who seeks to understand how the political stage was set throughout the 20th century. There are so many seemingly small hinges upon which massive events would turn - our delay in getting involved in WWI, the Germans helping Lenin get back into Russia, etc. Lenin and Wilson's own philosophies - having some common roots, yet diverging wildly in implementation and intent - both had profound impact on the world we live in 100 years later. The author doesn't pull any punches (which I appreciate) - Wilson's high-minded, self-righteous idealism and stubbornness blinded him to the reality of the world, and ended up undermining his own moral high ground. Lenin's vision was equally singular, yet came drenched in blood and ushered in the most brutally totalitarian regime humanity has ever seen. After reading this, you will find yourself wondering what Europe & the 20th century would have looked like if Russia's fledgling democracy had survived....or if General Pershing's advice had been heeded and Germany's army had been pushed all the way back to Berlin with the Entente powers demanding unconditional surrender. Fascinating possibilities - juxtaposed against the tragedy we *know* - tens of millions (possibly as many as 100 million) killed under communism.

[Shirley (stampartiste) · Rating 4 out of 5]

I don't know why it took me so long to finish this book, other than the fact that it covers so much material. It is really very interesting, with a unique angle of comparing U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's vision of a post WWI world to Vladimir Lenin's vision of a worldwide proletarian revolution. They were alike in so many ways, primarily in their arrogance and inability to see others' viewpoints. Opponents were viewed as evil enemies. Oddly enough, both men died of strokes within a couple of weeks of each other.

I would highly recommend this book to history buffs. It covers a lot of ground, so it is best seen as an overview of all the players and events which reshaped the world during and after WWI. This book introduced me to a lot of people and events I want to explore further.

[Jimmy · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is on both Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin. At first one might think these men are diametrically different from one another but the author Arthur Herman successfully show reader how much the two of them are alike and how both men shaped what the twentieth century would be like. A fascinating historical book even for those who know about both men since this work is still profitable for readers to see the comparison and contrast of the two men and also the timeline of both their lives. I agree with the author’s thesis that these two men shaped much of the Twentieth Century. I learned a lot from this book.
I thought the book was fascinating for exploring ways Lenin and Wilson were similar while also acknowledging their differences. I thought it was ironic to read about how much Hegelian philosophy has shaped Woodrow Wilson’s worldview yet in building up propaganda for the “War to End All Wars” Wilson’s own administration painted the Germans as backwards and uncivilized. Wilson’s statism is really the vision of the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s view of the state. In an interesting parallel Lenin was a fanatical follower of Karl Marx and Marx himself was a “Young Hegelian” who were Left-wing Hegelians. It is interesting to see how much Hegel has influenced these two men that shaped so much of the Twentieth Century. The book did a good job capturing the personality of Wilson and Lenin as ideologue who were obsessed with their vision and agenda for a new world order. Both men were fanatical in desiring their vision to be fulfilled even when their allies around them thought it was impractical. While some of their own supporters suggested taking small tangible step towards their objective or were willing to compromise and work with others nevertheless both Wilson and Lenin were “purists” to their ideology in that they were not willing to see a few accomplishment but rather their whole vision being implemented. There is an “all or nothing” approach for these two men. Sometimes that resulted in surprising victory such as Lenin with the Bolsheviks’ takeover of Russia while other times that resulted in humiliating loss such as Wilson’s inability to compromise led to the defeat of the Senate ratification of the League of Nations (by the way the author gave a conclusive argument that the blame for the League’s failure rest more on Wilson’s inability to compromise than even the Republicans who opposed him since they were willing to amend and compromise). Both men were at times pretty arrogant towards others. This came out politically and also militarily. Both Lenin and Wilson were never military men and didn’t necessarily pursue better relationship with the military during times of war but they were orators who were more comfortable continuing their talks about ideology.
An interesting parallel that Herman pointed out in the book is how both men’s destiny were shaped by German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Arthur Zimmermann. Many Americans might remember their high school history class on the Zimmermann telegram which was a coded message to the Mexican government about the possibility of alliance with Mexico against the United States. The Zimmermann telegram of course pushed the US to war. The same Zimmermann also helped Lenin. Zimmermann promoted a policy towards the Russians called Peace in the East which among many things included allowing revolutionaries such as Lenin to pass through Germany to Russia by train. After Lenin’s return to Russia later he did have to flee to Finland to avoid being arrested since he was paid by the German. These events allowed Lenin to be in Russia to bring about his goal of a Marxist government.
Lenin’s and Wilson’s relationship with each other is also an interesting exploration in this work. In some sense the way they relate to one another also defined some of the ways the two country interacted with each other for decades to come. The book was interesting and informative right up to the very end for the author explored the parallel of how both men suffered a stroke in their last years of their life and how they thought of themselves during the eve of their death. I thought it was very disturbing reading about Wilson here since Americans often have a sanitized view of him. For example Wilson in his later years thought the US should have pursued World War One differently not by not being involved but by entering into the war earlier. That is crazy! He also blamed the Russian revolution on capitalism but I think he’s confused capitalism for other kinds of economic policies (cronyism, serfdom, etc). While Wilson was not a Marxist he was similar to Lenin for believing in government controlled economy. I learned from the book that day light saving began in our modern time originally as a way for the government control coal.
There was way too many things that I learned from this work for me to go over in a review. I think the author’s thesis is right that the two men shaped much of the twentieth century. The author is right in his conclusion for arguing against the popular opinion that it was World War Two that allowed America to practice a world hegemony. For Herman the hegemony began in World War One where the United States started out financially with their unprecedented global reach and influence. I recommend this book.

[Greg · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5 stars. A very compelling narrative, especially at the beginning, for someone with only a passing familiarity with the period. Honestly it only drags in the moments when the author lets his clear right wing bias in, which leads to some eye rolling moments. Overall an interesting comparison of two historical figures in a fascinating period.

[Honza Prchal · Rating 5 out of 5]

I would, if a high school or middle school teacher, absolutely assign this book, along with Wilson's essay that still guides most American liberals and progressives about how government should be run efficiently (which is amusing given just how badly his war mobilization went, even compared to Germany's war-losing "War Socialism", which was promoted so well that it helped save Communism when it was nearly crushed thrice, as recounted in this book, being saved the last time by Herbert Hoover's food aid program).
It's so well written that no specialist knowledge is required to understand it, and one will gain valuable insight into the tottering wreck that was German political, and occasionally strategic, leadership in the Great War.

[Caleb · Rating 4.5 out of 5]

Idealism is not necessarily a virtue, for both tyrants and heroes have been and are idealists. In 1917, two men, different in many ways but similar in one underlying theme, were about to be catapulted to the forefront of the world. Their choices would be choices that would shape the world for the next century.

Author Arthur Herman argues that both Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States, and Vladimir Lenin, the revolutionary Marxist who would soon be deified as the founder of the Soviet Union, were not only alike in their fervent belief that history could be bent toward a grand design, but also in their confidence that they themselves understood that design. From a distinctly Hegelian lens, one which saw progress as an inevitable force that would lead to harmony, both believed that they could use government, or, in a Bismarckian sense, “the state,” to further their ends. The state was a means to an end for both men, and as a means it was applied in every possible way.

1917 explores how the visions of these two men collided in a colossal way during the terminus of the Great War. Wilson entered the war reluctantly, despite the clamor from those in the Republican Party, such as Theodore Roosevelt, who urged him to stand with their European allies from the start. Yet when he entered, he applied his vision of liberal democracy and an international order to every aspect of the conflict. It would be the mission of the United States Expeditionary Force, under the talented command of “Black Jack” Pershing, to secure a peace, but it would be, Wilson urged, a peace without victory.

Herman argues that that is exactly what he got.

On the other hand was the Russian exile living in Switzerland, the avowed Marxist Vladimir Lenin. Unlike today’s perception of Lenin as a fundamentally different man from his successor, Joseph Stalin, Herman points out that it was Lenin, and not Stalin, who was in command of the purges following the Bolsheviks’ triumph in the Revolution of ’17. It was Lenin, though this applied as well to Stalin or to Stalin’s nemesis Trotsky, who was the brutal warlord who murdered his political opponents, no matter their innocence. Yet Lenin too was an idealist, and Lenin also was willing to use the state to achieve progress. While Wilson viewed progress as that which could be achieved by peaceful coexistence, Lenin saw it in starkly different terms. Well might Mao Zedong’s motto, “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” have served as the unofficial motto of Vladimir Lenin’s revolution. Where Woodrow Wilson spoke the language of diplomacy, congresses, and international law, Lenin spoke the language of force, class war, and revolutionary necessity. Yet both men believed they were accelerating the march of history. The difference lay not in their certainty, but in the methods which they believed history required.

The irony is that Lenin need not have succeeded. The Soviet Union was an experiment, and like all experiments, was not bound to succeed. By its very nature, communism, argues Herman, eats its own creation, and indeed, following the stories of the leaders of the Revolution, such as Trotsky, such a proposition is historically evident as well. Rather than being bound to an inevitable victory of the proletariat, as Lenin firmly believed, the Russian Revolution nearly ended in failure many times. Alexander Kerensky and the fragile Provisional Government might well have crushed the Bolshevik movement had events taken only a slightly different course. The Whites, under the command of Alexander Denikin, could have stood up to Lenin had not inner turmoil and distrust between Denikin and Kerensky bloomed. Indeed, had Woodrow Wilson himself not intervened on behalf of the Bolsheviks, it is likely that the experiment in communism would have ended not in 1991 with the quiet dissolution of the Soviet Union, but in 1919 amid the smoke and confusion of the Russian Civil War. Ironically, it was the Hegelian idealism of Wilson that preserved the Soviet Union from destruction.

Wilson himself would fail, his idealism running aground when the Republican Senate, under the leadership of Henry Cabot Lodge, blocked Wilson’s pet project, the League of Nations. It was idealism that prevented Wilson from acceding to the demands made by the Republican Congress. It was idealism that made Wilson see the entire conflict over the League as a conflict for the future of humanity rather than an opportunity for compromise, which could have led to a fundamentally better League, one backed by both parties. It was idealism that drove Wilson mad with fury and would lead to several massive strokes that would leave him incapacitated for the remainder of his term and that would sink all hopes of running for a third term in 1920.

In clear prose, Herman successfully defends his central thesis: that the idealism of both Wilson and Lenin led to the disorder of the next century. The naivety of Wilson’s Fourteen Points and his belief that World War I was “the war to end all wars” would lead to the appeasement of Nazi Germany. The desperate, Machiavellian, yet at heart idealistic policies of Vladimir Lenin would lead to the deaths not only of Russians during the fifty-plus years of Soviet rule, but would also, albeit indirectly, cause the surge of bloody communist revolutions across the globe, from Mao’s China, where seventy million people died, to Pol Pot’s Cambodia and Kim’s North Korea. Although Herman makes no attempt to disguise his contempt for Wilson, and his hatred of Lenin, from beginning to end, the facts are neatly ordered, the thesis is well defended, and the writing is masterfully articulated.

[Chris Allen · Rating 3 out of 5]

Saw this book at the library and picked it up because the subject fascinates me and because the author was obviously drawing, or attempting to draw parallels, between two of the pivotal figures in the 20th century in Wilson and Lenin. Sounded interesting. Turned it over, as I always do, to the "Advance Praise" section on the back cover and lost some of my enthusiasm almost immediately, as the first three blurbs come from Steve Forbes, Victor Davis Hanson and Robert Kagan, two of which are notable neo-cons who urged on terrible foreign policy during the Bush years. And Steve Forbes, who I'm not sure why would be the person you'd want as your first up on the list. Herman might as well of added Bill O'Reilly. Be that as it may, I checked it out anyways and got to reading it. While the author was largely spot on in his assessment of Lenin and the Bolshevik rise to power, I think his views on Wilson are way too simplistic. I've noticed it's become a thing in right-wing intellectual circles to bash Woodrow Wilson and this book seems to be an effort to put those criticisms to work. So a non-biased piece of history or biography it's definitely not. And that largely goes to his views on Lenin as well, although I found myself more or less agreeing with him there. To be sure, Wilson had his flaws. He could be arrogant, self-righteous and uncompromising. His racial views were appalling. But let's be honest here. Wilson's high-minded ideals won out in the long run. He may have not gotten the United States to join his creation, the League of Nations, but the formation of The League directly led to NATO and the United Nations. And while it's easy to pick apart decisions that were made and extrapolate them into the future as the causes of future events, such as World War II, it's highly simplistic (and problematic) to just say, "see, this is what led to Hitler and the start of the Second World War." Just as easily, one could say that the Balance of Power prism that Wilson's critics saw things led to the Second World War, as Europe was left with the same basic power structures (minus the monarchies) that they had before.

As for critics of Wilson, Herman curiously largely neglects to criticize Henry Cabot Lodge or Teddy Roosevelt in any way. It's almost as though he believes that Wilson committed mortal sins by not seeing the world in the same way that they saw it. Wilson deserves blame for being non-compromising and his political skills were dwarfed by his high-minded idealism. But let's be honest here. Lodge and Roosevelt (and I'm a big fan of TR) saw the world through a 19th century prism. That they wanted to jump right into the war was more problematic in my view than Wilson's wanting to sit it out and be the non- tarnished arbiter for peace when it was over. Not to mention that popular will was not in favor of jumping in. Roosevelt's very public criticism of Wilson was unbecoming in many ways. It's nothing more that speculation, but I believe that some of that stemmed from jealousy. Wilson and Roosevelt had much in common politically (although obviously not in foreign policy) and it almost seemed that Wilson was setting his mind to do things that he, Roosevelt, never did. Much of the change in the way that the federal government operated could be traced to Wilson's actions but Roosevelt was really where the modern ideas of the strong state started to germinate (although some go all the way back to Alexander Hamilton and others as well). And Lodge very much deserves some of the criticism that he and his party have long received from historians. If Wilson could come across as petty for not reaching out to his detractors in the GOP, then so should Lodge, for letting Wilson's cold shoulder color his actions as Senate Majority Leader.

In the end, even though my review is critical, it was still a good book. It was thoughtfully researched and the reader does come away with things that they might not have been very aware of, such as the secret German plan to get Lenin back to Russia to foment unrest and hopefully push the Russians out of the war. And Lenin's secret olive branch to the Americans to help modernize his backward country. But in the end, the book could have been better by leaving out the authors opinions and biases and not holding up Wilson's critics, such as Lodge, as though they were guiltless actors. The biggest criticism is that, while the historical "meat" of the book is all there, Herman does make strong assertions and long leaps in logic to get to where he wants to go. Wilson made decisions, as did Lenin. But pointing to those decisions and then to events 20 or 30 years (sometimes more) down the road and extrapolating and connecting those decisions to other events needs more work. Because it looked like Herman had tunnel vision. He came in wanting to show that such and such led to such and such. Any scholar who is hell-bent on showing some special significance to past events is running the risk of missing other things.

Still, I gave the book a three. It adds to the canon of 20th century history and much of it is accurate. Mistakes made in the 1st World War led to the second. This can't be debated. But simplistically putting all of that on Woodrow Wilson's shoulders needs to be analyzed much more thoroughly.

[Joseph Viola · Rating 4 out of 5]

1917 by Arthur Herman covers the pivotal year of the Great War that saw the arrival of American troops to the front lines as well as the collapse of the Russian Empire. The book focuses on two men, Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin and the large role they played in the key events for both countries that loom large even to this day.

Having both Wilson and Lenin biographies sitting in my pile of to be read books, I felt 1917 would be a good primer prior to starting more in depth studies of both men. I was not disappointed. We get basic back stories for both Wilson and Lenin, as well as context of the war and the alliances that entangled most of Europe, but most of the book focuses on the years 1917 and 1918.

I learned more about the causes finally getting the US into the war (even after Wilson ran his re-election campaign on the slogan “he kept us out of war”), the Zimmerman Telegram, and the resumption of unrestricted u-boat patrolling and trench warfare. I really enjoyed the ups and downs of the end of the Romanov dynasty, Kerensky’s role in the Duma, and Lenin’s crazy plots to get back into Russia with the help of the Germans, and his masquerading around in wigs and other outlandish costumes to stay one step ahead of the police.

By the end of the year, Wilson had America in the war (although their decisive role would not actually be felt until midway through 1918) and Lenin had a tenuous but strengthening grasp of power in Russia, which was on the brink of civil war. The book follows each to the end of his life, with Stalin taking over for Lenin and Wilson’s failure to get the US to join the League of Nations.

Overall this book was a great overview of both Wilson and Lenin, two of the major historical figures of the early 20th century, who are not often thought of together in the same context. It was fascinating to think about how many things were happening at the same time in 1917! I look forward to reading Wilson by A Scott Berg and Lenin by Victor Sebestyen later this year after this great start.

[Mina Samir · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very informative and a really important book that identifies the real roots of the modern world.

[Tedward · Rating 4 out of 5]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVCQ4...

Herman is refreshingly critical of American global hegemony without dipping into the radical isolationism of Ron Paul or Pat Buchanan. The ultimate message at the end of the book is that America has a role to play in the international scene but cannot bear the weight of this role alone like Wilson thought it could. Removing America from the international scene like many isolationists want would only doom America to intervening in another conflict later likely with China. The American Hegemony needs to transition in the old-time balance of power that Teddy Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge preferred.

Wilson entered WW1 largely due to an almost messianic and secular millennial view of America as the arbiter of Hegel's end of history. A "shining light" and "beacon of hope" for humanity that was a product of his very Presbyterian upbringing. In addition to this seismic shift in America's role in the world he created the state capitalist economy that Eisenhower would likely call the "military-industrial complex" was created as a result of Wilsons' wartime progressive agenda for America.

Wilson bobbled about 3 opportunities to fundamentally change the history of Russian and Russia-American relations. First by abandoning Kuresnky after the Tsar had abdicated and missed Russia becoming a constitutional Republic in the vein of the West. The second was not intervening militarily in the Russian Civil War like France, Japan and Winston Churchill had wanted too, to the point that US and Japanese boots on the ground were already in Sibera to protect civilians and help the Whites in the Civil War, which would have stopped the Bolsheviks while still weak. The third time was when Lenin offered the US access to 3 million dollars worth of exports and infrastructure interests to repair and grow Russia after the war (American financial and engineering interests were shut out which stunted Russia for the interwar years).

The sections on the Treaty of Versailles and the circus around creating the League of Nations was fascinating if only because it turned into a who's-who of future world conflicts. The most crushing of all was Japans attempt to add a racial equality clause to the League's charter that Japan hoped would solidify it as a "great power" and the conscious of Aisa that was rejected by the League because it would've applied to Africa. This lead to the far right taking over japan and at the very least set the conditions for war with America in 1941. At the League was was a socialist/journalist and veteran of the war name Mussolini who resented the treatment of Italy at the conference and swore that Italy would never be humiliated at the international scene again. France's revenge against Germany sowed the seeds of the WW2 and above the scene was an almost naively idealist Wilson who was trying to create a liberal world order that required America to surrender some national sovereignty for the greater good (which was soundly rejected by the senate republicans and the general public) and who reputation was in shatters by the time he died. The interwar years of the 20's and 30's were almost a mockery of Wilson's dream with the League toothless, the allies had deferred on loans to America from the war during the depression and the Nazi's had openly started ignoring large segments of the Treaty of Versialles.

Herman is to preoccupied with Lenin's legacy as untainted by Stalin's terror. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlxpC... Solzhenitsyn had mention Lenin's role in creating the political and prison system that Stalin would inherit after he died in the 70's and in general there are much better books about Lenin and his role the Soviet Unions crimes against the Russian people. His take on Wilson is infinitely more interesting and timely. Pairing the two men together only really serves some general comparisons. Lenin and Wilson were both Hegelians of a sort (Wilson the liberal internationalist and Lenin the communist internationalist), they were visionaries, and they set in motion the events that would create the world we exist in today.

[Ben House · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Emerging from the forge of war in 1917 was the active role of government in every aspect of daily life, and the rising expectation that government can fix every problem and deal with every crisis from economic depression to childcare and climate change.” (Page 236)

This past year marked the 100th year anniversary of the Russian Revolutions. Most of the applauding and celebrating came from those who rejoiced in the fall, rather than the rise of Communist Russia. The Russian Revolution(s) is a story filled with all manner of drama, tragedy, near fulfillment of hopes, and unexpected turns of events. It might have been simply a sideshow to World War I, but it became something much bigger, more enduring, and more terrifying. The death count related to world-wide Communism has been listed as 100 million, and the count is not yet complete.

It is surprising that as 1917 was beginning, Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin were still sidelined on the cataclysmic war that was engulfing Europe. By the end of the year, they were the two prime movers and shakers in what was happening. There are, no doubt, plenty of books with plenty of positive things to say about Wilson and Lenin. By no means are the two men just alike. Herman notes clear differences as well as gifts and strengths of each man. But as his subtitle indicates, the results of their tampering with the world, 1919 gave us a world recovering from war and preparing for decades of disorder and preparation for the next war.

The story of Woodrow Wilson is painful. Brilliant, no doubt, Wilson was insufferable. His idealism was matched by a theological bent that convinced him that he was or his vision was God’s plan for the world. He imbibed much from his upbringing in a Presbyterian manse, but he did not seem to be grounded in sound doctrine. He did, for better or worse, want to avoid bringing the United States into World War I as a fighting power. At the same time, he wanted to rise above the powers of Europe and the older ways of war and diplomacy and craft a more perfect world. The key statement of his vision in found in the Fourteen Points.

Germany, reeling from the war by 1918, called for an armistice, hoping the 14 Points would work to their advantage. They didn’t. Wilson was as vindictive as he was idealistic. But all that came out after the firing stopped. Prior to that, the United States entered a war that it was totally unprepared for in 1917. A year later, even with troops pouring into France, the U. S. was not producing equipment for its own still fresh men. As a manager and administrator over a war government, Wilson was a disaster.

Lenin had plenty of problems of his own. His return to Russia was financed and provided for by the German government. As a measure to produce chaos behind the lines in the east, it worked better than any could have imagined. Russia underwent its first revolution and toppled the Tsar in February. In October, revolutionary actions finished off the provisional government headed by Alexander Kerensky, and moved the soviets into positions of power.

With Leon Trotsky overseeing the military, and a young Stalin perfecting ways of eliminating enemies (broadly defined), a totalitarian state was being put into place. Everything that would, in time, characterize the Evil Empire (Ronald Reagan’s term) was started during this time: acts of terror against the citizens, arrests right and left, establishment of the Gulag system, and the implementation of a secret police (forerunner to the KGB).

Russia gave up tremendous concessions and signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This freed numbers of German divisions which were raced to the western front in a last attempt to end the war. It almost worked. But this part of history is chock-full of “almosts.”

Arthur Herman, author of quite a few fine histories, has done a magnificent job in telling a terrible story in a way that is gripping. Full of insights, a few jabs at recent events, plenty of good narrative, this book will be a hard one to best in this upcoming year of reading.

[Gordon · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read for all interested in international relations and the history of the XX Century. Extremely well researched and written. Dr. Arthur Herman lays out how Lenin's and Wilson's powerful personalities and positions combined with their ideological views of societal forces and world order to shape the XX Century. Despite their lack of touch with reality and pragmatism these two leaders more than any others of their time influenced future events well into the late years of the XX Century, creating unrealizable dreams, unleashing forces of chaos, creating other forces of terror and disillusionment that continue to haunt the modern world of the XXI Century.

[Jesse Field · Rating 4 out of 5]

Historian Arthur Herman has a characteristic way of blending biographical portraits with analysis of historical forces, producing accounts that thrill us and leave us with a deeper sense of the progress within our folly, of both the promise and the limits of human nature. How the Scots Invented the Modern World was just plain fun, even when its central claim fails to hold up, because whether or not there is just something about the Scots, we do learn about bourgeois virtues that for a time drove society toward more equality, even as they also embraced imperialism abroad.

Here, Herman's argument is both tighter and more dramatic, making it all even more of a pleasure to read. I found this passage from the opening of chapter 6, comparing Vladimir Lenin with Woodrow Wilson, intriguing:

Both men were struggling to transform events (the world war for Wilson, the Russian Revolution for Lenin) in ways that would make those events consistent with their larger vision, instead of contradicting or correcting that vision. Both men were obsessed with the power of mind over matter, and held the belief that by sheer force of will, one could send physical events in a certain direction simply by insisting that history dictated such a course of action. This belief would become one of the moral diseases that would afflict the twentieth century until its end.

I'm reminded of the topic of self-deception, in philosophy (it crops up in The Experience of Philosophy). It is a painful one because I, too, have been afflicted with the disease of magical thinking. As Herman goes on to show, Wilson had critical deficits of empathy, as well. As for Lenin, the utter absence of humanity in the man reminds us of Captain Ahab, ever in pursuit of the vision, but critically missing the human limitations of his nation, and himself.

Along the way, we get an excellent brief review of the course of World War I, especially the first two years which left Allies and German powers alike mired in trench warfare, with awesome rates of mortality. (You can go online and watch a video about the Battle of Verdun, for example, but the political, philosophical, moral implications of these events, of the leaders who sent the men into the trenches, are a puzzle worthy of lifelong consideration.) There's also more details on the Russian fronts than in most textbooks, although this is by no means terribly detailed. Long story short: Czar Nicholas bears a lot responsibility for poor strategy, no vision for his empire, no effort to make reforms or even really understand his country. It was chilling to read the comment of a French general, Édouard de Curières de Castelnau, on meeting the Czar in early 1917 to plan for the year. I hope no one ever says something similar about me: “I could not help thinking to myself to what good use a monarch who really knew his business . . . would have put such an event.”

On the other hand, Wilson and Lenin knew how to put an event to use. But we did not necessarily benefit from their skill in seeing out their visions. Still, we admire the top leaders for their very real talents. And both Wilson and Lenin performed superhuman feats of politicking.

Wilson's progressive outlook still appeals to me, even if I understand now the self-righteousness and even inhumanity that lurked behind it. He was the focal point for political reforms before the war, and of a vast new bureaucracy during the war. (Much more than in A. Scott Berg's Wilson, we see a man peevish in rejecting Teddy Roosevelt's appeals, yet embracing more powerful government and fewer individual freedoms with alacrity. Berg also, by the way, may have really crossed into historical inaccuracy in describing Wilson's stance on race. Herman has documentation that Wilson wanted to preserve and protect white civilization in particular, a moral bankruptcy that puts stark limits on any contemporary admiration we can support.) Wilson's moral vision of a world in which the USA would itself answer to a higher power remains a thrilling one, even if ultimately wrong in its assumptions about the greatness of human nature and civilization. Wilson, in Herman's view, presents an unwarranted counter to the vision of balanced powers, held by Theodore Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge after TR. And they had a more correct observation the whole time.

But nothing beats reading about Lenin. This guy! I just love the moment when the Baron von Romberg, the German ambassador in Bern, Switzerland, is looking askance at the incredible chutzpah of the guy, who is itching to cross back into Russia, brushing aside even his fellow Bolsheviks proposing various more reasonable conditions Russia, such as through a prison swap scheme. Lenin simply plots with one contact to have the Germans send him and his cronies along on a train with extraterritorial status.

Although Romberg thought it odd that an “individual,” as he put it, should set conditions for a “government,” he passed Lenin’s request along, and on April 4, Zimmermann and the Foreign Ministry approved the plan.

Yes, Lenin simply used the force of his own personality to win rights to go take over Russia. (This reminds me of stories about how Donald Trump, bankrupt, could just walk into Deutsche Bank, by himself, no lawyers or anything, and walk out with hundreds of millions in new credit. Chutzpah. Which we are trained to admire, but it is not always a good thing, is the point!)

And yes, that is the same Zimmerman as the Zimmerman telegram. This German foreign minister was key to two of the biggest events in world history: dragging the USA unwillingly into the war, and guaranteeing his country's loss, and also the takeover of Russia by the Bolsheviks. What a resumé! Furthermore, Zimmerman did not take Lenin seriously; nor did Alexander Kerensky, the more moderately left-wing leader of the Russian provisional government. Kerensky at times is like a villain in a James Bond movie, having captured and arrested Lenin, and Trotsky, and Stalin, and then...he lets them go free! In my mind, I'm thinking "Just shoot them, for God's sake!" Alas, he did not, and he did live to regret it.

So yes, 1917 is a deeply dramatic dual-protagonist. I myself have envisioned such a historical narrative, playing two settings off of each other for effect. So I have a particular reason to examine and evaluate Herman here. Of course he uses mostly secondary sources, being one of those writers who boils down the loftier academic tomes, more screenwriter than archivist. No doubt, the problems with his writing mostly arise out of the tensions between tweaking the drama and telling the full truth. That is a productive tension, here.

[Neil · Rating 3 out of 5]

The historical narrative is well-researched and well-written, the conclusion is strange and it’s unclear exactly what the author thinks should have been done in 1917 or what should be done going forward. Also his views of the Chinese government as agents of orthodox (and therefore revolutionary) Marxism-Leninism is a bit odd given the history of China since Mao’s death. Also it’s strange that the author insists that Wilson is at fault for the League of Nations bill failing and not Cabot Lodge but also concedes that Wilson going back to Paris with a list of changes requested by Lodge and the Senate (or any changes at that point) would have been ridiculous. Perhaps his point is that Wilson would have been well-served taking Lodge (or anyone else skeptical of his vision) to Paris and perhaps avoided the Senate disaster altogether? His criticisms of Wilson are well-founded and correct, I just found his absolution of Lodge odd. Overall the narrative is compelling and the author is a fine writer, though, and if you can separate fact from opinion (it’s fairly obvious here) it’s an enjoyable book.

[Nate · Rating 5 out of 5]

I enjoyed this book quite a bit. It seemed to focus more on Wilson than Lenin but thats fine. Some people complain when I book beats you over the head with a point, and this one does, but its a point that people should get drilled into their heads. That point is this is progressivism unleashed. The unmovable, sanctimonious, righteous, stubborn worldview that Lenin and Wilson have in that they are right and everyone else is wrong is whats dogmatic about progressivism and what makes it dangerous. This book drives that point home and relays the utter failure and trainwreck that results from it. Very easy to read too. I highly recommend this book.

[Jack Janzen · Rating 4 out of 5]

I liked the detailed history surrounding Wilson and Lenin as much as their direct actions. It is a lesson that there can be too much of a good idea. Utopias were and are illusions that have a propensity to degenerate to something evil.

[Greg · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have written before both about how the problems that consumed European leaders in the latter 19th and early 20th centuries, coupled with the disastrous First World War and the flawed peace treaty of Versailles, have jointly formed the world in which we still live.

Thus, I keep returning to books that thoughtfully examine this period – or portions of it – to better understand both the issues and choices the leaders of that time thought that they had before them as well as a fuller understanding of how their choices, mistakes, and hopes influenced what happened then and continues to unravel today.

This fine book is one of the best for anyone wishing to understand how the First World War finally came to a bloody and prolonged end, as well as how the seeming different courses offered by Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin for a way to end such wars overlapped and conflicted. Please note, too, that this is a far more readable book – if less detailed and comprehensive – than the scholarly tome written 60 years ago, Wilson vs. Lenin, which I reviewed after re-reading it recently. Unlike the latter – which is sprinkled with footnotes on every page and can truly be something of a “stiff read” – this book by Herman reads as easily as if it were fiction.

His central tenets are these:

• As others have noted, the First World War dramatically changed the “face” and “power balance” of Europe, for it marked the destruction of three ancient empires – the Russian, the Austro-Hungarian, and the Ottoman – and the emergence of the 20th century superpowers, Russia and the United States.

• That war and its horrific destruction and human costs transformed all European populations, and left scars that in many cases have not healed yet.

• In the face of the seemingly impossible – the kind of total war that had seemed to be impossible in that modern, trade and communication linked age – this war had transformed the nature of warfare in the 20th century and beyond from ones considerably more limited in scope and largely restricted to uniformed combatants into total war in which no one – civilians, women and children – was safe.

• Two competing visions emerged that sought to offer hope that a repeat of this carnage would never happen again:

o Wilson’s, in which he envisioned a League of equal Nations banded together to nip any future problem in the bud before it could become problematic and in which American-style democracy would proliferate among newly independent peoples; and

o Lenin’s, where after an initial violent struggle between the “workers and their oppressors” there would emerge a world freed from the consuming competition of capitalist states and all workers everywhere would be at peace with each other since international competition for goods would be resolved by workers’ councils peacefully.

• Wilson’s visions failed to come to pass in part because of Wilson’s own self-righteous stubbornness to compromise with the Republican-led Senate when it was necessary to save the Treaty and the League, but also because the treaty in which the League was embedded failed to resolve – indeed, could not have resolved – every lingering problem that preceded the war or which emerged as a consequence of that war, including the growing demand for “self-determination” by peoples under the control of European powers in colonies principally in Africa and Asia.

• Lenin’s vision did achieve a kind of resolution with the Bolshevik Revolution in October of 1917 in which the fragile, newly born democratic government under Alexander Kerensky was overthrown and the validly elected, non-Communist Assembly was disbanded, but his hopes that Russia’s revolution would spark similar successful revolutions elsewhere – principally in Germany and England – came to naught, even if sputtering attempts were made in the immediate aftermath of the war in Germany.

But the book is also far more readable, exciting, and so full of golly, if only’s that I urge you to pick it up and get immersed in its pages. Herman does a superb job of presenting the competing options as various people saw them at the time as well as showing how and why they made the choices they did. Many times I found myself wondering how I might have reacted and decided things had I known only what they did at the time.

Although Herman can be quite harsh on Wilson, that president was truly a good – if flawed – human being who sincerely sought to end the horror of mass war.

Oh, and one minor caveat: There are several times when Herman offers an opinion that such and such a decision – taken or fumbled away – led to x, y, or z that happened many years later. While I do think that the decisions and actions taken by those before us do very much influence both how we see things and also what options seem to be available to us, they do not “bind us” blindly. Yes, the terms of the Treaty and the “stab in the back” myth in Germany did contribute to the post-war ferment that made the success of the fragile Weimer democracy much more difficult, but they did not make the rise of Hitler or the success of the Nazis inevitable.

[Socraticgadfly · Rating 2 out of 5]

I wanted to read this because Herman had written a very good dual biography of Churchill and Gandhi.

That said, dual biographies have a certain conceit, that there must be some sort of frisson between the two subjects for it to be m ore than two parallel bios. Churchill and Gandhi certainly had that. Luther and Erasmus, subjects of another dual bio I've read, did to a fair degree. Abraham Lincoln and John Brown, subjects of a phone-in dual bio by H.W. Brands, really did not.

And, neither do Wilson and Lenin. Per another reviewer, I think a backgrounded issue was that Herman thinks Wilson, racism and all, was some sort of leftist.

Given that Herman works for a winger think tank, this shouldn't be surprising. His Conclusion badly jumps the shark. Had he not written it, he'd still have three stars for sure, maybe four.

The following is notes I took about the book while reading, the bad stuff first, followed by the interesting stuff, some of which is good, some speculative but yet somewhat good. Anyway, it couldn't offset the bad stuff.

Problems:
1. Kind of superficial on run-up to American entry vis-à-vis illegality under naval law of both sub warfare and blockade by extension plus food as blockade weapon.
2. Almost seems to accept Wilson’s POV on causes of the Civil War
3. Claims Alexander II was still a progressive at time of assassination. Not so much.
4. The phrase “white supremacist dogmas and Darwinism” was the tipping point that dropped Herman to 4 stars. He had enough very good stuff elsewhere, but calling “social Darwinism” as “Darwinism” (and I’m assuming it’s deliberate, not a mistake) was too much. After all, he works at the wingnut Hudson Institute as a senior fellow.
5. As for his claim that Lenin had booted out Stravinsky and Chagall along with Rachmaninov? Stravinsky had been living abroad in 1918; Chagall left the USSR freely in 1923.
6. Says that Harding and Coolidge needed to turn Wilson’s Progressivism around. From there, the rest of the Conclusion descends even further into political hackery.


Interesting notes
1. Kerensky’s dad was headmaster at Lenin’s gymnasium. Why doesn’t any history of the two revolutions mention that?
2. Both Lenin and Wilson strongly influenced by Hegel. Marxism is based, of course, on a materialistic reinterpretation of Hegelian dialectic, though the core of that is actually Fichte, not Hegel. Herman says that Wilson hugely studied Hegel in college, and implies he was the greatest influence on Wilson’s political science outside of Walter Bagehot (who, weirdly, is not mentioned by Herman). The reality is that Bagehot was certainly more of an influence than Hegel. As for Hegel? Any good academic in the US, after Johns Hopkins and other institutions brought the “Humboldt model” of higher education to the US, would have read Hegel.
3. The Provisional Govt shot itself in the foot with Order No. 1 on March 14. Directed only to the Petrograd garrison, but assumed to apply to all the military, it included ordering officers not to use honorific titles and said that soldiers off duty didn’t have to salute officers, etc. Again, NOT Lenin doing this. (And yet, Herman spin-polishes Kerensky.)
4. Very good on just how much was known to Kerensky about Lenin taking German money. Related? His coverage of the July Days and Lenin’s loss of nerve, though brief, is interesting. (If it was a loss of nerve, rather than tactical smarts by Lenin realizing that he couldn’t pull off a successful revolution yet.)
5. Claims that Kerensky didn’t want “Entente terms” but did want something like “peace with honor” before ending the war. What if Germany had said “Independent Finland, Independent Poland (maybe with boundaries shoved east a bit)” but hadn’t sought land itself, other than maybe at the western edge of Poland? Back to the point at hand? It’s unclear WHAT Kerensky wanted. Even Pipes, treated as a semi-guru by Herman, admits this.
6. Reminds us that the worst acts out West against the “Wobbies” happened after US entry into the war.
7. Notes Wilson helped stoke the fires against German-Americans and did nothing to dampen them. Among those hit the worst? Mennonites, since they were also pacefists. Notes that Wilson and AGs Gregory, then Palmer “highlight the curious self-righteousness of the American Progressive mind.” Then goes to Wilson’s Hegelian background and him … ascending to the mark of a world-historical leader. Already in 1890, Wilson wrote “such as will not be convinced are crushed.” Notes that Wilson and AGs Gregory, then Palmer “highlight the curious self-righteousness of the American Progressive mind.”

Head-scratchers
1. I have NO idea who these supposed "Radical Free Churchers" are that David Lloyd George supposedly belonged to. He was a Liberal Party member. Wiki and other online encyclopedias don't even have a listing by that name. He did seek the disestablishment of the Church of England in Wales, but that was a religious movement, not a political party, and I don't think was organized by name as such. Weirdly, it's not listed in the index.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 3 out of 5]

An insightful, fast-paced and well-written work.

Herman looks at Wilson and Lenin, the ideas that inspired them, how they challenged some traditional ideas about power and foreign policy, and how they tried to master events to suit their worldview. As expected, his portrait of them isn’t very flattering. Herman shows how they surrounded themselves with narrow-minded yes-men, and were quick to rid themselves of advisors who disagreed with them. Wilson comes off as stubborn, self-righteous and confused, while Lenin comes off as self-absorbed. Herman also points out how their actions and legacies during this year were shaped by German foreign policy (such as the Zimmerman telegram, and Zimmerman’s support for allowing Lenin to enter Russia)

The writing is smooth and the narrative is readable and flows well. The story is easy to follow, and Herman succeeds at bringing Wilson and Lenin to life. Still, Herman’s discussion of Wilson’s and Lenin’s vision often strikes you as reductive. Herman has his own biases, for sure, but it comes out in almost every point he wants to make; I got the impression that he might not even have been aware of it while writing the book. In one of the book’s funniest passages, Herman writes that “Wilson promised better pay, a higher standard of living...staying out of war...it turned out to be lies. It would take two Republican administrations under Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, to turn America around.” A political candidate promised good things in his election campaigns and those things ended up not happening? That’s supposed to make Wilson unique?

Herman's arguments don’t always make much sense. Herman writes that Wilson should have predicted that the Bolsheviks would build a repressive state that would survive for decades; this seems a bit far-fetched. At the end of the book he concludes that “In the end, Wilson blamed capitalism for the [Russian] Revolution.” (huh?) This is a claim he doesn’t touch on anywhere else in the book. Elsewhere he writes that “Wilson’s Progressivism had promised racial harmony” (Wilson was a proponent of racial harmony?); he can’t help but add that this “promise” turned out to be another lie, like all of Wilson’s other promises. The book is filled with a lot of what-if questions, which might annoy some readers. At one point Herman refers to “Bismarckian balance-of-paper diplomacy” (surely he means “power”) Also, the book is based mostly on secondary sources.

The book also has some inaccuracies. Herman asserts that Rasputin influenced Russian military strategy. Nicholas I did tolerate various forms of interference from Rasputin, but even he never went this far. He writes that Falkenhayn commanded German troops during the Nivelle offensive. He states that “Order Number One” was issued by the Provisional Government in 1917, even though the Petrograd soviet issued this. He states that Pavel Miliukov was forced to step down as foreign minister and replaced by Kerensky, even though Kerensky was made war minister. When setting the stage for the attempted assassination of Lenin in August 1918, Herman calls him “the most revered but also the most hated figure in Russia,” even though at this point Lenin was obscure and rarely seen in public. It was only after surviving this assassination attempt that he became a more recognizable figure, due to eulogies, portraits, pamphlets, biographies, films, and other hagiographic propaganda.

Still, a compelling, engaging and mostly well-researched work.

[Lynn · Rating 2 out of 5]

I was given a copy of this book in exchange for an honest review by Harper Collins.

Today's Nonfiction post is on 1917: Vladimir Lenin, Woodrow Wilson, and the Year that Created the Modern Age by Arthur Herman. It is 448 pages long and is published by Harper Collins. The cover has the eyes of the two leaders with the title below in red. The intended reader is someone interested in World War 1 history. There is some mild language, no sex, and talk of violence in this book. There Be Spoilers Ahead.

From the back of the book- In 1917, Arthur Herman examines one crucial year and the two figures at its center who would set the course of modern world history: Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin. Though they were men of very different backgrounds and experiences, Herman reveals how Wilson and Lenin were very much alike. Both rose to supreme power, one through a democratic election; the other through violent revolution. Both transformed their countries by the policies they implemented, and the crucial decisions they made. Woodrow Wilson, a champion of democracy, capitalism, and the international order, steered America's involvement in World War I. Lenin, a communist revolutionary and advocate for the proletariat, lead the Bolsheviks' overthrow of Russia's earlier democratic revolution that toppled the Czar, and the establishment of a totalitarian Soviet Union. Men of opposing ideals and actions, each was idolized by millions-and vilified and feared by millions more. Though they would never meet, these two world leaders came to see in the other the evils of the world each sought to eradicate. In so doing, both would unleash the forces that still dominate our world, and that continue to shape its future from nationalism and Communism to today's maps of the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern Europe. In this incisive, fast-paced history, Herman brilliantly explores the birth of a potent rivalry between two men who rewrote the rules of geopolitics-and the moment, one hundred years ago, when our contemporary world began.

Review- This is a very hard, dry read about a very interesting time in history. Herman does his research , which was excellent with notes about sources and other materials, but he forgot to make his book engaging. Reading this book was not easy. It was dry, it was overloaded with details that did not add to the overall narrative, and it was boring at times. Herman takes the reader from the begins of the First World War, briefly, then he get into the meat of his book which is how these two very different leaders shaped the war and the world after it. Herman gives so much information that I was lost at times about why one detail mattered so much in the sea of everything he deluged me with, sometimes I could not even tell which detail he wanted to make more important. In the end I was very disappointed with this book because it sounds so interesting but Herman loses the power of his reading of history in all the details of that history.

I give this book a Two out of Five stars.

[Marsa · Rating 4 out of 5]

Overall, the book is an interesting and compelling look at the intersection and influence of Lenin's Bolshevik revolution and Wilson's ideas for the United States as a light/example to the world. The author maneuvers between Lenin, Wilson and their European counterparts in such a way as to demonstrate the interconnectedness of decisions made on all sides of events from 1917 on that still have ramifications to today.

The book comes across assuming the reader has more than cursory knowledge of WWI, its causes, and outcomes. More attention is paid to details around Wilson's and Lenin's thoughts, ideas, and actions than explaining reasons behind the actual war, yet throws some meaningful light on these details that enhance prior knowledge of the subject. What is especially compelling are the connections made between the events of 1917-1924 to the immediate future of the setting (1930s and 1940s and WWII) as well as connecting up to the present.

One distracting piece throughout the book is the somewhat constant interjection of the author's own opinions upon either the events themselves or how these events and decisions affected the future. These moments are more than drawing a conclusion based upon one's research, or even just expressing an opinion; rather, these moments come across as moral or value judgments that detract from the book's purpose and pull a reader out of the flow of the narrative. Where some may not notice or be particularly bothered by this, these statements uncomfortably border on an attempt to dictate how a reader ought to interpret and feel about a particular event or person.

This phenomenon is particularly noticeable when the author makes comparisons between Lenin's Russia and Wilson's United States. While expressing an opinion regarding these two people and / or countries is permissible, the author takes it one step further and - while not explicitly stating - appears to be extraordinarily critical of Lenin yet ends up pulling his punches when it comes time to turn the mirror on Wilson. It is as if the author can't quite bring himself to rise above the influence of decades of anti-Soviet and Cold War propaganda to set a truly equitable comparison and critique of both Lenin and Wilson. The author does a fair job at pointing to missed opportunities Wilson didn't take and his missteps with both Congress, Republicans, and the Allies/Entente forces, he ultimately doesn't hit as hard in the critique of Wilson and his legacy as he does with Lenin. Admittedly, this is hard to do when Lenin's legacy led to so much obvious death and destruction no one (even Lenin) could have truly foreseen.

All in all, this book is an important addition not only to the history of WWI but also to looking at the larger history of the Twentieth Century and the interconnectedness of Wilson, Lenin, and the rest of the world. For those looking for books that look at an important time in the history of the world, this is a book that should be added to one's reading list.

[Brian Manville · Rating 3 out of 5]

One of the common sayings in the evangelical Christian community is that someone is "so heavenly minded that they're no earthly good". This means that the person referenced has their focus so much on their eternal home that they lack a connection to the current world they are living in. Sadly, this book details two men who had similar idyllic visions for the future, but in the end made the world worse than when they grabbed the levers of power.

Both Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin sought to change the world; Wilson via his Fourteen Points and new era of civilization via the League of Nations while Lenin sought to bring about a worker's utopia. In the case of Lenin, he created a society which it can be argued was far worse than life under the tsars. He distained any attempts at moderation in creating this utopia, and, in the end, made paradise for no one except himself and his fellow travelers. The regime changed, but the repression didn't.

Conversely, Wilson was buoyed by high ideals from the readings of Heigl and his thoughts about creating a more civilized society. Wilson was determined to keep America out of the war; politically, it was as a neutral, yet conducting business only with the Entente. His vision was to make America the moral authority of the world, guiding the nations of the world to some unspecified greater good.

As many idealists are, Wilson was able to put together flourishing speeches, yet most times the actions to be taken with vague or non-existent. Worse yet, Wilson's arrogance would broker no compromise. Wilson considered people who disagreed with him as evil (sounds a lot like today's modern left). Unfortunately for Wilson, he reaped the whirlwind for years of condescension and haughtiness when he attempted to get the Treaty of Versailles passed in the Senate. Seeking explanation for some of the treaty's points, Wilson essentially went full Nancy Pelosi by giving a 1920s version of "you've got to pass it to find out what's in it." Fortunately, Henry Cabot Lodge was able to masterfully marshal the politics of the situation to turn the tide of opinion against the treaty. Wilson's attempt to rally the American public to pressure the Senate to change course did not work.

What the book lays out in plain detail is the hazard in giving idealists access to the levers of power. While Wilson naively believed (as do many modern leftists) that if we just show our cards to other nations and let them know that we mean them no harm, then they will accept us. That is not how the world works; Wilson saw it himself during the treaty negotiations in 1919 in the actions of various ethnic groups vying for power and nationhood. Worse, Wilson chose to ignore what he saw because his Messiah complex would not allow him to engage in real discussions to give as many people as possible a seat at the world's table. And, for that, we are worse off.

BOTTOM LINE: What happens when idealists want to lead people.