Truth

by Paul Horwich

What is truth? Paul Horwich gives the definitive exposition of a notable philosophical theory, `minimalism'. This is the controversial theory that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore, despite the philosophical struggles to which it has given rise, an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. Horwich makes a powerful case for the minimalist view, and gives a careful systematic explanation of its implications for a cluster of important philosophical issues on which questions about truth have impinged. The first edition of Truth, published in 1990, established itself both as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition Paul Horwich has refined and developed his treatment of the subject in the light of subsequent discussions, while preserving the distinctive format which made the book so successful. It appears simultaneously with his new book Meaning, a companion work which sets out the broader philosophical context for the theory of an account of meaning which seeks to accommodate the diversity of valuable insights that have been gained in the twentieth century within a common-sense view of meaning as deriving from use. The two books together present a compelling view of the relations between language, thought, and reality. Horwich's demystification of meaning and truth will be essential reading for all philosophers of language. Praise for the first 'subtle, penetrating and ingenious . . . everyone interested in philosophy is in his debt' Michael Dummett, University of Oxford 'lucid and compact . . . a forthright presentation of an interesting thesis' Donald Davidson, University of California, Berkeley 'This is an excellent book and deserves to be widely read and used as a text. It states its thesis clearly and argues for it a style that seems well calculated to start discussions . . . It seems like an admirable starting-point for several weeks' worth of discussions in a philosophy of language course at upper-division undergraduate level.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 'clearly written and well-structured' British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Genres: Philosophy

176 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1990

Reviews

[Eric · Rating 4 out of 5]

What this book does well, it does very well. It is clear, accessible, and concise. Horwich's efforts to demonstrate the utility and appeal of truth Deflationism (He calls it 'Minimalism' but that name was already taken.) are often effective. When this book tries to be a cross between a sketch and a manifesto, it does very well. A special mention should be given to the insightful (if very quick) criticism of Putnam's Pragmatism. There are some issues, however.

First, his response to worries about propositions mainly miss the mark. He assumes that the rejection of propositions must be based on a dogmatic Physicalism, but this is not necessarily so. All sorts of epistemological worries, for example, could be raised. Horwich is either unaware or unimpressed by these objections.

Second, Horwich's insistence that a theory of truth must be given a priori required greater support. If a theory of truth is part of our study of semantics as a branch of empirical linguistics - something that Horwich wishes to argue against, not assume to be false - then there is good reason to think that a theory of truth is given a posteriori like any other linguistic theory. This is especially pertinent because it is unclear how Horwich's defence of propositions can be sustained without an appeal to methodological naturalism, and such an appeal depends on the empirical success of theories utilising propositions. Hence, his theory has only the appearance of being a priori. Horwich must allow for theories of truth to be a posteriori.

Third, Horwich thinks that what he says for truth can easily be moved over to reference. While criticism of inflationary theories of reference can be given (for example, by Field), Horwich does not prosecute that case. It is not obvious to me how Horwich can explain how the name 'Danny DeVito' comes to pick out the flesh-and-blood person that is Danny DeVito. It is less than obvious that "'Danny DeVito' refers to Danny DeVito" is all that must be said on the matter. To be more technical, I don't see how Horwich's view can't be catastrophically Skolemised Putnam-Style.

I have my criticisms, but all in all it is a very well executed book that is good at what it aims to do.

[Reuben HF · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not particularly exciting, but as I am now convinced, just fundamentally correct about the nature of truth.

< Minimalism about truth > is true iff truth is minimal. Which it is.