Most historians would agree that the presidency of Woodrow Wilson was one of the most consequential in American history. However, this shouldn’t be confused with a claim that Woodrow Wilson was one of the most consequential people to serve as president. Like many historical figures, Wilson’s reputation among historians has waxed and waned over the years, and he hasn’t fared well in the recent “cancel culture.” The indiscretion of screening the racist film “The Birth of a Nation,” despite the popularity of the film at the time, has been ample reason for many of today’s woke historians to dismiss him entirely, regardless of his achievements as president.
Patricia O’ Toole takes a refreshingly balanced view of the 28th president in her biography The Moralist: Woodrow Wilson and the World He Made. As the title suggests, this book is tightly focused on Wilson’s lasting impact on foreign policy and the new world order that came into existence at the end of the First World War. Her thesis is that Wilson was a man of strong moral conviction, and this conviction guided, and frequently clouded, his decision making. Those looking for a more comprehensive biography on both the life and presidency of Woodrow Wilson won’t find it here. Wilson takes the oath of office on Page 62 (of the hardback edition of the book), and the 18th and 19th Amendments, arguably the most important Constitutional amendments of the 20th century, despite being debated and ratified during the Wilson presidency are barely mentioned.
In the 1912 presidential election, Wilson was the beneficiary of a split in the Republican Party that came about when Theodore Rooselvelt failed to win the party nomination. He ran as a third-party candidate, which split the Republican vote and gave the election to Wilson. The newly elected Wilson was focused almost entirely on domestic issues. Wilson, an economic populist, wanted the United States to pursue policies that created more opportunities for small businesses by eliminating monopolies and opening up the credit markets to a broader segment of the population. Wilson recognized that the high tariffs that were intended to raise money for the treasury and protect American jobs were more often used to protect American monopolies from foreign competition, which hurt American consumers. Wilson wanted a progressive income tax to replace the tariffs as the primary source of income for the treasury. This goal was realized with passage of the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act in September 1913, and his plan for democratizing capital was realized with passage of the Federal Reserve Act in December of the same year.
These were notable accomplishments, and Wilson would likely have been content to continue his focus on domestic policy, but when war broke out in Europe in the summer of 1914 he was inexorably drawn into the conflagration that soon engulfed the European continent. In the early years of the war, Wilson was staunchly isolationist. He was determined to remain neutral because he felt it gave the United States the moral authority to mediate a peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, as the author explains, neutrality is much easier in theory than in practice.
At the beginning of the war, Great Britain implemented a blockade of nearly the entire North Sea, which prevented the Germans from getting supplies, both military and civilian, into their ports. They retaliated by using their U-boats to attack merchant ships in the waters around the British Isles. These ships, regardless of their flag, frequently carried U.S. citizens, most notably the Lusitania in May of 1915. However, Wilson initially managed to resist cries for joining the war by the more militant members of Congress and the American public and ran for reelection in 1916 on a platform that maintained American neutrality in the war, but German belligerence continued and, with the revelation of a plot by Germany to provoke a war between the United States and Mexico in the now-infamous Zimmerman telegram that was made public in March of 1917, the United States was drawn into the war in support of the Allies.
The events on the European battlefields play, at best, a supporting role in this book. The crux of both the book and the author’s thesis is the role that Wilson played in the Paris Peace Conference and efforts to ratify the Treaty of Versailles in the U.S. Senate. Wilson’s primary objective was the creation of the League of Nations, which was his vision for an independent body that would help settle international disputes through diplomacy when possible and the use of an international coalition of force brought to bear on rogue nations when necessary. He conceded a great deal during the Paris Peace Talks to get a League of Nations covenant inserted into the treaty, but he conceded absolutely nothing with the U.S. Senate to get the treaty, and the covenant, ratified.
History has judged Woodrow Wilson harshly for how he handled these events. In order to get his covenant, he is frequently accused of standing by as Great Britain and France created an overly punitive peace treaty that set the stage for the next world war. To her credit, the author takes a much more nuanced view of Wilson’s role in the peace talks. He wasn’t the milquetoast that has emerged from popular history. He took firm positions that prevented France from effectively annexing the Rhineland, and he consistently reigned in the worst impulses of both Lloyd George of England and Georges Clemenceau of France.
His intransigence with the Senate is more difficult to explain. The author tends to vilify Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republican senator who led the efforts to scuttle ratification of the treaty, but Lodge would have been forced to vote for ratification if Wilson had made reasonable concessions. Wilson's ostensible reason for refusing to accept at least limited reservations to the treaty were that it would force him to break the promises he made to the Allies at the peace conference, but even they seemed agreeable to some of the more modest reservations that were proposed by moderate senators. Hopes for ratification were irrevocably damaged by Wilson’s stroke in October of 1919. In his infirmity, Wilson became even more uncooperative, and the United States neither ratified the treaty nor joined the League of Nations.
Wilson’s effort to create an international coalition dedicated to the preservation of peace and democracy was a noble goal, but, due to Wilson’s unwillingness to compromise, It wasn’t until more than twenty years after his death, and in the aftermath of another world war, that the United States finally joined such an organization. It is difficult to know what Wilson would think of the United Nations, but, for better or worse, it is the realization of one of his grandest ambitions.
Ms. O’ Toole does a fine job of explaining her theory that Wilson’s political failures are due to an inflated sense of morality, but, as I suspect is true with many readers, I wasn’t entirely convinced by her argument. In fact, much of Wilson’s behavior could likely be explained by nothing more than partisan politics. It’s also difficult to reconcile a strong sense of morality with his willingness to accept some of the harshest terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Regardless, her book is a welcome addition to the scholarship of Woodrow Wilson. He created the world we currently inhabit and the decisions he made more than one hundred years ago will continue to impact us well into the 21st century.