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The Lions of July: Prelude to War, 1914
"Shows how the great powers drove themselves into World War I, which none of them wanted, by gross miscalculations and misunderstandings."-- International Herald Tribune
480 pages, Paperback
First published July 15, 1996
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
November 17, 2016
A thorough, readable diplomatic history of the July Crisis. Jannes does a fine job bringing the tension and desperation of the period to life, as well as highlighting the role of pride and personal agendas, as well as how slow and cumbersome the communications systems and bureaucracies were.
Throughout the narrative, Jannes emphasizes the tension between the powers’ military planning (almost entirely offensive in nature), their mobilization timetables, and the atmosphere of fear (rather than outright belligerence) that was so common in all of the various camps. The detail is exhaustive and the narrative is told in a readable and linear day-by-day format. The discussion of the alliances and miscalculations is clear. Jannen seems to place most of the blame on France, while spreading the rest of it on Serbia and Austria-Hungary.
A riveting, well-written and well-researched history.
Throughout the narrative, Jannes emphasizes the tension between the powers’ military planning (almost entirely offensive in nature), their mobilization timetables, and the atmosphere of fear (rather than outright belligerence) that was so common in all of the various camps. The detail is exhaustive and the narrative is told in a readable and linear day-by-day format. The discussion of the alliances and miscalculations is clear. Jannen seems to place most of the blame on France, while spreading the rest of it on Serbia and Austria-Hungary.
A riveting, well-written and well-researched history.
May 12, 2011
Viewed through the diplomatic dispatches and personal diaries of the various ambassadors, foreign ministers, prime ministers, and heads of state, it appears that the catastrophe of WWI was essentially inevitable. No country was purely to blame, and each was acting in what it felt was its essential interest. No one wanted the war, but fear drove them to it. For Austria, fear of decline and Serbian nationalism. For Russia, fear of revolution and loss of prestige. For Germany, fear of a two-front war and the "slavic threat." For Britain and France, fear of German ambition.
As a Diplomacy enthusiast, this was a fantastic book.
As a Diplomacy enthusiast, this was a fantastic book.
May 10, 2014
The Lions of July, by William Jannen, Jr., is a fine overview of the diplomatic activities between the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28 and the start of World War I. Jannen writes in an informative but accessible style, illuminating the key players with brief sketches as they come into the narrative.
The book gives a good sense of both the international developments and the domestic dynamics involved. For example, the initial Austrian response to the assassination was delayed by resistance from the Hungarian Prime Minister Stephan Tisza, who didn’t want to absorb any more Slavs into the Austro-Hungarian Empire and was thus opposed to any measures that could lead to a war with Serbia and annexation of its territory. Edward Grey, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had to deal with a Cabinet with members opposed to British involvement in a European war under any circumstances while France’s political attention was fixed on a murder trial with political overtones.
Also well-presented is how the personal agendas of the personnel affected events. For example, Paleologue’s right-wing agenda and advocacy of a firm support of Russia seems to have been a factor in his decision to delay passing to Paris the news of Russian mobilization to forestall objections by Viviani, the Socialist prime minister.
The lost possibilities are also well-articulated. Jannen makes some interesting and credible speculations on the advantages to Russia of keeping Austria-Hungary guessing by delaying mobilization and the idea of a stop-in-Belgrade, where Austria-Hungary would satisfy its honor by holding Belgrade while the terms of its ultimatum to Serbia was subject to negotiation.
At the front is a useful list of the dramatis personae and photos of some of the key players.
This is a great introduction to the events immediately preceding “the lamps…going out all over Europe.”
The book gives a good sense of both the international developments and the domestic dynamics involved. For example, the initial Austrian response to the assassination was delayed by resistance from the Hungarian Prime Minister Stephan Tisza, who didn’t want to absorb any more Slavs into the Austro-Hungarian Empire and was thus opposed to any measures that could lead to a war with Serbia and annexation of its territory. Edward Grey, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had to deal with a Cabinet with members opposed to British involvement in a European war under any circumstances while France’s political attention was fixed on a murder trial with political overtones.
Also well-presented is how the personal agendas of the personnel affected events. For example, Paleologue’s right-wing agenda and advocacy of a firm support of Russia seems to have been a factor in his decision to delay passing to Paris the news of Russian mobilization to forestall objections by Viviani, the Socialist prime minister.
The lost possibilities are also well-articulated. Jannen makes some interesting and credible speculations on the advantages to Russia of keeping Austria-Hungary guessing by delaying mobilization and the idea of a stop-in-Belgrade, where Austria-Hungary would satisfy its honor by holding Belgrade while the terms of its ultimatum to Serbia was subject to negotiation.
At the front is a useful list of the dramatis personae and photos of some of the key players.
This is a great introduction to the events immediately preceding “the lamps…going out all over Europe.”
September 4, 2025
This is a masterly written chronicle about the many unfortunate steps taken by big countries and small countries that ended in them stumbling into World War II. Reviewers' words on the back of the book, tell it all...
Kirkus Reviews calls it great and small powers play in times of peril.
Library Journal states entangling treaties and alliances, ignorance and miscalculations, chauvinism,
and pride all resulted in WWI.
Flora Lewis tells us that the book shows us how the great powers drove themselves into WWI, which none of them wanted.
Kirkus Reviews calls it great and small powers play in times of peril.
Library Journal states entangling treaties and alliances, ignorance and miscalculations, chauvinism,
and pride all resulted in WWI.
Flora Lewis tells us that the book shows us how the great powers drove themselves into WWI, which none of them wanted.
January 5, 2023
In creating an account on Goodreads I tried not to give 5 stars to books unless they really stuck with me. This was one of the few. Anyone interested in understanding modern world political dynamics can start here for a digestible understanding of how the world changed. Anyone interested in WWII history could start with this book as primer to help understand that WWI and WWII were the same thing.
August 5, 2023
Men who don't want to go to war yet won't make decisions so they end up going to war
April 12, 2021
An account of the political maneuverings between the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the beginning of World War One. I wished for a few more maps and photos of the various dramatis personae, but this is the clearest and best-written account I have come across, with event leading inexorably to event like some fatalistic novel.
May 15, 2020
Bright Young Things nomination.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews