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Olive Branch and Sword: The United States and Mexico, 1845-1848
On May 14, 1846, the U.S. Congress declared that the country was at war with Mexico. Despite protestations to the contrary, the primary purpose of U.S. President James K. Polk in executing the war was the acquisition of California. In 1847, Nicholas P. Trist was sent on a diplomatic mission to deliver Polks peace terms to the Mexican president, Santa Ana. Angered by the Mexican governments rejection of his terms, Polk issued a recall order in November which Trist chose to ignore. He eventually negotiated a settlement on February 2, 1848, that contained nearly everything that Polk had hoped for. This diplomatic history of Americas first foreign war focuses on Trists efforts and the policies of the Polk administration.
233 pages, Hardcover
First published February 1, 1997
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November 8, 2015
A thorough diplomatic history of the Mexican-American War, provoked by the US and started by Mexico. Mahin’s coverage of the peace negotiations is the strongest part of the book, although it is still intended for a general audience. The book takes its title from Polk’s statement that “We go to war with Mexico solely for the purpose of conquering an honorable and permanent peace...we shall bear the olive branch in one hand, the sword in the other.”
The book, obviously, is not a military history of the war; these aspects are covered only insofar as they influenced the peace process and the calculations of either side. The story is also focused mainly on the US perspective, and the perception of Polk and Trist regarding events in Mexico and the intentions of its government is central to the narrative. From 1845 and 1848, Mexico had no less than five governments; Mahin does not cover them in much detail, but his use of Trist’s recollections seem sufficient enough.
At one point, Mahin writes that Polk was the first US president without substantial diplomatic or military experience, and he thus relied heavily on his cabinet. In a later section Mahin writes that US foreign policy was heavily influenced by Polk himself due to the cabinet’s limited diplomatic experience and their habit of usually abiding by his decisions. Upon reading the book, it’s not really clear if either of these statements is absolutely true. The State Department at the time was basically just a bunch of clerks, and, according to Mahin, Buchanan’s foreign policy views tended to be politically motivated. Congress was not in session for half of the war; when it was it was often so ill-informed that Polk rarely bothered to consult it. Mahin writes that Polk’s selection of Scott to lead the invasion of central Mexico “was about the only time that Polk put the national interest ahead of his perceived political interests, and he soon regretted the decision.”
At the time, the press was mostly ignorant of foreign policy issues, and tended to appeal to the nationalism or partisanship of its readership. According to Mahin, this made Polk more reliant on his own instincts and perceptions. His foreign policy throughout the Mexican crisis tended to consist of cycles: first the olive branch, then the sword, and so on. Throughout his presidency, Polk tended to misjudge the reactions of the Mexican government and people, and he operated under the assumption that the Mexicans were ruled by tyrants who cared little for public opinion and were thus easy to predict.
Mahin’s coverage of Trist’s mission is pretty thorough, and Mahin credits him as “the only man who single-handedly ended a major American war.” Mahin also examines the possibility that if Trist had obeyed his recall order a long-term US military occupation of Mexico may have been the result, as well as pressure to annex even more Mexican territory.
The book’s only problems tend to be odd writing here and there: “He knew little and understood less about the Mexican army,” or references to “the Polk.”
A fine work on an interesting subject.
The book, obviously, is not a military history of the war; these aspects are covered only insofar as they influenced the peace process and the calculations of either side. The story is also focused mainly on the US perspective, and the perception of Polk and Trist regarding events in Mexico and the intentions of its government is central to the narrative. From 1845 and 1848, Mexico had no less than five governments; Mahin does not cover them in much detail, but his use of Trist’s recollections seem sufficient enough.
At one point, Mahin writes that Polk was the first US president without substantial diplomatic or military experience, and he thus relied heavily on his cabinet. In a later section Mahin writes that US foreign policy was heavily influenced by Polk himself due to the cabinet’s limited diplomatic experience and their habit of usually abiding by his decisions. Upon reading the book, it’s not really clear if either of these statements is absolutely true. The State Department at the time was basically just a bunch of clerks, and, according to Mahin, Buchanan’s foreign policy views tended to be politically motivated. Congress was not in session for half of the war; when it was it was often so ill-informed that Polk rarely bothered to consult it. Mahin writes that Polk’s selection of Scott to lead the invasion of central Mexico “was about the only time that Polk put the national interest ahead of his perceived political interests, and he soon regretted the decision.”
At the time, the press was mostly ignorant of foreign policy issues, and tended to appeal to the nationalism or partisanship of its readership. According to Mahin, this made Polk more reliant on his own instincts and perceptions. His foreign policy throughout the Mexican crisis tended to consist of cycles: first the olive branch, then the sword, and so on. Throughout his presidency, Polk tended to misjudge the reactions of the Mexican government and people, and he operated under the assumption that the Mexicans were ruled by tyrants who cared little for public opinion and were thus easy to predict.
Mahin’s coverage of Trist’s mission is pretty thorough, and Mahin credits him as “the only man who single-handedly ended a major American war.” Mahin also examines the possibility that if Trist had obeyed his recall order a long-term US military occupation of Mexico may have been the result, as well as pressure to annex even more Mexican territory.
The book’s only problems tend to be odd writing here and there: “He knew little and understood less about the Mexican army,” or references to “the Polk.”
A fine work on an interesting subject.
Displaying 1 of 1 review