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Brexit and British Politics
Brexit has changed everything - from our government, to our economy and principal trading relationship, to the organization of our state. This watershed moment, which surprised most observers and mobilized previously apathetic sections of the electorate, is already transforming British politics in profound and lasting ways.
In this incisive book, leading analysts of UK and EU politics Geoffrey Evans and Anand Menon step back from the immediacy and hyperbole of the Referendum to explain what happened on 23 June 2016, and why. Brexit, they argue, was the product of both long-term dissatisfaction with the EU and a gradual breakdown in the relationship between parties and voters that spawned detachment, disinterest and disenchantment. Exploring its subsequent impact on the June 2017 General Election, they reveal the extent to which Brexit has shattered the contemporary equilibrium of British politics. These reverberations will continue to be felt for a very long time and could pose a real danger to the health of British democracy if the government fails to deliver on the promises linked to Brexit.
In this incisive book, leading analysts of UK and EU politics Geoffrey Evans and Anand Menon step back from the immediacy and hyperbole of the Referendum to explain what happened on 23 June 2016, and why. Brexit, they argue, was the product of both long-term dissatisfaction with the EU and a gradual breakdown in the relationship between parties and voters that spawned detachment, disinterest and disenchantment. Exploring its subsequent impact on the June 2017 General Election, they reveal the extent to which Brexit has shattered the contemporary equilibrium of British politics. These reverberations will continue to be felt for a very long time and could pose a real danger to the health of British democracy if the government fails to deliver on the promises linked to Brexit.
- GenresPoliticsNonfiction
140 pages, Paperback
Published December 11, 2017
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January 8, 2018
Anyone who, in the wake of the Brexit vote, still thinks that it is politics as usual should read Evans and Menon’s Brexit and British Politics. This slim volume explains clearly why the June 2016 referendum wasn’t wholly about the EU. It also demonstrates that the mendacity or otherwise of the campaign may be moot, because the result was probably preordained. It’s a convincing thesis in many ways, but there are one or two odd omissions.
Geoffrey Evans is Professor of the Sociology of Politics at Nuffield College, Oxford. He has published widely on inequality and politics. Anand Menon is Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs at King’s College, London. He has written a great deal on the European Union, including but not limited to Britain’s role in it. Together they are, I suppose, paid-up members of the great and the good, and the sort of experts that Michael Gove thinks we have all had enough of. That hasn’t stopped them from writing a challenging analysis on the roots of the Brexit vote.
The authors point out that in the 1990s and 2000s, Europe wasn’t really the pressing issue for the public that it was for Tory MPs. “The percentage of Britons citing Europe among ‘the major issues facing Britain today’ rose to double figures in the 1990s ...but the EU never became a decisive political issue,” they say, pointing out that by 2001 it had sunk back so that just 14% named it as an issue that might determine their vote.
What was happening at the same time, however, was an evolution in British politics that concentrated all debate in the centre. Evans and Menon see this as a phenomenon of the Blair era and they are surely right to ascribe a large part of it to the New Labour project; as Labour chased Basildon Man, a broader polity disappeared. One might call this centrification (my phrase, not theirs). They refer to it as an elite consensus. Within it, acceptance of globalization was not open to question. Importantly, neither was a certain liberal set of values on matters such as gay marriage and capital punishment. One of the nice insights of this book is that it sees this “values factor” as equally important in fostering a sense among those not part of this consensus that they were excluded from influence, and that politics did not serve them. The authors also note a growing homogenization in MPs’ backgrounds; professional politicians replaced the trade-union representatives of the past, for example. So when the 2016 referendum offered people a rare chance to register a protest against the elite consensus, they took it.
Evans and Menon may ascribe a little too much of this “centrification” to Blair’s era; there was concern in the early 1960s about so-called Butskellism, the easy consensus around certain centrist preoccupations or views. (Rab Butler was a prominent Tory politician of the late 1950s; Gaitskell the moderate Labour leader of the same era. Both were robbed of the premiership – Butler by Harold Macmillan, and Gaitskell by death.) Even in the 1970s, a lively time in politics, there was a perception that ideology no longer mattered. I can remember William Davis, editor of Punch, writing in 1973 that it was now, “Forget the politics: Are we better managers than the other lot?” So this ossification around an elite consensus in the 1990s was not really new. But it is true that interest in politics fell away rapidly in the time of New Labour, as Evans and Menon themselves demonstrate. “In the 1970s and 1980s, close to 80% would go to the polls,” they say. “Since the turn of the century, ...the average has been around 63%.” But for the Referendum it was 72.2%.
From all this, one could conclude that people voted leave purely because they had a chance, for once, to give the establishment a good kicking, and were not that interested in the EU at all. In fact, Evans and Menon don’t go quite that far. They make it clear that many voters did have reservations about the EU and that most British people had never really identified with Europe (apparently they scored 28th out of 28 for “feeling European”). The Single European Act of 1987, creating the single market, probably took integration as far as most British people really wanted to go. Neither do they ignore the role of immigration in the debate. The authors are also careful about the common analysis that Leave voters were the poor and those left behind by globalization and European integration. There is truth in this, they say, but it is not the whole truth; there were actually more middle-class Leave voters than there were working-class (to be sure, this does turn a bit on definitions). Brexit was not entirely a revolt by the dispossessed. Neither do Evans and Menon ascribe the breakdown of confidence in politics solely to “centrification”; they also cite (for example) the ghastly expenses scandal of 2009, when MPs were caught fiddling their expenses on a massive scale.
Even so, the authors make a compelling case that Brexit was not simply a vote on Europe. It was to a large extent a rebellion against a centrist consensus – and against a perceived elite with which that consensus was identified. The referendum campaign itself, as they demonstrate, made very little difference at all.
However, there is an elephant in the room that Evans and Menon ignore, although it has been trumpeting loudly and crapping on the floor for many decades. This is the British electoral system, which they mention only two or three times, and very briefly. They are clearly aware of it as a factor, but do not seem to attach much weight to it. But it is the biggest single factor in the exclusion of most people from the political process.
This is partly just because it delivers results that do not reflect popular voting intentions, and also excludes huge areas of the political spectrum from power. This is evident from the 2015 general election results. The Tories were able to secure an absolute majority in the Commons although they received the support of only 37% of the voters , and only 24% of those registered to vote. Again, the culprit is the “winner-takes-all” electoral system. According to the UK’s Electoral Reform Society: “Labour saw their vote share increase while their number of seats collapsed. The Conservatives won an overall majority on a minority of the vote, and the Liberal Democrats lost nearly all their seats – despite winning 8% of the vote. The SNP won 50% of the Scottish vote share, but 95% of Scottish seats.” UKIP won more than one in eight of the votes cast but just one seat. It could be added that many will have abstained because they knew their votes wouldn’t count where they lived. No wonder people feel that politics does not serve them.
However, simple inequities in the result aren’t the whole story; even worse, the system makes a relatively small number of voters pivotal and sends the political discourse in their directon, excluding everyone else. If you’re not a floating voter in a marginal, no-one cares for your opinions. This is what happened in the 1990s when the two main parties chased Basildon Man. They forgot about everyone else. On June 23 2016 the political establishment paid the price for refusing to change an iniquitous electoral system that kept them in power.
There is a further point that Evans and Menon don’t discuss, although they will be aware of it. This is the perceived denigration of national identity by a pro-European elite – an especially sore point amongst the English. This is related to the “values” issue that the authors do cover so well. However, it is distinct from that and especially toxic, as the referendum and its aftermath have been accompanied by some nasty displays of noisy nationalism. The way some in politics have played on this has been very worrying – for example, the silly business about getting blue passports back (the old ones were black not blue, and in any case the colour change wasn’t insisted upon by the EU). And yet one understands how some English people feel. The morning after the referendum, a picture was widely posted by Remain voters; it showed delicious European foods on one side and a solitary can of beans on the other. The picture was well-shot, and in a way witty, but one wonders if it was wise. No-one likes to see their culture insulted. Remain voters may be right, but they often struggle to understand the other side.
Notwithstanding these caveats, Evans and Menon’s analysis is shrewd and interesting. If they miss one or two insights, they have plenty more to offer – and in any case, it is early days; one suspects they will have more to say when the time is right. In the meantime, Brexit and British Politics is thought-provoking, and a good read.
Evans and Menon finish by warning that the Brexit vote has left British politics in disarray, with a rudderless political establishment trying to work out where it now stands, and a deep divide between the governors and the governed. In a telling quote, they describe how one of them warned in a pre-vote debate that Brexit would cause a reduction in GDP – only to be told by an audience member, “That’s your bloody GDP, not mine.” Late in the book, the authors quote journalist Chris Deerin, writing in The Herald Scotland in summer 2017: “The collapse of trust in our politicians, our politics, our institutions and our post-war settlement is real and it is profound. It pervades every layer of British society ...The titled, the humble and the dogs in the street alike know that our democracy has gone wonky.”
So what do we do now?
Geoffrey Evans is Professor of the Sociology of Politics at Nuffield College, Oxford. He has published widely on inequality and politics. Anand Menon is Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs at King’s College, London. He has written a great deal on the European Union, including but not limited to Britain’s role in it. Together they are, I suppose, paid-up members of the great and the good, and the sort of experts that Michael Gove thinks we have all had enough of. That hasn’t stopped them from writing a challenging analysis on the roots of the Brexit vote.
The authors point out that in the 1990s and 2000s, Europe wasn’t really the pressing issue for the public that it was for Tory MPs. “The percentage of Britons citing Europe among ‘the major issues facing Britain today’ rose to double figures in the 1990s ...but the EU never became a decisive political issue,” they say, pointing out that by 2001 it had sunk back so that just 14% named it as an issue that might determine their vote.
What was happening at the same time, however, was an evolution in British politics that concentrated all debate in the centre. Evans and Menon see this as a phenomenon of the Blair era and they are surely right to ascribe a large part of it to the New Labour project; as Labour chased Basildon Man, a broader polity disappeared. One might call this centrification (my phrase, not theirs). They refer to it as an elite consensus. Within it, acceptance of globalization was not open to question. Importantly, neither was a certain liberal set of values on matters such as gay marriage and capital punishment. One of the nice insights of this book is that it sees this “values factor” as equally important in fostering a sense among those not part of this consensus that they were excluded from influence, and that politics did not serve them. The authors also note a growing homogenization in MPs’ backgrounds; professional politicians replaced the trade-union representatives of the past, for example. So when the 2016 referendum offered people a rare chance to register a protest against the elite consensus, they took it.
Evans and Menon may ascribe a little too much of this “centrification” to Blair’s era; there was concern in the early 1960s about so-called Butskellism, the easy consensus around certain centrist preoccupations or views. (Rab Butler was a prominent Tory politician of the late 1950s; Gaitskell the moderate Labour leader of the same era. Both were robbed of the premiership – Butler by Harold Macmillan, and Gaitskell by death.) Even in the 1970s, a lively time in politics, there was a perception that ideology no longer mattered. I can remember William Davis, editor of Punch, writing in 1973 that it was now, “Forget the politics: Are we better managers than the other lot?” So this ossification around an elite consensus in the 1990s was not really new. But it is true that interest in politics fell away rapidly in the time of New Labour, as Evans and Menon themselves demonstrate. “In the 1970s and 1980s, close to 80% would go to the polls,” they say. “Since the turn of the century, ...the average has been around 63%.” But for the Referendum it was 72.2%.
From all this, one could conclude that people voted leave purely because they had a chance, for once, to give the establishment a good kicking, and were not that interested in the EU at all. In fact, Evans and Menon don’t go quite that far. They make it clear that many voters did have reservations about the EU and that most British people had never really identified with Europe (apparently they scored 28th out of 28 for “feeling European”). The Single European Act of 1987, creating the single market, probably took integration as far as most British people really wanted to go. Neither do they ignore the role of immigration in the debate. The authors are also careful about the common analysis that Leave voters were the poor and those left behind by globalization and European integration. There is truth in this, they say, but it is not the whole truth; there were actually more middle-class Leave voters than there were working-class (to be sure, this does turn a bit on definitions). Brexit was not entirely a revolt by the dispossessed. Neither do Evans and Menon ascribe the breakdown of confidence in politics solely to “centrification”; they also cite (for example) the ghastly expenses scandal of 2009, when MPs were caught fiddling their expenses on a massive scale.
Even so, the authors make a compelling case that Brexit was not simply a vote on Europe. It was to a large extent a rebellion against a centrist consensus – and against a perceived elite with which that consensus was identified. The referendum campaign itself, as they demonstrate, made very little difference at all.
However, there is an elephant in the room that Evans and Menon ignore, although it has been trumpeting loudly and crapping on the floor for many decades. This is the British electoral system, which they mention only two or three times, and very briefly. They are clearly aware of it as a factor, but do not seem to attach much weight to it. But it is the biggest single factor in the exclusion of most people from the political process.
This is partly just because it delivers results that do not reflect popular voting intentions, and also excludes huge areas of the political spectrum from power. This is evident from the 2015 general election results. The Tories were able to secure an absolute majority in the Commons although they received the support of only 37% of the voters , and only 24% of those registered to vote. Again, the culprit is the “winner-takes-all” electoral system. According to the UK’s Electoral Reform Society: “Labour saw their vote share increase while their number of seats collapsed. The Conservatives won an overall majority on a minority of the vote, and the Liberal Democrats lost nearly all their seats – despite winning 8% of the vote. The SNP won 50% of the Scottish vote share, but 95% of Scottish seats.” UKIP won more than one in eight of the votes cast but just one seat. It could be added that many will have abstained because they knew their votes wouldn’t count where they lived. No wonder people feel that politics does not serve them.
However, simple inequities in the result aren’t the whole story; even worse, the system makes a relatively small number of voters pivotal and sends the political discourse in their directon, excluding everyone else. If you’re not a floating voter in a marginal, no-one cares for your opinions. This is what happened in the 1990s when the two main parties chased Basildon Man. They forgot about everyone else. On June 23 2016 the political establishment paid the price for refusing to change an iniquitous electoral system that kept them in power.
There is a further point that Evans and Menon don’t discuss, although they will be aware of it. This is the perceived denigration of national identity by a pro-European elite – an especially sore point amongst the English. This is related to the “values” issue that the authors do cover so well. However, it is distinct from that and especially toxic, as the referendum and its aftermath have been accompanied by some nasty displays of noisy nationalism. The way some in politics have played on this has been very worrying – for example, the silly business about getting blue passports back (the old ones were black not blue, and in any case the colour change wasn’t insisted upon by the EU). And yet one understands how some English people feel. The morning after the referendum, a picture was widely posted by Remain voters; it showed delicious European foods on one side and a solitary can of beans on the other. The picture was well-shot, and in a way witty, but one wonders if it was wise. No-one likes to see their culture insulted. Remain voters may be right, but they often struggle to understand the other side.
Notwithstanding these caveats, Evans and Menon’s analysis is shrewd and interesting. If they miss one or two insights, they have plenty more to offer – and in any case, it is early days; one suspects they will have more to say when the time is right. In the meantime, Brexit and British Politics is thought-provoking, and a good read.
Evans and Menon finish by warning that the Brexit vote has left British politics in disarray, with a rudderless political establishment trying to work out where it now stands, and a deep divide between the governors and the governed. In a telling quote, they describe how one of them warned in a pre-vote debate that Brexit would cause a reduction in GDP – only to be told by an audience member, “That’s your bloody GDP, not mine.” Late in the book, the authors quote journalist Chris Deerin, writing in The Herald Scotland in summer 2017: “The collapse of trust in our politicians, our politics, our institutions and our post-war settlement is real and it is profound. It pervades every layer of British society ...The titled, the humble and the dogs in the street alike know that our democracy has gone wonky.”
So what do we do now?
Read
August 6, 2025A postmortem of the political environment before, during, and immediately post Brexit. Interesting insights on the breakdown of voter behaviors around the campaigns but you don't need to read the book to get those.
November 13, 2018
“Brexit and British Politics” tells the tale of the background of British politics that led to and resulted from the Brexit campaign. Authors Geoffrey Evans and Anand Menon make their case through verbal analysis supported by statistical data. They relate the relationship between Britain and Europe during the life of the European Community and the leaders on both sides from Charles de Gaulle through Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair, David Cameron and Jacques Chirac.
What is so fascinating about this relatively short book about recent and contemporary British politics? I admit, I am an American and a political junkie. The interplay between the Conservatives and Labour and UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party, I had wondered what that was before this reading) brings my superficial understanding of British politics up to date. What is seized my interest is the similarities between trends as depicted in this book and what I have seen in American politics. The realignment of parties is like watching America in a mirror. Conservatives rebrand from being the representatives of the upper classes and business to being the party of the middle class while Labour morphs from it working class roots to appeal to the middle class. Ideological wedges are dulled as politicians appeal to competency more than issues. In the wake of Brexit Labour moves back to the left and ideological/class struggle seems to be making a return. These moves provide a background against which to measure our own political odyssey
I recommend “Brexit and British Politics” to anyone to anyone with an interest in the unfolding saga of Britain and Europe, recent British history and for Americans seeking a parallel political universe against which to measure our own.
What is so fascinating about this relatively short book about recent and contemporary British politics? I admit, I am an American and a political junkie. The interplay between the Conservatives and Labour and UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party, I had wondered what that was before this reading) brings my superficial understanding of British politics up to date. What is seized my interest is the similarities between trends as depicted in this book and what I have seen in American politics. The realignment of parties is like watching America in a mirror. Conservatives rebrand from being the representatives of the upper classes and business to being the party of the middle class while Labour morphs from it working class roots to appeal to the middle class. Ideological wedges are dulled as politicians appeal to competency more than issues. In the wake of Brexit Labour moves back to the left and ideological/class struggle seems to be making a return. These moves provide a background against which to measure our own political odyssey
I recommend “Brexit and British Politics” to anyone to anyone with an interest in the unfolding saga of Britain and Europe, recent British history and for Americans seeking a parallel political universe against which to measure our own.
April 16, 2019
I admire anyone that was able to step back from the emotion of the 2016 referendum and analyse what caused such a result. I couldn’t, and part of the reason why it became so hard to see at that time was because it tore society in two. It was a question of values (as they explain in the book) and those values were right and wrong, good and bad, economy and sovereignty and of course the old favourite of conservatives who like to employ dog whistle politics to get the working classes to do their dirty work: the immigration card versus freedom of movement.
Voters have short memories and the result becomes less shocking when the timeline of Britain’s turbulent relationship with Europe is laid out. Britain the least European of all European countries. Always the troublemaker. In many ways it should have felt inevitable.
It was also interesting to see what prompted May’s, at the time, bizarre interpretation that those who voted Leave weren’t just fools who’d lost their minds because they’d been whipped into a frenzy but that they all knew what they wanted and wanted a hard brexit. And she was going to deliver it no matter what common sense or the common market said. Of course it’s obvious now but she pursued that path to steal the leave voting Labour Party members away from labour.
Votes, of course! How did I miss that at the time?
In spite of the bitterness of the campaigns we learn that pretty much everyone had decided which way they were voting a long time before Voting Day. This comes back to the values proposition. Values aren’t as fickle as parties. Values stick.
We learn how the remain camp messed up by playing the economic card way too soon. We learn how some people incredible as it seems found the triumvirate of Gove, Boris and the UKIP fascist made a compelling case for the future!
The first past the post flawed system is discussed but solutions to a better system like PR aren’t considered.
Trust in politicians being at an all time low is also key.
What’s clear to me, and what I liked is the book gave me space to draw my own conclusions on how to rectify a similarly terrifying breakdown in society again. Education. History. Teaching history in schools and not being in denial of that history because you did some bad things.
And we have a two party system that doesn’t cater for anyone’s values anyone so we might even get new parties.
Conversely, they claim there’s a high percentage of people who voted remain that are now happy with the decision to steadfastly adhere to the will (it was only half) of the people to leave. I found that very hard to believe.
Voters have short memories and the result becomes less shocking when the timeline of Britain’s turbulent relationship with Europe is laid out. Britain the least European of all European countries. Always the troublemaker. In many ways it should have felt inevitable.
It was also interesting to see what prompted May’s, at the time, bizarre interpretation that those who voted Leave weren’t just fools who’d lost their minds because they’d been whipped into a frenzy but that they all knew what they wanted and wanted a hard brexit. And she was going to deliver it no matter what common sense or the common market said. Of course it’s obvious now but she pursued that path to steal the leave voting Labour Party members away from labour.
Votes, of course! How did I miss that at the time?
In spite of the bitterness of the campaigns we learn that pretty much everyone had decided which way they were voting a long time before Voting Day. This comes back to the values proposition. Values aren’t as fickle as parties. Values stick.
We learn how the remain camp messed up by playing the economic card way too soon. We learn how some people incredible as it seems found the triumvirate of Gove, Boris and the UKIP fascist made a compelling case for the future!
The first past the post flawed system is discussed but solutions to a better system like PR aren’t considered.
Trust in politicians being at an all time low is also key.
What’s clear to me, and what I liked is the book gave me space to draw my own conclusions on how to rectify a similarly terrifying breakdown in society again. Education. History. Teaching history in schools and not being in denial of that history because you did some bad things.
And we have a two party system that doesn’t cater for anyone’s values anyone so we might even get new parties.
Conversely, they claim there’s a high percentage of people who voted remain that are now happy with the decision to steadfastly adhere to the will (it was only half) of the people to leave. I found that very hard to believe.
December 29, 2017
This short book is in effect an informed commentary discussing the causes and key influences that resulted in the mementus vote on the 23rd of June.
Key factors such as
Detachment
Disinterest
Disenchantment
Are discussed in detail.
The book begins with an interesting historical analysis of our relationship with Europe, along with the renegotiation of our commitments under Thatcher.
One of the key strengths of this book is the academic referencing os claims to reliable factual evidence.
For example the way our government handled the freedom of movement; which went against the stance from other major European countries and led to 1.5 million people coming to the UK as opposed to the 50K our government predicted.
Again and again I am surprised at how poorly our own government has handled key aspects of our European journey.
With regard to the reasons behind the vote, the gulf between political candidates and the electorate with “my kind of people” not being represented by major parties but in the fringe parties is well considered.
Issues such as the expenses scandal etc only went to furthering this thinking.
The book finishes by restating the obvious statement that we will all be living with the consequences of the vote for many years to come.
Key factors such as
Detachment
Disinterest
Disenchantment
Are discussed in detail.
The book begins with an interesting historical analysis of our relationship with Europe, along with the renegotiation of our commitments under Thatcher.
One of the key strengths of this book is the academic referencing os claims to reliable factual evidence.
For example the way our government handled the freedom of movement; which went against the stance from other major European countries and led to 1.5 million people coming to the UK as opposed to the 50K our government predicted.
Again and again I am surprised at how poorly our own government has handled key aspects of our European journey.
With regard to the reasons behind the vote, the gulf between political candidates and the electorate with “my kind of people” not being represented by major parties but in the fringe parties is well considered.
Issues such as the expenses scandal etc only went to furthering this thinking.
The book finishes by restating the obvious statement that we will all be living with the consequences of the vote for many years to come.
August 6, 2024
Un libro corto de 2017 (apenas un año después del Brexit) que explica los principales motivos detrás de la decisión de salirse de la UE en el referéndum de 2016. Algunos de esos motivos pueden trazarse hasta décadas atrás en lo que respecta a la complicada relación de los Conservadores con la Unión Europea en lo que respecta a la soberanía y las aportaciones monetarias. Sin embargo, lo autores creen (y defienden con bastante habilidad ) que el principal motivo detrás del voto al Leave fue la inmigración, seguido de aprovechar la oportunidad de dar un golpe de mano al consenso centrista liberal que estableció el blairismo.
La coalición del Leave fue una mezcla de votantes ricos tories tradicionalmente euroescépticos, clases medias envejecidas y trabajadores con baja cualificación en áreas tradicionalmente laboristas que habían visto aumentos de la inmigración de trabajadores del este de la UE y recortes tories desde 2010.
Muy interesante y de lectura rápida.
La coalición del Leave fue una mezcla de votantes ricos tories tradicionalmente euroescépticos, clases medias envejecidas y trabajadores con baja cualificación en áreas tradicionalmente laboristas que habían visto aumentos de la inmigración de trabajadores del este de la UE y recortes tories desde 2010.
Muy interesante y de lectura rápida.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews