An on-the-spot history of a fight in the Pacific during World War II, Island Victory was the first battle history written by—then Lieutenant-Colonel—S. L. A. Marshall, a veteran of World War I who would serve in Korea and Vietnam and become a brigadier general in the process. After the Seventh Infantry Division drove across Kwajalein Atoll in the first days of February 1944, successfully wresting control of the strategic southern tip from the Japanese, Marshall was charged with producing an accurate and comprehensive account of the fight. His solution: bring the front-line soldiers together at once and interview them as a group, tapping the collective memory of a platoon fresh from battle.
In this book, readers get a rare, first-hand sense of all the emotions that soldiers in combat experience. Numerous maps and photographs help us visualize precisely what took place. A compelling work of military history, and the first book of its kind, Island Victory is itself an important chapter in the history of how military exploits are described and recorded.—Print Ed.
S.L.A. Marshall (full name, Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall) served in World War I and then embarked in a career in journalism. In World War II, he was chief combat historian in the Central Pacific (1943) and chief historian for the European Theater of Operations (1945). He authored some 30 books about warfare, including Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, The River and the Gauntlet and Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War.
Marshall offers a confusing account of the battle based entirely on an interview with the entire invasion force shortly after the battle. There is almost no context. A brief introduction describes the size of the invasion force; but with the introduction of so many characters, the book is a jumble of eye witness narratives loosely compacted into a single-ish story.
The last ten pages of the book describe the methodology. Marshall had a conference with hundreds of people. In what would normally be called a debriefing, the veterans told their story in a huge group format. Marshall provides a limited number of tips and procedures for carrying on such a large interview. At times, he realizes that the stories of the infantrymen contradicted the stories of the higher officers. He merely says that everyone is equal at the interview....so the truth can be found.
What is most obviously missing is the context. Kwajalein is a small island with half of it occupied by the small airfield. Other islands in the atoll had garrisons; but it is not clear why they had garrisons. The strategic value of the islands is the routine vague island-hoping campaign where some islands had to be taken, and others not. Even with regards to the battle itself, Marshall leaves out crucial details such as the size and organization of the defense, and even the numbers of causalities for both sides. I knew going into the book that, compared to Tarawa or Guam, Kwajalein was a relatively easy conquest in terms of duration and casualties.
Readers will quickly get bogged down in the vast cast of characters. The story rightly identifies Major General Charles Corlett as the leader of the invasion force. However, Corlett is otherwise not mentioned in the book. What was the plan? How successful? Below Corlett was a bureaucracy of commanders who rarely appeared in the book. The battle was seemingly led by the captains. Marshall's collection of stories naturally involves every infantryman's story. It becomes impossible to keep track of the men and the units.
Despite the obvious problems, Marshall does relate a good impression of the battle. Readers unfamiliar with the Pacific War probably envision big islands covered in thick jungles, or the moonscape of the Vietnam War. Marshall shows that both of these scenarios are incorrect. The reality of this battle was that the Japanese had made a crude trench system or spider holes (interconnected fox holes), covered by debris. Unlike Tarawa or Peleliu, Kwajalein was actually built up with man-made structures all over the island. The island was covered in debris creating many opportunities for the enemy to hide themselves. Concrete blockhouses were also compartmentalized to allow for a better defense against heavy shells, grenades, and flame throwers.
The battle itself was slow-going with soldiers carefully searching for concealed enemies. Tanks, while only limited in their ability to target areas or break their treads, were useful for covering infantry with their metallic bodies. Marshall documented several instances were communication between the tanks and the infantry led to problems. In one case, the tanks fired consistently at the American infantry. A more obvious problem, Marshall documented was the arbitrary benchmarks for reaching objectives. The battle took place over four days. The heaviest casualties came on the third and fourth days because they soldiers were pressured to move faster.
Marshall offers little in the way of the Japanese perspective. Suicidal charges, suicide by grenade, and nearly 100% casualties, they must have endured worse than the attackers. The Americans had blocked supplies getting to them. Food, water, sanitation, medical care are totally unknown. Also the horror of the being the last defenders in the last 200 yards of occupied island late at night. The Americans normally halt advances in the evening. But on the last day they soldiered on to complete the conquest with heavy casualties to show for it.
Overall, this short book gives an indication of what it was like fighting the battle. It is poorly written. Even with multiple maps outlying the key points of action, it is hard to understand what was happening and where. Marshall also leaves out a holistic approach to the entire battle. It appears the book was written for the family members of the veterans. Otherwise, the first person stories are a tangle of vaguely interconnected narratives of a rather simple battle.
Nothing mentioned in the book at the start prepares you for the fact that these are merely news releases hope the time during the battle and just after. Their relation to historical fact and true outcomes is questionable.
Good reading for unit commanders, leaders, and those who appreciate the grunt
Excellent accounts of small unit tactics overlaid with the fog of war. Includes useful accounts of how one leader, no matter his rank, can influence momentum, good or bad.