This book argues that - in terms of institutional design, the allocation of power and privilege, and the lived experiences of citizens - democracy often does not restart the political game after displacing authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy systematically documents and analyzes the constitutional tools that outgoing authoritarian elites use to accomplish these ends, such as electoral system design, legislative appointments, federalism, legal immunities, constitutional tribunal design, and supermajority thresholds for change. The study provides wide-ranging evidence for these claims using data that spans the globe and dates from 1800 to the present. Albertus and Menaldo also conduct detailed case studies of Chile and Sweden. In doing so, they explain why some democracies successfully overhaul their elite-biased constitutions for more egalitarian social contracts.
boy that was a slog but a compelling analysis. i liked albertus' thesis that many democracies originate from elite-oriented constitutions and that leaves lasting legacies in the relationship between insider/outside elites w/ the government. i think political science at large could benefit from a reinterpretation of democracy. but was this truly a fundamental reevaluation of the origins of democracy? or was this a case study of two elite based democracies, one of which (chile) can barely be called as such immediately post-pinochet. and what is democracy in this case? maybe it is my own feelings about western democracy, but i don't find the idea that democracy is not always a popular revolution but a carefully managed relationship between elites particularly compelling or novel. albertus is also an excellent historian, the historical analysis of swedish and chilean politics is top notch.
This is an important book for our time -- revealing the tenuous nature of the democratic arrangement in the face of powerful competing interests among elites.
Says Albertus, "In my book Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy, my co-author Victor Menaldo and I examined all transitions to democracy around the globe over the last two centuries and documented a remarkable fact: around two-thirds of all democracies are inaugurated and begin operating with constitutions written under the previous authoritarian era. That’s also true since World War II. Many countries operate with these authoritarian constitutions for years, so that at any given time somewhere between one-third and one-half of democracies use them."
"The reason, we argue, is that most transitions to democracy occur under a strong elite hand. Political elites and their economic allies from the authoritarian era have power, connections, and influence that enable them to navigate a transition to democracy without sacrificing their interests. To the contrary, in many cases they are the leading voices on its terms, including whether to transition in the first place, the timing and pacing of transition, the content of the constitution and its institutions and key laws, and the rules of elections."
Albertus and Menaldo argue that democracy often emerges from the negotiations of elite political and economic actors who want to limit the power of a centralized authoritarian state. These elites set up and leverage democratic institutions to protect their interests and prevent the concentration of power in the hands of a single ruler or faction. Henry Kissinger, "In politics, there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests."
In essence, their compromise is to check each other's power in the hope of creating a more stable and predictable political environment: for instance, more favourable for rule of law, property rights protection, social cohesive, and market stability.
Best of all, a democratic system is "legitimized" by public support, reducing the likelihood of unrest or rebellion against elite interests. (We now see many modern authoritarian regimes use democratic trappings to legitimize their rule.)
In recent centuries, fueled by an industrial and scientific revolution, colonial control of global markets, and international trade agreements, this political system in the West correlates with what has been a seemingly unending growth in wealth. (Indeed, for a moment after the fall of Communism, some were ready to celebrate "The End of History.")
Overall, the book challenges the conventional wisdom that democracy always emerges from popular movements. Instead, the authors argue that elite actors play the crucial role in shaping the transition to democracy in many societies, and their interests and actions can significantly influence the form and stability of democratic institutions.
These are timely lessons to study because there is considerable evidence that the most influential force for democracy on the planet over the past several decades, the United States, has lost its way, as we witness an erosion of its democratic institutions by a coalition of powerful elites. (See Peter Turchin's new "End of Times.")