1983: The World at the Brink

by Taylor Downing

In 1983 cinema audiences flocked to see the latest James Bond movie in which Roger Moore defeats a Soviet general who attempts to launch a nuclear first strike against the West. Like all Bond movies, audiences believed that the storyline was entirely fictional if not totally crazy. Little did they know that while they munched on their popcorn, the Soviets were indeed preparing to launch a real nuclear attack on the West.

1983 was a dangerous year. In the United States, President Reagan increased defence spending and launched the 'Star Wars' Strategic Defence Initiative. When a Soviet plane shot down a Korean civilian jet, he described it as 'a crime against humanity'. Moscow was growing increasingly concerned about America's language and behaviour. Would they attack? The temperature was rising, fast.

By November, Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, a life-long KGB man, had his finger on the nuclear button. Had the US made a move, it would have meant global nuclear Armageddon.

It was only the following year that the US - which had never considered a first strike - came to learn just how terrified the Soviet Union was, and just how close to the brink the world had come.

In 1983, Taylor Downing draws on previously unpublished interviews, and over a thousand pages of secret documents that have recently been released by Washington to tell the gripping, astonishing story that was almost the end of the world. Sometimes fact is stranger than fiction.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, Russia, American History, Espionage, 20th Century

400 pages, Hardcover

First published April 24, 2018

Reviews

[Cold War Conversations Podcast · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fascinating insight into a hidden part of the cold war

Taylor Downing has written a very readable account of the 1983 and the dangerous period when the Soviets believed the the US was actively planning a pre-emptive nuclear strike.

This account is well written, moves at a good pace without neglecting the details.

Overall a good account especially for someone unfamiliar with the period or the politics, however if you know your Cold War you might find this a little light.

[Jonny · Rating 5 out of 5]

Told from the perspectives of the Soviet and Americans at the centre of the story, 1983: The World at the Brink tells how the election of Ronald Reagan and his anti-communist rhetoric, together with a series of seemingly unconnected, occasionally tragic events and policies helped raise paranoia within the Soviet leadership to the point where they believed that an annual nuclear communications exercise conducted by NATO was a pretext for a pre-emptive nuclear strike. This was, possibly, the closest the world came to Armageddon (at least in 1962 the Americans and Soviets were talking to each other).
With a cast of politicians, spies, missile crews, pilots and radar operators the story unfolds at a rapid pace, detailing the military and political developments leading up to Able Archer 83 and, happily, beyond as the Soviet leadership underwent a seismic shift in the aftermath of the crisis, leading to the late 80's thaw in relations, arms reduction talks and, ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Well written, gripping and well worth your time.

[Igor Ljubuncic · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a great, sobering book.

On one hand, it is the account of all that transpired in the year 1983, when the world almost weny supernova. It is also a tale of how ridiculously precarious the Cold War was.

Taylor does a great job introducing the setting - the build of massive nuclear arsenals, the lack of communication, the severe misunderstanding among the sides. But then, it gets better. No failsafe mechanisms on American nuke protocols for about 10 years - a real Dr. Strangelove situation. Then, we have nuclear-armed bombers crashing in the American and British countryside. The Soviets do their fail deal by invading Afghanistan and then shooting down a Korean liner. But wait, would that not make the world dangerous?

How about missile defenses systems spewing false alarms. Now, imagine everything being relegated to AI without human oversight. Reality much? Back in the 60-80s, humans supervised the machines and aborted disasters. What does the future of AI/ML holds for us? A nice lesson of how not to do things.

Let's add Reagan's Star Wars idea to the mix. Plus the deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe. Forget not the Soviet spies who report on seemingly bizzare activities in the West, but hey, they're getting paid to report so they do. Agents, double agents and triple agents, in embassies and all the way up in the NATO high command.

This book reads like a movie, except it's a hundred times better than any movie, because reality trumps fiction. It's amazing to see how frighteningly silly and naive things were - like the use of the phrase "evil empire" to describe the Soviets, an indication of complete misunderstanding of how things work on the other side, and then we have a repetition of most of these themes and buzzwords 20 and 30 years later.

1983 is a fascinating read - the 80s breezed by, not entirely without difficulties, but for most people, while there were many cardinal concerns and worries, they never quite knew how close the world came to thernonuclear incineration. The scary part is, neither did the West really. NATO went on with strategic WW3-simulation exercises ignoring the panic on the Soviet side, because they didn't believe the other side would take their annual drill seriously. It's not bad intent, it's not malevolence, not even wicked scheming. Far worse. It's blissful ignorance to how dangerous political games can be when cultures don't understand one another.

Well worth reading. 'Tis a page turner.

Igor

[Tony · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent and scary in equal measure.

[Sean O'Hara · Rating 4 out of 5]

Cold War junkies have long known about Able Archer '83, a NATO exercise that the Soviet Union believed to be an elaborate charade to cover a sneak attack on them. Most people who've looked into the situation have concluded that the world was closer to WWIII in November 1983 than any time after the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, information about what happened has largely been confined to articles. Book length accounts of what happened have been few, and mostly from self-pubbed historians or independent presses.

But luckily 2018 is the 35th anniversary of the war scare, and as we all know, mainstream publishers only put out books on major historical events (WWII and the American Civil War excepted) in conjunction with major anniversaries. So this year we get not one but two books on Able Archer -- this and Marc Ambinder's The Brink: President Reagan and the Nuclear War Scare of 1983. I hope Ambinder's entry is better.

There's nothing particularly bad about this one, but it's very much an intro-level text for people who've never heard about what happened in '83. For Cold War junkies, it's everything you already know gathered together in one place. The most interesting section is on KAL 007, a Korean Airlines flight that was shot down after straying into Soviet airspace. The exact reason it flew off course has never been determined, and the fact that it had a US Congressman on board has spawned several conspiracy theories. There have been several books written about the subject, but all in the '80s, and all long out of print. The main source modern readers have on the subject is the Wikipedia article, so any additional information is useful. But beyond that, the book is what you already know if you've read up on the subject -- Project RYAN; Andropov's paranoia; Reagan's provocations; the Soviet watch officer who had a hunch his equipment was malfunctioning when his computer told him the US had just launched a massive nuclear attack.

I'm giving this four stars, but that's only if you're not a Cold War junkie; if you are, wait for the reviews of Ambinder's book before deciding which one to read.

[Andrew · Rating 5 out of 5]

1983 was a year where, at the age of 18, I was only really concerned about finishing high school, finding a girlfriend and dealing with all the usual things that one does when you’re ending your youth and thinking about becoming a responsible adult. Yes, I was very much aware of the politics of the time; I was certainly knew about the popular perceptions that existed about Ronald Regan, and it was patently obvious that the USSR was a monolithic threat to the west. However, when it all boiled down to it my life was very much about what was the here and now in my immediate experience, and what was going on overseas was really only of peripheral interest. Little did I know, nor indeed did anyone else, that we were on the very precipice of nuclear Armageddon. Now, as outlined in Downing’s excellent book 1983: Reagan, Andropov and a World on the Brink I have learned how lucky I and everyone else, alive at that time were to escape an apocalypse. The history that is enclosed in this book is compelling and, thanks to the author, told in such a way to make it near impossible to walk away from the narrative of what happened forty years ago. This is a remarkable text.

The first thing that is so impressive about this book is that the author writes, with all the clarity and simplicity of a journalist on the hunt of a good story, but also with the desire to integrate a high level of academic and intellectual credibility. This is not a book written for postgraduate or other scholarly study. No; this is a book that’s written to make everything as accessible as possible for its audience without making it trite. For example, when it comes to Downing’s exploration of the political personality and aims of Ronald Reagan he doesn’t characterise him in reductivist terms, either as a populist simpleton or a right wing stooge. The author provides the then US president, with a reasonably complex characterisation, and one that makes the historical narrative that is told from the introductory chapter of this book much more understandable. It is probable that Taylor Downing has missed out on some of the more nuanced or complicated aspects of the Reagan presidency. However, that’s not a significant issue for the purpose of this text. 1983: Reagan, Andropov and a World on the Brink has made the events, issues and personalities of 1983 very clear for the reader, and Downing’s treatment of Reagan is a big part of this.

The same can be said about how the author reviews the key characters and issues pertaining to the Soviet mindset that helped create the tensions that in turn led almost to the outbreak of World War Three. The dilemma of the USSR’s leader Yuri Andropov, heading a country that was becoming increasingly moribund, whilst he and almost all around him, had their paranoia exacerbated by their age, their situation and American provocation is made very clear by Downing. As one reads chapter after chapter that deals with how Regan and Andropov, their governments, their spy agencies and their militaries continually misread each other the narrative becomes truly fascinating, yet also horrific.

Much of Downing’s book tells of key personalities, such as the KGB double agent Oleg Gordievsky or CIA head staff William Casey and Bob Gates. In fact, a good portion of this book is focused on espionage, and that adds to the excitement that is generated by the authors narrative. Alongside the attention, given to spying matters and the relevant political developments, Dowling also allocates a good amount of space to the military developments that were occurring during this era. The increase in capabilities and numbers of nuclear missiles is given due attention as is the evolution of nuclear strategy. As one reads 1983: Reagan, Andropov and a World on the Brink there is sufficient clear information given to allow the reader to understand the context and key strands of the history covered here with very little difficulty.

The narrative of this book is straightforward and follows a chronological agenda that helps the reader understand what happened, where, why when and how. Considerable attention is given to the shootdown of the Korean airliner KAL007 in Soviet airspace, which was a key aggravation between the two superpowers and as a result one closer step down the path towards potential nuclear war. The Able Archer 1983 NATO exercise is given even more coverage by Downing and it is this episode that is crucial for understanding the history that he has written about. It is in his study of the relationship between what transpired during this exercise and the Soviet perception of what they understood to be happening at the time that brings Downing’s book to a climax. And it is a climax that will evoke string responses from readers who remember 1983 with any clarity.

The remaining quarter of the book is about the aftermath of what transpired in superpower relations from the end of 1983 onwards. Downing focuses much of his history on the succession of Mikhail Gorbachev, and the relationship he developed with Ronald Reagan. Perhaps these chapters are a little bit of an anti-climax, and maybe even something that is underdone when contrasted with the work that Dowling has put into those chapters that lead up to the crisis of November 1983. To be fair to the author, it’s good that he has included some degree of resolution to the story that forms the core of this book. Also, there is some reflection on how what transpired, 40 years ago is both very different to nowadays and yet a troubling reminder to what we are all threatened with when it comes to the potential of nuclear war.

So, why am I so enthusiastic about this book. 1983: Reagan, Andropov and a World on the Brink is a masterful example of a popular history book that is well written, highly informative, clear in its prose and to some extent a revelation about the past. I have no reservations whatsoever when it comes to recommending this book to anyone who wants to learn more about the Cold War, politics, and strategy in the 1980s, geopolitical matters during the Reagan years, or just good old-fashioned espionage stories from four decades ago. At a time, when we are living in what might be considered a rebirth of Cold War antagonisms, and where the successor state to the USSR (Putin’s, Russia) is engaged in a hot war against the western supported Ukraine, Taylor Downing’s book is very worthy of consideration. Are we perhaps in the same spot as we were 40 years ago, with the threat of an apocalypse only a button push away? Can we learn from what happened in 1983 so that we never have to face Armageddon again?

[Russell Chee · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not intellectually provocative (it is, after all, primarily narrative), though nonetheless insightful and enlightening.

Downing has his work cut out here - the story he seeks to tell is an exciting, emotionally-charged one: the end of detente and the rise of the Second Cold War in the early 1980s, tracing the arc from the increasing insularity of the Soviet leadership in the late 1980s and the election of Reagan and Andropov as hardline leaders on both sides to the astonishingly charged atmosphere of 1983, a year that saw the delivery of Reagan's "Evil Empire" speech, the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the shooting down of KAL 007 and the near-nuclear Able Archer exercise.

Admittedly, the book is obviously well-researched in that it's not a mere rehashing of common Cold War tropes - we get fascinating looks into genuine Soviet paranoia like Operation RYaN, how the US genuinely frightened Soviet leaders with the secret strategy known as PSYOPS, and we get fascinating details about how NATO exercises involved genuine calls to American and European leaders authorising nuclear launches.

What I didn't enjoy so much were the occasional forays into unimportant spy stories that seemed tailored specifically to attract more readers (for example, in a book about 1983, was Oleg Gordivesky's escape really so important?) and the occasional but unmistakeable sense of Soviet-bashing (while Downing does not let America escape criticism for misreading Soviet intentions, blame is silently but firmly apportioned mainly to the Soviets).

Additionally, Downing is not always successful at keeping his narrative coherent and watertight; this is most obvious in two instances - one, the chapter on Lebanon, which though presented as another instance of the clash between two superpowers in a tense arena, simply does not cohere with the primarily Eurocentric narrative the author tells; two, and more significantly, the concluding chapter, which speeds through the years from the Soviet transfer of leadership to Gorbachev in 1985 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. These are presented as an all-too-hasty fait accompli that become curiously detached from the events of 1983, while there is another attempt to justify the inclusion of the spy narratives that strikes me as rather lacking in credibility, and a vague narration of the rise of rogue states and the threat they pose to nuclear stability today. While I appreciate the attempt to imbue the event with some currency, to draw a link from the bipolarity and undeniable hot peace of the early 1980s to today's multipolar world that is much more rigidly governed by robust international institutions. Though I do not offer the pretense of a superior conclusion, I am of the opinion that it would have been far more effective to leave this as a mere historical example of the destruction that might have been wrought, and to perhaps comment on the nature of nuclear weapons in warfare.

I enjoyed the book for the narrative and the events told (which are probably often enough considered a sideshow to the Cold War to be rarely told elsewhere), though there is little argumentation beyond a perfunctory warning about the dangers of war (tautological?) and the attempt at a conclusion seemed rather lacking. Still, overall, an exciting read!

[J TC · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excelente livro. Como numa viagem no tempo regressamos às histórias da guerra fria só que agora como espectadores esclarecidos.
Sempre tive a convicção que a guerra fria funcionou bem pela assumida garantia de destruição massiva mútua
Pelos vistos estava bem errado e em 1983 estivemos á beira de cumprir as expectativas que sempre nos ameaçaram.
Um excelente livro bem escrito e uma história que só não é mais aterradora porque começamos a vê-la pelo fim.

[Pauly · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mr Downing's books are always enjoyable. As a film maker and researcher he finds obscure historical details and presents them in a readable way for expert and novice alike.

This book is about one of the most deadly phases of the cold war, that most, including some intelligence analysts, did not know about. This book is both scary and fascinating.

[Jim · Rating 3 out of 5]

1983 – I remember it well. Or at least I thought I did. I was a student in America at the time, over for a year from the UK where we had Thatcher, America had Reagan and Russia had Gorbachov. And, in 1983, we students in the UK thought Reagan was a doddering nincompoop, girning his way through the Presidency, buffeted by fortune, baffled by events, only just able to tie his shoelaces. He had charm, we could see that, but that was all he had.
Therefore it never ceases to surprise me how history is reworking the past. Seemingly I was wrong. Reagan was a Giant amongst men, one of The Best President’s Ever and, whatever he focused on, he transformed it for the better. Oh, can’t we have him back? Things were so much better then. Mind you, look what’s come since – the Clintons, Bush times two and now Trump. Given that, maybe Ronnie actually was a bit of a giant?
American revisionism, but they're not alone. What do Brits think now about Thatcher? Reading this, I wondered if Thatcher had been the American President would she have pushed the button on a first strike? Just to show them who was boss? Probably. Bloody Commies. The Russians worried that Reagan might, so much so that they nearly moved to get their retaliation in first. That's what this book argues. Reagan was seen from Russia as an antagonistic loose cannon and, with a big cannon potentially being built in space, maybe there was a need to try and take him and his country out? So the world really flirted with MAD in 1983, with the Russians seriously thinking about a pre-emptive strike while Reagan joked about it. Nuclear war came close in 1983, very close according to this book, and it is convincing with its arguments. However, I was there, I was in America in that year, and I was blissfully unaware of anything of the sort. The message for me in this book, therefore, was very clear indeed: Ignorance Was Bliss.

[Dave · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very good book about the year 1983 and how close we came to a Nuclear War, because the Soviet Union misinterpreted a U.S. War game.
(I was 15 in 1983)
This book got me to look at President Reagan in a different light. And also it gives a good look at the inner workings of the U.S.S.R.
Some of the history we are shown boggles the mind, at how often we came to the brink of nuclear catastrophe.
Lots of good stuff in this book.

[Mark Durrell · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting period in 80s history. And to think that I was a teenager walking about without a care - while Russia and America had their fingers on the big red buttons!

[shweta agarwal · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's a must read for everyone, primarily because of the way it's been written and secondly the events that transpired are stranger than even the most nail biting thriller. I have become a fan of Taylor Downing for the clarity he has imparted to such complex global scenario during the Cold War especially 1983, the year which almost brought our world to annihilation. It's important to know about the sequence of bizzare coincidences, how they played out and ticked all the boxes almost leading to nuclear warfare probably culminating in WW3. It's important to realize how lucky we are to be alive. The book is dense with political, military and psychological profile of both USSR and US yet it's remarkably well written never dragging in pace. Downing has been extremely successful in entirely captivating the attention of his readers.

Book is as neutrally written as is possible, giving a good overview of both the Soviet(Andropov) and American(Regan)leadership, their psycholgical as well as political state. The contrast between the two couldn't have been more extreme. There was Regan on one hand, energetic, aggressive in public while quite mellowed down in private, good with PR but fuzzy on details on the other hand was Andropov, old and paranoid, a hard liner, well versed in details.

Several peace treaty have been signed during 60s and 70s, like the Partial Test Ban Treaty to save the environment, in 1968 Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty was signed banning the export of nuclear technology to other countries. In 1972, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty( SALT1) was signed between Nixon and Brezhnev, there was also the banning of ABMs. Despite all these measures both superpowers kept adding to their nuclear arsenals in an attempt to keep an upper hand by establishing military superiority over the other. Both had enough means of warfare to destroy the entire planet. The entire understanding between the two nations was thinly balanced on how the preemptive strike by either of them would result in a retaliation from the other side leading to Mutual Assured Destruction(MAD). It's evident how easily this precarious balance could have been disturbed if one became significantly superior in its military ability.It could have lead to hysteria on the other side and this is what precisely happened. The aggressive and vocal leadership of US led to paranoia in the old Kremlin leaders, who were skeptical of the west and their superior technology.

There were various intelligence operations like operation RYan of KGB and GRU, whose mission was to collect indicators of the possible first strike by US. These indicators will seem absurd and foolish to the readers but to the already paraoid Soviets they were real and important. Soviets were further psyched by the PSYOPS of US whose mission was to build psychological pressure on the former. There was massive deployment of agents who were supposed to be providing the secret military information both by CIA and KGB. There are short accounts of various spies, moles, intelligence, counter intelligence in the book which seem too James Bond like.

Ultimately it's a story of lack of communication between the two nations which led to insurmountable misunderstandings. Their inability to understand each other on human plane with no regard for each other's ideologies. There's always a common ground to be found even with seemingly irreconcilable differences. In the end it's this common ground of peace for their nations, their people which resulted in the end of cold war.

Are we glad for the destruction which by sheer stroke of luck was averted. Absolutely!!

[BenAbe · Rating 4 out of 5]

When we think of the Cold War, the most dangerous moment that comes to mind is often the Cuban Missile Crisis but that’s only because it played out publicly. The author, with a captivating narrative, shows that during one military exercise in 1983, the USSR came terrifyingly close to starting a nuclear holocaust. This event represents one of many moments during the Cold War when the world stood on the precipice of its own demise, with the difference here being that it happened entirely unbeknownst to NATO or the United States.


The moralizing rhetoric that characterized the Reagan administration in which he described the USSR as an “evil empire” and criticized it at almost every opportunity created a sense of unease within the Soviet leadership. This became symptomatic of the souring U.S.–Soviet relations, which deteriorated due to a series of mistakes by the Soviet leadership, mistakes born largely out of a misunderstanding of the United States and the West. The invasion of Afghanistan did little to help the Soviet image, instead, it only strengthened and validated the kind of language Reagan was using. Likewise, the Soviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles in eastern Europe did nothing to ease tensions.

Throughout the book, we see how Soviet actions often triggered Western responses that only worsened the growing sense of paranoia in the Soviet leadership, reinforcing the belief that the West was conspiring against them. For example, the Soviets became deeply concerned after the U.S. deployed Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, missiles capable of reaching Moscow within minutes. This created a sense of terror on the Soviet side, particularly in the Politburo and its head, the ailing Andropov. They feared that such a strike would leave them with little or no time to react in the event of a nuclear exchange. That meant there might not be enough time to organize a proper response, effectively tipping the balance of power dangerously toward the U.S. and the West (a nail in the coffin of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction)

This, along with a growing realization of the technological gap separating the Soviet Union from the United States, prompted Yuri Andropov to launch Operation RYaN. He believed there was a high chance of a U.S. nuclear first strike, which called for an urgent intelligence initiative. It didn’t help that the man tasked with implementing the program beyond Soviet borders—Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the branch responsible for foreign intelligence—matched (if not exceeded) Andropov’s paranoia. Under his guidance, Operation RYaN became a full-scale global obsession within the KGB machine, focused on detecting any signs of an imminent nuclear launch by the U.S. or its NATO allies, in order to give the Kremlin time to respond.

The initiative was driven by a deep fear: that the U.S. might launch a first strike and that the Soviet Union, just as in 1941 with Hitler’s invasion, might miss the warning signs. Agents were tasked with identifying any indication of Western preparations for war. The problem was that, due to a combination of the Soviet culture of deference to authority and institutional pressure, agents began reporting not what they actually observed, but what the Center in Moscow expected them to report. In most cases, these agents saw no real signs of imminent attack yet they shaped their reports to fit the assumptions of their superiors, rather than risk contradicting the prevailing narrative.

The wave of events that followed only deepened the Soviet sense of paranoia and reinforced the belief that the entire world was conspiring against them. These included the U.S. campaigns of psychological operations and border-probing missions (designed partly to trigger the USSR’s early warning systems and partly to exhaust them) and the downing of a civilian Korean airliner (kal 007), which further heightened tensions. Then came Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (nicknamed “Star Wars,”) which, although abstract and largely unfeasible, appeared to render any Soviet response to a U.S. first strike ineffective. In theory, this system would have intercepted any retaliatory Soviet missiles, ensuring that the U.S. could achieve complete nuclear dominance.

In the Soviet imagination, this meant one terrifying thing: if the threat of retaliation was neutralized, then America not only could strike first—it would, and without fear of consequences. This marked a moment of chilling realization for Andropov and the rest of the Politburo. That fear culminated during the 1983 Able Archer exercise (one of several NATO drills that year) which the Soviets came to believe was not an exercise at all, but a cover for a real nuclear attack designed to catch them off guard. What followed was the full unleashing of this paranoid interpretation of reality and one that triggered every alarm in the minds of the Soviet leadership.


The narrative was captivating, and as interesting as it was informative. It gives you a real sense of what was going on during that period. One thing that stood out to me was how the Soviet Union, by the late 1970s and early ’80s, seemed to have run out of steam. It became more isolated and anxious, as the gap between it and the rest of the world kept growing. Sadly, you can still see that kind of mindset in certain countries today.

The main takeaway here is that it’s essential to maintain some kind of channel of communication between opposing sides. You should never confuse hard data (like how many tanks or missiles a country has) with its intentions. Material strength doesn’t automatically reveal what a country is thinking or how it will react. To understand that, you need dialogue. That’s why it’s so important to keep talking, especially in times of crisis. No matter how justified one side might feel in its opinion of the other, communication has to stay open.

One small criticism: sometimes the narrative went a bit too long in places. For example, the sections after the Reagan–Gorbachev talks could have been a bit shorter. It’s not that the information wasn’t useful it just felt like it could’ve been presented more briefly. A few parts dragged a little more than they needed to.


Rating: 4/5

[Martha · Rating 5 out of 5]

Despite its misnomer of the title -- perhaps 40% of the book is narrowly focused on 1983 -- I enjoyed this a ton. The last couple of decades of the Cold War are fascinating and, for those of us who lived through it and are into history, reading about things like the emergence of Gorbachev and the reactions of Western leaders to him can be truly thrilling, especially when we know what's coming. If you don't care about the Cold War, it's hard image you'd find anything to hold your attention here, but if that era is of interest, this quite readable work is very much work a look.

Thanks to Perseus Books and NetGalley for the ARC.

[renzo · Rating 4 out of 5]

what it lacks in its subpar writing it makes up for in historical accuracy and its unbiased sources from both sides of the cold war

i immediately picked up this book because this is my favorite part of my favorite era of history and this book has taught me it was way scarier than i thought

a glass half-full 3.5 stars

[Dan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Surprisingly balanced and very gripping.

[Tom · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a well-told and very readable history of the development of the arms race from its inception through the fall of the Soviet Union. It focuses on the events of late 1983 that almost led to the Soviet Union launching its nukes in response to faulty intelligence that led its paranoid leaders to believe the U.S. was preparing a preemptive strike. It takes us deep inside the minds of Reagan and others in his administration, as well as Brezhnev, Andropov, Gorbachev and others in the USSR, laying a good foundation for the beliefs each side held that influenced their actions and negotiations. It’s a great companion to the excellent German miniseries “Deutschland 83”, which tells the story of the near holocaust from an East German perspective.

[Peter K · Rating 3 out of 5]

A fascinating and detailed insight into a period of history that is slipping away from the near memory - can this have happened nearly 40 years ago - surely not.

What once seemed so fixed and rigid, the cold war, the two superpowers around whom all orbited all seems so far away now.

This book looks at the period leading upto the historic upheaval that brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 90s, the change in leadership of the Soviet Union from the ailing Brezhnev to the soon to be ailing Andropov and the already ailing Chernenko - old beyond their years frail men who held the soviet people in a deep freeze of totalitarian control.

The election of Ronald Reagan to the US presidency, the consummate actor and cold war warrior, talking tough on the Soviets and ramping up the anxiety about the prospects of a nuclear war.

This book looks at the spy craft undertaken by both sides, the deep paranoia within the Kremlin about the possibility of a first strike from the Americans and the lack of insight the Americans had about just how scared and weak the Soviet leadership really was.

The Soviets were able to promote spies within the western infrastructure , even within NATO high command, the west , apart from singular coups such as Oleg Gordievsky, less successful.

Despite their espionage success the soviet leadership convinced themselves that the Able Archer NATO exercise of 1983 was a front leading upto a pre-emptive nuclear strike and this book explains well how close an error at this point by either side may have led to a cataclysmic nuclear exchange.

Interesting / terrifying also in this book is the first detailed explanation of how the Soviets almost launched nuclear missiles in response to what was actually unusual high altitude cloud formations bouncing sunlight in such a way to mislead them. It also explains how the actions of one commanding officer prevented disaster and how he was "rewarded" by the Soviets with dismissal and penury.

The book ends with a reflection of the ascension of Gorbachev to the leadership in the Kremlin , a youthful and energetic person compared to what had gone before and how this set in train the events of 1991 and indeed the world today.

An interesting book , very well sourced but slightly too willing to grant the soviet leadership a pass for their behaviours whilst prosecuting NATO for their undertaking of Able Archer in 1983, otherwise a compelling read

[Himanshu · Rating 5 out of 5]

1983 - the year which is more famous in Indian psyche for winning the Cricket World Cup . Well this very very engrossing book shows how near we had come to annihilation on account of escalating Cold war tensions.

Right from start, the book keeps one hooked on the pivotal year 1983. Instead of starting with no background , it slowly builds it up keeping a very fine balance between the level of details and pace of storyline. Unlike other books which might be prejudiced in their picturisation of opposite camp leaders. This paints a very honest , and if I might say a bit too rosy sketch of Gorbachev.

Insights into Operation RYaN give valuable lessons on how there can be gaps between the aspirations of the top management and the motivations of the foot soldiers.

All in all a very good book which should be read by any Cold war buff

[Joseph Spuckler · Rating 5 out of 5]

1983: Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink by Taylor Downing is a detailed study of the Cold War's most dangerous moment. Downing is a historian and writer whose best selling books include works on the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War.Taylor also writes on the history of film and television.

Almost 50% of the American population was not alive or too young to remember the Cold War. For those alive during the period, many thought it would never end, or when it did end the world would end with it. Most Americans know we came close to nuclear war over the Cuban missile crisis, but for the most part, it seemed the Cold War was more political or a war where most of the dying was done by proxy states. Of course, there was the Korean War, Vietnam, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I was in the Marines in 1983 and war concerns centered more on Latin America than the Soviet Union. 1983 was perhaps the most dangerous year for mankind.

Downing begins by tracing the Cold War back to its origins and the uneasy alliance of the US and USSR during World War II. Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev are used to show the Soviet mindset and policy changes leading up to the 1980s. A brief biography of Reagan is also included on the American side. The Brezhnev seemed like the career bureaucrat compared to Stalin he was stable. The gulag system was drastically reduced for the most part under Khrushchev. Brezhnev, for his part, increased and modernized the Soviet military at the expense of consumer goods. The Soviet gas pipeline to Europe would have increased hard currency but the effort was blocked by the US. At Brezhnev's death, a new leader was selected. Andropov was selected over the favored Chernenko.

Reagan built up the US military after the embarrassment in Vietnam and the hostage rescue attempt in Iran. America was on the way to a 600 ship navy to meet the Soviet Union threat. The B-1B and MX missile system were to come online. Reagan publicized the Strategic Defense Initiative, Star Wars, and added to his warlike image in the Soviet Union. The selection of Yuri Andropov came as a shock to many. Andropov, although his personal life was unknown in the West, was the head of the KGB. That was a scary proposition for the US. He would be as anti-American as Reagan was anti-Communist.

Reagan managed to build the US military without deep paranoia. He knew that America could outspend the Soviet Union and that an arms race would destroy the Soviet Union. The perception of the leaders did not match the reality of the situation. Andropov was very paranoid as well as Soviet leadership. Soviet Embassies in the west were told to report anything that might be a hint of war planning including counting the number of lights on in buildings. The Soviets believed war, an invasion from the West was only a matter of time. There were missile scares on both sides, but cooler heads prevailed. Then there was the downing of Korean Air 007 by a Soviet fighter. Most of the American leadership believed it was intentional. The US Air Force review believed it was a case of mistaken identity but was the minority opinion by far.

Much of Korean Air 007 is still a mystery. How and why the plane was so grossly off course are unknown. Radio checks from the plane describe the flight as on course, however, it drifted into restricted Soviet airspace. Andropov repeated a fabricated story. The US insisted it was intentional. The actual events still are unknown. Star Wars put the Soviets on edge. Korean Air put the US on edge. Neither leadership wanted conflict. Paranoia grew faster on the Soviet side. The isolation from the real world of the Soviet leadership left them to paint a darker picture. Soviet Ambassadors and residents in Western embassies had a much clearer picture but had a difficult time making their leadership believe.

The crucial point came in 1983. NATO was running a War Game, Able Archer '83, the Soviets were aware of the yearly maneuvers. Able Archer usually, as well, as in 1983 was played out as a reaction to an escalating invasion of the Soviet Union ending with the simulated nuclear attack. This year was different from other years in that the usual codes were changed, there were periods of radio silence, and participation from heads of states. Soviet intelligence saw these changes as ominous The added realism had more than the intended effect. The Soviets saw this as an actual invasion and readied its nuclear arsenal believing that a preemptive strike was underway. Soviet fighters were put on "strip alert", seconds from launching. Andropov and other Soviet leaders were readying to authorize launch codes. November 11th the exercise ended and NATO went back to business as usual without any knowledge of the responses it caused. Reagan would later say, "I don't see how they could believe that—but it’s something to think about."

Think he did. Reagan slowly turned from more saber rattling and evil empire talk. His campaign in 1984 centered on "Morning in America" and not military build-ups.  He would come to work on arms reductions with the Soviets.  Andropov barely lived into 1984 and was replaced by Chernenko who lasted thirteen months.  He was replaced by Gorbachev a man both Thatcher and Reagan could work with.  The rest is history. 

1983 is an interesting history with newly unclassified materials adds to the known events of the Cold War.  It adds the arms race did to leaders and how close a misunderstanding could turn to the end of the world.  Reagan was never weak on defense, but he did see what could easily happen and almost did happen.  Living under assured mutual destruction was not the way for mankind to progress. An excellent read.

[R Davies · Rating 5 out of 5]

A superbly written account of a year in the life of the Cold War. It takes us through flashpoints and close calls highlighting just how close we came to nuclear war, more terrifyingly without the West even having any idea in the most fraught incident in November of that year.

Taylor Downing manages to tell the story effectively and in a very readable fashion, introducing key characters and events, which could no doubt merit ( and in many cases do ) books devoted to those individuals and incidents themselves, but providing enough detail to provide a proper sense of the period without ever bogging the reader down in jargon.

One of my favourite 'popular' history books I've read in a long while.

[Larry · Rating 5 out of 5]

What fantastic read. Well written and flows so well. I’m not sure that it read like a novel because of the writing or because of the content.

It doesn’t matter that there are a lot of other books on the Cold War (each putting a slightly different bias on the writers viewpoint). This book hammered home a sequence of events in 1983 that could well have led to someone hitting the “large red button”.

Open d my eyes to a lot of facts that are sometimes glossed over in general histories of the Cold War & not containing more recently declassified documents.

[Bruce Lyman · Rating 5 out of 5]

The events here were lived through though my direct connection with Russia didn’t happen for another decade after event related here. But it all adds up with what I know and lived Sonia all the more intriguing for that. Not to everyone’s taste as it glosses over a lot of the political events of the time but it does at least touch the high points. I enjoyed it, but especially the personal touches - such as the insight into Stanislav Petrov, the man who saved the world.

[Kevin Burke · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of my earliest memories is seeing the trailer for Threads and being told that the nuclear bomb on the television was real. It wasn't, of course, but at least it gave 5-year-old me an insight into a very anxious time.

Taylor Downing's 1983 is a very thorough account of what I'd missed at the time. Starting with an account of the development of nuclear weapons and the two main parties - Reagan and Andropov - the story, with first-hand sources (such Reagan's diaries, Gorbachev's memoirs), builds through Reagan's anti-communist diatribes and his Star Wars programme, and the Soviet's Operation RYaN looking for signs of an imminent incoming attack. It's an early indication of one of the central themes - US policy was never to launch a first strike, but the Soviets believed their own anti-US propaganda, aided by Reagan's anti-Communist stance, and with the Star Wars defence plan meaning the US could likely afford to launch a first strike and defend itself successfully and with no communication between Reagan and Andropov, both sides were stirring each other up without realising it.

The Korean Airlines shootdown is a fascinating one even without the implications for nuclear tension, with its unsolved mystery of why it was so far off course and why its pilot failed to notice warning shots fired across it (the remarkable theory is posited that the pilot was entertaining first class, and his co-pilot wanted to avoid the loss of face which such a major error would entail). Added to the PSYOPS, US conducted operations trollingly close to the Soviet border, and the result was a mutual misunderstanding which led to tragedy - and if it could lead to a plane being shot down, what else could it lead to?

The infamous false alert is next, averted by Stanislav Petrov in part because he had written the code the detection software used and so didn't have much faith in it. His reward was to be shifted out of the military within 12 months and given reduced pension. Downing takes the chance to relate a number of other false alerts in nuclear history - generally US nuclear bombs dropped by accident and even lost. "Looking back, it is nothing short of a miracle nuclear war did not break out because of accident or misunderstanding", Downing says, surely one of the more terrifying sentences ever written.

Things reach a crescendo during Able Archer, a war game where NATO troops change code signals, leading Soviet intelligence - happy to report any evidence of an incoming strike as proof that they were doing their job - to genuinely fear an attack was being lined up. With Soviet planes on the runways to launch counterstrikes - and pilots being switched out every hour due to the psychological stress of sitting with engine running awaiting orders to effectively destroy the planet - this was pretty much as close as you ever want to get to nuclear war.

A key element in unwinding the tensions is double agents. Soviets working for the KGB spying in London and Washington but also passing on Soviet secrets to the Americans and Brits started relaying just how scared the Soviets really were of Reagan's bolshy attitude, and how they had convinced themselves Able Archer in particular was real. At first this was dismissed, but gradually it was realised it explained a lot, and it paved the way to the first formal talks between the US and USSR and ultimately the nuclear thaw. A key element was the die-off of the old Soviet guard - Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko (Of Thatcher's first meeting with Chernenko, at Andropov's funeral, Thatcher "felt that the cost of the expensive, thick, fur-lined Russian boots she had not been a waste. She would probably need them again soon.") - and then the accession of Gorbachev, who immediately gets on with Thatcher and Reagan.

The double agents themselves are another area that's a worthy story in its own right, from the KGB double agent Gordievsky who is recalled to Moscow suspected of double-dealing; drugged prior to his interrogation, he wakes up with no memory of what he may have told the KGB. But gradually fearing for his safety, he arranges a pre-planned rescue operation with British agents which starts with him standing under a street light for five minutes with a shopping bad in his hand. Rather petrified, he smokes a cigarette to calm his nerves, but the British agent monitoring for this signal didn't know he smoked. Is it a sign of something else? Is it a Soviet spy aware mimicking Gordievsky to get at the British agents, but who has one tiny detail of Gordievsky's character (his smoking habit) wrong? Ultimately, the rescue operation goes ahead and he is smuggled across the Finnish border in the boot of a car. On the other side of the Atlantic, the CIA don't come out with a huge amount of credit, at one stage appointing to the head of a committee investigating a possible double-agent the exact double-agent they were looking to find, which ended predictably.

The story moves beyond 1983 to look at the Cold War thaw, but also the unforeseen geopolitical impacts it had - the fall of the Iron Curtain the most obvious one ("Mr Gorbachev, tear down this wall!"), but also a bizarre joke-gone-wrong by Reagan in 1984 when, in a soundtest for a radio address, he said "My fellow Americans, I'm pleased to tell you today that I've signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes." It was never intended for broadcast, but it leaked out, duly terrifying the Kremlin again, who responded with a tit-for-tat leak of their own ("War has begun with the United States of America"). The blackest of black humour maybe showed that the worst had passed.

Fascinating stuff.

[Zachary Barker · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have finished reading “1983: The World At the Brink” by Taylor Downing.

"We May have been at the brink of nuclear war and not even known it"

Robert Gates

In 1962 the world nearly came to an end in a nuclear holocaust during the Cuban Missile Crisis. What many people don’t know is that this nearly happened again in 1983. What this book skilfully illustrates is that this happened due to a near-perfect storm of a mix of political opportunism, naivety, paranoia, frightening coincidences and intelligence failures driving confirmation biases for both the Soviets and the Americans.

The book sets the stage first. Détente, a period of an easing of relations between the US and the Soviet Union during the start of the 1970s is dying by the end of it. The causes of it’s death are certainly multiple, but the New Right movement championed by Reagan is on the rise, and it lays the blame squarely at the alleged bad faith of the Soviet Union. This leads neatly into profiles in power of the leaders of the two superpowers; President of the United States Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov. Both experienced unique political journeys that were influenced by the upheavals both of their countries experienced from the 1930s onwards. Both sensed that the US and the Soviet Union was passing through a period of dangerously heightened tensions. More worryingly, both held the other to be directly responsible for their relationship seemingly heading into a downward spiral, beckoning a more uncertain future.

This is one of the best books I have read about this historical period. The book brims with tension and intrigue as much as a Tom Clancy novel, but still comes out with some new and genuinely interesting revelations about that period. What it does especially well is reveal the inner tensions of the different countries and their decision making and intelligence gathering bodies. Frighteningly both the CIA and the KGB were blind for different reasons to the near nuclear collision. The CIA interpreted the Soviet leadership’s harrowing rhetoric as a reflection of it’s propaganda machine. The KGB set up a specific operation to detect the signs of a possible early nuclear war, but it was set up in such a way to guarantee confirmation bias in their findings. The result was the Soviet nuclear forces reaching an alarmingly high level in 1983 during NATO’s Able Archer military exercise. But it could have ended all before then, due to Soviet early warning satellites that same year, confusing sun reflections on the clouds over the US mid West for nuclear missile launches. In that instance a Lieutenant Colonel bravely used his gut instinct to call off what he merely suspected, correctly, was a false alarm. Stanislav Petrov’s reward for saving the world was a dishonourable discharge.

The structure of the book is 3 quarters build up to the near nuclear war, and then a discussion of events after. After reading this I began to appreciate how clever this structure was. Some of the events leading to the build up looked at best indirectly relevant, but made sense when they came together to build a up a picture. In the aftermath, frighteningly much of the intelligence community of both countries were oblivious to their mistakes. However, various signs as well as a well placed double agent working for British Intelligence helped convince US President Ronald Reagan that he had reached the limits of relying on belligerent anti-Soviet rhetoric alone. So in a roundabout way the near end of the world created a massive incentive for peace.

This is a clever and well considered book. I can tell this by how few people in this story come out consistently well in it, but the author still takes pains to explain their mentalities and their world views. Reagan was genuinely horrified by nuclear war, but couldn’t grasp why Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was seen by some as a valuable stabilising influence. Reagan could never grasp Soviet fears about his Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) “Star Wars” programme, that threatened to nullify the Soviet nuclear deterrent. Soviet Premier Andropov’s experiences in Hungary helped trap him in a paranoid world view about the West and the loss of Soviet power. Meanwhile various spies found themselves by accident at the convergence of what would turn out to be historical events.

Few books I have read have captured the tension, the bombast and the frightening near misses caused by misunderstandings as well as this book.

[shweta agarwal · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's a must read for everyone, primarily because of the way it's been written and secondly the events that transpired are stranger than even the most nail biting thriller. I have become a fan of Taylor Downing for the clarity he has imparted to such complex global scenario during the Cold War especially 1983, the year which almost brought our world to annihilation. It's important to know about the sequence of bizzare coincidences, how they played out and ticked all the boxes almost leading to nuclear warfare probably culminating in WW3. It's important to realize how lucky we are to be alive. The book is dense with political, military and psychological profile of both USSR and US yet it's remarkably well written never dragging in pace. Downing has been extremely successful in entirely captivating the attention of his readers.

Book is as neutrally written as is possible, giving a good overview of both the Soviet(Andropov) and American(Regan)leadership, their psycholgical as well as political state. The contrast between the two couldn't have been more extreme. There was Regan on one hand, energetic, aggressive in public while quite mellowed down in private, good with PR but fuzzy on details on the other hand was Andropov, old and paranoid, a hard liner, well versed in details.

Several peace treaty have been signed during 60s and 70s, like the Partial Test Ban Treaty to save the environment, in 1968 Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty was signed banning the export of nuclear technology to other countries. In 1972, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty( SALT1) was signed between Nixon and Brezhnev, there was also the banning of ABMs. Despite all these measures both superpowers kept adding to their nuclear arsenals in an attempt to keep an upper hand by establishing military superiority over the other. Both had enough means of warfare to destroy the entire planet. The entire understanding between the two nations was thinly balanced on how the preemptive strike by either of them would result in a retaliation from the other side leading to Mutual Assured Destruction(MAD). It's evident how easily this precarious balance could have been disrupted if one became significantly superior in its military ability.It could have lead to hysteria on the other side and this is what precisely happened. The aggressive and vocal leadership of US led to paranoia in the old Kremlin leaders, who were skeptical of the west and their superior technology.

There were various intelligence operations like operation RYan of KGB and GRU, whose mission was to collect indicators of the possible first strike by US. These indicators will seem absurd and foolish to the readers but to the already paraoid Soviets they were real and important. Soviets were further psyched by the PSYOPS of US whose mission was to build psychological pressure on the former. There was massive deployment of agents who were supposed to be providing the secret military information both by CIA and KGB. There are short accounts of various spies, moles, intelligence, counter intelligence in the book which seem too James Bond like.

Ultimately it's a story of lack of communication between the two nations which led to insurmountable misunderstandings. Their inability to understand each other on human plane with no regard to each other's ideologies. There's always a common ground to be found even with seemingly irreconcilable differences. In the end it's this common ground of peace for their nations, their people which resulted in the end of cold war.

Are we glad for the destruction which by sheer stroke of luck was averted. Absolutely!!

[Jimmy Reagan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Who would’ve thought that 1983 was so pivotal? I’ve done a lot of reading over the years on Ronald Reagan and thought the mantra was Reagan and Gorbachev, not Reagan and Andropov! This book for me was a shocking revelation. In addition to its revealing nature, this book is as fortuitous in its timing as I’ve seen in a long time. We live in the days when the fear of nuclear war has been taken from the closet, dusted off, and put prominently back on the shelf. There’s North Korea, there’s Iran, and Russia is starting to seem more 1983 than 2018.

When I say that this book is a shock for me, it’s not only the major history from the 1980s that I was clueless about, but worse it’s the fact that we almost had a nuclear war and the United States wasn’t even aware of it at the time. I pray we figured something out since then, but it’s all a little unnerving in light of where confidence in the United States government falls on the scale at this moment.

This book reads well and is hard to put down, which is quite a feat since you know we didn’t have nuclear war 30 years ago. The author, Taylor Downing, has done some interesting research into some recently-declassified material. I can see why they waited a while to release it! We owe a debt of gratitude to our intelligence services, but it appears they let one slip by them here. The author has a background in producing documentaries and looking into these overlooked subjects. Isn’t it strange that someone from Great Britain produced this book of so critical an episode in our history that has been often overlooked?

The book isn’t perfect. Though I appreciated much of what he had to say once he got to this crisis, I thought he caricatured Ronald Reagan leading up to that event. Of course, President Reagan responded as he went along but it was always from core principles. The pre-Gorbachev “warmonger” Ronald Reagan was the same man as the post-Gorbachev peacemaking Ronald Reagan. The results he managed to get were the ones he was always after. I doubt the same could be said of Gorbachev who I’m sure never intended to lose the Soviet Union.

This book is so good, interesting, and revealing that to say much about it would make me a spoiler. Part of the enjoyment of this book will be the surprises you will gain as you go. There will be events you’re aware of such as the death of three Soviet presidents before Gorbachev, the shooting down of a Korean civilian jet, the “evil empire” comment, and so much more, but I promise you there’s so much you didn’t know too.

The year 1983 never stood out to me before and I’m even a Ronald Reagan fan. It’s a big deal to me now – I’ll never think of 1983 the same again. For that reason, how could I label this book anything other than a success?

I received this book free from the publisher. I was not required to write a positive review. The opinions I have expressed are my own. I am disclosing this in accordance with the Federal Trade Commission’s 16 CFR, Part 255.

[Simon Mee · Rating 4 out of 5]

Two  mutually suspicious and antagonistic superpowers, each with an 8 to 10 min decision making window, repeatedly came close to pressing the "end all humanity" button. Maybe 1983 was the closest they came, maybe it wasn't.  But it serves as a very good reference year to the posturing, mirror image mentality, and reliance on whizz bang technology that put a bit too much emphasis on the bang part.

The prism through which we view 1983 is global nuclear war, and the book is built up accordingly:

1. Generally worsening relations due to the end of detente; a declining Soviet regime versus the portrayal of a Reagan upswing; the basing of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles changing timeframes and undermining Mutually Assured Destruction.

2.  Attempts to understand whether the other side will strike first, with confusion over how to read the tea leaves via meetings with the leaders and various spy efforts, with Operation RYAN standing out.

3. A focus on immediately prior events during 1983 that ratcheted up tension, whether deliberate hostile acts such as the marine barracks bombing in Lebanon, or defensive ones that could be hostile, such as Reagan's brillantly insane Strategic Defence Initiative

4. Mutual misinterpretation of those events, e.g. increased British-U.S. tensions over Grenada being read as cooperation or the hardening of soft targets such as embassies post Lebanon being read as war preparation.

5.  The climatic tales of Stanislav Petrov and Able Archer 1983 coming with all of the above clearly laid out to the reader and linked to the decision making processes of those with the finger on the buttons and no time to think about them. 

(Technically there's a "6" where tensions are unwound, but it is a bit dull).

Its worth laying out the above because 1983 isn't constantly looking at the calendar.  It tells you there was a nuclear war on the horizon and everyone seemed to be galloping towards it. Chapters aren't wasted, you get payoffs for events recounted earlier in the book. The linking is deft.

In terms of weakness, 1983 isn't about the world in 1983. The various clashes in the Third World, where right and wrong gets even murkier, are not covered except in the context of the nuclear war. The Lebanon War is important in the context of Soviet-US relations, not as a lead on to Iran-Contra.   The declining power of the Soviets is viewed from a military expenditure context, not from the perspective of sluggish growth and inferior and hard to find consumer goods. The Asian Tigers exist only as land for listening stations. Reagan is probably portrayed in an (arguably) overly laudatory manner.

1983 stands as a book about how to tell a tale or make a written argument. It's not comprehensive, but it's cogent and chilling. Even particular incidents in the book, such as the saga of KAL007, stand on their own as masterpieces of storytelling.

[Jason Wilson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Even for a youngster in the eighties the way popular culture was saturated with the paranoia of the Cold War was unmissable . From books to tv drama to pop music, it was everywhere . And with good reason.

The Cuban missile crisis had been close enough , but 1983 was a closer shave yet. America was belligerently denouncing Russia as an evil empire while the Soviets , following the attempts by Kruschev to thaw relations, clung to a Stalinist old guard who viewed the west with deep suspicion. Reagan flew spy planes over Soviet territory and when Russia shot down a plane that it thought was one of these, but which turned out to be a Korean passenger plane, escalation began. Reagan , who had been economically successful, threatened this with overt investment in weapons. To be fair, he was motivated by a desperation to escape a deadlock of Mutual Assured Destruction but he hated detail and was willing to massively buy into the Star Wars SDI program as a propaganda tool without being sure how achievable it was . Meanwhile Russian agents interpreted any troop movement as war preparation to satisfy eager Kremlin masters. In both camps system and human error brought war close a
Petrifying number of times: on one occasion an American trooper sounded an intruder alert only to find he’d triggered an incoming missile warning in error ; not only this but the intruder was a bear. There are similar instances from Russia in this well told but horrifying book.

Finally the near miss counter was too high ; both sides were preparing for war and finally it dawned that dialogue was needed. After false starts Reagan and Gorbachev found synergy (even if their wives didn’t ) and breakthrough began. Even now there was mistrust and unreasonable demands on both sides. It’s sad that the legacy of all this is more nuclear capability in the world than ever and a Russia going ideologically backwards under Putin.



Thus a salutary book and Ben Oghengweke’s narration lends appropriate gravitas.

Via Audible